Physician Payments from Pharmaceutical Companies Related to Cancer Drugs.

BACKGROUND: Drug manufacturers claim that the purpose of financial payments to physicians is to facilitate education about new drugs. This claim suggests 2 testable hypotheses: payments should not be associated with drug revenue and payments for each drug should decline over time as physicians become educated. MATERIALS AND METHODS: We used open payments data on industry payments. We included payments for cancer drugs without generic/biosimilar competitors and used federal data sources to measure Medicare spending (a proxy for overall drug revenue) and a number of prescribers. We used generalized estimating equations (GEE) to model the drug-level association between industry payments and Medicare spending. Separately, we used GEE to estimate the change in payments with respect to the duration of time since initial FDA approval. RESULTS: The sample included 89 drugs and 361 drug-year observations. The total value of industry payments for oncology drugs increased, from $53 333 854 in 2014 to $90 343 731 in 2018. There was no association between log-transformed mean, per-physician industry payments, and per-physician Medicare spending (estimate -0.001, 95%CI, -0.005 to 0.004). Payments for individual drugs decreased over time; estimated payments in the subsequent year for a drug with mean, per-physician payments of $1000 in the index year was: $681* for drugs 0-4 years since approval, $825 for 5-9 years, and $679* for ≥10 years (*P < .05). CONCLUSIONS: Although industry-sponsored education may also serve marketing purposes, the absence of association between industry payments and Medicare spending and the decline in payments subsequent to approval are consistent with claims that industry payments function to facilitate physician education.

Costs to Medicare of Nonrecommended Bone-Modifying Agent Use for Castration-Sensitive Prostate Cancer.

PURPOSE: Bone-modifying agents (BMAs) do not prevent skeletal-related events among patients with castration-sensitive prostate cancer (CSPC), but many patients receive BMAs unnecessarily. The costs to Medicare from overuse have not been assessed. METHODS: We used linked SEER-Medicare data 2011-2015 to measure the frequency and number of doses of zoledronic acid (ZA) and denosumab received during CSPC (between diagnosis and initiation of metastatic, castration resistant prostate cancer therapy). We estimated excess BMA among patients who received BMA therapy for CSPC and did not have an indication for osteoporosis fracture prevention. We used the Medicare fee schedule for drug prices and peer-reviewed sources to estimate adverse event frequencies and costs. RESULTS: Median CSPC duration was 387 days (IQR, 253-573), during which time 42% of patients received ≥one dose of denosumab (mean doses, 7) and 18% received ≥one dose of ZA (mean doses, 7). Thirty-eight percent of those receiving denosumab and 47% of those receiving ZA had a history of osteoporosis, osteopenia, spine or hip fracture, or hypercalcemia. The estimated, annual excess BMA cost to Medicare was $44,105,041 in US dollars (USD), composed of $43,303,078 USD and $45,512 USD in drug costs for denosumab and ZA, respectively, and $682,865 USD and $75,585 USD in adverse event costs, respectively. In one-way sensitivity analysis, the estimate was most sensitive to denosumab dosing frequency (estimate range, $28,469,237 USD-$98,830,351 USD) and duration of CSPC (estimate range, $36,823,311 USD-$99,015,908 USD). CONCLUSION: BMA overuse in CSPC incurs substantial cost to Medicare, largely because of denosumab drug costs. Excess costs may be reduced by greater adherence to guideline-concordant BMA use.

Pharmaceutical industry payments and delivery of non-recommended and low value cancer drugs: population based cohort study.

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the association between oncologists' receipt of payments from the pharmaceutical industry and delivery of non-recommended or low value interventions among their patients. DESIGN: Cohort study. SETTING: Fee-for-service Medicare claims. PARTICIPANTS: Medicare beneficiaries with a diagnosis of incident cancer (new occurrence of a cancer diagnosis code in proximity to claims for cancer treatment, and no such diagnosis codes during a ≥1 year washout period) during 2014-19, who met additional requirements identifying them as at risk for one of four non-recommended or low value interventions: denosumab for castration sensitive prostate cancer, granulocyte colony stimulating factors (GCSF) for patients at low risk for neutropenic fever, nab-paclitaxel for cancers with no evidence of superiority over paclitaxel, and a branded drug in settings where a generic or biosimilar version was available. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Receipt of the non-recommended or low value drug for which the patient was at risk. The primary association of interest was the assigned oncologist's receipt of any general payments from the manufacturer of the corresponding non-recommended or low value drug (measured in Open Payments) within 365 days before the patient's index cancer date. The two modeling approaches used were general linear model controlling for patients' characteristics and calendar year, and general linear model with physician level indicator variables. RESULTS: Oncologists were in receipt of industry payments for 2962 of 9799 patients (30.2%) at risk for non-recommended denosumab (median $63), 76 747 of 271 485 patients (28.3%) at risk for GCSF (median $60); 18 491 of 86 394 patients (21.4%) at risk for nab-paclitaxel (median $89), and 4170 of 13 386 patients (31.2%) at risk for branded drugs (median $156). The unadjusted proportion of patients who received non-recommended denosumab was 31.4% for those whose oncologist had not received payment and 49.5% for those whose oncologist had (prevalence difference 18.0%); the corresponding values for GCSF were 26.6% v 32.1% (5.5%), for nab-paclitaxel were 7.3% v 15.1% (7.8%), and for branded drugs were 88.3% v 83.5% (-4.8%). Controlling for patients' characteristics and calendar year, payments from industry were associated with increased use of denosumab (17.5% (95% confidence interval 15.3% to 19.7%)), GCSF (5.8% (5.4% to 6.1%)), and nab-paclitaxel (7.6% (7.1% to 8.1%)), but lower use of branded drugs (-4.6% (-5.8% to -3.3%)). In physician level indicator models, payments from industry were associated with increased use of denosumab (7.4% (2.5% to 12.2%)) and nab-paclitaxel (1.7% (0.9% to 2.5%)), but not with GCSF (0.4% (-0.3% to 1.1%)) or branded drugs (1.2% (-6.0 to 8.5%)). CONCLUSIONS: Within some clinical scenarios, industry payments to physicians are associated with non-recommended and low value drugs. These findings raise quality of care concerns about the financial relationships between physicians and industry.

Real-World Use of Bone-Modifying Agents in Metastatic Castration-Sensitive Prostate Cancer.

BACKGROUND: Bone-modifying agent (BMA) therapy is recommended for metastatic castration-resistant prostate cancer but not metastatic castration-sensitive prostate cancer (mCSPC). BMA treatment in mCSPC may therefore constitute overuse. METHODS: In this retrospective cohort study using linked Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results-Medicare data, we included patients diagnosed with stage IV prostate adenocarcinoma from 2007 to 2015 who were 66 years of age or older at diagnosis and had received androgen-deprivation or antiandrogen therapy. We excluded patients who had previously received BMAs or had existing osteoporosis, osteopenia, hypercalcemia, or prior bone fracture. The primary outcome was receipt of BMA (zoledronic acid or denosumab) within 180 days of diagnosis (emergence of CRPC within this time frame is unlikely). The secondary outcome was receipt of a BMA within 90 days. Exposures of interest included practice location (physician office vs hospital outpatient) and the specialty (medical oncologist vs urologist) of the treating physician. RESULTS: Our sample included 2627 patients, of whom 52.9% were treated by medical oncologists and 47.1% by urologists; 77.7% and 22.3% received care in physician office and hospital outpatient locations, respectively. Overall, 23.6% received a BMA within 180 days; 18.4% did within 90 days. BMA therapy was more common among patients treated by oncologists (odds ratio = 8.23, 95% confidence interval = 6.41 to 10.57) and in physician office locations (odds ratio = 1.33, 95% confidence interval = 1.06 to 1.69). Utilization has increased: 17.3% of patients received BMAs from 2007 to 2009 (17.3% zoledronic acid, 0% denosumab) and 28.1% from 2012 to 2015 (8.4% zoledronic acid, 20.3% denosumab). CONCLUSIONS: Among patients with mCSPC who had no evidence of high osteoporotic fracture risk, more than one-quarter have received BMAs in recent years. This overuse may lead to excess costs and toxicity.

Validation of a Population-Based Data Source to Examine National Cancer Clinical Trial Participation.

Importance: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services requires health care organizations to report the National Clinical Trial (NCT) identifier on claims for items and services related to clinical trials that qualify for coverage. This same NCT identifier is used to identify clinical trials in the ClinicalTrials.gov registry. If linked, this information could facilitate population-based analyses of clinical trial participation and outcomes. Objective: To evaluate the validity of a linkage between fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare claims and ClinicalTrials.gov through the NCT identifier for patients with cancer enrolled in clinical trials. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cohort study included 2 complementary retrospective analyses for a validation assessment. First, billing data from 3 health care institutions were used to estimate the missingness of the NCT identifier in claims by calculating the proportion of known participants in cancer clinical trials with no NCT identifier on any submitted Medicare claims. Second, the Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results-Medicare data set, which includes a subset of all FFS Medicare beneficiaries for whom health insurance claims are linked with cancer registry data, was used to identify adult patients diagnosed with cancer between 2006 and 2015 with an NCT identifier in claims corresponding to an interventional cancer clinical trial. To estimate the accuracy of the NCT identifier when present, the proportion of NCT identifiers that corresponded to trials that were aligned with the patients' known primary or secondary diagnoses was calculated. Data were analyzed from March 2020 to March 2021. Exposures: An NCT identifier present in Medicare claims. Main Outcomes and Measures: The main outcome was participating in a clinical trial relevant to patient's cancer diagnosis. Results: A total of 1 171 816 patients were included in analyses. Across the 3 participating institutions, there were 5061 Medicare patients enrolled in a clinical trial, including 3797 patients (75.0%) with an NCT identifier on at least 1 billing claim that matched the clinical trial on which the patient was participating. Among 1 171 816 SEER-Medicare patients, 29 138 patients (2.5%) had at least 1 claim with a value entered in the NCT identifier field corresponding to 32 950 unique patient-NCT identifier pairs. There were 26 694 pairs (81.0%) with an NCT identifier corresponding to a clinical trial registered in ClinicalTrials.gov, of which 10 170 pairs (38.1%) were interventional cancer clinical trials. Among these, 9805 pairs (96.4%) were considered appropriate. Conclusions and Relevance: In this cohort study, this data linkage provided a novel data source to study clinical trial enrollment patterns among Medicare patients with cancer on a population level. The presence of the NCT identifiers in claims for Medicare patients participating in clinical trials is likely to improve over time with increasing adherence with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services mandate.

Effect of Financial Bonus Size, Loss Aversion, and Increased Social Pressure on Physician Pay-for-Performance: A Randomized Clinical Trial and Cohort Study.

Importance: Despite limited effectiveness of pay-for-performance (P4P), payers continue to expand P4P nationally. Objective: To test whether increasing bonus size or adding the behavioral economic principles of increased social pressure (ISP) or loss aversion (LA) improves the effectiveness of P4P. Design, Setting, and Participants: Parallel studies conducted from January 1 to December 31, 2016, consisted of a randomized clinical trial with patients cluster-randomized by practice site to an active control group (larger bonus size [LBS] only) or to groups with 1 of 2 behavioral economic interventions added and a cohort study comparing changes in outcomes among patients of physicians receiving an LBS with outcomes in propensity-matched physicians not receiving an LBS. A total of 8118 patients attributed to 66 physicians with 1 of 5 chronic conditions were treated at Advocate HealthCare, an integrated health system in Illinois. Data were analyzed using intention to treat and multiple imputation from February 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018. Interventions: Physician participants received an LBS increased by a mean of $3355 per physician (LBS-only group); prefunded incentives to elicit LA and an LBS; or increasing proportion of a P4P bonus determined by group performance from 30% to 50% (ISP) and an LBS. Main Outcomes and Measures: The proportion of 20 evidence-based quality measures achieved at the patient level. Results: A total of 86 physicians were eligible for the randomized trial. Of these, 32 were excluded because they did not have unique attributed patients. Fifty-four physicians were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 groups, and 33 physicians (54.5% male; mean [SD] age, 57 [10] years) and 3747 patients (63.6% female; mean [SD] age, 64 [18] years) were included in the final analysis. Nine physicians and 864 patients were randomized to the LBS-only group, 13 physicians and 1496 patients to the LBS plus ISP group, and 11 physicians and 1387 patients to the LBS plus LA group. Physician characteristics did not differ significantly by arm, such as mean (SD) physician age ranging from 56 (9) to 59 (9) years, and sex (6 [46.2%] to 6 [66.7%] male). No differences were found between the LBS-only and the intervention groups (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] for LBS plus LA vs LBS-only, 0.86 [95% CI, 0.65-1.15; P = .31]; aOR for LBS plus ISP vs LBS-only, 0.95 [95% CI, 0.64-1.42; P = .81]; and aOR for LBS plus ISP vs LBS plus LA, 1.10 [95% CI, 0.75-1.61; P = .62]). Increased bonus size was associated with a greater increase in evidence-based care relative to the comparison group (risk-standardized absolute difference-in-differences, 3.2 percentage points; 95% CI, 1.9-4.5 percentage points; P < .001). Conclusions and Relevance: Increased bonus size was associated with significantly improved quality of care relative to a comparison group. Adding ISP and opportunities for LA did not improve quality. Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02634879.