Extraordinary claims, extraordinary evidence? A discussion.

Roberts (2020, Learning & Behavior, 48[2], 191-192) discussed research claiming honeybees can do arithmetic. Some readers of this research might regard such claims as unlikely. The present authors used this example as a basis for a debate on the criterion that ought to be used for publication of results or conclusions that could be viewed as unlikely by a significant number of readers, editors, or reviewers.

Opportunity for verbalization does not improve visual change detection performance: A state-trace analysis.

Evidence suggests that there is a tendency to verbally recode visually-presented information, and that in some cases verbal recoding can boost memory performance. According to multi-component models of working memory, memory performance is increased because task-relevant information is simultaneously maintained in two codes. The possibility of dual encoding is problematic if the goal is to measure capacity for visual information exclusively. To counteract this possibility, articulatory suppression is frequently used with visual change detection tasks specifically to prevent verbalization of visual stimuli. But is this precaution always necessary? There is little reason to believe that concurrent articulation affects performance in typical visual change detection tasks, suggesting that verbal recoding might not be likely to occur in this paradigm, and if not, precautionary articulatory suppression would not always be necessary. We present evidence confirming that articulatory suppression has no discernible effect on performance in a typical visual change-detection task in which abstract patterns are briefly presented. A comprehensive analysis using both descriptive statistics and Bayesian state-trace analysis revealed no evidence for any complex relationship between articulatory suppression and performance that would be consistent with a verbal recoding explanation. Instead, the evidence favors the simpler explanation that verbal strategies were either not deployed in the task or, if they were, were not effective in improving performance, and thus have no influence on visual working memory as measured during visual change detection. We conclude that in visual change detection experiments in which abstract visual stimuli are briefly presented, pre-cautionary articulatory suppression is unnecessary.

Default "Gunel and Dickey" Bayes factors for contingency tables.

The analysis of R×C contingency tables usually features a test for independence between row and column counts. Throughout the social sciences, the adequacy of the independence hypothesis is generally evaluated by the outcome of a classical p-value null-hypothesis significance test. Unfortunately, however, the classical p-value comes with a number of well-documented drawbacks. Here we outline an alternative, Bayes factor method to quantify the evidence for and against the hypothesis of independence in R×C contingency tables. First we describe different sampling models for contingency tables and provide the corresponding default Bayes factors as originally developed by Gunel and Dickey (Biometrika, 61(3):545-557 (1974)). We then illustrate the properties and advantages of a Bayes factor analysis of contingency tables through simulations and practical examples. Computer code is available online and has been incorporated in the "BayesFactor" R package and the JASP program ( jasp-stats.org ).

Calibrated Bayes Factors Should Not Be Used: A Reply to Hoijtink, van Kooten, and Hulsker.

Hoijtink, Kooten, and Hulsker ( 2016 ) present a method for choosing the prior distribution for an analysis with Bayes factor that is based on controlling error rates, which they advocate as an alternative to our more subjective methods (Morey & Rouder, 2014 ; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009 ; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & van der Maas, 2011 ). We show that the method they advocate amounts to a simple significance test, and that the resulting Bayes factors are not interpretable. Additionally, their method fails in common circumstances, and has the potential to yield arbitrarily high Type II error rates. After critiquing their method, we outline the position on subjectivity that underlies our advocacy of Bayes factors.

A power fallacy.

The power fallacy refers to the misconception that what holds on average -across an ensemble of hypothetical experiments- also holds for each case individually. According to the fallacy, high-power experiments always yield more informative data than do low-power experiments. Here we expose the fallacy with concrete examples, demonstrating that a particular outcome from a high-power experiment can be completely uninformative, whereas a particular outcome from a low-power experiment can be highly informative. Although power is useful in planning an experiment, it is less useful-and sometimes even misleading-for making inferences from observed data. To make inferences from data, we recommend the use of likelihood ratios or Bayes factors, which are the extension of likelihood ratios beyond point hypotheses. These methods of inference do not average over hypothetical replications of an experiment, but instead condition on the data that have actually been observed. In this way, likelihood ratios and Bayes factors rationally quantify the evidence that a particular data set provides for or against the null or any other hypothesis.

A pre-registered, multi-lab non-replication of the action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE).

The Action-sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE) is a well-known demonstration of the role of motor activity in the comprehension of language. Participants are asked to make sensibility judgments on sentences by producing movements toward the body or away from the body. The ACE is the finding that movements are faster when the direction of the movement (e.g., toward) matches the direction of the action in the to-be-judged sentence (e.g., Art gave you the pen describes action toward you). We report on a pre-registered, multi-lab replication of one version of the ACE. The results show that none of the 18 labs involved in the study observed a reliable ACE, and that the meta-analytic estimate of the size of the ACE was essentially zero.

An assessment of fixed-capacity models of visual working memory.

Visual working memory is often modeled as having a fixed number of slots. We test this model by assessing the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) of participants in a visual-working-memory change-detection task. ROC plots yielded straight lines with a slope of 1.0, a tell-tale characteristic of all-or-none mnemonic representations. Formal model assessment yielded evidence highly consistent with a discrete fixed-capacity model of working memory for this task.

WoMMBAT: A user interface for hierarchical Bayesian estimation of working memory capacity.

The change detection paradigm has become an important tool for researchers studying working memory. Change detection is especially useful for studying visual working memory, because recall paradigms are difficult to employ in the visual modality. Pashler (Perception & Psychophysics, 44, 369-378, 1988) and Cowan (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 87-114, 2001) suggested formulas for estimating working memory capacity from change detection data. Although these formulas have become widely used, Morey (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 55, 8-24, 2011) showed that the formulas suffer from a number of issues, including inefficient use of information, bias, volatility, uninterpretable parameter estimates, and violation of ANOVA assumptions. Morey presented a hierarchical Bayesian extension of Pashler's and Cowan's basic models that mitigates these issues. Here, we present WoMMBAT (Working Memory Modeling using Bayesian Analysis Techniques) software for fitting Morey's model to data. WoMMBAT has a graphical user interface, is freely available, and is cross-platform, running on Windows, Linux, and Mac operating systems.

Beyond Statistical Ritual: Theory in Psychological Science.

More than 40 years ago, Paul Meehl (1978) published a seminal critique of the state of theorizing in psychological science. According to Meehl, the quality of theories had diminished in the preceding decades, resulting in statistical methods standing in for theoretical rigor. In this introduction to the special issue Theory in Psychological Science, we apply Meehl's account to contemporary psychological science. We suggest that by the time of Meehl's writing, psychology found itself in the midst of a crisis that is typical of maturing sciences, in which the theories that had been guiding research were gradually cast into doubt. Psychologists were faced with the same general choice when worldviews fail: Face reality and pursue knowledge in the absence of certainty, or shift emphasis toward sources of synthetic certainty. We suggest that psychologists have too often chosen the latter option, substituting synthetic certainties for theory-guided research, in much the same manner as Scholastic scholars did centuries ago. Drawing from our contributors, we go on to make recommendations for how psychological science may fully reengage with theory-based science.

The nature of psychological thresholds.

Following G. T. Fechner (1966), thresholds have been conceptualized as the amount of intensity needed to transition between mental states, such as between states of unconsciousness and consciousness. With the advent of the theory of signal detection, however, discrete-state theory and the corresponding notion of threshold have been discounted. Consequently, phenomena such as subliminal priming and perception have a reduced theoretical basis. The authors propose a process-neutral definition of threshold that allows for graded perception and activation throughout the system. Thresholds correspond to maximum stimulus intensities such that the distribution of mental states does not differ from that when an appropriate baseline stimulus is presented. In practice, thresholds are maximum intensities such that the probability distribution on behavioral events does not differ from that from baseline. These thresholds, which the authors call task thresholds, may be estimated with modified item response psychometric measurement models.

Bayesian t tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis.

Progress in science often comes from discovering invariances in relationships among variables; these invariances often correspond to null hypotheses. As is commonly known, it is not possible to state evidence for the null hypothesis in conventional significance testing. Here we highlight a Bayes factor alternative to the conventional t test that will allow researchers to express preference for either the null hypothesis or the alternative. The Bayes factor has a natural and straightforward interpretation, is based on reasonable assumptions, and has better properties than other methods of inference that have been advocated in the psychological literature. To facilitate use of the Bayes factor, we provide an easy-to-use, Web-based program that performs the necessary calculations.

A hierarchical process-dissociation model.

In fitting the process-dissociation model (L. L. Jacoby, 1991) to observed data, researchers aggregate outcomes across participant, items, or both. T. Curran and D. L. Hintzman (1995) demonstrated how biases from aggregation may lead to artifactual support for the model. The authors develop a hierarchical process-dissociation model that does not require aggregation for analysis. Most importantly, the Curran and Hintzman critique does not hold for this model. Model analysis provides for support of process dissociation--selective influence holds, and there is a dissociation in correlation patterns among participants and items. Items that are better recollected also elicit higher automatic activation. There is no correlation, however, across participants; that is, participants with higher recollection have no increased tendency toward automatic activation. The critique of aggregation is not limited to process dissociation. Aggregation distorts analysis in many nonlinear models, including signal detection, multinomial processing tree models, and strength models. Hierarchical modeling serves as a general solution for accurately fitting these psychological-processing models to data.

Bayesian inference for psychology. Part I: Theoretical advantages and practical ramifications.

Bayesian parameter estimation and Bayesian hypothesis testing present attractive alternatives to classical inference using confidence intervals and p values. In part I of this series we outline ten prominent advantages of the Bayesian approach. Many of these advantages translate to concrete opportunities for pragmatic researchers. For instance, Bayesian hypothesis testing allows researchers to quantify evidence and monitor its progression as data come in, without needing to know the intention with which the data were collected. We end by countering several objections to Bayesian hypothesis testing. Part II of this series discusses JASP, a free and open source software program that makes it easy to conduct Bayesian estimation and testing for a range of popular statistical scenarios (Wagenmakers et al. this issue).

Bayesian inference for psychology. Part II: Example applications with JASP.

Bayesian hypothesis testing presents an attractive alternative to p value hypothesis testing. Part I of this series outlined several advantages of Bayesian hypothesis testing, including the ability to quantify evidence and the ability to monitor and update this evidence as data come in, without the need to know the intention with which the data were collected. Despite these and other practical advantages, Bayesian hypothesis tests are still reported relatively rarely. An important impediment to the widespread adoption of Bayesian tests is arguably the lack of user-friendly software for the run-of-the-mill statistical problems that confront psychologists for the analysis of almost every experiment: the t-test, ANOVA, correlation, regression, and contingency tables. In Part II of this series we introduce JASP ( http://www.jasp-stats.org ), an open-source, cross-platform, user-friendly graphical software package that allows users to carry out Bayesian hypothesis tests for standard statistical problems. JASP is based in part on the Bayesian analyses implemented in Morey and Rouder's BayesFactor package for R. Armed with JASP, the practical advantages of Bayesian hypothesis testing are only a mouse click away.

Detecting chance: a solution to the null sensitivity problem in subliminal priming.

In many paradigms, the persuasiveness of subliminal priming relies on establishing that stimuli are undetectable. The standard significance test approach is ill-suited as null results may reflect either truly undetectable stimuli or a lack of power to resolve weakly detectable stimuli. We present a novel statistical model as an alternative. The model provides for estimates of the probability that each individual is truly at chance. Researchers may select individuals for whom there are sufficiently high probabilities of true undetectability. The model is hierarchical, and estimation is done within the Bayesian framework.

What Are the Odds? Modern Relevance and Bayes Factor Solutions for MacAlister's Problem From the 1881 Educational Times.

In 1881, Donald MacAlister posed a problem in the Educational Times that remains relevant today. The problem centers on the statistical evidence for the effectiveness of a treatment based on a comparison between two proportions. A brief historical sketch is followed by a discussion of two default Bayesian solutions, one based on a one-sided test between independent rates, and one on a one-sided test between dependent rates. We demonstrate the current-day relevance of MacAlister's original question with a modern-day example about the effectiveness of an educational program.

Bayesian analysis of factorial designs.

This article provides a Bayes factor approach to multiway analysis of variance (ANOVA) that allows researchers to state graded evidence for effects or invariances as determined by the data. ANOVA is conceptualized as a hierarchical model where levels are clustered within factors. The development is comprehensive in that it includes Bayes factors for fixed and random effects and for within-subjects, between-subjects, and mixed designs. Different model construction and comparison strategies are discussed, and an example is provided. We show how Bayes factors may be computed with BayesFactor package in R and with the JASP statistical package. (PsycINFO Database Record

A Bayesian bird's eye view of 'Replications of important results in social psychology'.

We applied three Bayesian methods to reanalyse the preregistered contributions to the Social Psychology special issue 'Replications of Important Results in Social Psychology' (Nosek & Lakens. 2014 Registered reports: a method to increase the credibility of published results. Soc. Psychol.45, 137-141. (doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000192)). First, individual-experiment Bayesian parameter estimation revealed that for directed effect size measures, only three out of 44 central 95% credible intervals did not overlap with zero and fell in the expected direction. For undirected effect size measures, only four out of 59 credible intervals contained values greater than [Formula: see text] (10% of variance explained) and only 19 intervals contained values larger than [Formula: see text]. Second, a Bayesian random-effects meta-analysis for all 38 t-tests showed that only one out of the 38 hierarchically estimated credible intervals did not overlap with zero and fell in the expected direction. Third, a Bayes factor hypothesis test was used to quantify the evidence for the null hypothesis against a default one-sided alternative. Only seven out of 60 Bayes factors indicated non-anecdotal support in favour of the alternative hypothesis ([Formula: see text]), whereas 51 Bayes factors indicated at least some support for the null hypothesis. We hope that future analyses of replication success will embrace a more inclusive statistical approach by adopting a wider range of complementary techniques.

Correction to 'A Bayesian bird's eye view of 'Replications of important results in social psychology'.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160426.].