When CVaR Meets With Bluetooth PAN: A Physical Distancing System for COVID-19 Proactive Safety.

In this work, we propose a risk-aware physical distancing system to assure a private safety distance from others for reducing the chance of being affected by the COVID-19 or such kind of pandemic. In particular, we have formulated a physical distancing problem by capturing Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) of a Bluetooth-enabled personal area network (PAN). To solve the formulated risk-aware physical distancing problem, we propose two stages solution approach by imposing control flow, linear model, and curve-fitting schemes. Notably, in the first stage, we determine a PAN creator's safe movement distance by proposing a probabilistic linear model. This scheme can effectively cope with a tail-risk from the probability distribution by satisfying the CVaR constraint for estimating safe movement distance. In the second stage, we design a Levenberg-Marquardt (LM)-based curve fitting algorithm upon the recommended safety distance and current distances between the PAN creator and others to find an optimal high-risk trajectory plan for the PAN creator. Finally, we have performed an extensive performance analysis using state-of-the-art Bluetooth data to establish the proposed risk-aware physical distancing system's effectiveness. Our experimental results show that the proposed solution approach can effectively reduce the risk of recommending safety distance towards ensuring private safety. In particular, for a 95% CVaR confidence, we can successfully deal with 45.11% of the risk for measuring the PAN creator's safe movement distance.

Controlling the Outbreak of COVID-19: A Noncooperative Game Perspective.

COVID-19 is a global epidemic. Till now, there is no remedy for this epidemic. However, isolation and social distancing are seemed to be effective preventive measures to control this pandemic. Therefore, in this article, an optimization problem is formulated that accommodates both isolation and social distancing features of the individuals. To promote social distancing, we solve the formulated problem by applying a noncooperative game that can provide an incentive for maintaining social distancing to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Furthermore, the sustainability of the lockdown policy is interpreted with the help of our proposed game-theoretic incentive model for maintaining social distancing where there exists a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we perform an extensive numerical analysis that shows the effectiveness of the proposed approach in terms of achieving the desired social-distancing to prevent the outbreak of the COVID-19 in a noncooperative environment. Numerical results show that the individual incentive increases more than 85% with an increasing percentage of home isolation from 25% to 100% for all considered scenarios. The numerical results also demonstrate that in a particular percentage of home isolation, the individual incentive decreases with an increasing number of individuals.