Organismal Superposition and Death.

Organismal superposition holds that the same individual both is and is not an organism, as a consequence of organismal pluralism. When coupled with the assumption that death is the cessation of an organism, this entails that there is no unique answer as to whether brain death is biological death. This essay argues that concerns about organismal pluralism and superposition do not undermine a theory of biological death, nor entail any metaphysical indeterminacy about the biological vital status of a brain-dead individual.

The Uniform Determination of Death Act is Not Changing. Will Physicians Continue to Misdiagnose Brain Death?

Efforts to revise the Uniform Determination of Death Act in order to align law with medical practice have failed. Medical practice must now align with the law. People who are not dead under the law that defines death should not be declared dead. There is no compelling reason to continue the practice of declaring legally living persons to be dead.

Current Practice Diagnosing Brain Death Is Not Consistent With Legal Statutes Requiring the Absence of All Brain Function.

The legal standard for the determination of death by neurologic criteria in the United States is laid out in the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which requires the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain. Most other nations endorse a "whole-brain" standard as well. However, current practice in the determination of death by neurologic criteria is not consistent with this legal standard, because some patients who are diagnosed as brain-dead, in fact retain some brain function, or retain the capacity for the return of some brain function. In response, the American Academy of Neurology published updated guidelines, which assert that hypothalamic function is consistent with the neurological standard enshrined in the UDDA. Others have suggested that it is an open question whether the hypothalamus and pituitary are part of "the entire brain," as delineated in the UDDA. While we agree that determination of death practices are worthy of continued dialogue and refinement in practice that dialogue must adhere to reasonable standards of logic and scientific accuracy.

Expanding the Social Status of "Corpse" to the Severely Comatose: Henry Beecher and the Harvard Brain Death Committee.

This essay examines the development of the seminal report, "A Definition of Irreversible Coma," by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death in 1968. Detailed examination of original documents archived in the Henry K. Beecher Papers at Harvard's Countway Library reveals a variety of concerns and values at play in the development of the report, along with disagreement on a few key points among Committee members. One important goal of the Committee was to render treatment removal from patients in severe coma mandatory-not merely permissible-and without need for permission or consultation with the patient's family. Protecting and supporting organ transplantation also played a significant role in the Committee's writings and deliberations. Multiple concepts of death and justifications for brain death can be found, most of them inconsistent with each other and offered without a clear rationale. The essay emphasizes what is perhaps the most important aspect of this period in history: this is the moment when, without clear physiologic justification, the social and legal status of "corpse" became compulsorily applied to living human bodies.

From the Slaughterhouse to the Laboratory Bench: On the Ethics of Using Slaughtered Animals for Biomedical Research.

Is it ethically permissible to acquire biological materials from a slaughterhouse for biomedical research? This essay examines this question, using a recent, high-profile research program as a case study. Using roughly 300 decapitated pig heads acquired from a slaughterhouse, researchers reperfused the animals' brains and observed a variety of cellular and molecular activities. The study was exempted from review and oversight by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC), on the grounds that the animals were already dead. This essay argues that the IACUC was mistaken in exempting the study from their oversight, and furthermore, that acquiring animals or their parts from a slaughterhouse for research purposes is unethical and should not occur again. Examination of the study within a broader societal context helps to illuminate why each of us has an ethical obligation to do what we can to abolish the vicious and cruel treatment endured by billions of animals every year on factory farms and in slaughterhouses.

Medical Futility and Involuntary Passive Euthanasia.

Conflicts between providers and patients or their families surrounding end-of-life care are both regrettable and extremely challenging, interpersonally and ethically, for all involved. These conflicts often implicate the concept of medical futility. The concept of futility is too often conflated with distinct concepts that are more ethically salient, including the fiduciary responsibility to assess surrogate decision-making, and distributive justice. By distinguishing these concepts from futility, it becomes clear that there are some situations in which forgoing life-sustaining treatment over objection is permissible, and perhaps even obligatory. But the justification lies in the constellation of rights and responsibilities surrounding surrogate decision-making, or in distributive justice, but not futility. Once futility is disambiguated from these other concepts, the practice of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment over the objection of a valid surrogate or a competent patient, based on the alleged futility of such treatment, is more clearly described as involuntary passive euthanasia.

Do the 'brain dead' merely appear to be alive?

The established view regarding 'brain death' in medicine and medical ethics is that patients determined to be dead by neurological criteria are dead in terms of a biological conception of death, not a philosophical conception of personhood, a social construction or a legal fiction. Although such individuals show apparent signs of being alive, in reality they are (biologically) dead, though this reality is masked by the intervention of medical technology. In this article, we argue that an appeal to the distinction between appearance and reality fails in defending the view that the 'brain dead' are dead. Specifically, this view relies on an inaccurate and overly simplistic account of the role of medical technology in the physiology of a 'brain dead' patient. We conclude by offering an explanation of why the conventional view on 'brain death', though mistaken, continues to be endorsed in light of its connection to organ transplantation and the dead donor rule.

Can the Brain-Dead Be Harmed or Wronged?: On the Moral Status of Brain Death and its Implications for Organ Transplantation.

The majority of transplantable human organs are retrieved from patients declared dead by neurological criteria, or "brain-dead." Since brain death is considered to be sufficient for death, the procurement of vital organs is not considered to harm or wrong such patients. In this essay I argue that this is not the case. After distinguishing welfare, experiential, and investment interests, and defining precedent autonomy and surviving interests, I argue that brain-dead patients can be, and many are, harmed and wronged by organ procurement as currently practiced. Indeed, with respect to precedent autonomy and surviving investment interests, the brain-dead are morally equivalent to patients with severe dementia, and thus can be harmed and wronged if and only if, and to the extent that, patients with severe dementia can. The "bright line" that separates brain death from all other conditions for clinical and legal purposes is not justified by any morally relevant distinctions.

Hypothalamic-Pituitary Function in Brain Death: A Review.

The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) states that an individual is dead when "all functions of the entire brain" have ceased irreversibly. However, it has been questioned whether some functions of the hypothalamus, particularly osmoregulation, can continue after the clinical diagnosis of brain death (BD). In order to learn whether parts of the hypothalamus can continue to function after the diagnosis of BD, we performed 2 separate systematic searches of the MEDLINE database, corresponding to the functions of the posterior and anterior pituitary. No meta-analysis is possible due to nonuniformity in the clinical literature. However, some modest generalizations can reasonably be drawn from a narrative review and from anatomic considerations that explain why these findings should be expected. We found evidence suggesting the preservation of hypothalamic function, including secretion of hypophysiotropic hormones, responsiveness to anterior pituitary stimulation, and osmoregulation, in a substantial proportion of patients declared dead by neurological criteria. We discuss several possible explanations for these findings. We conclude by suggesting that additional clinical research with strict inclusion criteria is necessary and further that a more nuanced and forthright public dialogue is needed, particularly since standard diagnostic practices and the UDDA may not be entirely in accord.

Is heart transplantation after circulatory death compatible with the dead donor rule?

Dalle Ave et al (2016) provide a valuable overview of several protocols for heart transplantation after circulatory death. However, their analysis of the compatibility of heart donation after circulatory death (DCD) with the dead donor rule (DDR) is flawed. Their permanence-based criteria for death, which depart substantially from established law and bioethics, are ad hoc and unfounded. Furthermore, their analysis is self-defeating, because it undercuts the central motivation for DDR as both a legal and a moral constraint, rendering the DDR vacuous and trivial. Rather than devise new and ad hoc criteria for death for the purpose of rendering DCD nominally consistent with DDR, we contend that the best approach is to explicitly abandon DDR.

Abandoning the dead donor rule? A national survey of public views on death and organ donation.

Brain dead organ donors are the principal source of transplantable organs. However, it is controversial whether brain death is the same as biological death. Therefore, it is unclear whether organ removal in brain death is consistent with the 'dead donor rule', which states that organ removal must not cause death. Our aim was to evaluate the public's opinion about organ removal if explicitly described as causing the death of a donor in irreversible apneic coma. We conducted a cross-sectional internet survey of the American public (n=1096). Questionnaire domains included opinions about a hypothetical scenario of organ removal described as causing the death of a patient in irreversible coma, and items measuring willingness to donate organs after death. Some 71% of the sample agreed that it should be legal for patients to donate organs in the scenario described and 67% agreed that they would want to donate organs in a similar situation. Of the 85% of the sample who agreed that they were willing to donate organs after death, 76% agreed that they would donate in the scenario of irreversible coma with organ removal causing death. There appears to be public support for organ donation in a scenario explicitly described as violating the dead donor rule. Further, most but not all people who would agree to donate when organ removal is described as occurring after death would also agree to donate when organ removal is described as causing death in irreversible coma.

Taking Science Seriously in the Debate on Death and Organ Transplantation.

The effort to develop international guidelines for determination of death purports to start with an objective examination of the biology of death. So far, however, it is showing once again how moral and metaphysical claims about death masquerade as scientific facts.

Laying Futility to Rest.

In this essay I examine the formal structure of the concept of futility, enabling identification of the appropriate roles played by patient, professional, and society. I argue that the concept of futility does not justify unilateral decisions to forego life-sustaining medical treatment over patient or legitimate surrogate objection, even when futility is determined by a process or subject to ethics committee review. Furthermore, I argue for a limited positive ethical obligation on the part of health care professionals to assist patients in achieving certain restricted goals, including the preservation of life, even in circumstances in which most would agree that that life is of no benefit to the patient. Finally, I address the objection that professional integrity overrides this limited obligation and find the objection unconvincing. In short, my aim in this essay is to see the concept of futility finally buried, once and for all.

Brain death, paternalism, and the language of "death".

The controversy surrounding the dead donor rule and the adequacy of neurological criteria for death continues unabated. However, despite disagreement on fundamental theoretical questions, I argue that there is significant (but not complete) agreement on the permissibility of organ retrieval from heart-beating donors. Many disagreements are rooted in disputes surrounding language meaning and use, rather than the practices of transplant medicine. Thus I suggest that the debate can be fruitfully recast in terms of a dispute about language. Given this recasting, I argue that the language used to describe organ donation is misleading and paternalistic. Finally, I suggest that the near-agreement on the permissibility of heart-beating organ retrieval ought to be reconsidered. If the paternalism is not justified, then either the language used to describe organ transplantation must change radically, or it would seem to follow that much of the transplant enterprise lacks ethical justification.

Abortion, Brain Death, and Coercion.

A "universalist" policy on brain death holds that brain death is death, and neurologic criteria for death determination are rightly applied to all, without exemptions or opt outs. This essay argues that advocates of a universalist brain death policy defend the same sort of coercive control of end-of-life decision-making as "pro-life" advocates seek to achieve for reproductive decision-making, and both are grounded in an illiberal political philosophy. Those who recognize the serious flaws of this kind of public policy with respect to abortion must apply the same logic to brain death.