The essence of nursing in the shifting reality of Israel today.

Israel's healthcare system is undergoing constant transformation; nurses' roles and education are changing accordingly. Israel's severe shortage of physicians has led to an increase in nurses' authority and responsibilities. The nursing profession is addressing many questions particularly in light of its expanded responsibilities and the current lack of legislation related to the practice of nursing. Additionally Israel is coping with an increasing shortage of nurses and the rapid development of innovative technologies. This article describes Israel's shifting reality and the nation's responses to these changing conditions. Responses include increasing financial support, enhancing educational opportunities, expanding the nursing role, and using new technologies.

Defining the problem, main objective, and strategies of medical management in mass-casualty incidents caused by terrorist events.

Based on the experience of managing > 20 such events during the last decade, the authors' understanding of a mass-casualty incident is that it is an event in which there may be many victims, but only a few that actually suffer from life-threatening injuries. To make an impact on survival, one must identify those who are severely wounded as quickly as possible and offer those patients optimal care. Experienced trauma physicians are the most important resource available to achieve this objective, and they should be allocated to the treatment of seriously injured victims instead of more traditional management roles such as triage and incident manager.

Effect of teleradiology upon pattern of transfer of head injured patients from a rural general hospital to a neurosurgical referral centre.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the effect of teleradiology upon the need for transfer of head injured victims requiring hospitalisation but referred initially to a rural level 2 trauma centre without neurosurgical capacity. METHODS: Head injured patients requiring hospitalisation, admitted to a rural level 2 trauma centre between August 2003 and August 2005, were identified. A digitalised copy of the computed tomographic (CT) scan was transferred to the neurosurgical referral centre via teleradiology and was available for review by the neurosurgeon on-call, who then, together with the trauma surgeon in the rural level 2 trauma centre, decided whether to transfer the patient to the neurosurgical referral centre. RESULTS: Of 209 trauma victims with neurosurgical pathology in need of hospitalisation, 126 (60.2%) were immediately transferred while 83 (39.7%) of the patients were hospitalised in the rural level 2 trauma centre for observation. Two (2.4%) failed the intent to treat locally. One patient, suffering from multi-trauma, was stabilised after damage control laparotomy only to succumb to an enlarging epidural haematoma. Another patient was transferred 2 days after admission because of difficulty in clinical evaluation due to a previously existing neurological disorder, but no active treatment was necessary. All other 81 patients recovered uneventfully. CONCLUSIONS: Selective head injured patients with pathological CT scan may be safely managed in level 2 trauma centres. A committed trauma team in the rural trauma centre, neurosurgical consultation and availability of a teleradiology system are requisites. Currently existing transfer criteria should be carefully re-evaluated.

Significance of a Level-2, "selective, secondary evacuation" hospital during a peripheral town terrorist attack.

INTRODUCTION: Mass-casualty incidents (MCIs) can occur outside of major metropolitan areas. In such circumstances, the nearest hospital seldom is a Level-1 Trauma Center. Moreover, emergency medical services (EMS) capabilities in such areas tend to be limited, which may compromise prehospital care and evacuation speed. The objective of this study was to extract lessons learned from the medical response to a terrorist event that occurred in the marketplace of a small Israeli town on 26 October 2005. The lessons pertain to the management of primary and secondary evacuation and the operational practices by the only hospital in the town, which is designated as a Level-2 Trauma Center. METHODS: Data were collected during the event by Home Front Command Medical Department personnel. After the event, formal and informal debriefings were conducted with EMS personnel, the hospitals involved, and the Ministry of Health. The medical response components, interactions (mainly primary triage and secondary distribution), and the principal outcomes were analyzed. The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology. RESULTS: The suicide bomber and four victims died at the scene, and two severely injured patients later died in the hospital. A total of 58 wounded persons were evacuated, including eight severely injured, two moderately injured, and 48 mildly injured. Forty-nine of the wounded arrived to the nearby Hillel Yafe Hospital, including all eight of the severely injured victims, the two moderately injured, and 39 of the mildly injured. Most of the mildly injured victims were evacuated in private cars by bystanders. Five other area hospitals were alerted, three of which primarily received the mildly injured victims. Two distant, Level-1 Trauma Centers also were alerted; each received one severely injured patient from Hillel Yafe Hospital during the secondary distribution process. Emergency medical services personnel were able to treat and evacuate all severely and moderately injured patients within 17 minutes of the explosion. A total of 12 of the 21 ambulances arriving on-scene within the first 20 minutes were staffed by EMS volunteers or off-duty workers. CONCLUSION: When a MCI occurs in a small town that is in the vicinity of a Level-2 Trauma Center, and located a > 40 minute drive from Level-1 Trauma Centers, the Level-2 Trauma Center is a critical component in medical management of the event. All severely and moderately injured patients initially should be evacuated to the Level-2 Trauma Center, and given advanced, hospital-based resuscitation. The patients needing care beyond the capabilities of this facility should be distributed secondarily to Level-1 Trauma Centers. To alleviate the burden placed on the local hospital, some of the mildly injured victims can be evacuated primarily to more distant hospitals. The ability to control the flow of mildly injured patients is limited by the large percentage of them arriving by private cars. The availability of EMS in small towns can be augmented significantly by enrolling off-duty EMS workers and volunteers to the rescue effort. Level-2 hospitals in small towns should be prepared and drilled to operate in a "selective evacuation" mode during MCIs.

Distribution of casualties in a mass-casualty incident with three local hospitals in the periphery of a densely populated area: lessons learned from the medical management of a terrorist attack.

INTRODUCTION: A mass-casualty incident (MCI) can occur in the periphery of a densely populated area, away from a metropolitan area. In such circumstances, the medical management of the casualties is expected to be difficult because the nearest hospital and the emergency medical services (EMS), only can offer limited resources. When coping with these types of events (i.e., limited medical capability in the nearby medical facilities), a quick response time and rational triage can have a great impact on the outcome of the victims. The objective of this study was to identify the lessons learned from the medical response to a terrorist attack that occurred on 05 December 2005, in Netanya, a small Israeli city. METHODS: Data were collected during and after the event from formal debriefings and from patient files. The data were processed using descriptive statistics and compared to those from previous events. The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology. RESULTS: Four victims and the terrorist died as a result of this suicide bombing. A total of 131 patients were evacuated (by EMS or self-evacuation) to three nearby hospitals. Due to the proximity of the event to the ambulance dispatch station, the EMS response was quick. The first evacuation took place only three minutes after the explosion. Non-urgent patients were diverted to two close-circle hospitals, allowing the nearest hospital to treat urgent patients and to receive the majority of self-evacuated patients. The nearest hospital continued to receive patients for >6 hours after the explosion, 57 of them (78%) were self-evacuated. CONCLUSION: The distribution of casualties from the scene plays a vital role in the management of a MCI that occurs in the outskirts of a densely populated area. Non-urgent patients should be referred to a hospital close to the scene of the event, but not the closest hospital. The nearest hospital should be prepared to treat urgent casualties, as well as a large number of self-evacuated patients.

Precision of in-hospital triage in mass-casualty incidents after terror attacks.

INTRODUCTION: Proper management of mass-casualty incidents (MCIs) relies on triage as a critical component of the disaster plan. OBJECTIVE: [corrected] The objective of this study was to assess the precision of triage in mass-casualty incidents. METHODS: The precision of decisions made by two experienced triage officers was examined in two large MCIs. These decisions were compared to the real severity of injury as defined by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) classification of severity of injuries and the Injury Severity Score (ISS). RESULTS: Two experienced trauma physicians triaged a total of 94 casualties into 77 mild, seven moderate, and 10 severe casualties. Based on the IDF criteria, there were 74 mild, five moderate, and 15 severe casualties. Based on ISS scoring, there were 78 mild (ISS <9), five moderate (9 < or = ISS < 16), and 11 severe (ISS <16) casualties. Of 15 severely injured victims defined by the IDF classification of injury severity, the triage officers identified only seven (47%). CONCLUSION: Primary triage, even when carried out by experienced trauma physicians, can be unreliable in a MCI.

Real time cerebral perfusion monitoring in acute trauma patients: a preliminary study.

BACKGROUND: Management of traumatic brain injury is focused on preventing secondary damage. Early recognition of brain ischaemia may improve the final outcome of the trauma victim. The primary aim of this study was to examine the correlation between peripheral oxygen pulse oximetry and brain oxygen saturation measured by a near infrared oximetry device. A second aim was to evaluate the influence of different factors such as fluid and blood administration on brain tissue oxygenation. METHODS: This was a prospective pilot study. Mechanically ventilated trauma patients admitted to the trauma unit had cerebral-somatic oxygen saturation monitoring. Oximeter readings (rSO2) were prospectively collected and compared with concurrent values for peripheral pulse oximetry (SO2). Data were recorded every 15 min and during interventions such as administration of a fluid bolus and blood administration. All interventions were based on accepted clinical parameters. RESULTS: Thirty-three patients were enrolled. A total of 210 simultaneous measurements of rSO2 and pulse oximetry values were performed. There was correlation between these two parameters in only one third of patients. Twenty-seven events of possible brain ischemia, defined as rSO2 values less than 50 or a decrease of more than 20% from the baseline, were observed. In 68 (77.2%) of these measurements there was no decrease of peripheral SO2. Significant increases in rSO2 were observed only during administration of fluid boluses. CONCLUSIONS: A cerebral oxygenation monitoring device may recognize the possible events of brain ischaemia which are not reflected by pulse oximetry. Fluid administration was the only factor found to improve brain saturation.

Quarantine after an international biological weapons attack: medical and public health requirements for containment.

The world now faces the dreadful possibility of biological weapons attacks by terrorists. Healthcare systems would have to cope with such emergencies should all preemptive measures fail. Information gained from the Global Mercury exercise and the SARS outbreak has shown that containing an outbreak at the start is more effective than reacting to it once it has spread and that containment should be treated both nationally and internationally. On the national level this entails developing rapid and effective methods to detect and identify infected cases, and implementing isolation and control measures to lower the risk of further transmission of the disease while assuring the safety of medical teams and laboratory workers. Strategic contingency plans should incorporate well-defined procedures for hospitalization and isolation of patients, providing regional backup of medical personnel and equipment and maintaining close cooperation between the various bodies in the healthcare system. Quarantine is an effective containment measure, especially if voluntarily imposed. Modern communication systems can help by sending professional teams timely instructions and providing the public with information to reduce panic and stress during quarantine procedures. Informing the public poses a dilemma: finding a balance between giving advance warning of an imminent epidemic outbreak and ascertaining the likelihood of its occurrence. Containment of international bioterrorist attacks depends entirely on close international cooperation to implement national and international strategic contingency plans with free exchange of information and recognition of procedures.

Preparedness of the Israeli health system for a biologic warfare event.

The threat of a disease outbreak resulting from biologic warfare has been of concern for the Israeli health system for many years. In order to be prepared for such an event the health system has formulated doctrines for various biologic agents and defined the logistic elements for the procurement of drugs. During the last 4 years, and especially after the West Nile fever epidemic in 2000, efforts to prepare the healthcare system and the relevant organizations were accelerated. The Director-General of the Ministry of Health nominated a Supreme Steering Committee to fill in the gaps and upgrade the preparedness of the health system for an unusual disease outbreak. This committee and its seven subcommittees established appropriate guidelines, communication routes among different organizations, and training programs for medical personnel. The anthrax outbreak in the United States found the healthcare system in the hub of the preparation process, and all modes of action were intensified. Further work by hospitals, primary care clinics and all other institutes should be increased to maintain a state of proper preparedness.

[Bioterrorism].

The terror attacks of the September 11, 2001 in the U.S.A followed by the proliferation of anthrax using mail in some US cities and abroad, demonstrated the complex, devastating and harmful nature of terror activity. The use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in terrorist activities is a reality as is the use of biological weapons (BW) in bioterrorism. Cyberterrorism is another form of non-conventional terrorism. The health care system throughout all its different components and layers--public health, primary care, hospitals, first responders etc., must be prepared. The complete network must have a comprehensive contingency plan for any possible BW scenario. The health care system must cope successfully with the challenge of early diagnosis of extraordinary illness or outbreak of disease, having the ability to define any bioterror event and to conduct appropriate risk assessments. It is of great importance to prepare in advance a comprehensive coordinated plan with all other governmental ministries and agencies. In order to succeed it is crucial that the top decision makers--the Prime Minister and government members and top ranking officials at the Ministry of Health, be committed, and continuously proactive in the complicated and lengthy process of preparing the health care system for a bioterrorism event.

[Evaluation of the impact of a clinical pharmacist on the quality and cost of pharmacotherapy in a general surgical department, the Hillel-Yaffe Medical Center].

BACKGROUND: Clinical pharmacy could be defined as an umbrella of services aimed at maximizing the pharmacotherapeutic effect, minimizing the risk for developing adverse drug effects and reducing drug expenditures for the health care system. Clinical pharmacists, in Israel and abroad, have been practicing in different health care settings aiming to implement the principles mentioned above. Most of the articles previously published reviewed the role of the clinical pharmacist in internal medicine wards or in intensive care units. This article focuses on the role of the clinical pharmacist in a general surgery department and the influence of this service on the quality and cost of pharmacotherapy and on intravenous antibiotic therapy in particular. AIMS: Improving the quality of pharmacotherapy while optimally using economic resources in a general surgery ward. METHODS: During September 1999 to August 2000, the clinical pharmacist joined physician rounds in the surgical ward. During the rounds he advised physicians about clinical and economical aspects of drug treatment, and collected data on his activity on a specific designated form. The data was processed on a central computerized database, and analyzed to determine the influence of the clinical pharmacist on clinical and economical outcomes. RESULTS: At the end of the study period the following were found: The pharmacist made 219 interventions. These included adverse drug effects, which were identified and/or prevented. When considering the economic data, a substantial reduction of 56% in intravenous antibiotic therapy was noted (direct saving of about 140,000 NIS). Such savings were accompanied by changes in the prescribing patterns in the department, which were translated into increased rate of oral antibiotic prescribing and reduction in the use of certain i.v. antibiotics while undamaging the quality of the pharmacotherapeutic effect. CONCLUSION: The results of this study indicate that participation of a clinical pharmacist during physicians rounds improved the quality of the pharmacotherapy, assisted in changing clinicians prescribing habits, and at the same time significantly reduced the direct expenditures on medications in general and of intravenous antibiotic therapy in particular.

Pandemic influenza preparedness and response in Israel: a unique model of civilian-defense collaboration.

In April 2009, the World Health Organization announced the emergence of a novel influenza A(H1N1-09) virus and in June 2009 declared the outbreak a pandemic. The value of military structures in responding to pandemic influenza has become widely acknowledged in recent years. In 2005, the Israeli Government appointed the Ministry of Defense to be in charge of national preparedness and response for a severe pandemic influenza scenario. The Israeli case offers a unique example of civilian-defense partnership where the interface between the governmental, military and civilian spheres has formed a distinctive structure. The Israeli pandemic preparedness protocols represent an example of a collaboration in which aspects of an inherently medical problem can be managed by the defense sector. Although distinctive concepts of the model are not applicable to all countries, it offers a unique forum for governments and international agencies to evaluate this interface within the context of pandemic influenza.