Correction to: Linear numerosity illusions in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella), rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), and humans (Homo sapiens).

In the original publication, values of last three rows in Table 1 and Table 2 were incorrectly published.

Linear numerosity illusions in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella), rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), and humans (Homo sapiens).

Numerosity illusions emerge when the stimuli in one set are overestimated or underestimated relative to the number (or quantity) of stimuli in another set. In the case of multi-item arrays, individual items that form a better Gestalt are more readily grouped, leading to overestimation by human adults and children. As an example, the Solitaire illusion emerges when dots forming a central cluster (cross-pattern) are overestimated relative to the same number of dots on the periphery of the array. Although this illusion is robustly experienced by human adults, previous studies have produced weaker illusory results for young children, chimpanzees, rhesus macaques, capuchin monkeys, and guppies. In the current study, we presented nonhuman primates with other linear arrangements of stimuli from Frith and Frith's (Percept Psychoph 11:409-410, 1972) original paper with human participants that included the Solitaire illusion. Capuchin monkeys, rhesus macaques, and human adults learned to quantify black and white dots that were presented within intermingled arrays, responding on the basis of the more numerous dot colors. Humans perceived the various illusions similar to the original findings of Frith and Frith (1972), validating the current comparative design; however, there was no evidence of illusory susceptibility in either species of monkey. These results are considered in light of illusion susceptibility among primates as well as considering the role of numerical discrimination abilities and perceptual processing mode on illusion emergence.

Exploring the Jastrow Illusion in Humans ( Homo sapiens), Rhesus Monkeys ( Macaca mulatta), and Capuchin Monkeys ( Sapajus apella).

In the Jastrow size illusion, two vertically stacked but offset stimuli of identical size are misperceived such that the bottom stimulus is overestimated relative to the top stimulus due to their spatial layout. In this study, we explored whether nonhuman primates perceive this geometric illusion in the same manner as humans. Human adults, rhesus macaques, and capuchin monkeys were presented with a computerized size discrimination task including Jastrow illusion probe trials. Consistent with previous results, humans perceived the illusory stimuli, validating the current experimental approach. Adults selected the bottom figure as larger in illusion trials with identical shapes, and performance was facilitated in trials with a true size difference when the larger figure was positioned at bottom. Monkeys performed very well in trials with a true size difference including difficult discriminations (5% difference in stimuli size), but they did not show evidence of the Jastrow illusion. They were indifferent between top and bottom stimuli in the illusory arrangement, showing no evidence of a human-like (or reversed) bias. These results are considered in light of differences in perceptual processing across primates and in comparison to previous comparative studies of the Jastrow and other size illusions.

The number sense is neither last resort nor of primary import.

Leibovich et al. argue that evidence for an innate sense of number in children and animals may instead reflect the processing of continuous magnitude properties. However, some comparative research highlights responding on the basis of numerosity when non-numerical confounds are controlled. Future comparative tests might evaluate how early experience with continuous magnitudes affects the development of a sense of number.

Trading up: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) show self-control through their exchange behavior.

Self-control is defined as the ability or capacity to obtain an objectively more valuable outcome rather than an objectively less valuable outcome though tolerating a longer delay or a greater effort requirement (or both) in obtaining that more valuable outcome. A number of tests have been devised to assess self-control in non-human animals, including exchange tasks. In this study, three chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) participated in a delay of gratification task that required food exchange as the behavioral response that reflected self-control. The chimpanzees were offered opportunities to inhibit eating and instead exchange a currently possessed food item for a different (and sometimes better) item, often needing to exchange several food items before obtaining the highest valued reward. We manipulated reward type, reward size, reward visibility, delay to exchange, and location of the highest valued reward in the sequence of exchange events to compare performance within the same individuals. The chimpanzees successfully traded until obtaining the best item in most cases, although there were individual differences among participants in some variations of the test. These results support the idea that self-control is robust in chimpanzees even in contexts in which they perhaps anticipate future rewards and sustain delay of gratification until they can obtain the ultimately most valuable item.

The elusive illusion: Do children (Homo sapiens) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) see the Solitaire illusion?

One approach to gaining a better understanding of how we perceive the world is to assess the errors that human and nonhuman animals make in perceptual processing. Developmental and comparative perspectives can contribute to identifying the mechanisms that underlie systematic perceptual errors often referred to as perceptual illusions. In the visual domain, some illusions appear to remain constant across the lifespan, whereas others change with age. From a comparative perspective, many of the illusions observed in humans appear to be shared with nonhuman primates. Numerosity illusions are a subset of visual illusions and occur when the spatial arrangement of stimuli within a set influences the perception of quantity. Previous research has found one such illusion that readily occurs in human adults, the Solitaire illusion. This illusion appears to be less robust in two monkey species, rhesus macaques and capuchin monkeys. We attempted to clarify the ontogeny of this illusion from a developmental and comparative perspective by testing human children and task-naïve capuchin monkeys in a computerized quantity judgment task. The overall performance of the monkeys suggested that they perceived the numerosity illusion, although there were large differences among individuals. Younger children performed similarly to the monkeys, whereas older children more consistently perceived the illusion. These findings suggest that human-unique perceptual experiences with the world might play an important role in the emergence of the Solitaire illusion in human adults, although other factors also may contribute.

When less is more: like humans, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) misperceive food amounts based on plate size.

We investigated whether chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) misperceived food portion sizes depending upon the context in which they were presented, something that often affects how much humans serve themselves and subsequently consume. Chimpanzees judged same-sized and smaller food portions to be larger in amount when presented on a small plate compared to an equal or larger food portion presented on a large plate and did so despite clearly being able to tell the difference in portions when plate size was identical. These results are consistent with data from the human literature in which people misperceive food portion sizes as a function of plate size. This misperception is attributed to the Delboeuf illusion which occurs when the size of a central item is misperceived on the basis of its surrounding context. These results demonstrate a cross-species shared visual misperception of portion size that affects choice behavior, here in a nonhuman species for which there is little experience with tests that involve choosing between food amounts on dinnerware. The biases resulting in this form of misperception of food portions appear to have a deep-rooted evolutionary history which we share with, at minimum, our closest living nonhuman relative, the chimpanzee.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) transfer tokens repeatedly with a partner to accumulate rewards in a self-control task.

There has been extensive research investigating self-control in humans and nonhuman animals, yet we know surprisingly little about how one's social environment influences self-control. The present study examined the self-control of chimpanzees in a task that required active engagement with conspecifics. The task consisted of transferring a token back and forth with a partner animal in order to accumulate food rewards, one item per token transfer. Self-control was required because at any point in the trial, either chimpanzee could obtain their accumulated rewards, but doing so discontinued the food accumulation and ended the trial for both individuals. Chimpanzees readily engaged the task and accumulated the majority of available rewards before ending each trial, and they did so across a number of conditions that varied the identity of the partner, the presence/absence of the experimenter, and the means by which they could obtain rewards. A second experiment examined chimpanzees' self-control when given the choice between immediately available food items and a potentially larger amount of rewards that could be obtained by engaging the token transfer task with a partner. Chimpanzees were flexible in their decision-making in this test, typically choosing the option representing the largest amount of food, even if it involved delayed accumulation of the rewards via the token transfer task. These results demonstrate that chimpanzees can exhibit self-control in situations involving social interactions, and they encourage further research into this important aspect of the self-control scenario.

The less-is-better effect: a developmental perspective.

The less-is-better effect emerges when an option of lesser quantitative value is preferred or overvalued relative to a quantitively greater alternative (e.g., 24-piece dinnerware set > 24-piece dinnerware set with 16 additional broken dishes; Hsee, 1998, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 11, 107-121). This decisional bias emerges when the option of lesser quantitative value is perceived as qualitatively better (e.g., smaller set of intact dishes > larger set of partially broken dishes). Interestingly, this effect emerges for adult humans when options are evaluated separately but dissipates when options are considered simultaneously. The less-is-better bias has been attributed to the evaluability hypothesis: individuals judge objects on the basis of easy-to-evaluate attributes when judged in isolation, such as the brokenness of items within a set, yet shift to quantitative information when evaluated jointly, such as the overall number of dishes. This bias emerges for adult humans and chimpanzees in a variety of experimental settings but has not yet been evaluated among children. In the current study, we presented a joint evaluation task (larger yet qualitatively inferior option vs. smaller yet qualitatively superior option) to children aged 3 to 9 years old to better understand the developmental trajectory of the less-is-better effect. Children demonstrated the bias across all choice trials, preferring an objectively smaller set relative to a larger yet qualitatively poorer alternative. These developmental findings suggest that young children rely upon salient features of a set to guide decision-making under joint evaluation versus more objective attributes such as quantity/value.

Focality and prospective memory in preschool children.

We examined the influence of prospective memory (PM) cue focality in a sample of preschool children. Prior investigations in older populations indicated that focal targets were associated with enhanced PM performance, perhaps through more automatic retrieval processes. Importantly, this influential variable has not been thoroughly explored in younger samples. Over three test sessions, preschool children completed a memory task where they were shown a series of animals. During retrieval, participants were shown all of the animals except for one, and they had to name the missing animal. While engaged in this task, participants in the focal PM condition were instructed to remove particular animals (e.g., spider) from the game if they saw them. In the nonfocal condition, participants were told to remove any animal that was entirely one color (e.g., black) if they saw them during the game. The results demonstrated no difference in PM remembering between focal and nonfocal conditions. These results suggest that the effects of focality may not be present at the beginning stages of PM development. The implications for PM retrieval processes also are discussed.

Sequential responding and planning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella).

Previous experiments have assessed planning during sequential responding to computer generated stimuli by Old World nonhuman primates including chimpanzees and rhesus macaques. However, no such assessment has been made with a New World primate species. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) are an interesting test case for assessing the distribution of cognitive processes in the Order Primates because they sometimes show proficiency in tasks also mastered by apes and Old World monkeys, but in other cases fail to match the proficiency of those other species. In two experiments, eight capuchin monkeys selected five arbitrary stimuli in distinct locations on a computer monitor in a learned sequence. In Experiment 1, shift trials occurred in which the second and third stimuli were transposed when the first stimulus was selected by the animal. In Experiment 2, mask trials occurred in which all remaining stimuli were masked after the monkey selected the first stimulus. Monkeys made more mistakes on trials in which the locations of the second and third stimuli were interchanged than on trials in which locations were not interchanged, suggesting they had already planned to select a location that no longer contained the correct stimulus. When mask trials occurred, monkeys performed at levels significantly better than chance, but their performance exceeded chance levels only for the first and the second selections on a trial. These data indicate that capuchin monkeys performed very similarly to chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys and appeared to plan their selection sequences during the computerized task, but only to a limited degree.

Children (Homo sapiens), but not rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), perceive the one-is-more illusion.

Visual illusions are of particular interest to cognitive researchers because they reflect the active role of the brain in processing the world around us. Yousif and Scholl (2019) recently described a new visual experience, the one-is-more illusion, in which adult humans perceived continuous objects as longer than sets of discrete objects of equal length. In the current study, we investigated this phenomenon in human children (Homo sapiens) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Children were presented with a computerized 2-choice discrimination task and successfully selected the longer of 2 images for control trials. On trials in which 2 versions of the same image were presented (identical in length), and one was of a continuous form and the other consisted of 2 or more distinct units, children showed a bias for the continuous object. Monkeys were given the same computerized task and learned to choose the longer of 2 otherwise identical stimuli. However, monkeys did not show a bias to choose the continuous probe images as longer than the discrete images in the critical test trials with equal-length stimuli. These results are discussed in light of developmental and comparative research on related illusory experiences and perceptual mechanisms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Consistently Inconsistent Perceptual Illusions in Nonhuman Primates: The Importance of Individual Differences.

Perceptual illusions, and especially visual illusions, are of great interest not only to scientists, but to all people who experience them. From a scientific perspective, illusory visual experiences are informative about the nature of visual processes and the translation of sensory experiences to perceptual information that can then be used to guide behavior. It has been widely reported that some nonhuman species share these illusory experiences with humans. However, it is consistently the case that not all members of a species experience illusions in the same way. In fact, individual differences in susceptibility may be more typical than universal experiences of any given illusion. Focusing on research with the same nonhuman primates who were given a variety of perceptual illusion tasks, this "consistent inconsistency" is clearly evident. Additionally, this can even be true in assessments of human illusory experiences. Individual differences in susceptibility offer an important avenue for better understanding idiosyncratic aspects of visual perception, and the goal of isolating any possible universal principles of visual perception (in primates and beyond) should address these individual differences.

Non-human primate token use shows possibilities but also limitations for establishing a form of currency.

Non-human primates evaluate choices based on quantitative information and subjective valuation of options. Non-human primates can learn to value tokens as placeholders for primary rewards (such as food). With those tokens established as a potential form of 'currency', it is then possible to examine how they respond to opportunities to earn and use tokens in ways such as accumulating tokens or exchanging tokens with each other or with human experimenters to gain primary rewards. Sometimes, individuals make efficient and beneficial choices to obtain tokens and then exchange them at the right moments to gain optimal reward. Sometimes, they even accumulate such rewards through extended delay of gratification, or through other exchange-based interactions. Thus, non-human primates are capable of associating value to arbitrary tokens that may function as currency-like stimuli, but there also are strong limitations on how non-human primates can integrate such tokens into choice situations or use such tokens to fully 'symbolize' economic decision-making. These limitations are important to acknowledge when considering the evolutionary emergence of currency use in our species. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Children and monkeys overestimate the size of high-contrast stimuli.

The letter height superiority effect reveals that human adults judge letters to be taller than identically sized pseudoletters. This effect extends to words, such that words are estimated to be greater in size or lasting longer in duration than pseudowords of the same size or those presented for the same duration. The physical properties of letters and words also impact their perceived size, such that higher contrast between figure-ground stimuli leads to greater size estimates. Specifically, black letters on a white background (high contrast between figure and ground) are judged to be taller than gray letters and gray pseudoletters on a white background (low contrast between figure and ground) for adult humans. In the current study, we assessed whether this effect would extend to nonverbal stimuli (shapes) such that high-contrast shapes would lead to greater size estimates relative to low-contrast shapes for human children and rhesus monkeys in a two-choice discrimination task. We found that children and monkeys tended to overestimate the size of high-contrast shapes relative to low-contrast shapes consistent with results reported among human adults. Implications for perceptual fluency and its impact on subjective size estimates are discussed.

Capuchin monkeys (sometimes) go when they know: Confidence movements in Sapajus apella.

To test for evidence of metacognition in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella), we analyzed confidence movements using a paradigm adapted from research with chimpanzees. Capuchin monkeys provide an interesting model species for the comparative assessment of metacognition as they show limited evidence of such cognitive-monitoring processes in a variety of metacognition paradigms. Here, monkeys were presented with a computerized delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) memory test in one location but were rewarded for correct responses in a separate location. Movements could be made from one location to the other at any time, but movements between a response and reward feedback may reflect confidence in the accuracy of the response. Critically, DMTS tests included occasional "no sample" trials where monkeys' performance was at chance when the trial started without a sample and a 1-s interval to the response options. We predicted that monkeys would (1) perform less accurately (and less confidently) at longer retention intervals, (2) move to the dispenser early more often on trials completed correctly than incorrectly, and (3) show a relation between faster response latency and early movements. Analyses of response times and "go" or "no go" confidence movements before feedback to the reward location suggested that the monkeys were capable of monitoring confidence in their responses. However, their confidence movements were less precise and less flexible than chimpanzees. Overall, this paradigm can reveal potential metacognitive abilities in nonhuman animals that otherwise demonstrate these abilities inconsistently.

The density bias: Capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella) prefer densely arranged items in a food-choice task.

In the current work, we investigated whether capuchin monkeys preferred densely distributed resources to sparsely distributed resources in a 2-choice discrimination task with edible rewards. Capuchin monkeys were biased to select a denser food set over the same number of food items in a sparsely arranged set. Furthermore, increased density of the larger food set facilitated discrimination performance in quantity comparisons with a true difference in set size. These results align with previous studies demonstrating a preference for densely distributed food sets in infants and callitrichid primates, as well as previous evidence of a density bias among several rhesus macaques and capuchin monkeys in a computerized relative quantity discrimination task. Thus, the density bias appears to emerge across multiple domains and presentation formats for some primate species. The role of density in perceived numerosity by capuchin monkeys and other species as it pertains to the foraging domain is discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Limited evidence of number-space mapping in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella).

Humans exhibit evidence of a mental number line that suggests a left-to-right, or sometimes right-to-left, representation of smaller to larger numbers. The Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) effect is one example of this mental number line and has been investigated extensively in humans. Less research has been done with animals, and results have been inconclusive. Rugani, Vallortigara, Priftis, and Regolin (2015) found that young chicks showed a bias to respond to small quantities presented to their left and large quantities presented to their right when forced to move toward those stimuli to gain food reward. We replicated this design with rhesus macaques and capuchin monkeys using a computerized task, but we did not find this outcome. We also trained monkeys to choose between 2 arrays of dots, and then assessed biases in terms of choice location and response latency on trials with a numerical difference and on trials with equal numbers of items in both sets. There was no evidence of SNARC-like effects in equal trials, although when arrays differed in number, 12 of 19 monkeys showed differential performance depending on whether the smaller array was at the left or at the right onscreen. These results indicate that SNARC-like effects may not emerge in all contexts and may not be phylogenetically widespread. More effort is needed to broaden the number of species assessed and match other methods that are used with human participants so that we can better define the presence and extent of such effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Divide and Conquer.

We assessed the ability of preschool children to assign the most difficult tasks to a symbolic helper. First, children were taught that a toy "helper" could aid them in remembering the location of a hidden item. Children preferentially assigned the helper to the objectively most difficult locations to remember. Each child then completed eight more tests, assessing a range of different skills such as counting, object identification, and word reading. Children again could assign some stimuli in each task to the helper, leaving the remaining stimuli for themselves to respond to in the given tasks. They were not explicitly told to assign the hardest stimulus to the helper. However, children consistently still did so in most tasks, although some tasks showed an effect of age where older children were more proficient in assigning the objectively more difficult stimuli to the helper. These results highlight a potential form of metacognition in young children in which they can monitor difficulty across varied kinds of assessments and use a generalized tool for asking for help that does not require verbal responding.

Social vs. Nonsocial Housing Differentially Affects Perseverative Behavior in Rats (Ratus norvegicus).

Perseverance, also commonly referred to as grit or industriousness, is the continued effort exerted to complete goal-directed tasks. Many factors, such as stress, can contribute to perseverative behavior, but the role of sociality on perseverance in animal models has not been studied. In this experiment, perseverance was measured in Long-Evans rats; half of which were socially housed (SH) and the other half were nonsocially housed (NSH). Rats were placed in a continuous T-maze; one arm of the maze contained an unobstructed low value reward and the other arm contained a high value reward blocked by a barrier that progressively increased in height across testing sessions. We will hereon refer to the low value reward and high value reward as the low reward and the high reward, respectively. Perseverative behavior was assessed by time spent interacting with the barrier and trials were characterized as either adaptive perseverative trials (high reward obtainment) and maladaptive perseverative trials (low reward obtainment after abandoning attempts to overcome the high reward barrier). SH and NSH rats were equally proficient at overcoming a physical barrier to obtain a higher-valued reward, but the NSH rats spent more time interacting with the barriers during maladaptive perseverative trials than SH rats. NSH rats thus exhibited prolonged efforts to overcome the barrier only to ultimately travel to the low reward option. In contrast, SH rats selected the low reward option earlier in the trial and did not maladaptively perseverate without obtaining the high reward. Putative evidence for increased perseverance in NSH rats is explained in the context of maladaptive perseverative behavior rather than perseverance per se. Increased adaptability and acquisition of task-set in SH rats suggests a role of social housing in advantageous decision making.