Top-down versus bottom-up processes in the formation of positive and negative retrospective affect.

On the basis of two large scale diary studies (n = 2022, n = 762) We study differences in the effects of dispositions and situations in the formation of positive and negative retrospective affect (retrospective-PA and retrospective-NA, respectively), the affect associated with extended (e.g. daily) experiences, as opposed to very short (episodic) experiences. We suggest that the differences between retrospective-PA and retrospective-NA is due to the fact that positive retrospective evaluation (i.e. the evaluation of positive retrospective affect) involves primarily top-down processing, in which people resort to their dispositions in making these evaluations, whereas negative retrospective evaluation (the evaluation of negative retrospective affect) is primarily based on the cumulative affects of individual experiences.

The Scaling and Modeling of Pay and the Robustness of the Effect of Core Self Evaluations on Career Success.

A number of recent studies used nominal pay in estimating the effects of individual differences, particularly core-self-evaluation, on career success. We show that this practice may lead to results that are substantively different from the results when the logarithm of pay is used. We conduct three constructive replications of previous studies, and argue that substantive conclusion based on the results of nominal pay are misleading.

Negotiation as a form of persuasion: arguments in first offers.

In this article we examined aspects of negotiation within a persuasion framework. Specifically, we investigated how the provision of arguments that justified the first offer in a negotiation affected the behavior of the parties, namely, how it influenced counteroffers and settlement prices. In a series of 4 experiments and 2 pilot studies, we demonstrated that when the generation of counterarguments was easy, negotiators who did not add arguments to their first offers achieved superior results compared with negotiators who used arguments to justify their first offer. We hypothesized and provided evidence that adding arguments to a first offer was likely to cause the responding party to search for counterarguments, and this, in turn, led him or her to present counteroffers that were further away from the first offer.