Public health actions to control new SARS-CoV-2 variants.

Recent reports suggest that some SARS-CoV-2 genetic variants, such as B.1.1.7, might be more transmissible and are quickly spreading around the world. As the emergence of more transmissible variants could exacerbate the pandemic, we provide public health guidance for increased surveillance and measures to reduce community transmission.

International law reform for One Health notifications.

Epidemic risk assessment and response relies on rapid information sharing. Using examples from the past decade, we discuss the limitations of the present system for outbreak notifications, which suffers from ambiguous obligations, fragile incentives, and an overly narrow focus on human outbreaks. We examine existing international legal frameworks, and provide clarity on what a successful One Health approach to proposed international law reforms-including a pandemic treaty and amendments to the International Health Regulations-would require. In particular, we focus on how a treaty would provide opportunities to simultaneously expand reporting obligations, accelerate the sharing of scientific discoveries, and strengthen existing legal frameworks, all while addressing the most complex issues that global health governance currently faces.

How an outbreak became a pandemic: a chronological analysis of crucial junctures and international obligations in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Understanding the spread of SARS-CoV-2, how and when evidence emerged, and the timing of local, national, regional, and global responses is essential to establish how an outbreak became a pandemic and to prepare for future health threats. With that aim, the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response has developed a chronology of events, actions, and recommendations, from December, 2019, when the first cases of COVID-19 were identified in China, to the end of March, 2020, by which time the outbreak had spread extensively worldwide and had been characterised as a pandemic. Datapoints are based on two literature reviews, WHO documents and correspondence, submissions to the Panel, and an expert verification process. The retrospective analysis of the chronology shows a dedicated initial response by WHO and some national governments, but also aspects of the response that could have been quicker, including outbreak notifications under the International Health Regulations (IHR), presumption and confirmation of human-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2, declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, and, most importantly, the public health response of many national governments. The chronology also shows that some countries, largely those with previous experience with similar outbreaks, reacted quickly, even ahead of WHO alerts, and were more successful in initially containing the virus. Mapping actions against IHR obligations, the chronology shows where efficiency and accountability could be improved at local, national, and international levels to more quickly alert and contain health threats in the future. In particular, these improvements include necessary reforms to international law and governance for pandemic preparedness and response, including the IHR and a potential framework convention on pandemic preparedness and response.

What would it take to describe the global diversity of parasites?

How many parasites are there on Earth? Here, we use helminth parasites to highlight how little is known about parasite diversity, and how insufficient our current approach will be to describe the full scope of life on Earth. Using the largest database of host-parasite associations and one of the world's largest parasite collections, we estimate a global total of roughly 100 000-350 000 species of helminth endoparasites of vertebrates, of which 85-95% are unknown to science. The parasites of amphibians and reptiles remain the most poorly described, but the majority of undescribed species are probably parasites of birds and bony fish. Missing species are disproportionately likely to be smaller parasites of smaller hosts in undersampled countries. At current rates, it would take centuries to comprehensively sample, collect and name vertebrate helminths. While some have suggested that macroecology can work around existing data limitations, we argue that patterns described from a small, biased sample of diversity aren't necessarily reliable, especially as host-parasite networks are increasingly altered by global change. In the spirit of moonshots like the Human Genome Project and the Global Virome Project, we consider the idea of a Global Parasite Project: a global effort to transform parasitology and inventory parasite diversity at an unprecedented pace.

The Resurgence of Mpox in Africa.

This Viewpoint discusses the current mpox outbreak in Africa and why countries worldwide must urgently act to address it after the World Health Organization declared the event a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.

A pandemic agreement is within reach.

At the end of May, 194 member states of the World Health Organization (WHO) will meet for the World Health Assembly. Negotiations underway now will determine whether they vote then to adopt a pandemic agreement. For the past 2 years, discussions have focused on articulating essential components of a robust and equitable architecture for pandemic preparedness and response. Despite this, talks have failed to produce sufficient consensus on a detailed draft, prompting the intergovernmental negotiating body to propose a "streamlined" version. The new text, released on 16 April, consolidates provisions for research and development, technology transfer, pathogen access and benefit sharing (including pandemic products such as medicines and vaccines), with many particulars deferred to future procedures. Ultimately, success of the agreement will depend on these details and implementation. Nevertheless, member states shouldn't bypass the consensus reached to date, but continue progress to adopt this agreement.

Governance and Public Health Decision-Making During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Scoping Review.

Objective: We provide an in-depth understanding of how governance and decision-making during the COVID-19 pandemic has been empirically characterized in the literature to identify gaps in research and highlight areas that require further inquiry. Methods: We searched peer-reviewed publications using empirical data published between Jan 1, 2020 and Jan 31, 2022 in three electronic databases to examine the process of governance and decision-making during the COVID-19 pandemic. Two authors independently screened the records and 24 publications were extracted for the review. Results: Governance is analyzed by its level at national, sub-national, community and by its aspects of process, determinants and performance. While different methodological approaches are used, governance is conceptualized in four ways 1) characteristics and elements, 2) leadership, 3) application of power and 4) models or arrangements of governance. Conclusion: For future pandemic preparedness, there is a need for more empirical research using a unified conceptual approach to governance, which integrates decision-making processes and can guide governance structures and mechanisms across different countries and contexts. We call for more inclusivity in who performs the research on governance and where.

Singapore's COVID-19 crisis decision-making through centralization, legitimacy, and agility: an empirical analysis.

Background: Decision-making during health crises differs from routine decision-making and is constrained by ambiguity about evolving epidemiological situations, urgency of response, lack of evidence, and fear. Recent analyses of governance and decision-making during COVID-19, focusing on leadership qualities, involvement of specific stakeholders, and effective resource management, do not adequately address a persisting gap in understanding the determinants of decision-making during health crises at the national level. Methods: We undertook a study to understand the processes and characteristics of decision-making during the COVID-19 pandemic in Singapore. We used a case study approach and collected empirical evidence about public health decision-making, using a combination of key informant interviews and focus group discussions with stakeholders from government, academia and civil society organizations. Findings: We argue that administrative centralization and political legitimacy played important roles in agile governance and decision-making during the pandemic in Singapore. We demonstrate the role of the Singapore government's centralization in creating a unified and coherent governance model for emergency response and the People's Action Party's (PAP) legitimacy in facilitating people's trust in the government. Health system resilience and financial reserves further facilitated an agile response, yet community participation and prioritization of vulnerable migrant populations were insufficient in the governance processes. Interpretation: Our analysis contributes to the theory and practice of crisis decision-making by highlighting the role of political and administrative determinants in agile crisis decision-making. Funding: This study is funded by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention through a Cooperative Research Agreement (NU2HGH2020000037).