Prosocial option increases women's entry into competition.

We provide evidence that women enter competitions at the same rate as men when the incentive for winning includes the option to share part of the rewards with the losers (i.e., when the incentive system is socially oriented). Using an experiment (with N = 238 subjects from three laboratories), we find that about 16% more men than women choose to compete in the standard tournament; this gender gap is eliminated in the socially oriented incentive treatment. While men's choice to compete remains unchanged, at around 52% in both conditions, women increase their entry rate from 35% in the standard tournament to 60% when the incentive includes a socially oriented option.

Efficiency wages in an experimental labor market.

There has been recent experimental support for efficiency wage theories of the labor market. This short paper initiates the larger process of evaluating the boundary conditions of the gift- exchange phenomenon. In particular, we will see whether behavior consistent with the fair wage-effort hypothesis can emerge and be sustained under conditions in which there is (i) a nontrivial marginal cost to providing effort and (ii) increased social distance between subject and experimenter.