Perceiving an exclusive cause of affect prevents misattribution.

Affect misattribution occurs when affective cues color subsequent unrelated evaluations. Research suggests that affect misattribution decreases when one is aware that affective cues are unrelated to the evaluation at hand. We propose that affect misattribution may even occur when one is aware that affective cues are irrelevant, as long as the source of these cues seems ambiguous. When source ambiguity exists, affective cues may freely influence upcoming unrelated evaluations. We examined this using an adapted affect misattribution procedure where pleasant and unpleasant responses served as affective cues that could influence later evaluations of unrelated targets. These affective cues were either perceived as reflecting a single source (i.e., a subliminal affective picture in Experiment 1; one's internal affective state in Experiment 2), or as reflecting two sources (i.e., both) suggesting source ambiguity. Results show that misattribution of affect decreased when participants perceived affective cues as representing one source rather than two.

Prime and probability: causal knowledge affects inferential and predictive effects on self-agency experiences.

Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action-outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their (combined) contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences. Therefore, we manipulated causal knowledge that was either relevant or irrelevant by varying the probability of co-occurrence (50% or 80%) of specific actions and outcomes. Afterwards, we measured self-agency experiences in an action-outcome task where outcomes were primed or not. Results showed that motor prediction only affected self-agency when relevant actions and outcomes were learned to be causally related. Interestingly, however, inference effects also occurred when no relevant causal knowledge was acquired.

The art of anger: reward context turns avoidance responses to anger-related objects into approach.

Anger has a special status among the emotions in that it can elicit avoidance as well as approach motivation. This study tested the ignored role of reward context in potentiating approach rather than avoidance responses toward objects associated with anger. In Experiment 1, angry and neutral facial expressions were parafoveally paired with common objects, and responses to the objects were assessed by subjective reports of motivation to obtain them. In Experiment 2, objects were again paired with angry or neutral faces outside of participants' awareness, and responses toward the objects were indexed by physical effort expended in attempting to win them. Results showed that approach motivation toward anger-related objects can be observed when responding is framed in terms of rewards that one can obtain, whereas avoidance motivation occurs in the absence of such a reward context. These findings point to the importance of a reward context in modulating people's responses to anger.

Reflecting on the action or its outcome: behavior representation level modulates high level outcome priming effects on self-agency experiences.

Recent research suggests that one can have the feeling of being the cause of an action's outcome, even in the absence of a prior intention to act. That is, experienced self-agency over behavior increases when outcome representations are primed outside of awareness, prior to executing the action and observing the resulting outcome. Based on the notion that behavior can be represented at different levels, we propose that priming outcome representations is more likely to augment self-agency experiences when the primed representation corresponds with a person's behavior representation level. Three experiments, using different priming and self-agency tasks, both measuring and manipulating the level of behavior representation, confirmed this idea. Priming high level outcome representations enhanced experienced self-agency over behavior more strongly when behavior was represented at a higher level, rather than a lower level. Thus, priming effects on self-agency experiences critically depend on behavior representation level.

How to heat up from the cold: examining the preconditions for (unconscious) mood effects.

What are the necessary preconditions to make people feel good or bad? In this research, the authors aimed to uncover the bare essentials of mood induction. Several induction techniques exist, and most of these techniques demand a relatively high amount of cognitive capacity. Moreover, to be effective, most techniques require conscious awareness. The authors proposed that the common and defining element in all effective mood induction techniques is the dominating salience of evaluative tone over descriptive meaning. This evaluative-tone hypothesis was tested in two paradigms in which the evaluative meaning of the "primed" concept was more salient than its descriptive meaning (i.e., when subliminal stimulus exposure was so short that mainly the evaluative meaning was activated [see D. A. Stapel, W. Koomen, & K. I. Ruys, 2002] and when the primed concepts were sufficiently extreme such that evaluative meaning always dominated descriptive meaning). Explicit and implicit mood measures showed that the activation of a dominating evaluative tone affected people's mood states. Implications of these findings for theories on unconscious mood induction are discussed.

On the (mis)categorization of unattractive brides and attractive prostitutes: extending evaluative congruency effects to social category activation.

Numerous studies have shown that social categorization is a flexible process that partly depends on contextual variables. However, little is known about the role of affect in people's access to categorical dimensions. We investigated the hypothesis that social category activation is facilitated on evaluatively congruent dimensions. Two studies provide support for this evaluative-matching hypothesis, in which social categorization was found to be faster and more accurate for evaluatively congruent categories (i.e., unattractive foreigners, unattractive prostitutes, attractive fellow-citizens and attractive brides) than for evaluatively incongruent categories (i.e., attractive foreigners, attractive prostitutes, unattractive fellow-citizens and unattractive brides). We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

"Just another pretty face": a multidimensional scaling approach to face attractiveness and variability.

Findings on both attractiveness and memory for faces suggest that people should perceive more similarity among attractive than among unattractive faces. A multidimensional scaling approach was used to test this hypothesis in two studies. In Study 1, we derived a psychological face space from similarity ratings of attractive and unattractive Caucasian female faces. In Study 2, we derived a face space for attractive and unattractive male faces of Caucasians and non-Caucasians. Both studies confirm that attractive faces are indeed more tightly clustered than unattractive faces in people's psychological face spaces. These studies provide direct and original support for theoretical assumptions previously made in the face space and face memory literatures.

Automatic contrast: evidence that automatic comparison with the social self affects evaluative responses.

The aim of the present research was to investigate whether unconsciously presented affective information may cause opposite evaluative responses depending on what social category the information originates from. We argue that automatic comparison processes between the self and the unconscious affective information produce this evaluative contrast effect. Consistent with research on automatic behaviour, we propose that when an intergroup context is activated, an automatic comparison to the social self may determine the automatic evaluative responses, at least for highly visible categories (e.g. sex, ethnicity). Contrary to previous research on evaluative priming, we predict automatic contrastive responses to affective information originating from an outgroup category such that the evaluative response to neutral targets is opposite to the valence of the suboptimal primes. Two studies using different intergroup contexts provide support for our hypotheses.

Two faces of (dis)similarity in affective judgments of persons: contrast or assimilation effects revealed by morphs.

The authors investigated the role of dissimilarity on context effects in person perception. Most research predicts similar people to be similarly evaluated and different people to be contrasted with each other. However, some research suggests that similarity may enhance comparison and contrast. To explain these opposite effects, the authors argue that dissimilarity may influence 2 different processes with opposite consequences. Dissimilarity may decrease common categorization and thus the likelihood of comparison, resulting in reduced contrast, whereas during comparison itself dissimilarity may increase the perceived dissimilarity of features and thereby increase contrast. To investigate this, the authors conducted 3 studies in which they manipulated dissimilarity by inserting morphs that were related or unrelated to the context and target faces before judgments were made. The results indicate that dissimilarity may affect the likelihood and the outcome of comparison, with contrasting consequences.

The effects of diffuse and distinct affect.

In a series of suboptimal priming studies, it was shown that both affective and nonaffective reactions to a stimulus may occur without awareness. Moreover, it was demonstrated that affective information is detected earlier than nonaffective information. Therefore, early reactions to an affect-laden stimulus (e.g., a smiling man) are cognitively unappraised and thus diffuse (e.g., "positive"), whereas later affective reactions can be more specific and distinct (e.g., "a smiling man"). Through variations of prime exposure (extremely short, moderately short) the impact of early diffuse and late distinct affect on judgment was investigated. Findings show that distinctness (and prime-target similarity) is an essential determinant of whether the effect of affect is null, assimilation, or contrast. Furthermore, whether affect priming activates diffuse or distinct reactions is a matter of a fraction of seconds.

A matter of matching: how goals and primes affect self-agency experiences.

The sense of self-agency is a pervasive experience that people infer from their actions and the outcomes they produce. Recent research suggests that self-agency inferences arise from an explicit goal-directed process as well as an implicit outcome-priming process. Three experiments examined potential differences between these 2 processes. Participants had the goal to produce an outcome or were primed with the outcome. Next, they performed an action in an agency-ambiguous situation, followed by an outcome that matched or mismatched the goal or prime, and indicated experienced self-agency over the action-outcome. Results showed that goals reduce self-agency over mismatching outcomes. However, outcome-primes did not affect self-agency over mismatching outcomes but even enhanced self-agency over mismatching proximate outcomes. Goals and outcome-primes equally enhanced self-agency for matches. Our findings provide novel evidence that self-agency experiences result from 2 distinct inferential routes and that goals and primes differentially affect the perception of our own behavior.

I didn't mean to hurt you! Unconscious origins of experienced self-agency over others' emotions.

Our conscious experiences of self-agency tell us that we cause and change other people's emotions during social interactions, even without awareness of what we did. How do such experiences of being the cause of an outcome, such as the emotions of others, emerge? Previous authorship ascription research suggests that unconsciously primed knowledge about emotions produces a sense of self-agency upon seeing the primed emotions expressed in another agent. Taking into account the crucial role of valence and the nature of one's own actions in understanding others' behaviors, we predicted that preactivated knowledge linked to a particular emotion, in terms of action or valence, increases experienced self-agency upon seeing the emotion in another agent. In four experiments, participants interacted with another agent and observed this agent's neutral expressions change into emotional expressions. Results showed that various kinds of subliminal primes enhance experienced self-agency over the observed emotions. Our findings support the idea that the unconscious authorship ascription process is less rigid when outcomes are socially meaningful.

Facing disapproval: performance monitoring in a social context.

Facial expressions are a potent source of information about how others evaluate our behavior. In the present study, we investigated how the internal performance-monitoring system, as reflected by error-related negativity (ERN), is affected by external cues of positive (happy faces) or negative evaluation (disgusted faces) of performance. We hypothesized that if the social context indeed impacts on how we evaluate our own performance, we would expect that the same performance error would result in larger ERN amplitudes in the context of negative evaluation than in a positive evaluation context. Our findings confirm our predictions: ERN amplitudes were largest when stimuli consisted of disgusted faces, compared to when stimuli consisted of happy faces. Importantly, ERN amplitudes in our control condition, in which sad faces were used as stimuli, were no different from the positive evaluation condition, ruling out the possibility that effects in the negative evaluation condition resulted from negative affect per se. We suggest that external social cues of approval or disapproval impact on how we evaluate our own performance at a very basic level: The brain processes errors that are associated with social disapproval as more motivationally salient, signaling the need for additional cognitive resources to prevent subsequent failures.

The secret life of emotions.

The possibility of unconsciously evoked emotions is often denied because awareness of an emotion's cause is considered to be precisely what produces the emotion. However, we argue that because emotional responding is important for successful living, both global and specific emotional responses can be induced without awareness. The present research used quick and super-quick subliminal priming techniques, and cognitive, feelings, and behavioral measures, to test this hypothesis. Our results show that both global moods and specific emotions can be evoked without conscious awareness of their cause.

Emotion elicitor or emotion messenger? Subliminal priming reveals two faces of facial expressions.

Facial emotional expressions can serve both as emotional stimuli and as communicative signals. The research reported here was conducted to illustrate how responses to both roles of facial emotional expressions unfold over time. As an emotion elicitor, a facial emotional expression (e.g., a disgusted face) activates a response that is similar to responses to other emotional stimuli of the same valence (e.g., a dirty, nonflushed toilet). As an emotion messenger, the same facial expression (e.g., a disgusted face) serves as a communicative signal by also activating the knowledge that the sender is experiencing a specific emotion (e.g., the sender feels disgusted). By varying the duration of exposure to disgusted, fearful, angry, and neutral faces in two subliminal-priming studies, we demonstrated that responses to faces as emotion elicitors occur prior to responses to faces as emotion messengers, and that both types of responses may unfold unconsciously.