Investigation of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Associated With a Large Indoor Convention - New York City, November-December 2021.

During November 19-21, 2021, an indoor convention (event) in New York City (NYC), was attended by approximately 53,000 persons from 52 U.S. jurisdictions and 30 foreign countries. In-person registration for the event began on November 18, 2021. The venue was equipped with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration, and attendees were required to wear a mask indoors and have documented receipt of at least 1 dose of a COVID-19 vaccine.* On December 2, 2021, the Minnesota Department of Health reported the first case of community-acquired COVID-19 in the United States caused by the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 (Omicron) variant in a person who had attended the event (1). CDC collaborated with state and local health departments to assess event-associated COVID-19 cases and potential exposures among U.S.-based attendees using data from COVID-19 surveillance systems and an anonymous online attendee survey. Among 34,541 attendees with available contact information, surveillance data identified test results for 4,560, including 119 (2.6%) persons from 16 jurisdictions with positive SARS-CoV-2 test results. Most (4,041 [95.2%]), survey respondents reported always wearing a mask while indoors at the event. Compared with test-negative respondents, test-positive respondents were more likely to report attending bars, karaoke, or nightclubs, and eating or drinking indoors near others for at least 15 minutes. Among 4,560 attendees who received testing, evidence of widespread transmission during the event was not identified. Genomic sequencing of 20 specimens identified the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.617.2 (Delta) variant (AY.25 and AY.103 sublineages) in 15 (75%) cases, and the Omicron variant (BA.1 sublineage) in five (25%) cases. These findings reinforce the importance of implementing multiple, simultaneous prevention measures, such as ensuring up-to-date vaccination, mask use, physical distancing, and improved ventilation in limiting SARS-CoV-2 transmission, during large, indoor events.†.

Lessons Learned From Implementation of Mpox Surveillance During an Outbreak Response in Tennessee, 2022.

OBJECTIVES: Mpox surveillance was integral during the 2022 outbreak response. We evaluated implementation of mpox surveillance in Tennessee during an outbreak response and made recommendations for surveillance during emerging infectious disease outbreaks. METHODS: To understand surveillance implementation, system processes, and areas for improvement, we conducted 8 semistructured focus groups and 7 interviews with 36 health care, laboratory, and health department representatives during September 9-20, 2022. We categorized and analyzed session transcription and notes. We analyzed completeness and timeliness of surveillance data, including 349 orthopoxvirus-positive laboratory reports from commercial, public health, and health system laboratories during July 1-August 31, 2022. RESULTS: Participants described an evolving system and noted that existing informatics platforms inefficiently supported iterations of reporting requirements. Clear communication, standardization of terminology, and shared, adaptable, and user-friendly informatics platforms were prioritized for future emerging infectious disease surveillance systems. Laboratory-reported epidemiologic information was often incomplete; only 55% (191 of 349) of reports included patient address and telephone number. The median time from symptom onset to specimen collection was 5 days (IQR, 3-6 d), from specimen collection to laboratory reporting was 3 days (IQR, 1-4 d), from laboratory reporting to patient interview was 1 day (IQR, 1-3 d), and from symptom onset to patient interview was 9 days (IQR, 7-12 d). CONCLUSIONS: Future emerging infectious disease responses would benefit from standardized surveillance approaches that facilitate rapid implementation. Closer collaboration among informatics, laboratory, and clinical partners across jurisdictions and agencies in determining system priorities and designing workflow processes could improve flexibility of the surveillance platform and completeness and timeliness of laboratory reporting. Improved timeliness will facilitate public health response and intervention, thereby mitigating morbidity.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Temporary Epidemiology Field Assignee program: Supporting state and local preparedness in the wake of Ebola.

OBJECTIVES: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention launched the Temporary Epidemiology Field Assignee (TEFA) Program to help state and local jurisdictions respond to the risk of Ebola virus importation during the 2014-2016 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa. We describe steps taken to launch the 2-year program, its outcomes and lessons learned. METHODS: State and local health departments submitted proposals for a TEFA to strengthen local capacity in four key public health preparedness areas: 1) epidemiology and surveillance, 2) health systems preparedness, 3) health communications, and 4) incident management. TEFAs and jurisdictions were selected through a competitive process. Descriptions of TEFA activities in their quarterly reports were reviewed to select illustrative examples for each preparedness area. RESULTS: Eleven TEFAs began in the fall of 2015, assigned to 7 states, 2 cities, 1 county and the District of Columbia. TEFAs strengthened epidemiologic capacity, investigating routine and major outbreaks in addition to implementing event-based and syndromic surveillance systems. They supported improvements in health communications, strengthened healthcare coalitions, and enhanced collaboration between local epidemiology and emergency preparedness units. Several TEFAs deployed to United States territories for the 2016 Zika Outbreak response. CONCLUSION: TEFAs made important contributions to their jurisdictions' preparedness. We believe the TEFA model can be a significant component of a national strategy for surging state and local capacity in future high-consequence events.

Challenges to Arboviral Surveillance in Tennessee: Health-Care Providers' Attitudes and Behaviors.

Surveillance of arboviruses depends on health-care providers' ability to diagnose and report human cases of disease. The purposes of this study were to assess Tennessee providers' 1) self-efficacy toward diagnosis and management, 2) clinical practices, and 3) variation in these measures by provider characteristics. A survey was e-mailed to 13,851 providers, of which 916 (7%) responded. Respondents diagnosed more arboviruses in the previous year than were recorded in surveillance records, an indication of underreporting. Respondents had low to moderate self-efficacy toward diagnosis and management of arboviruses. Although more than 70% (N = 589) used paired serology, only 46% (N = 396) asked patients to return for a convalescent specimen draw within the correct time frame. One of the most commonly reported barriers to testing was uncertainty about which tests to order. Providers working in family medicine and urgent care, nurse practitioners, and those at outpatient facilities had lower rates of high self-efficacy than their counterparts working in other settings and from other specialties. Clinical practices were influenced by specialty, designation, setting, and geography but not by years of experience. Education to improve arboviral surveillance in Tennessee is warranted. Topics could include proper diagnosis and management, appropriate testing and overcoming barriers to testing, and public health reporting.