Neurotypical individuals fail to understand action vitality form in children with autism spectrum disorder.

Any defects of sociality in individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are standardly explained in terms of those individuals' putative impairments in a variety of cognitive functions. Recently, however, the need for a bidirectional approach to social interaction has been emphasized. Such an approach highlights differences in basic ways of acting between ASD and neurotypical individuals which would prevent them from understanding each other. Here we pursue this approach by focusing on basic action features reflecting the agent's mood and affective states. These are action features Stern named "vitality forms," and which are widely assumed to substantiate core social interactions [D. N. Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant (1985); D. N. Stern, Forms of Vitality Exploring Dynamic Experience in Psychology, Arts, Psychotherapy, and Development (2010)]. Previously we demonstrated that, although ASD and typically developing (TD) children alike differentiate vitality forms when performing actions, ASD children express them in a way that is motorically dissimilar to TD children. To assess whether this motor dissimilarity may have consequences for vitality form recognition, we asked neurotypical participants to identify the vitality form of different types of action performed by ASD or TD children. We found that participants exhibited remarkable inaccuracy in identifying ASD children's vitality forms. Interestingly, their performance did not benefit from information feedback. This indicates that how people act matters for understanding others and for being understood by them. Because vitality forms pervade every aspect of daily life, our findings promise to open the way to a deeper comprehension of the bidirectional difficulties for both ASD and neurotypical individuals in interacting with one another.

The mirror mechanism: a basic principle of brain function.

The mirror mechanism is a basic brain mechanism that transforms sensory representations of others' behaviour into one's own motor or visceromotor representations concerning that behaviour. According to its location in the brain, it may fulfil a range of cognitive functions, including action and emotion understanding. In each case, it may enable a route to knowledge of others' behaviour, which mainly depends on one's own motor or visceromotor representations.

How action performance affects object perception.

How deep is the linkage between action and perception? Much is known about how object perception impacts on action performance, much less about how action performance affects object perception. Does action performance affect perceptual judgment on object features such as shape and orientation? Answering these questions was the aim of the present study. Participants were asked to reach and grasp a handled mug without any visual feedback before judging whether a visually presented mug was handled or not. Performing repeatedly a grasping action resulted in a perceptual categorization aftereffect as measured by a slowdown in the judgment on a handled mug. We suggest that what people are doing may impact on their perceptual judgments on the surrounding things.

Press to grasp: how action dynamics shape object categorization.

Action and object are deeply linked to each other. Not only can viewing an object influence an ongoing action, but motor representations of action can also influence visual categorization of objects. It is tempting to assume that this influence is effector-specific. However, there is indirect evidence suggesting that this influence may be related to the action goal and not just to the effector involved in achieving it. This paper aimed, for the first time, to tackle this issue directly. Participants were asked to categorize different objects in terms of the effector (e.g. hand or foot) typically used to act upon them. The task was delivered before and after a training session in which participants were instructed either just to press a pedal with their foot or to perform the same foot action with the goal of guiding an avatar's hand to grasp a small ball. Results showed that pressing a pedal to grasp a ball influenced how participants correctly identified graspable objects as hand-related ones, making their responses more uncertain than before the training. Just pressing a pedal did not have any similar effect. This is evidence that the influence of action on object categorization can be goal-related rather than effector-specific.

The functional role of the parieto-frontal mirror circuit: interpretations and misinterpretations.

The parieto-frontal cortical circuit that is active during action observation is the circuit with mirror properties that has been most extensively studied. Yet, there remains controversy on its role in social cognition and its contribution to understanding the actions and intentions of other individuals. Recent studies in monkeys and humans have shed light on what the parieto-frontal cortical circuit encodes and its possible functional relevance for cognition. We conclude that, although there are several mechanisms through which one can understand the behaviour of other individuals, the parieto-frontal mechanism is the only one that allows an individual to understand the action of others 'from the inside' and gives the observer a first-person grasp of the motor goals and intentions of other individuals.

When a laser pen becomes a stick: remapping of space by tool-use observation in hemispatial neglect.

The role of active tool use in the remapping of space in hemispatial neglect patients has been extensively investigated. To date, however, there is no evidence that observing tool use can play a role in the remapping of space in hemispatial neglect patients. In this study, a patient with a severe hemispatial neglect in near but not far space and twelve healthy controls were asked to bisect near and far lines using a laser pen. The task was performed both before and immediately after sessions in which they merely observed the experimenter bisecting near and far lines with a stick. During the observation session, participants were either holding an identical stick or empty-handed. Results, in both the neglect patient and healthy controls, showed that observing the experimenter bisecting line while holding the same tool, produces a remapping of the far space into the near space. This result was particularly evident in the neglect patient where observing line-bisection task extended the spatial deficit from the near to the far space. Our results provide new empirical support to the idea that the space around us is not mapped in merely metrical terms, rather it seems to be deeply impacted by both action observation and execution.

Understanding action with the motor system.

We challenge Cook et al.'s claim about the vagueness of the notion of action understanding in relation with mirror neurons. We show the multidimensional nature of action understanding and provide a definition of motor-based action understanding, shedding new light on the various components of action understanding and on their relationship. Finally, we propose an alternative perspective on the origin of mirror neurons, stressing the necessity to abandon the dichotomy between genetic and associative hypotheses.

Sharing motor plans while acting jointly: A TMS study.

When acting together, we may represent not only our own individual goals but also a collective goal. Although behavioural evidence suggests that agents' motor plans might be related to collective goals, direct neurophysiological evidence of whether collective goals are motorically represented is still scarce. The aim of the present transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study is to begin to fill this gap. A participant and a confederate were asked to sequentially perform a two-choice reaction time task by acting on pressure sensors. In their own turn, they saw a cue indicating whether to lift their fingers from (or to press them on) a pressure sensor to shoot a ball across the screen as fast as possible. The confederate responded with the right hand, the participant with the left hand. While the confederate acted on the sensor, the participant's motor evoked potentials (MEPs) were collected from the right Extensor Carpi Ulnaris. If participants represent their own and the confederate's actions as being directed to a collective goal, MEPs amplitude should be modulated according to the action the confederate should perform. To test this conjecture, we contrasted three conditions: a Joint condition, in which both players worked together with their collective goal being to shoot the ball to get it to a common target, a Parallel condition, in which the players performed exactly the same task but received independent outcomes for their performance, and a Competitive condition, in which the outcome of the game still depended on the other player performance, but without the collective goal feature. Results showed no MEPs modulation according to the confederate's action in the Joint condition. Post-hoc exploratory analyses both provide some hints about this negative finding and also suggest possible improvements (i.e., adopting a different dependent variable, avoiding task-switching between conditions) for testing our hypothesis that collective goal can be represented motorically.

Grasping with the eyes.

When observing someone else acting on an object, people implement goal-specific eye movement programs that are driven by their own motor representation of the observed action. Usually, however, we observe people acting in contexts where more objects, different in shape and size, are present. Is our brain able to select the intended target even when there are different objects in the visual scene? And if this is the case, what kind of information does our motor system capitalize on? We recorded eye movements while participants observed an actor reaching for and grasping one of two objects requiring two different kinds of grip to be picked up. In a control condition, the actor merely reached for and touched one of the two objects without preshaping her hand according to the target features. Results showed higher accuracy and earlier saccadic movements when participants observed an actually grasping hand than when they observed a mere reaching hand devoid of any kind of target-related preshaping. This clearly suggests that the hand preshaping provided the observer with enough motor cues to proactively and reliably saccade toward the object to be grasped, thus identifying it even when the action target was not previously known. Our findings strongly corroborate the direct matching hypothesis suggesting that in processing others' actions, we take advantage of the same motor knowledge that enables us to efficiently perform those actions.

Through the looking glass: self and others.

In the present article we discuss the relevance of the mirror mechanism for our sense of self and our sense of others. We argue that, by providing us with an understanding from the inside of actions, the mirror mechanism radically challenges the traditional view of the self and of the others. Indeed, this mechanism not only reveals the common ground on the basis of which we become aware of ourselves as selves distinct from other selves, but also sheds new light on the content of our self and other experience, showing that we primarily experience ourselves and the others in terms of our own and of their motor possibilities respectively.

Colors and Handles: How Action Primes Perception.

How deeply does action influence perception? Does action performance affect the perception of object features directly related to action only? Or does it concern also object features such as colors, which are not held to directly afford action? The present study aimed at answering these questions. We asked participants to repeatedly grasp a handled mug hidden from their view before judging whether a visually presented mug was blue rather than cyan. The motor training impacted on their perceptual judgments, by speeding participants' responses, when the handle of the presented mug was spatially aligned with the trained hand. The priming effect did not occur when participants were trained to merely touch the mug with their hand closed in a fist. This indicates that action performance may shape the perceptual judgment on object features, even when these features are colors and do not afford any action. How we act on surrounding objects is therefore not without consequence for how we experience them.

Consciousness and complexity: a consilience of evidence.

Over the last years, a surge of empirical studies converged on complexity-related measures as reliable markers of consciousness across many different conditions, such as sleep, anesthesia, hallucinatory states, coma, and related disorders. Most of these measures were independently proposed by researchers endorsing disparate frameworks and employing different methods and techniques. Since this body of evidence has not been systematically reviewed and coherently organized so far, this positive trend has remained somewhat below the radar. The aim of this paper is to make this consilience of evidence in the science of consciousness explicit. We start with a systematic assessment of the growing literature on complexity-related measures and identify their common denominator, tracing it back to core theoretical principles and predictions put forward more than 20 years ago. In doing this, we highlight a consistent trajectory spanning two decades of consciousness research and provide a provisional taxonomy of the present literature. Finally, we consider all of the above as a positive ground to approach new questions and devise future experiments that may help consolidate and further develop a promising field where empirical research on consciousness appears to have, so far, naturally converged.

Emerging of new bioartificial corticospinal motor synergies using a robotic additional thumb.

It is likely that when using an artificially augmented hand with six fingers, the natural five plus a robotic one, corticospinal motor synergies controlling grasping actions might be different. However, no direct neurophysiological evidence for this reasonable assumption is available yet. We used transcranial magnetic stimulation of the primary motor cortex to directly address this issue during motor imagery of objects' grasping actions performed with or without the Soft Sixth Finger (SSF). The SSF is a wearable robotic additional thumb patented for helping patients with hand paresis and inherent loss of thumb opposition abilities. To this aim, we capitalized from the solid notion that neural circuits and mechanisms underlying motor imagery overlap those of physiological voluntary actions. After a few minutes of training, healthy humans wearing the SSF rapidly reshaped the pattern of corticospinal outputs towards forearm and hand muscles governing imagined grasping actions of different objects, suggesting the possibility that the extra finger might rapidly be encoded into the user's body schema, which is integral part of the frontal-parietal grasping network. Such neural signatures might explain how the motor system of human beings is open to very quickly welcoming emerging augmentative bioartificial corticospinal grasping strategies. Such an ability might represent the functional substrate of a final common pathway the brain might count on towards new interactions with the surrounding objects within the peripersonal space. Findings provide a neurophysiological framework for implementing augmentative robotic tools in humans and for the exploitation of the SSF in conceptually new rehabilitation settings.

Reduced readiness potential and post-movement beta synchronization reflect self-disorders in early course schizophrenia.

Disturbances of conscious awareness, or self-disorders, are a defining feature of schizophrenia. These include symptoms such as delusions of control, i.e. the belief that one's actions are controlled by an external agent. Models of self-disorders point at altered neural mechanisms of source monitoring, i.e. the ability of the brain to discriminate self-generated stimuli from those driven by the environment. However, evidence supporting this putative relationship is currently lacking. We performed electroencephalography (EEG) during self-paced, brisk right fist closures in ten (M = 9; F = 1) patients with Early-Course Schizophrenia (ECSCZ) and age and gender-matched healthy volunteers. We measured the Readiness Potential (RP), i.e. an EEG feature preceding self-generated movements, and movement-related EEG spectral changes. Self-disorders in ECSCZ were assessed with the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE). Patients showed a markedly reduced RP and altered post-movement Event-Related Synchronization (ERS) in the beta frequency band (14-24 Hz) compared to healthy controls. Importantly, smaller RP and weaker ERS were associated with higher EASE scores in ECSCZ. Our data suggest that disturbances of neural correlates preceding and following self-initiated movements may reflect the severity of self-disorders in patients suffering from ECSCZ. These findings point towards deficits in basic mechanisms of sensorimotor integration as a substrate for self-disorders.

Where does an object trigger an action? An investigation about affordances in space.

A series of experiments provide evidence that affordances rely not only on the mutual appropriateness of the features of an object and the abilities of an individual, but also on the fact that those features fall within her own reachable space, thus being really ready-to-her-own-hand. We used a spatial alignment effect paradigm and systematically examined this effect when the visually presented object was located either within or outside the peripersonal space of the participants, both from a metric (Experiment 1) and from a functional point of view (Experiment 2). We found that objectual features evoke actions only when the object is presented within the portion of the peripersonal space that is effectively reachable by the participants. Experiments 3 and 4 ruled out that our results could be merely accounted for by differences in the visual salience of the presented objects. Our data suggest that the power of an object to automatically trigger an action is strictly linked to the effective possibility that an individual has to interact with it.

Motor cognition and its role in the phylogeny and ontogeny of action understanding.

Social life rests in large part on the capacity to understand the intentions behind the behavior of others. What are the origins of this capacity? How is one to construe its development in ontogenesis? By assuming that action understanding can be explained only in terms of the ability to read the minds of others--that is, to represent mental states--the traditional view claims that a sharp discontinuity occurs in both phylogeny and ontogeny. Over the last few years this view has been challenged by a number of ethological and psychological studies, as well as by several neurophysiological findings. In particular, the functional properties of the mirror neuron system and its direct matching mechanism indicate that action understanding may be primarily based on the motor cognition that underpins one's own capacity to act. This article aims to elaborate and motivate the pivotal role of such motor cognition, providing a biologically plausible and theoretically unitary account for the phylogeny and ontogeny of action understanding and also its impairment, as in the case of autistic spectrum disorder.

How Tool-Use Shapes Body Metric Representation: Evidence From Motor Training With and Without Robotic Assistance.

Previous evidence has shown that tool-use can reshape one's own body schema, extending peripersonal space and modulating the representation of related body parts. Here, we investigated the role of tool action in shaping the body metric representation, by contrasting two different views. According to a first view, the shaping would rely on the mere execution of tool action, while the second view suggests that the shaping induced by tool action on body representation would primarily depend on the representation of the action goals to be accomplished. To this aim, we contrasted a condition in which participants voluntarily accomplish the movement by representing the program and goal of a tool action (i.e., active tool-use training) with a condition in which the tool-use training was produced without any prior goal representation (i.e., passive tool-use training by means of robotic assistance). If the body metric representation primarily depends on the coexistence between goal representation and bodily movements, we would expect an increase of the perceived forearm length in the post- with respect to the pre-training phase after the active training phase only. Healthy participants were asked to estimate the midpoint of their right forearm before and after 20 min of tool-use training. In the active condition, subjects performed "enfold-and-push" movements using a rake to prolong their arm. In the passive condition, subjects were asked to be completely relaxed while the movements were performed with robotic assistance. Results showed a significant increase in the perceived arm length in the post- with respect to the pre-training phase only in the active task. Interestingly, only in the post-training phase, a significant difference was found between active and passive conditions, with a higher perceived arm length in the former than in the latter. From a theoretical perspective, these findings suggest that tool-use may shape body metric representation only when action programs are motorically represented and not merely produced. From a clinical perspective, these results support the use of robots for the rehabilitation of brain-damaged hemiplegic patients, provided that robot assistance during the exercises is present only "as-needed" and that patients' motor representation is actively involved.

Mirror neurons and motor intentionality.

Our social life rests to a large extent on our ability to understand the intentions of others. What are the bases of this ability? A very influential view is that we understand the intentions of others because we are able to represent them as having mental states. Without this meta-representational (mind-reading) ability their behavior would be meaningless to us. Over the past few years this view has been challenged by neurophysiological findings and, in particular, by the discovery of mirror neurons. The functional properties of these neurons indicate that intentional understanding is based primarily on a mechanism that directly matches the sensory representation of the observed actions with one's own motor representation of those same actions. These findings reveal how deeply motor and intentional components of action are intertwined, suggesting that both can be fully comprehended only starting from a motor approach to intentionality.