Emotion and decision making: multiple modulatory neural circuits.

Although the prevalent view of emotion and decision making is derived from the notion that there are dual systems of emotion and reason, a modulatory relationship more accurately reflects the current research in affective neuroscience and neuroeconomics. Studies show two potential mechanisms for affect's modulation of the computation of subjective value and decisions. Incidental affective states may carry over to the assessment of subjective value and the decision, and emotional reactions to the choice may be incorporated into the value calculation. In addition, this modulatory relationship is reciprocal: Changing emotion can change choices. This research suggests that the neural mechanisms mediating the relation between affect and choice vary depending on which affective component is engaged and which decision variables are assessed. We suggest that a detailed and nuanced understanding of emotion and decision making requires characterizing the multiple modulatory neural circuits underlying the different means by which emotion and affect can influence choices.

Perceiving gaze from head and eye rotations: An integrative challenge for children and adults.

Gaze is an emergent visual feature. A person's gaze direction is perceived not just based on the rotation of their eyes, but also their head. At least among adults, this integrative process appears to be flexible such that one feature can be weighted more heavily than the other depending on the circumstances. Yet it is unclear how this weighting might vary across individuals or across development. When children engage emergent gaze, do they prioritize cues from the head and eyes similarly to adults? Is the perception of gaze among individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) emergent, or is it reliant on a single feature? Sixty adults (M = 29.86 years-of-age), thirty-seven typically developing children and adolescents (M = 9.3 years-of-age; range = 7-15), and eighteen children with ASD (M = 9.72 years-of-age; range = 7-15) viewed faces with leftward, rightward, or direct head rotations in conjunction with leftward or rightward pupil rotations, and then indicated whether the face was looking leftward or rightward. All individuals, across development and ASD status, used head rotation to infer gaze direction, albeit with some individual differences. However, the use of pupil rotation was heavily dependent on age. Finally, children with ASD used pupil rotation significantly less than typically developing (TD) children when inferring gaze direction, even after accounting for age. Our approach provides a novel framework for understanding individual and group differences in gaze as it is actually perceived-as an emergent feature. Furthermore, this study begins to address an important gap in ASD literature, taking the first look at emergent gaze perception in this population.

Determinants of Propranolol's Selective Effect on Loss Aversion.

Research on emotion and decision making has suggested that arousal mediates risky decisions, but several distinct and often confounded processes drive such choices. We used econometric modeling to separate and quantify the unique contributions of loss aversion, risk attitudes, and choice consistency to risky decision making. We administered the beta-blocker propranolol in a double-blind, placebo-controlled within-subjects study, targeting the neurohormonal basis of physiological arousal. Matching our intervention's pharmacological specificity with a quantitative model delineating decision-making components allowed us to identify the causal relationships between arousal and decision making that do and do not exist. Propranolol selectively reduced loss aversion in a baseline- and dose-dependent manner (i.e., as a function of initial loss aversion and body mass index), and did not affect risk attitudes or choice consistency. These findings provide evidence for a specific, modulatory, and causal relationship between precise components of emotion and risky decision making.

Interoceptive ability predicts aversion to losses.

Emotions have been proposed to inform risky decision-making through the influence of affective physiological responses on subjective value. The ability to perceive internal body states, or "interoception" may influence this relationship. Here, we examined whether interoception predicts participants' degree of loss aversion, which has been previously linked to choice-related arousal responses. Participants performed both a heartbeat-detection task indexing interoception and a risky monetary decision-making task, from which loss aversion, risk attitudes and choice consistency were parametrically measured. Interoceptive ability correlated selectively with loss aversion and was unrelated to the other value parameters. This finding suggests that specific and separable component processes underlying valuation are shaped not only by our physiological responses, as shown in previous findings, but also by our interoceptive access to such signals.

Implicit race attitudes predict trustworthiness judgments and economic trust decisions.

Trust lies at the heart of every social interaction. Each day we face decisions in which we must accurately assess another individual's trustworthiness or risk suffering very real consequences. In a global marketplace of increasing heterogeneity with respect to nationality, race, and multiple other social categories, it is of great value to understand how implicitly held attitudes about group membership may support or undermine social trust and thereby implicitly shape the decisions we make. Recent behavioral and neuroimaging work suggests that a common mechanism may underlie the expression of implicit race bias and evaluations of trustworthiness, although no direct evidence of a connection exists. In two behavioral studies, we investigated the relationship between implicit race attitude (as measured by the Implicit Association Test) and social trust. We demonstrate that race disparity in both an individual's explicit evaluations of trustworthiness and, more crucially, his or her economic decisions to trust is predicted by that person's bias in implicit race attitude. Importantly, this relationship is robust and is independent of the individual's bias in explicit race attitude. These data demonstrate that the extent to which an individual invests in and trusts others with different racial backgrounds is related to the magnitude of that individual's implicit race bias. The core dimension of social trust can be shaped, to some degree, by attitudes that reside outside conscious awareness and intention.

Multiple timescales of temporal context in risky choice: Behavioral identification and relationships to physiological arousal.

Context-dependence is fundamental to risky monetary decision-making. A growing body of evidence suggests that temporal context, or recent events, alters risk-taking at a minimum of three timescales: immediate (e.g. trial-by-trial), neighborhood (e.g. a group of consecutive trials), and global (e.g. task-level). To examine context effects, we created a novel monetary choice set with intentional temporal structure in which option values shifted between multiple levels of value magnitude ("contexts") several times over the course of the task. This structure allowed us to examine whether effects of each timescale were simultaneously present in risky choice behavior and the potential mechanistic role of arousal, an established correlate of risk-taking, in context-dependency. We found that risk-taking was sensitive to immediate, neighborhood, and global timescales: risk-taking decreased following large (vs. small) outcome amounts, increased following large positive (but not negative) shifts in context, and increased when cumulative earnings exceeded expectations. We quantified arousal with skin conductance responses, which were related to the global timescale, increasing with cumulative earnings, suggesting that physiological arousal captures a task-level assessment of performance. Our results both replicate and extend prior research by demonstrating that risky decision-making is consistently dynamic at multiple timescales and that the role of arousal in risk-taking extends to some, but not all timescales of context-dependence.

Decision value computation in DLPFC and VMPFC adjusts to the available decision time.

It is increasingly clear that simple decisions are made by computing decision values for the options under consideration, and then comparing these values to make a choice. Computational models of this process suggest that it involves the accumulation of information over time, but little is known about the temporal course of valuation in the brain. To examine this, we manipulated the available decision time and observed the consequences in the brain and behavioral correlates of choice. Participants were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging while they chose to eat or not eat basic food items, in two conditions differing in the amount of time provided for choice. After identifying valuation-related regions with unbiased whole-brain general linear models, we analyzed two regions of interest: ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Finite impulse response models of the upsampled estimated neural activity from those regions allowed us to examine the onset, duration and termination of decision value signals, and to compare across regions. We found evidence for the immediate onset of value computation in both regions, but an extended duration with longer decision time. However, this was not accompanied by behavioral changes in either the accuracy or determinants of choice. Finally, there was modest evidence that DLPFC computation correlated with, but lagged behind, VMPFC computation, suggesting the sharing of information across these regions. These findings have important implications for models of decision value computation and choice.

Thinking like a trader selectively reduces individuals' loss aversion.

Research on emotion regulation has focused upon observers' ability to regulate their emotional reaction to stimuli such as affective pictures, but many other aspects of our affective experience are also potentially amenable to intentional cognitive regulation. In the domain of decision-making, recent work has demonstrated a role for emotions in choice, although such work has generally remained agnostic about the specific role of emotion. Combining psychologically-derived cognitive strategies, physiological measurements of arousal, and an economic model of behavior, this study examined changes in choices (specifically, loss aversion) and physiological correlates of behavior as the result of an intentional cognitive regulation strategy. Participants were on average more aroused per dollar to losses relative to gains, as measured with skin conductance response, and the difference in arousal to losses versus gains correlated with behavioral loss aversion across subjects. These results suggest a specific role for arousal responses in loss aversion. Most importantly, the intentional cognitive regulation strategy, which emphasized "perspective-taking," uniquely reduced both behavioral loss aversion and arousal to losses relative to gains, largely by influencing arousal to losses. Our results confirm previous research demonstrating loss aversion while providing new evidence characterizing individual differences and arousal correlates and illustrating the effectiveness of intentional regulation strategies in reducing loss aversion both behaviorally and physiologically.

Choosing for others changes dissociable computational mechanisms underpinning risky decision-making.

Choices under risk often have consequences for ourselves and others. Yet, it is unclear how the other's identity (stranger, close friend, etc.) influences risky choices made on their behalf. In a mixed within and between subjects design, two participant groups made three series of risky economic decisions: for themselves, another person, or for both themselves and another person (i.e., shared outcomes). One group made choices involving a same-sex stranger (n = 29), the other made choices involving a same-sex close friend (n = 28). Hierarchical Bayesian estimation of computations underlying risky decision-making revealed that relative to choosing for themselves, people were more risk averse, loss averse, and consistent when choices involved another person. Partner identity was additionally crucial: people became risk neutral and more consistent when choosing for friends relative to strangers. These findings establish that the complexity of the social world is mirrored in its nuanced consequences for our choices.

The actor's insight: Actors have comparable interoception but better metacognition than nonactors.

Both accurately sensing our own bodily signals and knowing whether we have accurately sensed them may contribute to a successful emotional life, but there is little evidence on whether these physiological perceptual and metacognitive abilities systematically differ between people. Here, we examined whether actors, who receive substantial training in the production, awareness, and control of emotion, and nonactor controls differed in interoceptive ability (the perception of internal bodily signals) and/or metacognition about interoceptive accuracy (awareness of that perception), and explored potential sources of individual differences in and consequences of these abilities including correlational relationships with state and trait anxiety, proxies for acting ability, and the amount of acting training. Participants performed a heartbeat detection task in which they judged whether tones were played synchronously or delayed relative to their heartbeats, and then rated their metacognitive confidence in that judgment. Cardiac interoceptive accuracy and metacognitive awareness of interoceptive accuracy were independent, and while actors' and controls' interoceptive accuracy was not significantly different, actors had consistently superior metacognitive awareness of interoception. Exploratory analyses additionally suggest that this metacognitive ability may be correlated with measures of acting ability, but not the duration of acting training. Interoceptive accuracy and metacognitive insight into that accuracy appear to be separate abilities, and while actors may be no more accurate in reading their bodies, their metacognitive insight means they know better when they're accurate and when they're not. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Gaze perception from head and pupil rotations in 2D and 3D: Typical development and the impact of autism spectrum disorder.

The study of gaze perception has largely focused on a single cue (the eyes) in two-dimensional settings. While this literature suggests that 2D gaze perception is shaped by atypical development, as in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), gaze perception is in reality contextually-sensitive, perceived as an emergent feature conveyed by the rotation of the pupils and head. We examined gaze perception in this integrative context, across development, among children and adolescents developing typically or with ASD with both 2D and 3D stimuli. We found that both groups utilized head and pupil rotations to judge gaze on a 2D face. But when evaluating the gaze of a physically-present, 3D robot, the same ASD observers used eye cues less than their typically-developing peers. This demonstrates that emergent gaze perception is a slowly developing process that is surprisingly intact, albeit weakened in ASD, and illustrates how new technology can bridge visual and clinical science.

Development of the declarative memory system in the human brain.

Brain regions that are involved in memory formation, particularly medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures and lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), have been identified in adults, but not in children. We investigated the development of brain regions involved in memory formation in 49 children and adults (ages 8-24), who studied scenes during functional magnetic resonance imaging. Recognition memory for vividly recollected scenes improved with age. There was greater activation for subsequently remembered scenes than there was for forgotten scenes in MTL and PFC regions. These activations increased with age in specific PFC, but not in MTL, regions. PFC, but not MTL, activations correlated with developmental gains in memory for details of experiences. Voxel-based morphometry indicated that gray matter volume in PFC, but not in MTL, regions reduced with age. These results suggest that PFC regions that are important for the formation of detailed memories for experiences have a prolonged maturational trajectory.

Quantifying the immediate computational effects of preceding outcomes on subsequent risky choices.

Forty years ago, prospect theory introduced the notion that risky options are evaluated relative to their recent context, causing a significant shift in the study of risky monetary decision-making in psychology, economics, and neuroscience. Despite the central role of past experiences, it remains unclear whether, how, and how much past experiences quantitatively influence risky monetary choices moment-to-moment in a nominally learning-free setting. We analyzed a large dataset of risky monetary choices with trial-by-trial feedback to quantify how past experiences, or recent events, influence risky choice behavior and the underlying processes. We found larger recent outcomes both negatively influence subsequent risk-taking and positively influence the weight put on potential losses. Using a hierarchical Bayesian framework to fit a modified version of prospect theory, we demonstrated that the same risks will be evaluated differently given different past experiences. The computations underlying risky decision-making are fundamentally dynamic, even if the environment is not.

Unique and persistent individual patterns of brain activity across different memory retrieval tasks.

Fourteen subjects were scanned in two fMRI sessions separated by several months. During each session, subjects performed an episodic retrieval task, a semantic retrieval task, and a working memory task. We found that 1) despite extensive intersubject variability in the pattern of activity across the whole brain, individual activity patterns were stable over time, 2) activity patterns of the same individual performing different tasks were more similar than activity patterns of different individuals performing the same task, and 3) that individual differences in decision criterion on a recognition test predicted the degree of similarity between any two individuals' patterns of brain activity, but individual differences in memory accuracy or similarity in structural anatomy did not. These results imply that the exclusive use of group maps may be ineffective in profiling the pattern of activations for a given task. This may be particularly true for a task like episodic retrieval, which is relatively strategic and can involve widely distributed specialized processes that are peripheral to the actual retrieval of stored information. Further, these processes may be differentially engaged depending on individual differences in cognitive processing and/or physiology.

Acute stress does not affect risky monetary decision-making.

The ubiquitous and intense nature of stress responses necessitate that we understand how they affect decision-making. Despite a number of studies examining risky decision-making under stress, it is as yet unclear whether and in what way stress alters the underlying processes that shape our choices. This is in part because previous studies have not separated and quantified dissociable valuation and decision-making processes that can affect choices of risky options, including risk attitudes, loss aversion, and choice consistency, among others. Here, in a large, fully-crossed two-day within-subjects design, we examined how acute stress alters risky decision-making. On each day, 120 participants completed either the cold pressor test or a control manipulation with equal probability, followed by a risky decision-making task. Stress responses were assessed with salivary cortisol. We fit an econometric model to choices that dissociated risk attitudes, loss aversion, and choice consistency using hierarchical Bayesian techniques to both pool data and allow heterogeneity in decision-making. Acute stress was found to have no effect on risk attitudes, loss aversion, or choice consistency, though participants did become more loss averse and more consistent on the second day relative to the first. In the context of an inconsistent previous literature on risk and acute stress, our findings provide strong and specific evidence that acute stress does not affect risk attitudes, loss aversion, or consistency in risky monetary decision-making.

Deciding How To Decide: Self-Control and Meta-Decision Making.

Many different situations related to self control involve competition between two routes to decisions: default and frugal versus more resource-intensive. Examples include habits versus deliberative decisions, fatigue versus cognitive effort, and Pavlovian versus instrumental decision making. We propose that these situations are linked by a strikingly similar core dilemma, pitting the opportunity costs of monopolizing shared resources such as executive functions for some time, against the possibility of obtaining a better outcome. We offer a unifying normative perspective on this underlying rational meta-optimization, review how this may tie together recent advances in many separate areas, and connect several independent models. Finally, we suggest that the crucial mechanisms and meta-decision variables may be shared across domains.

Fairness violations elicit greater punishment on behalf of another than for oneself.

Classic psychology and economic studies argue that punishment is the standard response to violations of fairness norms. Typically, individuals are presented with the option to punish the transgressor or not. However, such a narrow choice set may fail to capture stronger alternative preferences for restoring justice. Here we show, in contrast to the majority of findings on social punishment, that other forms of justice restoration (for example, compensation to the victim) are strongly preferred to punitive measures. Furthermore, these alternative preferences for restoring justice depend on the perspective of the deciding agent. When people are the recipient of an unfair offer, they prefer to compensate themselves without seeking retribution, even when punishment is free. Yet when people observe a fairness violation targeted at another, they change their decision to the most punitive option. Together these findings indicate that humans prefer alternative forms of justice restoration to punishment alone.

Emotion regulation reduces loss aversion and decreases amygdala responses to losses.

Emotion regulation strategies can alter behavioral and physiological responses to emotional stimuli and the neural correlates of those responses in regions such as the amygdala or striatum. The current study investigates the brain systems engaged when using an emotion regulation technique during financial decisions. In decision making, regulating emotion with reappraisal-focused strategies that encourage taking a different perspective has been shown to reduce loss aversion as observed both in choices and in the relative arousal responses to actual loss and gain outcomes. In the current study, we find using fMRI that behavioral loss aversion correlates with amygdala activity in response to losses relative to gains. Success in regulating loss aversion also correlates with the reduction in amygdala responses to losses but not to gains. Furthermore, across both decisions and outcomes, we find the reappraisal strategy increases baseline activity in dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the striatum. The similarity of the neural circuitry observed to that seen in emotion regulation, despite divergent tasks, serves as further evidence for a role of emotion in decision making, and for the power of reappraisal to change assessments of value and thereby choices.

Race and reputation: perceived racial group trustworthiness influences the neural correlates of trust decisions.

Decisions to trust people with whom we have no personal history can be based on their social reputation-a product of what we can observe about them (their appearance, social group membership, etc.)-and our own beliefs. The striatum and amygdala have been identified as regions of the brain involved in trust decisions and trustworthiness estimation, respectively. However, it is unknown whether social reputation based on group membership modulates the involvement of these regions during trust decisions. To investigate this, we examined blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) activity while participants completed a series of single-shot trust game interactions with real partners of varying races. At the time of choice, baseline BOLD responses in the striatum correlated with individuals' trust bias-that is, the overall disparity in decisions to trust Black versus White partners. BOLD signal in the striatum was higher when deciding to trust partners from the race group that the individual participant considered less trustworthy overall. In contrast, activation of the amygdala showed greater BOLD responses to Black versus White partners that scaled with the amount invested. These results suggest that the amygdala may represent emotionally relevant social group information as a subset of the general detection function it serves, whereas the striatum is involved in representing race-based reputations that shape trust decisions.