Lay standards for reasoning predict people's acceptance of suspect claims.

People vary between each other and across contexts with respect to how important it is to them to think in logical, impartial, and evidence-based ways. Recent studies demonstrate that this variation in people's personal standards for thinking predicts the nature and quality of their beliefs. Strong commitments to epistemic virtues motivate careful thinking and protect people from suspicious claims. At the same time, people are more likely to knowingly hold biased or evidentially unsupported beliefs when they think that they are justified to think in biased or evidentially poor ways. People's personal standards for reasoning likely play an important role in shaping how suspect or unreasonable information is received.

The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality.

There is a widespread cross-cultural stereotype suggesting that atheists are untrustworthy and lack a moral compass. Is there any truth to this notion? Building on theory about the cultural, (de)motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, the present research investigated whether there are reliable similarities as well as differences between believers and disbelievers in the moral values and principles they endorse. Four studies examined how religious disbelief (vs. belief) relates to endorsement of various moral values and principles in a predominately religious (vs. irreligious) country (the U.S. vs. Sweden). Two U.S. M-Turk studies (Studies 1A and 1B, N = 429) and two large cross-national studies (Studies 2-3, N = 4,193), consistently show that disbelievers (vs. believers) are less inclined to endorse moral values that serve group cohesion (the binding moral foundations). By contrast, only minor differences between believers and disbelievers were found in endorsement of other moral values (individualizing moral foundations, epistemic rationality). It is also demonstrated that presumed cultural and demotivational antecedents of disbelief (limited exposure to credibility-enhancing displays, low existential threat) are associated with disbelief. Furthermore, these factors are associated with weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations in both countries (Study 2). Most of these findings were replicated in Study 3, and results also show that disbelievers (vs. believers) have a more consequentialist view of morality in both countries. A consequentialist view of morality was also associated with another presumed antecedent of disbelief-analytic cognitive style.

Epistemic values and the Big Five: Personality characteristics of those who ascribe personal and moral value to epistemic rationality.

People differ in how much personal importance, and moral relevance, they ascribe to epistemic rationality. These stable individual differences can be assessed using the Importance of Rationality Scale (IRS), and Moralized Rationality Scale (MRS). Furthermore, these individual differences are conceptually distinct, and associated with different cognitive, affective, and behavioral outcomes. However, little is known about what signifies and differentiates people who score high (vs. low) on the IRS and MRS respectively, and where these individual differences stem from. In the present research we begin to address these questions by examining how these epistemic values relate to the Big Five personality traits. Two studies consistently show that both the IRS and MRS are positively related to Openness to experience. However, only the MRS is negatively associated with Agreeableness, and only the IRS is positively associated with Conscientiousness.

Moralized Rationality: Relying on Logic and Evidence in the Formation and Evaluation of Belief Can Be Seen as a Moral Issue.

In the present article we demonstrate stable individual differences in the extent to which a reliance on logic and evidence in the formation and evaluation of beliefs is perceived as a moral virtue, and a reliance on less rational processes is perceived as a vice. We refer to this individual difference variable as moralized rationality. Eight studies are reported in which an instrument to measure individual differences in moralized rationality is validated. Results show that the Moralized Rationality Scale (MRS) is internally consistent, and captures something distinct from the personal importance people attach to being rational (Studies 1-3). Furthermore, the MRS has high test-retest reliability (Study 4), is conceptually distinct from frequently used measures of individual differences in moral values, and it is negatively related to common beliefs that are not supported by scientific evidence (Study 5). We further demonstrate that the MRS predicts morally laden reactions, such as a desire for punishment, of people who rely on irrational (vs. rational) ways of forming and evaluating beliefs (Studies 6 and 7). Finally, we show that the MRS uniquely predicts motivation to contribute to a charity that works to prevent the spread of irrational beliefs (Study 8). We conclude that (1) there are stable individual differences in the extent to which people moralize a reliance on rationality in the formation and evaluation of beliefs, (2) that these individual differences do not reduce to the personal importance attached to rationality, and (3) that individual differences in moralized rationality have important motivational and interpersonal consequences.

The role of prevention focus under stereotype threat: Initial cognitive mobilization is followed by depletion.

Previous research has demonstrated that stereotype threat induces a prevention focus and impairs central executive functions. The present research examines how these 2 consequences of stereotype threat are related. The authors argue that the prevention focus is responsible for the effects of stereotype threat on executive functions and cognitive performance. However, because the prevention focus is adapted to deal with threatening situations, the authors propose that it also leads to some beneficial responses to stereotype threat. Specifically, because stereotype threat signals a high risk of failure, a prevention focus initiates immediate recruitment of cognitive control resources. The authors further argue that this response initially facilitates cognitive performance but that the additional cognitive demands associated with working under threat lead to cognitive depletion over time. Study 1 demonstrates that stereotype threat (vs. control) facilitates immediate cognitive control capacity during a stereotype-relevant task. Study 2 experimentally demonstrates the process by showing that stereotype threat (vs. control) facilitates cognitive control as a default, as well as when a prevention focus has been experimentally induced, but not when a promotion focus has been induced. Study 3 shows that stereotype threat facilitates initial math performance under a prevention focus, whereas no effect is found under a promotion focus. Consistent with previous research, however, stereotype threat impaired math performance over time under a prevention focus, but not under a promotion focus.

Injustice for all or just for me? Social value orientation predicts responses to own versus other's procedures.

In two experiments, the authors investigated how differences in social value orientation predict evaluations of procedures that were accorded to self and others. Proselfs versus prosocials were either granted or denied an opportunity to voice an opinion in a decision-making process and witnessed how someone else was either granted or denied such an opportunity. Consistent with the hypothesis, procedural evaluations of both proselfs and prosocials were influenced by own procedure when other was granted voice, but only proselfs were influenced by own procedure when other was denied voice. These findings were particularly attributable to prosocials' tendency to evaluate a situation where no-voice procedures are applied consistently between persons more positively than proselfs. It is concluded that proselfs are focused on procedural justice and injustice for self more than prosocials, whereas prosocials value equality in procedures more than proselfs-even when equality implies injustice for all.

Social change as an important goal or likely outcome: how regulatory focus affects commitment to collective action.

The results of three experiments showed that regulatory focus influences the way in which the importance and likelihood of social change affect individuals' commitment to collective action. In Studies 1 (N= 82) and 2 (N= 153), the strength of participants' chronic regulatory focus was measured. In Study 3 (N= 52), promotion or prevention focus was experimentally induced. The results showed that for individuals under promotion focus, commitment to collective action depended on the perceived likelihood that through this action important social change would be achieved. Individuals under prevention focus were willing to commit to collective action when they attached high importance to its goal, regardless of the extent to which they believed that attainment of this goal was likely. Implications of these results for work on regulatory focus and collective action are discussed.

By any means necessary: the effects of regulatory focus and moral conviction on hostile and benevolent forms of collective action.

In two studies, we investigate the effect of individuals' promotion and prevention focus on engagement in collective action. We show that responding to group-based disadvantage out of a sense of moral conviction motivates prevention-oriented- but not promotion-oriented- individuals to engage in collective action. Furthermore, holding such strong moral convictions about the fair treatment of their group causes the prevention-oriented to disregard societal rules against hostile forms of collective action (i.e., forms of action that are aimed at harming the interests of those held responsible for the group's disadvantage). Study 1 showed that prevention-oriented individuals, but not promotion-oriented individuals, with a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group are willing to support both hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. Study 2 replicated this effect and showed that for prevention-oriented individuals but not for promotion-oriented individuals, holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group overrides moral objections to hostile forms of collective action in the decision to support these forms of action.