Psychobiology of altered states of consciousness.

The article reviews the current knowledge regarding altered states of consciousness (ASC) (a) occurring spontaneously, (b) evoked by physical and physiological stimulation, (c) induced by psychological means, and (d) caused by diseases. The emphasis is laid on psychological and neurobiological approaches. The phenomenological analysis of the multiple ASC resulted in 4 dimensions by which they can be characterized: activation, awareness span, self-awareness, and sensory dynamics. The neurophysiological approach revealed that the different states of consciousness are mainly brought about by a compromised brain structure, transient changes in brain dynamics (disconnectivity), and neurochemical and metabolic processes. Besides these severe alterations, environmental stimuli, mental practices, and techniques of self-control can also temporarily alter brain functioning and conscious experience.

Brain electrical activity and subjective experience during altered states of consciousness: ganzfeld and hypnagogic states.

Manifestations of experimentally induced altered states of consciousness in the brain's electrical activity as well as in subjective experience were explored via the hypnagogic state at sleep onset, and the state induced by exposure to an unstructured perceptual field (ganzfeld). Twelve female paid volunteers participated in sessions involving sleep onset, ganzfeld, and eyes-closed relaxed waking, and were repeatedly prompted for recall of their momentary mentation, according to a predefined schedule. Nineteen channel EEG, two channels EOG and EMG were recorded simultaneously. The mentation reports were followed by the subjects' ratings of their experience on a number of ordinal scales. Two-hundred and forty-one mentation reports were collected. EEG epochs immediately preceding the mentation reports were FFT-analysed and the spectra compared between states. The ganzfeld EEG spectrum, showing no signs of decreased vigilance, was very similar to the EEG spectrum of waking states, even showed a minor acceleration of alpha activity. The subjective experience data were reduced to four principal components: Factor I represented the subjective vigilance dimension, as confirmed by correlations with EEG spectral indices. Only Factor IV, the 'absorption' dimension, differentiated between the ganzfeld state (more absorption) and other states. In waking states and in ganzfeld, the subjects estimated elapsed time periods significantly shorter than in states at sleep onset. The results did not support the assumption of a hypnagogic nature of the ganzfeld imagery. Dream-like imagery can occur in various global functional states of the brain; hypnagogic and ganzfeld-induced states should be conceived as special cases of a broader class of 'hypnagoid' phenomena.