Culturally learned first impressions occur rapidly and automatically and emerge early in development.

Previous research indicates that first impressions from faces are the products of automatic and rapid processing and emerge early in development. These features have been taken as evidence that first impressions have a phylogenetic origin. We examine whether first impressions acquired through learning can also possess these features. First, we confirm that adults rate a person as more intelligent when they are wearing glasses (Study 1). Next, we show this inference persists when participants are instructed to ignore the glasses (Study 2) and when viewing time is restricted to 100 ms (Study 3). Finally, we show that 6-year-old, but not 4-year-old, children perceive individuals wearing glasses to be more intelligent, indicating that the effect is seen relatively early in development (Study 4). These data indicate that automaticity, rapid access and early emergence are not evidence that first impressions have an innate origin. Rather, these features are equally compatible with a learning model.

Exploring patterns of ongoing thought under naturalistic and conventional task-based conditions.

Previous research suggests that patterns of ongoing thought are heterogeneous, varying across situations and individuals. The current study investigated the influence of multiple tasks and affective style on ongoing patterns of thought. We used 9 different tasks and measured ongoing thought using multidimensional experience sampling. A Principal Component Analysis of the experience sampling data revealed four patterns of ongoing thought: episodic social cognition, unpleasant intrusive, concentration and self focus. Linear Mixed Modelling was used to conduct a series of exploratory analyses aimed at examining contextual distributions of these thought patterns. We found that different task contexts reliably evoke different thought patterns. Moreover, intrusive and negative thought pattern expression were influenced by individual affective style (depression level). The data establish the influence of task context and intrinsic features on ongoing thought, highlighting the importance of documenting how thought patterns emerge in cognitive tasks with different requirements.

Young children perceive less humanness in outgroup faces.

We investigated when young children first dehumanize outgroups. Across two studies, 5- and 6-year-olds were asked to rate how human they thought a set of ambiguous doll-human face morphs were. We manipulated whether these faces belonged to their gender in- or gender outgroup (Study 1) and to a geographically based in- or outgroup (Study 2). In both studies, the tendency to perceive outgroup faces as less human relative to ingroup faces increased with age. Explicit ingroup preference, in contrast, was present even in the youngest children and remained stable across age. These results demonstrate that children dehumanize outgroup members from relatively early in development and suggest that the tendency to do so may be partially distinguishable from intergroup preference. This research has important implications for our understanding of children's perception of humanness and the origins of intergroup bias.

Incidental retrieval of prior emotion mimicry.

When observing emotional expressions, similar sensorimotor states are activated in the observer, often resulting in physical mimicry. For example, when observing a smile, the zygomaticus muscles associated with smiling are activated in the observer, and when observing a frown, the corrugator brow muscles. We show that the consistency of an individual's facial emotion, whether they always frown or smile, can be encoded into memory. When the individuals are viewed at a later time expressing no emotion, muscle mimicry of the prior state can be detected, even when the emotion itself is task irrelevant. The results support simulation accounts of memory, where prior embodiments of other's states during encoding are reactivated when re-encountering a person.

Vulnerability to depression is associated with a failure to acquire implicit social appraisals.

Major depressive disorder (MDD) is associated with disrupted relationships with partners, family, and peers. These problems can precipitate the onset of clinical illness, influence severity and the prospects for recovery. Here, we investigated whether individuals who have recovered from depression use interpersonal signals to form favourable appraisals of others as social partners. Twenty recovered-depressed adults (with >1 adult episode of MDD but euthymic and medication-free for six months) and 23 healthy, never-depressed adults completed a task in which the gaze direction of some faces reliably cued the location a target (valid faces), whereas other faces cued the opposite location (invalid faces). No participants reported awareness of this contingency, and both groups were significantly faster to categorise targets following valid compared with invalid gaze cueing faces. Following this task, participants judged the trustworthiness of the faces. Whereas the healthy never-depressed participants judged the valid faces to be significantly more trustworthy than the invalid faces; this implicit social appraisal was absent in the recovered-depressed participants. Individuals who have recovered from MDD are able to respond appropriately to joint attention with other people but appear to not use joint attention to form implicit trust appraisals of others as potential social partners.

Ownership Status Influences the Degree of Joint Facilitatory Behavior.

When engaging in joint activities, humans tend to sacrifice some of their own sensorimotor comfort and efficiency to facilitate a partner's performance. In the two experiments reported here, we investigated whether ownership-a socioculturally based nonphysical feature ascribed to objects-influenced facilitatory motor behavior in joint action. Participants passed mugs that differed in ownership status across a table to a partner. We found that participants oriented handles less toward their partners when passing their own mugs than when passing mugs owned by their partners (Experiment 1) and mugs owned by the experimenter (Experiment 2). These findings indicate that individuals plan and execute actions that assist their partners but do so to a smaller degree if it is the individuals' own property that the partners intend to manipulate. We discuss these findings in terms of underlying variables associated with ownership and conclude that a self-other distinction can be found in the human sensorimotor system.

Four fundamental dimensions underlie the perception of human actions.

We evaluate the actions of other individuals based upon a variety of movements that reveal critical information to guide decision making and behavioural responses. These signals convey a range of information about the actor, including their goals, intentions and internal mental states. Although progress has been made to identify cortical regions involved in action processing, the organising principles underlying our representation of actions still remains unclear. In this paper we investigated the conceptual space that underlies action perception by assessing which qualities are fundamental to the perception of human actions. We recorded 240 different actions using motion-capture and used these data to animate a volumetric avatar that performed the different actions. 230 participants then viewed these actions and rated the extent to which each action demonstrated 23 different action characteristics (e.g., avoiding-approaching, pulling-pushing, weak-powerful). We analysed these data using Exploratory Factor Analysis to examine the latent factors underlying visual action perception. The best fitting model was a four-dimensional model with oblique rotation. We named the factors: friendly-unfriendly, formidable-feeble, planned-unplanned, and abduction-adduction. The first two factors of friendliness and formidableness explained approximately 22% of the variance each, compared to planned and abduction, which explained approximately 7-8% of the variance each; as such we interpret this representation of action space as having 2 + 2 dimensions. A closer examination of the first two factors suggests a similarity to the principal factors underlying our evaluation of facial traits and emotions, whilst the last two factors of planning and abduction appear unique to actions.

Facilitation and interference in spatial and body reference frames.

The observation of someone else's action facilitates similar actions in the observer. Such priming effects can be driven by alignment between the observer and the observed in body-centred or spatial coordinates (or both). The separate and joint contributions of these sources of priming remain to be fully characterised. Here, we compare spatial and body priming effects across the whole body "space", by using hand and foot responses. This allows a clearer separation of body priming from spatial priming than available from previous studies. In addition, we demonstrate two further features of these action priming effects. First, there are general interference and facilitation effects when the layout of viewed displays matches the participant's body (e.g. hand above the foot). These effects have not been considered in previous studies. Second, by taking these layout effects into account, we identify the facilitation and interference components of spatial and body priming effects. Both types of priming effect are observed, and facilitation and interference effects are only observed when both body and spatial frames of reference are working in the same direction. These findings show that in action perception, the behaviours of others are processed simultaneously in multiple frames of reference that have complex, interacting effects--both facilitating and interfering--on the motor system of the observer.

Self-generated cognitive fluency as an alternative route to preference formation.

People tend to prefer fluently processed over harder to process information. In this study we examine two issues concerning fluency and preference. First, previous research has pre-selected fluent and non-fluent materials. We did not take this approach yet show that the fluency of individuals' idiosyncratic on-line interactions with a given stimulus can influence preference formation. Second, while processing fluency influences preference, the opposite also may be true: preferred stimuli could be processed more fluently than non-preferred. Participants performed a visual search task either before or after indicating their preferred images from an array of either paintings by Kandinsky or decorated coffee mugs. Preferred stimuli were associated with fluent processing, reflected in facilitated search times. Critically, this was only the case for participants who gave their preferences after completing the visual search task, not for those stating preferences prior to the visual search task. Our results suggest that the spontaneous and idiosyncratic experience of processing fluency plays a role in forming preference judgments and conversely that our first impressions of preference do not drive response fluency.

Viewpoint (in)dependence of action representations: an MVPA study.

The discovery of mirror neurons-neurons that code specific actions both when executed and observed-in area F5 of the macaque provides a potential neural mechanism underlying action understanding. To date, neuroimaging evidence for similar coding of specific actions across the visual and motor modalities in human ventral premotor cortex (PMv)-the putative homologue of macaque F5-is limited to the case of actions observed from a first-person perspective. However, it is the third-person perspective that figures centrally in our understanding of the actions and intentions of others. To address this gap in the literature, we scanned participants with fMRI while they viewed two actions from either a first- or third-person perspective during some trials and executed the same actions during other trials. Using multivoxel pattern analysis, we found action-specific cross-modal visual-motor representations in PMv for the first-person but not for the third-person perspective. Additional analyses showed no evidence for spatial or attentional differences across the two perspective conditions. In contrast, more posterior areas in the parietal and occipitotemporal cortex did show cross-modal coding regardless of perspective. These findings point to a stronger role for these latter regions, relative to PMv, in supporting the understanding of others' actions with reference to one's own actions.

Visuo-motor imagery of specific manual actions: a multi-variate pattern analysis fMRI study.

An important human capacity is the ability to imagine performing an action, and its consequences, without actually executing it. Here we seek neural representations of specific manual actions that are common across visuo-motor performance and imagery. Participants were scanned with fMRI while they performed and observed themselves performing two different manual actions during some trials, and imagined performing and observing themselves performing the same actions during other trials. We used multi-variate pattern analysis to identify areas where representations of specific actions generalize across imagined and performed actions. The left anterior parietal cortex showed this property. In this region, we also found that activity patterns for imagined actions generalize better to performed actions than vice versa, and we provide simulation results that can explain this asymmetry. The present results are the first demonstration of action-specific representations that are similar irrespective of whether actions are actively performed or covertly imagined. Further, they demonstrate concretely how the apparent cross-modal visuo-motor coding of actions identified in studies of a human "mirror neuron system" could, at least partially, reflect imagery.

Remembered together: Social interaction facilitates retrieval while reducing individuation of features within bound representations.

When encountering social scenes, there appears to be rapid and automatic detection of social interactions. Representations of interacting people appear to be bound together via a mechanism of joint attention, which results in enhanced memory, even when participants are unaware that memory is required. However, even though access is facilitated for socially bound representations, we predicted that the individual features of these representations are less efficiently encoded, and features can therefore migrate between the constituent interacting individuals. This was confirmed in Experiment 1, where overall memory for interacting compared with non-interacting dyads was facilitated but binding of features within an individual was weak, resulting in feature migration errors. Experiment 2 demonstrated the role of conscious strategic processing, where participants were aware that memory would be tested. With such awareness, attention can be focused on individual objects allowing the binding of features. The results support an account of two forms of processing: an initial automatic social binding process where interacting individuals are represented as one episode in memory facilitating access and a further stage where attention can be focused on each individual enabling the binding of features within individual objects.

Rapid detection of social interactions is the result of domain general attentional processes.

Using visual search displays of interacting and non-interacting pairs, it has been demonstrated that detection of social interactions is facilitated. For example, two people facing each other are found faster than two people with their backs turned: an effect that may reflect social binding. However, recent work has shown the same effects with non-social arrow stimuli, where towards facing arrows are detected faster than away facing arrows. This latter work suggests a primary mechanism is an attention orienting process driven by basic low-level direction cues. However, evidence for lower level attentional processes does not preclude a potential additional role of higher-level social processes. Therefore, in this series of experiments we test this idea further by directly comparing basic visual features that orient attention with representations of socially interacting individuals. Results confirm the potency of orienting of attention via low-level visual features in the detection of interacting objects. In contrast, there is little evidence for the representation of social interactions influencing initial search performance.

On the role of object information in action observation: an fMRI study.

Observing other people's actions activates a network of brain regions that is also activated during the execution of these actions. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to test whether these "mirror" regions in frontal and parietal cortices primarily encode the spatiomotor aspects or the functional goal-related aspects of observed tool actions. Participants viewed static depictions of actions consisting of a tool object (e.g., key) and a target object (e.g., keyhole). They judged the actions either with regard to whether the objects were oriented correctly for the action to succeed (spatiomotor task) or whether an action goal could be achieved with the objects (function task). Compared with a control condition, both tasks activated regions in left frontoparietal cortex previously implicated in action observation and execution. Of these regions, the premotor cortex and supramarginal gyrus were primarily activated during the spatiomotor task, whereas the middle frontal gyrus was primarily activated during the function task. Regions along the intraparietal sulcus were more strongly activated during the spatiomotor task but only when the spatiomotor properties of the tool object were unknown in advance. These results suggest a division of labor within the action observation network that maps onto a similar division previously proposed for action execution.

Intergroup preference, not dehumanization, explains social biases in emotion attribution.

Psychological models can only help improve intergroup relations if they accurately characterise the mechanisms underlying social biases. The claim that outgroups suffer dehumanization is near ubiquitous in the social sciences. We challenge the most prominent psychological model of dehumanization - infrahumanization theory - which holds outgroup members are subtly dehumanized by being denied human emotions. We examine the theory across seven intergroup contexts in thirteen pre-registered and highly powered experiments (N = 1690). We find outgroup members are not denied uniquely human emotions relative to ingroup members. Rather, they are ascribed prosocial emotions to a lesser extent but antisocial emotions to a greater extent. Apparent evidence for infrahumanization is better explained by ingroup preference, outgroup derogation and stereotyping. Infrahumanization theory may obscure more than it reveals about intergroup bias.

Young children learn first impressions of faces through social referencing.

Previous research has demonstrated that the tendency to form first impressions from facial appearance emerges early in development. We examined whether social referencing is one route through which these consistent first impressions are acquired. In Study 1, we show that 5- to 7-year-old children are more likely to choose a target face previously associated with positive non-verbal signals as more trustworthy than a face previously associated with negative non-verbal signals. In Study 2, we show that children generalise this learning to novel faces who resemble those who have previously been the recipients of positive non-verbal behaviour. Taken together, these data show one means through which individuals within a community could acquire consistent, and potentially inaccurate, first impressions of others faces. In doing so, they highlight a route through which cultural transmission of first impressions can occur.

No convincing evidence outgroups are denied uniquely human characteristics: Distinguishing intergroup preference from trait-based dehumanization.

According to the dual model, outgroup members can be dehumanized by being thought to possess uniquely and characteristically human traits to a lesser extent than ingroup members. However, previous research on this topic has tended to investigate the attribution of human traits that are socially desirable in nature such as warmth, civility and rationality. As a result, it has not yet been possible to determine whether this form of dehumanization is distinct from intergroup preference and stereotyping. We first establish that participants associate undesirable (e.g., corrupt, jealous) as well as desirable (e.g., open-minded, generous) traits with humans. We then go on to show that participants tend to attribute desirable human traits more strongly to ingroup members but undesirable human traits more strongly to outgroup members. This pattern holds across three different intergroup contexts for which dehumanization effects have previously been reported: political opponents, immigrants and criminals. Taken together, these studies cast doubt on the claim that a trait-based account of representing others as 'less human' holds value in the study of intergroup bias.

Predictive person models elicit motor biases: The face-inhibition effect revisited.

Using an established paradigm, we tested whether people derive motoric predictions about an actor's forthcoming actions from prior knowledge about them and the context in which they are seen. In two experiments, participants identified famous tennis and soccer players using either hand or foot responses. Athletes were shown either carrying out or not carrying out their associated actions (swinging, kicking), either in the context where these actions are typically seen (tennis court, soccer Pitch) or outside these contexts (beach, awards ceremony). Replicating prior work, identifying non-acting athletes revealed the negative compatibility effects: viewing tennis players led to faster responses with a foot than a hand, and vice versa for viewing soccer players. Consistent with the idea that negative compatibility effects result from the absence of a predicted action, these effects were eliminated (or reversed) when the athletes were seen carrying out actions typically associated with them. Strikingly, however, these motoric biases were not limited to In-Context trials but were, if anything, more robust in the Out-of-Context trials. This pattern held even when attention was drawn specifically to the context (Experiment 2). These results confirm that people hold motoric knowledge about the actions that others typically carry out and that these actions are part of perceptual representations that are accessed when those others are re-encountered, possibly in order to resolve uncertainty in person perception.

Searching for people: Non-facing distractor pairs hinder the visual search of social scenes more than facing distractor pairs.

There is growing interest in the visual and attentional processes recruited when human observers view social scenes containing multiple people. Findings from visual search paradigms have helped shape this emerging literature. Previous research has established that, when hidden amongst pairs of individuals facing in the same direction (leftwards or rightwards), pairs of individuals arranged front-to-front are found faster than pairs of individuals arranged back-to-back. Here, we describe a second, closely-related effect with important theoretical implications. When searching for a pair of individuals facing in the same direction (leftwards or rightwards), target dyads are found faster when hidden amongst distractor pairs arranged front-to-front, than when hidden amongst distractor pairs arranged back-to-back. This distractor arrangement effect was also obtained with target and distractor pairs constructed from arrows and types of common objects that cue visuospatial attention. These findings argue against the view that pairs of people arranged front-to-front capture exogenous attention due to a domain-specific orienting mechanism. Rather, it appears that salient direction cues (e.g., gaze direction, body orientation, arrows) hamper systematic search and impede efficient interpretation, when distractor pairs are arranged back-to-back.

Spontaneous first impressions emerge from brief training.

People have a strong and reliable tendency to infer the character traits of strangers based solely on facial appearance. In five highly powered and pre-registered experiments, we investigate the relative merits of learning and nativist accounts of the origins of these first impressions. First, we test whether brief periods of training can establish consistent first impressions de novo. Using a novel paradigm with Greebles-a class of synthetic object with inter-exemplar variation that approximates that seen between individual faces-we show that participants quickly learn to associate appearance cues with trustworthiness (Experiments 1 and 2). In a further experiment, we show that participants easily learn a two-dimensional structure in which individuals are presented as simultaneously varying in both trustworthiness and competence (Experiment 3). Crucially, in the final two experiments (Experiments 4 and 5) we show that, once learned, these first impressions occur following very brief exposure (100 ms). These results demonstrate that first impressions can be rapidly learned and, once learned, take on features previously thought to hold only for innate first impressions (rapid availability). Taken together, these results highlight the plausibility of learning accounts of first impressions.