The Anticipatory and Task-Driven Nature of Visual Perception.

Humans have a remarkable capacity to arrange and rearrange perceptual input according to different categorizations. This begs the question whether the categorization is exclusively a higher visual or amodal process, or whether categorization processes influence early visual areas as well. To investigate this we scanned healthy participants in a magnetic resonance imaging scanner during a conceptual decision task in which participants had to answer questions about upcoming images of animals. Early visual cortices (V1 and V2) contained information about the current visual input, about the granularity of the forthcoming categorical decision, as well as perceptual expectations about the upcoming visual stimulus. The middle temporal gyrus, the anterior temporal lobe, and the inferior frontal gyrus were also involved in the categorization process, constituting an attention and control network that modulates perceptual processing. These findings provide further evidence that early visual processes are driven by conceptual expectations and task demands.

What do infants understand of others' action? A theoretical account of early social cognition.

Intention reading and action understanding have been reported in ever-younger infants. However, the notions of intention attribution and action understanding, as well as their relation to each other, are surrounded by much confusion, making it difficult to assess the meaning and value of such findings. In this paper we set out to clarify the notions of 'action understanding' and 'intention attribution'. We will show that what is commonly referred to as 'action understanding' in fact encompasses various heterogeneous association and prediction mechanisms. In general, these forms of action understanding will not result in the attribution of an intention to an observed actor. By detaching intention attribution from action understanding, and by exposing the latter as an umbrella notion, we provide a theoretical framework on early social cognition that allows for better comparison of findings from different experimental paradigms, and better assessment of infant action understanding abilities. Taking into account the plurality of forms that action understanding can adopt will help cognitive neuroscience to gain a full understanding of the early roots of social cognition.

The effect of context and reason on the neural correlates of intentions.

Many studies have identified networks in parietal and prefrontal cortex that are involved in intentional action. Yet, our understanding of the way these networks are involved in intentions is still very limited. In this study, we investigate two characteristics of these processes: context- and reason-dependence of the neural states associated with intentions. We ask whether these states depend on the context a person is in and the reasons they have for choosing an action. We used a combination of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and multivariate decoding to directly assess the context- and reason-dependency of the neural states underlying intentions. We show that action intentions can be decoded from fMRI data based on a classifier trained in the same context and with the same reason, in line with previous decoding studies. Furthermore, we found that intentions can be decoded across different reasons for choosing an action. However, decoding across different contexts was not successful. We found anecdotal to moderate evidence against context-invariant information in all regions of interest and for all conditions but one. These results suggest that the neural states associated with intentions are modulated by the context of the action.

Hierarchies in action and motor control.

In analyses of the motor system, two hierarchies are often posited: The first-the action hierarchy-is a decomposition of an action into subactions and sub-subactions. The second-the control hierarchy-is a postulated hierarchy in the neural control processes that are supposed to bring about the action. A general assumption in cognitive neuroscience is that these two hierarchies are internally consistent and provide complementary descriptions of neuronal control processes. In this article, we suggest that neither offers a complete explanation and that they cannot be reconciled in a logical or conceptually coherent way. Furthermore, neither pays proper attention to the dynamics and temporal aspects of neural control processes. We will explore an alternative hierarchical organization in which causality is inherent in the dynamics over time. Specifically, high levels of the hierarchy encode more stable (goal-related) representations, whereas lower levels represent more transient (actions and motor acts) kinematics. If employed properly, a hierarchy based on this latter principle of temporal extension is not subject to the problems that plague the traditional accounts.

Does the temporal cortex make us human? A review of structural and functional diversity of the primate temporal lobe.

Temporal cortex is a primate specialization that shows considerable variation in size, morphology, and connectivity across species. Human temporal cortex is involved in many behaviors that are considered especially well developed in humans, including semantic processing, language, and theory of mind. Here, we ask whether the involvement of temporal cortex in these behaviors can be explained in the context of the 'general' primate organization of the temporal lobe or whether the human temporal lobe contains unique specializations indicative of a 'step change' in the lineage leading to modern humans. We propose that many human behaviors can be explained as elaborations of temporal cortex functions observed in other primates. However, changes in temporal lobe white matter suggest increased integration of information within temporal cortex and between posterior temporal cortex and other association areas, which likely enable behaviors not possible in other species.

Embodying the camera: An EEG study on the effect of camera movements on film spectators´ sensorimotor cortex activation.

One key feature of film consists in its power to bodily engage the viewer. Previous research has suggested lens and camera movements to be among the most effective stylistic devices involved in such engagement. In an EEG experiment we assessed the role of such movements in modulating specific spectators´ neural and experiential responses, likely reflecting such engagement. We produced short video clips of an empty room with a still, a zooming and a moving camera (steadicam) that might simulate the movement of an observer in different ways. We found an event related desynchronization of the beta components of the rolandic mu rhythm that was stronger for the clips produced with steadicam than for those produced with a still or zooming camera. No equivalent modulation in the attention related occipital areas was found, thus confirming the sensorimotor nature of spectators´ neural responses to the film clips. The present study provides the first empirical evidence that filmic means such as camera movements alone can modulate spectators' bodily engagement with film.

Disentangling causal webs in the brain using functional magnetic resonance imaging: A review of current approaches.

In the past two decades, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) has been used to relate neuronal network activity to cognitive processing and behavior. Recently this approach has been augmented by algorithms that allow us to infer causal links between component populations of neuronal networks. Multiple inference procedures have been proposed to approach this research question but so far, each method has limitations when it comes to establishing whole-brain connectivity patterns. In this paper, we discuss eight ways to infer causality in fMRI research: Bayesian Nets, Dynamical Causal Modelling, Granger Causality, Likelihood Ratios, Linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Models, Patel's Tau, Structural Equation Modelling, and Transfer Entropy. We finish with formulating some recommendations for the future directions in this area.

"Cuts in Action": A High-Density EEG Study Investigating the Neural Correlates of Different Editing Techniques in Film.

In spite of their striking differences with real-life perception, films are perceived and understood without effort. Cognitive film theory attributes this to the system of continuity editing, a system of editing guidelines outlining the effect of different cuts and edits on spectators. A major principle in this framework is the 180° rule, a rule recommendation that, to avoid spectators' attention to the editing, two edited shots of the same event or action should not be filmed from angles differing in a way that expectations of spatial continuity are strongly violated. In the present study, we used high-density EEG to explore the neural underpinnings of this rule. In particular, our analysis shows that cuts and edits in general elicit early ERP component indicating the registration of syntactic violations as known from language, music, and action processing. However, continuity edits and cuts-across the line differ from each other regarding later components likely to be indicating the differences in spatial remapping as well as in the degree of conscious awareness of one's own perception. Interestingly, a time-frequency analysis of the occipital alpha rhythm did not support the hypothesis that such differences in processing routes are mainly linked to visual attention. On the contrary, our study found specific modulations of the central mu rhythm ERD as an indicator of sensorimotor activity, suggesting that sensorimotor networks might play an important role. We think that these findings shed new light on current discussions about the role of attention and embodied perception in film perception and should be considered when explaining spectators' different experience of different kinds of cuts.

Engagement: Looking beyond the mirror to understand action understanding.

In this paper, we argue that the current focus on mirroring as the route to explaining the development of action understanding is misleading and problematic. It facilitates a fundamentally spectatorial stance, ignoring engagement and dialogue; it focuses on similarity between self and other and neglects difference; and it succumbs to the static terminology of mechanism rather than a dynamic language of process. Contrary to this view, dialogic exchanges are evident from the start of life, revealing infants' ability to engage with and respond appropriately to actions that are outside their own motor repertoire. We suggest that engagement rather than mirroring better accounts for many current findings in action understanding. The neurological evidence to date shows that action perception involves a process of continuous synchronization and change, suggesting that it might be more fruitful for research and theory to look beyond mirroring and instead adopt dynamic processual explanations of action understanding within interaction.

The role of the body in social cognition.

In this review, we discuss the actual and active dependence of social cognitive processes on the body, i.e., that part of the organism beyond the central nervous system. In particular, we will discuss mirror mechanisms, and assess the extent to which the body is recruited during these processes. We show that for emotion mirroring, this dependency is well-documented, but for action mirroring far less so. By reviewing these mechanisms and processes while contrasting body from brain, and social from general cognition, we show that both contrasts are arbitrary and problematic and that any study of cognitive processes, both social and general, should take the body into account.

Single-pulse Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Reveals Contribution of Premotor Cortex to Object Shape Recognition.

BACKGROUND: It is known that ventral premotor cortex responds selectively to the visual perception of object shapes. However, it is unclear whether this activation also contributes to visual processing. OBJECTIVE: In this study we want to assess whether activation in premotor areas contributes to visual perception of objects. METHODS: We measure performance on a perception task while delivering single pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the left premotor cortex at different latencies after stimulus onset. RESULTS: We show that in cases of limited visual consciousness, disturbing the left premotor cortex 150 ms after stimulus onset results in a decrease in the capacity to recognize shapes, compared both to other latencies and to stimulation of the vertex. CONCLUSION: Premotor cortex plays a constitutive role in object shape recognition.

Why we may not find intentions in the brain.

Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. We argue, however, that the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for. Therefore, adopting the notion of 'intention' in neuroscientific explanations can easily lead to misinterpretation of the data, and can negatively influence investigation into the neural correlates of intentional action. We suggest reinterpreting the mechanisms underlying intentional action, and we will discuss the elements that such a reinterpretation needs to account for.

How action selection can be embodied: intracranial gamma band recording shows response competition during the Eriksen flankers test.

Recent findings in monkeys suggest that action selection is based on a competition between various action options that are automatically planned by the motor system. Here we discuss data from intracranial EEG recordings in human premotor cortex (PMC) during a bimanual version of the Eriksen flankers test that suggest that the same principles apply to human action decisions. Recording sites in the dorsal PMC show an early but undifferentiated activation, a delayed response that depends on the experimental conditions and, finally, a movement related activation during action execution. Additionally, we found that the medial part of the PMC show a significant increase in response for ipsilateral trials, suggesting a role in inhibiting the wrong response. The ventral PMC seems to be involved in action execution, rather than action selection. Together these findings suggest that the human PMC is part of a network that specifies, selects, and executes actions.

Understanding motor resonance.

The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys, and the finding of motor activity during action observation in humans are generally regarded to support motor theories of action understanding. These theories take motor resonance to be essential in the understanding of observed actions and the inference of action goals. However, the notions of "resonance," "action understanding," and "action goal" appear to be used ambiguously in the literature. A survey of the literature on mirror neurons and motor resonance yields two different interpretations of the term "resonance," three different interpretations of action understanding, and again three different interpretations of what the goal of an action is. This entails that, unless it is specified what interpretation is used, the meaning of any statement about the relation between these concepts can differ to a great extent. By discussing an experiment we will show that more precise definitions and use of the concepts will allow for better assessments of motor theories of action understanding and hence a more fruitful scientific debate. Lastly, we will provide an example of how the discussed experimental setup could be adapted to test other interpretations of the concepts.