Meningococcal Carriage Evaluation in Response to a Serogroup B Meningococcal Disease Outbreak and Mass Vaccination Campaign at a College-Rhode Island, 2015-2016.

Background: Serogroup B meningococcal disease caused 7 US university outbreaks during 2013-2016. Neisseria meningitidis can be transmitted via asymptomatic nasopharyngeal carriage. MenB-FHbp (factor H binding protein), a serogroup B meningococcal (MenB) vaccine, was used to control a college outbreak. We investigated MenB-FHbp impact on meningococcal carriage. Methods: Four cross-sectional surveys were conducted in conjunction with MenB-FHbp vaccination campaigns. Questionnaires and oropharyngeal swabs were collected from students. Specimens were evaluated using culture, slide agglutination, real-time polymerase chain reaction (rt-PCR), and whole genome sequencing. Adjusted prevalence ratios (aPRs) were calculated using generalized estimating equations. Results: During each survey, 20%-24% of participants carried any meningococcal bacteria and 4% carried serogroup B by rt-PCR. The outbreak strain (ST-9069) was not detected during the initial survey; 1 student carried ST-9069 in the second and third surveys. No carriage reduction was observed over time or with more MenB-FHbp doses. In total, 615 students participated in multiple surveys: 71% remained noncarriers, 8% cleared carriage, 15% remained carriers, and 7% acquired carriage. Ten students acquired serogroup B carriage: 3 after 1 MenB-FHbp dose, 4 after 2 doses, and 3 after 3 doses. Smoking (aPR, 1.3; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.1-1.5) and male sex (aPR, 1.3; 95% CI, 1.1-1.5) were associated with increased meningococcal carriage. Conclusions: Carriage prevalence on campus remained stable, suggesting MenB-FHbp does not rapidly reduce meningococcal carriage or prevent serogroup B carriage acquisition. This reinforces the need for high vaccination coverage to protect vaccinated individuals and chemoprophylaxis for close contacts during outbreaks.

Serogroup B Meningococcal Disease Outbreak and Carriage Evaluation at a College - Rhode Island, 2015.

On February 2, 2015, the Rhode Island Department of Health was notified of a case of meningococcal disease in a male undergraduate student at Providence College. Three days later, a second case was reported in a male undergraduate with no contact with the first student, indicating an attack rate of 44 cases per 100,000 students, nearly 500 times higher than the national incidence of 0.15 cases per 100,000 among persons aged 17-22 years (Division of Bacterial Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC, unpublished data, 2013). Both cases were caused by a rare outbreak strain of Neisseria meningitidis serogroup B (ST-9069); neither case was fatal. In response to the outbreak, potential contacts received antibiotic chemoprophylaxis, and a mass vaccination campaign with a recently licensed serogroup B meningococcal (MenB) vaccine was implemented. In collaboration with CDC, the first phase of a meningococcal carriage evaluation was undertaken.

The Role of the State Health Laboratories in Advancing Health Equity.

While laboratories play an important and recognized role in many public health programs that require surveillance of disease spread or monitoring of environmental conditions, the role of public laboratories in assessing and advancing health equity is not well understood. Yet, public laboratories collect, provide or generate much of the data used to determine health equity status and monitor heath equity trends in multiple settings and disciplines. RI State Health Laboratories, a division of the RI Department of Health, operates programs that help measure and address health disparities. Health equity themes are present in laboratory programs that measure environmental determinants of health and assure equal access to laboratory screening and diagnostic services. This article will review the role of laboratory programs in advancing health equity in the state. Specific examples of laboratory contributions to health equity programs will be provided and examined. Future trends and unmet needs will also be discussed. [Full article available at http://rimed.org/rimedicaljournal-2016-11.asp].

A Model of Shared Mycobacteriology Testing Services: Lessons Learned.

OBJECTIVE: The need for public health laboratories (PHLs) to prioritize resources has led to increased interest in sharing diagnostic services. To address this concept for tuberculosis (TB) testing, the New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center and the Rhode Island State Health Laboratories assessed the feasibility of shared services for the detection and characterization of Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex (MTBC). METHODS: We assessed multiple aspects of shared services including shipping, testing, reporting, and cost. Rhode Island State Health Laboratories shipped MTBC-positive specimens and isolates to Wadsworth Center. Average turnaround times were calculated and cost analysis was performed. RESULTS: Testing turnaround times were similar at both PHLs; however, the availability of conventional drug susceptibility testing (DST) results for Rhode Island primary specimens and isolates were extended by approximately four days of shipping time. An extended molecular testing panel was performed on every specimen submitted from Rhode Island State Health Laboratories to Wadsworth Center, and the total cost per specimen at Wadsworth Center was $177.12 less than at Rhode Island State Health Laboratories, plus shipping. Following a mid-study review, Wadsworth Center provided testing turnaround times for detection (same day), species determination of MTBC (same day), and molecular DST (2.5 days). CONCLUSION: The collaboration between Wadsworth Center and Rhode Island State Health Laboratories to assess shared services of TB testing highlighted a successful model that may serve as a guideline for other PHLs. The provision of additional rapid testing at a lower cost demonstrated in this study could potentially improve patient management and result in significant cost and resource savings if used in similar models across the country.

Identification and characterization of clinical Bacillus spp. isolates phenotypically similar to Bacillus anthracis.

Bacillus anthracis, the etiological agent of anthrax, is a gram-positive, spore-forming rod, with colonies exhibiting a unique ground-glass appearance, and lacking hemolysis and motility. In addition to these phenotypes, several others traits are characteristic of B. anthracis such as susceptibility to gamma phage, the presence of two virulence plasmids (pX01 and pX02), and specific cell wall and capsular antigens that are commonly detected by direct fluorescent-antibody assays. We report on the identification and characterization of 14 Bacillus megaterium and four Bacillus sp. clinical isolates that are nonhemolytic, nonmotile, and produce a capsule antigenically similar to B. anthracis. This work furthers our understanding of Bacillus diversity and the limitations of the assays and phenotypes that are used to differentiate species in this genus. Further work is necessary to understand whether these strains are opportunistic pathogens or just contaminates.

Public health response to bioterrorism with Bacillus anthracis: coordinating public health laboratory, communication, and law enforcement.

In October 2001, public health departments across the United States were part of an intensive response to a bioterrorism event using anthrax spores delivered by mail. It is useful to examine this experience as an unscripted exercise of bioterrorism response capacity, more realistic than scenarios of planned exercises. The event particularly challenged public health laboratory and communications capacity, but it also tested surveillance and training capacity. The bioterrorism response demonstrated the importance of strong partnerships between the public health laboratory and emergency response agencies as well as medical providers and the usefulness of open, flexible communication strategies.