A swapped genetic code prevents viral infections and gene transfer.

Engineering the genetic code of an organism has been proposed to provide a firewall from natural ecosystems by preventing viral infections and gene transfer1-6. However, numerous viruses and mobile genetic elements encode parts of the translational apparatus7-9, potentially rendering a genetic-code-based firewall ineffective. Here we show that such mobile transfer RNAs (tRNAs) enable gene transfer and allow viral replication in Escherichia coli despite the genome-wide removal of 3 of the 64 codons and the previously essential cognate tRNA and release factor genes. We then establish a genetic firewall by discovering viral tRNAs that provide exceptionally efficient codon reassignment allowing us to develop cells bearing an amino acid-swapped genetic code that reassigns two of the six serine codons to leucine during translation. This amino acid-swapped genetic code renders cells resistant to viral infections by mistranslating viral proteomes and prevents the escape of synthetic genetic information by engineered reliance on serine codons to produce leucine-requiring proteins. As these cells may have a selective advantage over wild organisms due to virus resistance, we also repurpose a third codon to biocontain this virus-resistant host through dependence on an amino acid not found in nature10. Our results may provide the basis for a general strategy to make any organism safely resistant to all natural viruses and prevent genetic information flow into and out of genetically modified organisms.

How to teach life sciences students about dual-use research-a view from the field.

To reduce biological risks, raising awareness for dual-use issues already at the level of university education is essential. Currently, most life sciences education programs do not incorporate biosecurity and dual-use in their regular curricula. Consequently, the responsibility rests with individual lecturers and depends on their initiative to incorporate dual-use topics into teaching activities. Students interested in biosecurity and dual-use topics often only have the option to educate themselves in external or online courses. Here, we provide practical guidance on how to initiate and integrate a dual-use education program within the curriculum and provide a selection of existing teaching materials. In addition, we suggest key learning objectives to guide the planning of dual-use courses. Different course formats like lectures, seminars, or stand-alone events are discussed regarding their advantages, disadvantages, and suitability for conveying the learning objectives to different educational stages and audiences. As a minimum, we recommend the incorporation of dual-use issues into at least one mandatory course. Ideally, students should additionally participate in in-depth seminars, which can be voluntary and offered in cooperation with external organisations.

Proceedings of the Dual Use Research of Concern Panel Discussion: challenges and perspectives.

To address real and perceived emerging risks originating from the ever-accelerating breakthroughs in life science research, the Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) Panel Discussion, organized by Synbio Canada and the Alberta RNA Research and Training Institute (ARRTI), took place on June 23rd, 2021. It brought together six stakeholders from different levels of academic research, administration, governance, and science publishing to explore the current and future challenges in addressing DURC. Technological advancements within the life sciences, especially within the field of omics technology, make it difficult to apply a simple checklist for dual-use assessment and require continuous and integrated effort. Bottom-up approaches from within the scientific community are suggested by all stakeholders to enable efficient governance and address the true risks resulting from DURC, not just the alleged risks. To address such alleged risks, open and broadscale communication of DURC and its oversight policies may be required. At the same time, any form of open communication also contains the risk of information hazards, defined as potentially creating public fear or informing malicious actors. Here, an overview of the DURC panel and its outcomes is provided.

Classification of three corynebacterial strains isolated from a small paddock in North Rhine-Westphalia: proposal of Corynebacterium kalinowskii sp. nov., Corynebacterium comes sp. nov. and Corynebacterium occultum sp. nov.

Three novel corynebacterial species were isolated from soil sampled at a paddock in Vilsendorf, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. The strains were coccoid or irregular rod-shaped, catalase-positive and pale white to yellow-orange in colour. By whole genome sequencing and comparison of the 16S rRNA genes as well as the whole genome structure, it was shown that all three strains represent novel species of the family Corynebacteriaceae, order Corynebacteriales, class Actinobacteria. This project describes the isolation, identification, sequencing, and phenotypic characterization of the three novel Corynebacterium species. We propose the names Corynebacterium kalinowskii sp. nov. (DSM 110639T=LMG 31801T), Corynebacterium comes sp. nov. (DSM 110640T=LMG 31802T), and Corynebacterium occultum sp. nov. (DSM 110642T=LMG 31803T).

The Dual-Use Education Gap: Awareness and Education of Life Science Researchers on Nonpathogen-Related Dual-Use Research.

With the rise of synthetic biology, dual-use research risks are not confined to pathogen-related research. However, existing measures to mitigate the risks of dual-use research, such as export control, are still designed to hinder access to pathogens and do not address the risks of nonpathogen-related dual-use research. The current self-regulatory approach requires scientists to be aware of their responsibility and know how to assess risks and establish countermeasures. The purpose of this study was to examine the state of knowledge about dual-use research among life science students and to test an alternative teaching approach on the importance of considering biosecurity risks for teams participating in the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition. We conducted an international survey from July 18 to September 13, 2018, which was completed by 192 respondents from 29 countries and 74 universities. Based on the results of the survey, we designed and tested a learning workshop on dual-use research within the iGEM community. Results from the workshop and the survey show that educational machinery so far have failed to integrate teaching about dual-use research issues.

Multiple Occurrences of a 168-Nucleotide Deletion in SARS-CoV-2 ORF8, Unnoticed by Standard Amplicon Sequencing and Variant Calling Pipelines.

Genomic surveillance of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is crucial and mainly achieved by amplicon sequencing protocols. Overlapping tiled-amplicons are generated to establish contiguous SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences, which enable the precise resolution of infection chains and outbreaks. We investigated a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in a local hospital and used nanopore sequencing with a modified ARTIC protocol employing 1200 bp long amplicons. We detected a long deletion of 168 nucleotides in the ORF8 gene in 76 samples from the hospital outbreak. This deletion is difficult to identify with the classical amplicon sequencing procedures since it removes two amplicon primer-binding sites. We analyzed public SARS-CoV-2 sequences and sequencing read data from ENA and identified the same deletion in over 100 genomes belonging to different lineages of SARS-CoV-2, pointing to a mutation hotspot or to positive selection. In almost all cases, the deletion was not represented in the virus genome sequence after consensus building. Additionally, further database searches point to other deletions in the ORF8 coding region that have never been reported by the standard data analysis pipelines. These findings and the fact that ORF8 is especially prone to deletions, make a clear case for the urgent necessity of public availability of the raw data for this and other large deletions that might change the physiology of the virus towards endemism.

Application of Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) in Phage Displayed Peptide Selection to Support the Identification of Arsenic-Binding Motifs.

Next generation sequencing (NGS) in combination with phage surface display (PSD) are powerful tools in the newly equipped molecular biology toolbox for the identification of specific target binding biomolecules. Application of PSD led to the discovery of manifold ligands in clinical and material research. However, limitations of traditional phage display hinder the identification process. Growth-based library biases and target-unrelated peptides often result in the dominance of parasitic sequences and the collapse of library diversity. This study describes the effective enrichment of specific peptide motifs potentially binding to arsenic as proof-of-concept using the combination of PSD and NGS. Arsenic is an environmental toxin, which is applied in various semiconductors as gallium arsenide and selective recovery of this element is crucial for recycling and remediation. The development of biomolecules as specific arsenic-binding sorbents is a new approach for its recovery. Usage of NGS for all biopanning fractions allowed for evaluation of motif enrichment, in-depth insight into the selection process and the discrimination of biopanning artefacts, e.g., the amplification-induced library-wide reduction in hydrophobic amino acid proportion. Application of bioinformatics tools led to the identification of an SxHS and a carboxy-terminal QxQ motif, which are potentially involved in the binding of arsenic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first report of PSD combined with NGS of all relevant biopanning fractions.