Effects of delayed recovery and nonuniform transmission on the spreading of diseases in complex networks.

We investigate the effects of delaying the time to recovery (delayed recovery) and of nonuniform transmission on the propagation of diseases on structured populations. Through a mean-field approximation and large-scale numerical simulations, we find that postponing the transition from the infectious to the recovered states can largely reduce the epidemic threshold, therefore promoting the outbreak of epidemics. On the other hand, if we consider nonuniform transmission among individuals, the epidemic threshold increases, thus inhibiting the spreading process. When both mechanisms are at work, the latter might prevail, hence resulting in an increase of the epidemic threshold with respect to the standard case, in which both ingredients are absent. Our findings are of interest for a better understanding of how diseases propagate on structured populations and to a further design of efficient immunization strategies.

Dynamics of opinion formation under majority rules on complex social networks.

We study opinion dynamics on complex social networks where each individual holding a binary opinion on a certain subject may change her/his mind to match the opinion of the majority. Two rules of interactions between individuals, termed as classic majority and influence majority rules, respectively, are imposed on the social networks. The former rule allows each individual to adopt an opinion following a simple majority of her/his immediate neighbors, while the latter one lets each individual calculate the influence of each opinion and choose to follow the more influential one. In this calculation, the influences of different opinions are counted as the sum of the influences of their respective opinion holders in neighborhood area, where the influence of each individual is conveniently estimated as the number of social connections s/he has. Our study reveals that in densely-connected social networks, all individuals tend to converge to having a single global consensus. In sparsely-connected networks, however, the systems may exhibit rich properties where coexistence of different opinions, and more interestingly, multiple steady states of coexistence can be observed. Further studies reveal that low-degree and high-degree nodes may play different roles in formulating the final steady state, including multi-steady states, of the systems under different opinion evolution rules. Such observations would help understand the complex dynamics of opinion evolution and coexistence in social systems.

The XIA's No. 1 sleeping Prescription for the treatment of insomnia of the deficiency type: a clinical observation of 60 cases.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the therapeutic effects and safety of the XIA's No.1 Sleeping Prescription for the treatment of insomnia of the deficiency type. METHODS: 120 cases conformed to the diagnostic criteria of the Chinese Classification of Mental Disorders-Version 3 (CCMD-3) and were diagnosed as having insomnia of the deficiency type were divided randomly into a treatment group and a control group, 60 cases in each group. The treatment group was treated with the XIA's No. 1 Sleeping Prescription, while the control group was given estazolam (1 mg) for 6 weeks. The Athens Insomnia Scale (AIS) was used to evaluate the clinical therapeutic effects, while the treatment emergent symptom scale (TESS) was used to evaluate adverse reactions. RESULTS: The total effective rate of the treatment group (80%) was higher than that of the control group (70%), but with no significant difference (P > 0.05). The effective rate for long-term insomnia was 77.8% in the treatment group and 52.4% in the control group, with a significant difference between the two groups (P < 0.05). The adverse reactions shown in the treatment group were obviously fewer and milder than those in the control group. CONCLUSION: The XIA's No. 1 Sleeping Prescription is effective for insomnia of the deficiency type and with no obvious toxic side effects.

Heterogeneous resource allocation can change social hierarchy in public goods games.

Public goods games (PGGs) represent one of the most useful tools to study group interactions. However, even if they could provide an explanation for the emergence and stability of cooperation in modern societies, they are not able to reproduce some key features observed in social and economical interactions. The typical shape of wealth distribution-known as Pareto Law-and the microscopic organization of wealth production are two of them. Here, we introduce a modification to the classical formulation of PGGs that allows for the emergence of both of these features from first principles. Unlike traditional PGGs, where players contribute equally to all the games in which they participate, we allow individuals to redistribute their contribution according to what they earned in previous rounds. Results from numerical simulations show that not only a Pareto distribution for the pay-offs naturally emerges but also that if players do not invest enough in one round they can act as defectors even if they are formally cooperators. Our results not only give an explanation for wealth heterogeneity observed in real data but also point to a conceptual change on cooperation in collective dilemmas.

Heterogeneous Coupling between Interdependent Lattices Promotes the Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game.

In the research realm of game theory, interdependent networks have extended the content of spatial reciprocity, which needs the suitable coupling between networks. However, thus far, the vast majority of existing works just assume that the coupling strength between networks is symmetric. This hypothesis, to some extent, seems inconsistent with the ubiquitous observation of heterogeneity. Here, we study how the heterogeneous coupling strength, which characterizes the interdependency of utility between corresponding players of both networks, affects the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with two types of coupling schemes (symmetric and asymmetric ones). Compared with the traditional case, we show that heterogeneous coupling greatly promotes the collective cooperation. The symmetric scheme seems much better than the asymmetric case. Moreover, the role of varying amplitude of coupling strength is also studied on these two interdependent ways. Current findings are helpful for us to understand the evolution of cooperation within many real-world systems, in particular for the interconnected and interrelated systems.

Multi-frequency complex network from time series for uncovering oil-water flow structure.

Uncovering complex oil-water flow structure represents a challenge in diverse scientific disciplines. This challenge stimulates us to develop a new distributed conductance sensor for measuring local flow signals at different positions and then propose a novel approach based on multi-frequency complex network to uncover the flow structures from experimental multivariate measurements. In particular, based on the Fast Fourier transform, we demonstrate how to derive multi-frequency complex network from multivariate time series. We construct complex networks at different frequencies and then detect community structures. Our results indicate that the community structures faithfully represent the structural features of oil-water flow patterns. Furthermore, we investigate the network statistic at different frequencies for each derived network and find that the frequency clustering coefficient enables to uncover the evolution of flow patterns and yield deep insights into the formation of flow structures. Current results present a first step towards a network visualization of complex flow patterns from a community structure perspective.

Role of investment heterogeneity in the cooperation on spatial public goods game.

Public cooperation plays a significant role in the survival and maintenance of biological species, to elucidate its origin thus becomes an interesting question from various disciplines. Through long-term development, the public goods game has proven to be a useful tool, where cooperator making contribution can beat again the free-rides. Differentiating from the traditional homogeneous investment, individual trend of making contribution is more likely affected by the investment level of his neighborhood. Based on this fact, we here investigate the impact of heterogeneous investment on public cooperation, where the investment sum is mapped to the proportion of cooperators determined by parameter α. Interestingly, we find, irrespective of interaction networks, that the increment of α (increment of heterogeneous investment) is beneficial for promoting cooperation and even guarantees the complete cooperation dominance under weak replication factor. While this promotion effect can be attributed to the formation of more robust cooperator clusters and shortening END period. Moreover, we find that this simple mechanism can change the potential interaction network, which results in the change of phase diagrams. We hope that our work may shed light on the understanding of the cooperative behavior in other social dilemmas.

Spontaneous symmetry breaking in interdependent networked game.

Spatial evolution game has traditionally assumed that players interact with direct neighbors on a single network, which is isolated and not influenced by other systems. However, this is not fully consistent with recent research identification that interactions between networks play a crucial rule for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. In this work, we introduce the simple game model into the interdependent networks composed of two networks. By means of imitation dynamics, we display that when the interdependent factor α is smaller than a threshold value α(C), the symmetry of cooperation can be guaranteed. Interestingly, as interdependent factor exceeds α(C), spontaneous symmetry breaking of fraction of cooperators presents itself between different networks. With respect to the breakage of symmetry, it is induced by asynchronous expansion between heterogeneous strategy couples of both networks, which further enriches the content of spatial reciprocity. Moreover, our results can be well predicted by the strategy-couple pair approximation method.

Decision support for personalized cloud service selection through multi-attribute trustworthiness evaluation.

Facing a customer market with rising demands for cloud service dependability and security, trustworthiness evaluation techniques are becoming essential to cloud service selection. But these methods are out of the reach to most customers as they require considerable expertise. Additionally, since the cloud service evaluation is often a costly and time-consuming process, it is not practical to measure trustworthy attributes of all candidates for each customer. Many existing models cannot easily deal with cloud services which have very few historical records. In this paper, we propose a novel service selection approach in which the missing value prediction and the multi-attribute trustworthiness evaluation are commonly taken into account. By simply collecting limited historical records, the current approach is able to support the personalized trustworthy service selection. The experimental results also show that our approach performs much better than other competing ones with respect to the customer preference and expectation in trustworthiness assessment.

Impact of social punishment on cooperative behavior in complex networks.

Social punishment is a mechanism by which cooperative individuals spend part of their resources to penalize defectors. In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation in 2-person evolutionary games on networks when a mechanism for social punishment is introduced. Specifically, we introduce a new kind of role, punisher, which is aimed at reducing the earnings of defectors by applying to them a social fee. Results from numerical simulations show that different equilibria allowing the three strategies to coexist are possible as well as that social punishment further enhance the robustness of cooperation. Our results are confirmed for different network topologies and two evolutionary games. In addition, we analyze the microscopic mechanisms that give rise to the observed macroscopic behaviors in both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks. Our conclusions might provide additional insights for understanding the roots of cooperation in social systems.

Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.

In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately realize others' reputation situation. Here we introduce the mechanism of inferring reputation into the selection of potential strategy sources to explore the evolution of cooperation. Before the game each player is assigned with a randomly distributed parameter p denoting his ability to infer the reputation of others. The parameter p of each individual is kept constant during the game. The value of p indicates that the neighbor possessing highest reputation is chosen with the probability p and randomly choosing an opponent is left with the probability 1-p. We find that this novel mechanism can be seen as an universally applicable promoter of cooperation, which works on various interaction networks and in different types of evolutionary game. Of particular interest is the fact that, in the early stages of evolutionary process, cooperators with high reputation who are easily regarded as the potential strategy donors can quickly lead to the formation of extremely robust clusters of cooperators that are impervious to defector attacks. These clusters eventually help cooperators reach their undisputed dominance, which transcends what can be warranted by the spatial reciprocity alone. Moreover, we provide complete phase diagrams to depict the impact of uncertainty in strategy adoptions and conclude that the effective interaction topology structure may be altered under such a mechanism. When the estimation of reputation is extended, we also show that the moderate value of evaluation factor enables cooperation to thrive best. We thus present a viable method of understanding the ubiquitous cooperative behaviors in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies to resolve social dilemmas.