Stabilizing High-Frequency Magnetic Properties of Stretchable CoFeB Films by Ribbon-Patterned Periodic Wrinkles.

The intrinsic nonstretchable feature of magnetic films has significantly limited its applications on wearable high-frequency devices. Recent studies have proved that the wrinkling surface structure based on the growth on polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS) is an effective route to obtain stretchable magnetic films. However, it is still a great challenge to simultaneously achieve a desired stretchability and stretching-insensitive high-frequency properties of magnetic films. Herein, we reported a convenient method to stabilize the high-frequency properties of stretchable magnetic films by depositing magnetic ribbon-patterned films on prestrain PDMS membranes. The ribbon-patterned wrinkling CoFeB films have far fewer cracks than the continuous film, which indicates a nice strain-relief effect and thus confers the stability of high-frequency properties for the films under stretching. However, the wrinkle bifurcation and the uneven thickness at the ribbon edge could adversely affect the stability of its high-frequency properties. The 200 µm wide ribbon-patterned film shows the best stretching-insensitive behaviors and maintains a constant resonance frequency of 3.17 GHz at strain from 10% to 25%. Moreover, a good repeatability has been demonstrated by performing thousands of stretch-release cycles, which did not significantly deteriorate its performances. The ribbon-patterned wrinkling CoFeB films with excellent stretching-insensitive high-frequency properties are promising for application in flexible microwave devices.

Impacts of Supply Chain Competition on Firms' Carbon Emission Reduction and Social Welfare under Cap-and-Trade Regulation.

In the carbon neutrality era, firms are facing increasingly intense environmental pressure and market competition. This paper considers two competitive supply chains with consumers' low-carbon preference under the cap-and-trade regulation, each of which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. Considering competition or integration in vertical and horizontal directions, four different supply chain structures are modeled. By applying a game-theoretical approach, the equilibrium pricing, carbon emission reduction (CER) level, profit, and social welfare are obtained. Through comparison and analysis, the economic and environmental impacts of supply chain competition are explored. The results show that (1) the carbon quota acts as a kind of financial subsidy and brings direct economic profit to the supply chain, which cannot be used to incentivize the firm to invest in CER technology; (2) the HCVI strategy can bring the highest CER level, the most market demand, and social welfare among the four strategies; (3) for the enterprise and the government, it is recommended to take measures and enact policies to strengthen the vertical integration and horizontal competition between supply chains. Our study can guide firms on how to cope with increasingly fierce industry competition and environmental pressure by adjusting their operational decisions and supply chain structure.

Incentive Mechanisms for Carbon Emission Abatement Considering Consumers' Low-Carbon Awareness under Cap-and-Trade Regulation.

In the era of sustainable development, reducing carbon emissions and achieving carbon neutrality are gradually becoming a consensus for our society. This study explores firms' incentive mechanisms for carbon emission abatement in a two-echelon supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation, where consumers exhibit low-carbon awareness. To boost the manufacturer's motivation for abatement, the retailer can provide four incentive strategies, i.e., price-only (PO), cost-sharing (CS), revenue-sharing (RS), and both (cost and revenue) sharing (BS). The equilibrium decisions under the four incentive strategies are obtained by establishing and solving game models. A two-part tariff contract is also proposed to coordinate the low-carbon supply chain. Finally, through comparisons and analyses, we find that: (1) Consumers' high low-carbon awareness can boost the manufacturer's incentive for carbon emission abatement (CEA), thus increasing supply chain members' profits. (2) It is more effective for the retailer to share its revenue to incentivize the manufacturer for abatement than to bear the investment cost of CEA. Thus, Strategy RS is better than Strategy CS and equivalent to Strategy BS. (3) The manufacturer and retailer have consistent incentive strategy preference under cap-and-trade regulation. Both firms prefer the incentive strategy with a higher cooperation level. (4) The incentive strategy with a higher cooperation level can also bring higher eco-social welfare under certain conditions.