The effect of an embodied intervention on responsibility: put a load on one's shoulder.

Responsibility is an essential part of our social life. Although responsibility is an abstract concept, it can be represented with concrete ideas through conceptual metaphor. Expressions like "carry a lot of responsibility," "shoulder the responsibility" shows that responsibility can be understood as a load on shoulder that one has to carry. Accordingly, this study tests the question that does putting a burden on one's shoulder makes him/her more responsible or not. In order to investigate this, on each trial, we asked participants to decide between risky situations that vary in magnitude, probability of win/lose, and the ambiguity level in two conditions: "self" and 'group." Each subject wears a vest with a load on each shoulder in half of the trials. As expected, Most of participants choose to defer on the group trials more than on the self-trials. This difference between numbers of deferring in group and self conditions is called responsibility aversion. Results indicate that responsibility aversion scores are lower (responsibility-taking was greater) in the state of wearing the vest than in the form of not wearing the vest significantly. We provided evidence that the abstract concept of responsibility is linked to bodily experiences of feeling load on the shoulder consistent with an embodied cognition theory.

Do you share your personally useless information if others may benefit from it?

Information is personally useless if its beholder cannot individually benefit from it further unless she shares it with those who can exploit that information to increase their mutual outcome. We study sharing such information anonymously in a non-strategic and non-competitive setting, where selfish and cooperative motives align. Although sharing information was cost-free and resulted in expected mutual payoff, almost all subjects showed some levels of hesitancy toward sharing information, and it was more severe in the introverts. According to our mechanistic model, this irrationality could arise because of the excessive subjective value of personally useless information and low other-regarding motives, that necessitated over-attainable personal benefit to drive sharing. Interestingly, other-regarding element correlated with the subjects' belief about how others are cooperative in general. In addition, sensitivity to the value of information correlated with their extraversion level. The results open a new window towards understanding inefficient motives that deprive people of collective benefit.

Iranian and American Moral Judgments for Everyday Dilemmas Are Mostly Similar.

Moral judgment is a complex cognitive process that partly depends upon social and individual cultural values. There have been various efforts to categorize different aspects of moral judgment, but most studies depend upon rare dilemmas. We recruited 25 subjects from Tehran, Iran, to rate 150 everyday moral scenarios developed by Knutson et al. Using exploratory factor analysis (EFA), we observed that the same moral dimensions (except socialness dimension) were driven by the same moral cognitive factors (norm violation, intention, and social affect) in Iranian vs. American studies. However, there were minor differences in the factor loadings between the two cultures. Furthermore, based on the EFA results, we developed a short form of the questionnaire by removing eleven of the fifteen scenarios from each of the ten categories. These results could be used in further studies to better understand the similarities and differences in moral judgment in everyday interactions across different cultures.