RESUMO
The human ability to reason about the causes behind other people' behavior is critical for navigating the social world. Recent empirical research with both children and adults suggests that this ability is structured around an assumption that other agents act to maximize some notion of subjective utility. In this paper, we present a formal theory of this Naïve Utility Calculus as a probabilistic generative model, which highlights the role of cost and reward tradeoffs in a Bayesian framework for action-understanding. Our model predicts with quantitative accuracy how people infer agents' subjective costs and rewards based on their observable actions. By distinguishing between desires, goals, and intentions, the model extends to complex action scenarios unfolding over space and time in scenes with multiple objects and multiple action episodes. We contrast our account with simpler model variants and a set of special-case heuristics across a wide range of action-understanding tasks: inferring costs and rewards, making confidence judgments about relative costs and rewards, combining inferences from multiple events, predicting future behavior, inferring knowledge or ignorance, and reasoning about social goals. Our work sheds light on the basic representations and computations that structure our everyday ability to make sense of and navigate the social world.
Assuntos
Cognição/fisiologia , Compreensão/fisiologia , Comportamento Social , Percepção Social , Pensamento/fisiologia , Adulto , Teorema de Bayes , Cálculos , Humanos , Pessoa de Meia-Idade , Modelos Estatísticos , Motivação , Recompensa , Adulto JovemRESUMO
Humans can seamlessly infer other people's preferences, based on what they do. Broadly, two types of accounts have been proposed to explain different aspects of this ability. The first account focuses on spatial information: Agents' efficient navigation in space reveals what they like. The second account focuses on statistical information: Uncommon choices reveal stronger preferences. Together, these two lines of research suggest that we have two distinct capacities for inferring preferences. Here we propose that this is not the case, and that spatial-based and statistical-based preference inferences can be explained by the assumption that agents are efficient alone. We show that people's sensitivity to spatial and statistical information when they infer preferences is best predicted by a computational model of the principle of efficiency, and that this model outperforms dual-system models, even when the latter are fit to participant judgments. Our results suggest that, as adults, a unified understanding of agency under the principle of efficiency underlies our ability to infer preferences.
Assuntos
Eficiência , Percepção Social , Adulto , Comportamento de Escolha , Compreensão , Humanos , Julgamento , Pessoa de Meia-Idade , Modelos Psicológicos , Modelos Estatísticos , Percepção Espacial , Navegação Espacial , Adulto JovemRESUMO
Bayesian explanations have swept through cognitive science over the past two decades, from intuitive physics and causal learning, to perception, motor control and language. Yet people flounder with even the simplest probability questions. What explains this apparent paradox? How can a supposedly Bayesian brain reason so poorly with probabilities? In this paper, we propose a direct and perhaps unexpected answer: that Bayesian brains need not represent or calculate probabilities at all and are, indeed, poorly adapted to do so. Instead, the brain is a Bayesian sampler. Only with infinite samples does a Bayesian sampler conform to the laws of probability; with finite samples it systematically generates classic probabilistic reasoning errors, including the unpacking effect, base-rate neglect, and the conjunction fallacy.
Assuntos
Teorema de Bayes , Encéfalo/fisiologia , Ciência Cognitiva , Probabilidade , Humanos , PensamentoRESUMO
We present a computational model of multiple-object tracking that makes trial-level predictions about the allocation of visual attention and the effect of this allocation on observers' ability to track multiple objects simultaneously. This model follows the intuition that increased attention to a location increases the spatial resolution of its internal representation. Using a combination of empirical and computational experiments, we demonstrate the existence of a tight coupling between cognitive and perceptual resources in this task: Low-level tracking of objects generates bottom-up predictions of error likelihood, and high-level attention allocation selectively reduces error probabilities in attended locations while increasing it at non-attended locations. Whereas earlier models of multiple-object tracking have predicted the big picture relationship between stimulus complexity and response accuracy, our approach makes accurate predictions of both the macro-scale effect of target number and velocity on tracking difficulty and micro-scale variations in difficulty across individual trials and targets arising from the idiosyncratic within-trial interactions of targets and distractors.
Assuntos
Atenção/fisiologia , Percepção Espacial/fisiologia , Teorema de Bayes , Ciência Cognitiva/métodos , Humanos , Metacognição/fisiologia , Percepção de Movimento/fisiologia , Modelagem Computacional Específica para o Paciente , Estimulação Luminosa , Percepção Visual/fisiologiaRESUMO
Marr's levels of analysis-computational, algorithmic, and implementation-have served cognitive science well over the last 30 years. But the recent increase in the popularity of the computational level raises a new challenge: How do we begin to relate models at different levels of analysis? We propose that it is possible to define levels of analysis that lie between the computational and the algorithmic, providing a way to build a bridge between computational- and algorithmic-level models. The key idea is to push the notion of rationality, often used in defining computational-level models, deeper toward the algorithmic level. We offer a simple recipe for reverse-engineering the mind's cognitive strategies by deriving optimal algorithms for a series of increasingly more realistic abstract computational architectures, which we call "resource-rational analysis."
Assuntos
Algoritmos , Cognição/fisiologia , Modelos Teóricos , Pensamento/fisiologia , HumanosRESUMO
Building fine-grained visual recognition systems that are capable of recognizing tens of thousands of categories, has received much attention in recent years. The well known semantic hierarchical structure of categories and concepts, has been shown to provide a key prior which allows for optimal predictions. The hierarchical organization of various domains and concepts has been subject to extensive research, and led to the development of the WordNet domains hierarchy (Fellbaum, 1998), which was also used to organize the images in the ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) dataset, in which the category count approaches the human capacity. Still, for the human visual system, the form of the hierarchy must be discovered with minimal use of supervision or innate knowledge. In this work, we propose a new Bayesian generative model for learning such domain hierarchies, based on semantic input. Our model is motivated by the super-subordinate organization of domain labels and concepts that characterizes WordNet, and accounts for several important challenges: maintaining context information when progressing deeper into the hierarchy, learning a coherent semantic concept for each node, and modeling uncertainty in the perception process.