Future-oriented repetitive thought, depressive symptoms, and suicide ideation severity: Role of future-event fluency and depressive predictive certainty.

BACKGROUND: Knowing how future-oriented repetitive thought - i.e., repeated consideration of whether positive or negative outcomes will happen in one's future - leads to hopelessness-related cognitions may elucidate the role of anticipating the future in depressive symptoms and suicide ideation. This study examined future-event fluency and depressive predictive certainty - i.e., the tendency to make pessimistic future-event predictions with certainty - as mechanisms explaining the relation between future-oriented repetitive thought, depressive symptoms, and suicide ideation. METHODS: Young adults (N = 354), oversampled for suicide ideation or attempt history, completed baseline measures of pessimistic future-oriented repetitive thought (i.e., the degree to which people consider whether negative outcomes will happen or positive outcomes will not happen in their futures), future-event fluency, depressive predictive certainty, depressive symptoms, and suicide ideation severity and were followed up 6 months later (N = 324). RESULTS: Pessimistic future-oriented repetitive thought predicted depressive predictive certainty at 6-months, partially mediated by lower positive but not increased negative future-event fluency. There was an indirect relationship between pessimistic future-oriented repetitive thought and 6-month suicide ideation severity via 6-month depressive predictive certainty through 6-month depressive symptoms, and also via 6-month depressive symptoms (but not depressive predictive certainty) alone. LIMITATIONS: Lack of an experimental design limits inferences about causality, and a predominantly female sample may limit generalizability by sex. CONCLUSION: Clinical interventions should address pessimistic future-oriented repetitive thought - and its impact on how easily people can think about positive future outcomes - as one potential way to reduce depressive symptoms and, indirectly, suicide ideation.

Being certain that negative events will happen or that positive events will not happen: Depressive predictive certainty and change in suicide ideation over time.

INTRODUCTION: Relatively little research has examined the precise components of hopelessness that increase vulnerability to suicidal thinking. We examined whether certainty about an absence of positive future outcomes (Certainty-AP) would more strongly predict suicide ideation over time than certainty about negative future outcomes (Certainty-N). METHOD: Young adults (N = 208), ages 18-34 (M = 19.08, SD = 2.22), with either recent suicide ideation, suicide attempt history, or past-year psychiatric diagnosis were assessed four times over 18 months. RESULTS: We used multilevel modeling to assess within-participant differences in suicide ideation over time. Both Certainty-AP and Certainty-N predicted later suicide ideation above and beyond generalized hopelessness and depressive symptoms, when examined in separate models. However, Certainty-AP emerged as a stronger predictor of suicide ideation than Certainty-N when examined in the same model. DISCUSSION: These findings suggest that certainty about an absence of positive future outcomes may have a more unique prospective relationship to SI than certainty about the presence of negative future outcomes. We discuss clinical and theoretical implications of these findings.

Induced optimism as mental rehearsal to decrease depressive predictive certainty.

The present study examined whether practice in making optimistic future-event predictions would result in change in the hopelessness-related cognitions that characterize depression. Individuals (N = 170) with low, mild, and moderate-to-severe depressive symptoms were randomly assigned to a condition in which they practiced making optimistic future-event predictions or to a control condition in which they viewed the same stimuli but practiced determining whether a given phrase contained an adjective. Overall, individuals in the induced optimism condition showed increases in optimistic predictions, relative to the control condition, as a result of practice, but only individuals with moderate-to-severe symptoms of depression who practiced making optimistic future-event predictions showed decreases in depressive predictive certainty, relative to the control condition. In addition, they showed gains in efficiency in making optimistic predictions over the practice blocks, as assessed by response time. There was no difference in depressed mood by practice condition. Mental rehearsal might be one way of changing the hopelessness-related cognitions that characterize depression.