Value change, reprogenetic technologies, and the axiological underpinnings of reproductive choice.

Value change is a phenomenon that is gaining increasing attention in ethical analyses of technologies. However, a comprehensive study of how reprogenetic technologies and values coevolve is lacking. To remedy this gap, in this overview article, I address the relationship between reprogenetics and value change. This contribution thus argues for the importance of investigating the phenomenon of value change in relation to the technological controversies discussed in bioethics. To meet this goal, I begin by clarifying, first, how technologies shape reproductive choice. I then clarify what "values" and "moral values" are, how reprogenetic technologies are value laden, and what values are often discussed in reprogenetics debates. Next, I show five types of value changes that have occurred in advance in reproductive and genetic technologies. Finally, I argue for the bioethical relevance of discussing future techno-value change, pointing out the descriptive and normative challenges of this philosophical endeavor.

Reproductive carrier screening: responding to the eugenics critique.

Reproductive genetic carrier screening (RCS), when offered to anyone regardless of their family history or ancestry, has been subject to the critique that it is a form of eugenics. Eugenics describes a range of practices that seek to use the science of heredity to improve the genetic composition of a population group. The term is associated with a range of unethical programmes that were taken up in various countries during the 20th century. Contemporary practice in medical genetics has, understandably, distanced itself from such programmes. However, as RCS becomes more widespread, gains public funding and uses expanded gene panels, there are concerns that such programmes could be perceived as eugenic either in intent or outcome. The typical response to the eugenics critique of RCS is to emphasise the voluntary nature of both participating in screening and making subsequent reproductive choices. While safeguarding individuals' freedom to choose in relation to screening is essential, we consider this response inadequate. By examining the specific ethical wrongs committed by eugenics in the past, we argue that to avoid the perception of RCS being a form of eugenics it is essential to attend to the broader normative context in which reproductive decisions occur. Furthermore, ethical RCS programmes must recognise and respond to their potential to shift societal norms that shape individual reproductive choices.

Future of global regulation of human genome editing: a South African perspective on the WHO Draft Governance Framework on Human Genome Editing.

WHO in 2019 established the Advisory Committee on Developing Global Standards for Governance and Oversight of Human Genome Editing, which has recently published a Draft Governance Framework on Human Genome Editing. Although the Draft Framework is a good point of departure, there are four areas of concern: first, it does not sufficiently address issues related to establishing safety and efficacy. Second, issues that are a source of tension between global standard setting and state sovereignty need to be addressed in a more nuanced fashion. Third, it fails to meaningfully engage with the extent to which the conceptualisation of human dignity may justifiably vary between jurisdictions. Fourth, the meaning of harm to the interests of a future person requires clarity. Provided these four areas of concern can be addressed, the future of the global governance of human genome editing may hold promise.

From proband to provider: is there an obligation to inform genetic relatives of actionable risks discovered through direct-to-consumer genetic testing?

Direct-to-consumer genetic testing is a growing phenomenon, fuelled by the notion that knowledge equals control. One ethical question that arises concerns the proband's duty to share information indicating genetic risks in their relatives. However, such duties are unenforceable and may result in the realisation of anticipated harm to relatives. We argue for a shift in responsibility from proband to provider, placing a duty on test providers in the event of identified actionable risks to relatives. Starting from Parker and Lucassen's (2004) 'joint account model', we adapt Kilbride's (2018) application of the rule of rescue and balance it against the relative's right not to know, placing responsibility on the providers of direct-to-consumer genetic testing. Where the risk of disease to a relative is actionable, we argue providers ought to share results even in the face of the proband's objections. Confidentiality issues are navigated by a pre-emptive consent model, whereby consumers agree to the sharing of certain information with their relatives ahead of testing and as a condition of testing. When a relative is informed, the proband's privacy is protected by maximal deidentification, and the rights of the relative are met by a stepwise approach to informing that allows them to decide how much information they receive.

Genomic privacy, identity and dignity.

Significant advancements towards a future of big data genomic medicine, associated with large-scale public dataset repositories, intensify dilemmas of genomic privacy. To resolve dilemmas adequately, we need to understand the relative force of the competing considerations that make them up. Attitudes towards genomic privacy are complex and not well understood; understanding is further complicated by the vague claim of 'genetic exceptionalism'. In this paper, we distinguish between consequentialist and non-consequentialist privacy interests: while the former are concerned with harms secondary to exposure, the latter represent the interest in a private sphere for its own sake, as an essential component of human dignity. Empirical studies of attitudes towards genomic privacy have almost never targeted specifically this important dignitary component of the privacy interest. In this paper we first articulate the question of a non-consequentialist genomic privacy interest, and then present results of an empirical study that probed people's attitudes towards that interest. This was done via comparison to other non-consequentialist privacy interests, which are more tangible and can be more easily assessed. Our results indicate that the non-consequentialist genomic privacy interest is rather weak. This insight can assist in adjudicating dilemmas involving genomic privacy.

Taking it to the bank: the ethical management of individual findings arising in secondary research.

A rapidly growing proportion of health research uses 'secondary data': data used for purposes other than those for which it was originally collected. Do researchers using secondary data have an obligation to disclose individual research findings to participants? While the importance of this question has been duly recognised in the context of primary research (ie, where data are collected from participants directly), it remains largely unexamined in the context of research using secondary data. In this paper, we critically examine the arguments for a moral obligation to disclose individual research findings in the context of primary research, to determine if they can be applied to secondary research. We conclude that they cannot. We then propose that the nature of the relationship between researchers and participants is what gives rise to particular moral obligations, including the obligation to disclose individual results. We argue that the relationship between researchers and participants in secondary research does not generate an obligation to disclose. However, we also argue that the biobanks or data archives which collect and provide access to secondary data may have such an obligation, depending on the nature of the relationship they establish with participants.

Genetic information, insurance and a pluralistic approach to justice.

The use of genetic testing has prompted the question of whether insurance companies should be able to use predictive genetic test results (GTRs) in their risk classification of clients. While some jurisdictions have passed legislation to prohibit this practice, the UK has instead adopted a voluntary code of practice that merely restricts the ways in which insurance companies may use GTRs. Critics have invoked various theories of justice to argue that this approach is unfair. However, as well as sometimes relying on somewhat idealised assumptions, these analyses have tended to invoke theories that have wide-ranging and highly revisionary implications for insurance. Moreover, they fail to adequately engage with a conception of justice that plausibly undergirds the status quo approach to insurance in the UK. I argue that it is a mistake to simply invoke a single contestable theory in seeking to develop sound policy on the use of GTRs in insurance. To that end, in this paper, I outline three plausible principles of justice that policy on this issue ought to balance: A principle of equity, a principle of equal access and a principle of need. In doing so, I shall offer a pluralist justice-based argument in support of the spirit, if not the precise letter, of the UK approach.

Terrible choices in the septic child: a response to the PALOH trial round table authors.

In this response article, we challenge a core assumption that lies at the centre of a round table discussion regarding the Pharmacogenetics to Avoid Loss of Hearing trial. The round table regards a genetic test for a variant (mt.1555A>G) that increases the risk of deafness if a carrier is given the antibiotic gentamicin. The idea is that rapid testing can identify neonates at risk, providing an opportunity to prevent giving an antibiotic that might cause deafness. We challenge the assumption that a positive test unequivocally guides antibiotic choice because, aside from the risk of deafness, all antibiotics for neonatal sepsis are equivalent. We argue that this assumption is faulty and has particularly troubling moral consequences. We claim that giving an alternative to gentamicin is potentially providing inferior treatment and thereby may increase the risk of death. Parents and doctors are faced with a terrible choice as a result of positive point-of-care testing (POCT): give gold-standard treatment and risk deafness or give second line care and risk death. While we do not indicate an answer to this choice, what we do argue is that such a deep and difficult choice is one that may make parents wish genetic testing was never undertaken, and therefore, contra some authors in the round table, provides a reason to gain specific consent for POCT.

Using a biomarker acutely to identify babies at risk of serious adverse effects from antibiotics: where is the 'Terrible Moral and Medical Dilemma'?

We thank Parker and Wright for engaging in this roundtable debate in such a spirited way. The 'Pharmacogenetic [test] to Avoid Loss of Hearing' (PALOH) Trial is the first time a genetic point of care test has been applied in the acute neonatal setting; therefore, it is not surprising that questions have been raised which require debate, discussion and clarification. Parker and Wright misattribute several assumptions to the roundtable authors, which we would like to clarify here. Since they raise wider questions about the PALOH trial itself, several of the roundtable discussants have made a joint response.

Ethical issues in global neuroimaging genetics collaborations.

Neuroimaging genetics is a rapidly developing field that combines neuropsychiatric genetics studies with imaging modalities to investigate how genetic variation influences brain structure and function. As both genetic and imaging technologies improve further, their combined power may hold translational potential in terms of improving psychiatric nosology, diagnosis, and treatment. While neuroimaging genetics studies offer a number of scientific advantages, they also face challenges. In response to some of these challenges, global neuroimaging genetics collaborations have been created to pool and compare brain data and replicate study findings. Attention has been paid to ethical issues in genetics, neuroimaging, and multi-site collaborative research, respectively, but there have been few substantive discussions of the ethical issues generated by the confluence of these areas in global neuroimaging genetics collaborations. Our discussion focuses on two areas: benefits and risks of global neuroimaging genetics collaborations and the potential impact of neuroimaging genetics research findings in low- and middle-income countries. Global neuroimaging genetics collaborations have the potential to enhance relations between countries and address global mental health challenges, however there are risks regarding inequity, exploitation and data sharing. Moreover, neuroimaging genetics research in low- and middle-income countries must address the issue of feedback of findings and the risk of essentializing and stigmatizing interpretations of mental disorders. We conclude by examining how the notion of solidarity, informed by an African Ethics framework, may justify some of the suggestions made in our discussion.

Ethical issues raised by intergenerational monitoring in clinical trials of germline gene modification.

As research involving gene editing continues to advance, we are headed in the direction of being able to modify the human germline. Should we reach a point where an argument can be made that the benefits of preventing unborn children and future generations from inheriting genetic conditions that cause tremendous suffering outweigh the risks associated with altering the human germline, the next step will be to design clinical trials using this technology in humans. These clinical trials will likely require careful follow-up and monitoring of future generations born with altered genes. This paper addresses some of the ethical issues raised by intergenerational monitoring and sets out to show that these issues can be avoided with careful consideration and clinical trial design.

'Serious' science: a response to Kleiderman, Ravitsky and Knoppers.

In their paper 'The "serious" factor in germline modification', Kleiderman, Ravitsky and Knoppers rightly highlight the ambiguity in the oft-utilised term 'serious' in legal discussions of human germline genome modification.1 They suggest interpretation of this term may benefit from a framework based on human rights rather than solely objectivist or constructivist frameworks. In this response, I show the authors provide a narrow and hasty dismissal of objectivist frameworks by defining objectivism broadly as 'based on biological facts' early on but later criticising genetic treatment lists, a single narrow implementation of only some of the facts. Furthermore, I will show their consideration of the right to science is biassed towards the material innovations of science, the authors succeed in recognising but fail in elaborating on the knowledge gained from scientific progress; knowledge which may ultimately update moral intuitions and change the nature of ethical conversation across cultures.

To test or not to test: genetic cancer predisposition testing in paediatric patients with cancer.

Genetic cancer predisposition testing in the paediatric population poses unique ethical dilemmas. Using the hypothetical example of a teenager with cancer with a high probability of having an underlying cancer predisposition syndrome, we discuss the ethical considerations that affect the decision-making process. Because legally these decisions are made by parents, genetic testing in paediatrics can remove a child's autonomy to preserve his or her own 'open future'. However, knowledge of results confirming a predisposition syndrome can potentially be beneficial in modifying treatment and surveillance plans and enabling at-risk family members to obtain cascade testing for themselves. Considering virtue ethics to envision the best characters of the patient, parents and healthcare providers can guide them to the better choice to test or not to test, with the ultimate goal of achieving the best outcome for survival and eudaimonia, human flourishing reliably sought out.

Chromosomal microarray analysis in prenatal diagnosis: ethical considerations of the Belgian approach.

Detection of genetic aberrations in prenatal samples, obtained through amniocentesis or chorion villus biopsy, is increasingly performed using chromosomal microarray (CMA), a technique that can uncover both aneuploidies and copy number variants throughout the genome. Despite the obvious benefits of CMA, the decision on implementing the technology is complicated by ethical issues concerning variant interpretation and reporting. In Belgium, uniform guidelines were composed and a shared database for prenatal CMA findings was established. This Belgian approach sparks discussion: it is evidence-based, prevents inconsistencies and avoids parental anxiety, but can be considered paternalistic. Here, we reflect on the cultural and moral bases of the Belgian reporting system of prenatally detected variants.

Roles of genetics and blood type in clinical responses to COVID-19: ethical and policy concerns.

Recently, several genetic variants have been associated with increased or decreased risks of becoming infected and/or seriously ill with COVID-19-not only offering important potential medical benefits but also posing critical ethical questions. These genetic factors, some of which are associated with blood type, may account for variations in observed responses to COVID-19. Hence, assessments of these genetic differences and blood type could provide possible benefits in gauging patients' risks of disease acquisition and prioritising allocation of interventions or vaccines, if supplies are limited. The media has widely reported these findings, and people online are now discussing their blood type and its possible effects on their COVID-19 risks, but several ethical concerns arise. Individuals possessing genetic variants or blood types associated with lower risk may engage in 'risk compensation', erroneously assuming that they can protect themselves less, and hence less frequently wearing masks or washing hands. Given the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, many physicians, hospitals, patients, policymakers, members of the public, testing companies and others may well consider these factors in making critical prevention/treatment decisions. Researchers, providers and others should thus begin to address these concerns. Increased awareness and education aimed at providers, patients, family members, public health officials, political leaders and the public-at-large are critical. Attitudinal research is vital to examine how providers, patients and the public understand these findings. Ethical frameworks and guidelines are needed, addressing whether such genetic information should be incorporated into decisions regarding allocation of scarce resources-including hospital and ICU beds, ventilators, medications (eg, remdesivir) and vaccines-and if so, how.

Genetic testing in the acute setting: a round table discussion.

Genetic testing has historically been performed in the context of chronic disease and cancer diagnostics. The timelines for these tests are typically measured in days or weeks, rather than in minutes. As such, the concept that genetic information might be generated and then used to alter management in the acute setting has, thus far, not been feasible. However, recent advances in genetic technologies have the potential to allow genetic information to be generated significantly quicker. The m.1555A>G genetic variant is present in one in 500 individuals and predisposes to profound hearing loss following the administration of aminoglycoside antibiotics. These antibiotics are used frequently in cases of neonatal sepsis and it is estimated that approximately 180 neonates in the UK are at risk of antibiotic induced hearing loss each year because of this genetic change. Knowledge of this variant in the acute setting would allow clinicians to prescribe alternative antibiotics. The Pharmacogenetics to Avoid Loss of Hearing study will implement a genetic point of care test (POCT) for the m.1555A>G variant within two major UK based neonatal intensive care units. This represents the first trial of a genetic POCT aimed at altering management in the acute setting. This round table discussion outlines the novel ethical issues faced in the development of this trial and the legal barriers to implementation. We ask five stakeholders to provide their opinions on this trial and their perspectives on the concept of genetic testing in the acute setting.Trial registration numberISRCTN-13704894.

In vitro fertilisation with preimplantation genetic testing: the need for expanded insurance coverage.

Technological advances in genetic testing have enabled prospective parents to learn about their risk of passing a genetic condition to their future children. One option for those who want to ensure that their biological children do not inherit a genetic condition is to create embryos through in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and use a technique called preimplantation genetic testing (PGT) to screen embryos for genetic abnormalities before implantation. Unfortunately, due to its high cost, IVF-with-PGT is out of reach for the vast majority of Americans. This article addresses an issue that has been underexplored in the medical ethics literature: the lack of insurance coverage for IVF-with-PGT.Within the US system, a key concept in insurance is that of medically necessary care, which broadly consists of diagnostic services and treatment services. In this article, I argue that IVF-with-PGT could be classified as either a diagnostic service or as a treatment service. To make this case, I show that IVF-with-PGT is similar to other types of services that are often covered by US insurance providers. In light of these similarities, I argue that the current system is inconsistent with respect to what is-and is not-covered by insurance. To promote consistency and fairness in coverage, like cases should be treated alike-starting with greater coverage for IVF-with-PGT.

Familial genetic risks: how can we better navigate patient confidentiality and appropriate risk disclosure to relatives?

This article investigates a high-profile and ongoing dilemma for healthcare professionals (HCPs), namely whether the existence of a (legal) duty of care to genetic relatives of a patient is a help or a hindrance in deciding what to do in cases where a patient's genetic information may have relevance to the health of the patient's family members. The English case ABC v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust and others considered if a duty of confidentiality owed to the patient and a putative duty of care to the patient's close relatives could coexist in this context. This article examines whether embracing the concept of coexisting duties could enable HCPs to respect duties in line with their clinical judgement, thereby providing legal support and clarity to professionals to allow them to provide the best possible genetics service to both the patient and their family. We argue that these dual duties, framed as a novel, composite duty to consider the interests of genetic relatives, could allow HCPs to exercise and act on their professional judgements about the relative value of information to family members, without fears of liability for negligence or breach of confidence.

Ethical dangers of facial phenotyping through photography in psychiatric genomics studies.

Psychiatric genomics research protocols are increasingly incorporating tools of deep phenotyping to observe and examine phenotypic abnormalities among individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders. In particular, photography and the use of two-dimensional and three-dimensional facial analysis is thought to shed further light on the phenotypic expression of the genes underlying neurodevelopmental disorders, as well as provide potential diagnostic tools for clinicians. In this paper, I argue that the research use of photography to aid facial phenotyping raises deeply fraught issues from an ethical point of view. First, the process of objectification through photographic imagery and facial analysis could potentially worsen the stigmatisation of persons with neurodevelopmental disorders. Second, the use of photography for facial phenotyping has worrying parallels with the historical misuse of photography to advance positive and negative eugenics around race, ethnicity and intellectual disability. The paper recommends ethical caution in the use of photography and facial phenotyping in psychiatric genomics studies exploring neurodevelopmental disorders, outlining certain necessary safeguards, such as a critical awareness of the history of anthropometric photography use among scientists, as well as the exploration of photographic methodologies that could potentially empower individuals with disabilities.

The 'serious' factor in germline modification.

Current advances in assisted reproductive technologies aim to promote the health and well-being of future children. They offer the possibility to select embryos with the greatest potential of being born healthy (eg, preimplantation genetic testing) and may someday correct faulty genes responsible for heritable diseases in the embryo (eg, human germline genome modification (HGGM)). Most laws and policy statements surrounding HGGM refer to the notion of 'serious' as a core criterion in determining what genetic diseases should be targeted by these technologies. Yet, this notion remains vague and poorly defined, rendering its application challenging and decision making subjective and arbitrary. By way of background, we begin by briefly presenting two conceptual approaches to 'health' and 'disease': objectivism (ie, based on biological facts) and constructivism (ie, based on human values). The basic challenge under both is sorting out whether and to what extent social and environmental factors have a role in helping to define what qualifies as a 'serious' disease beyond the medical criteria. We then focus on how a human rights framework (eg, right to science and right to the highest attainable health) could integrate the concepts of objectivism and constructivism so as to provide guidance for a more actionable consideration of 'serious'. Ultimately, it could be argued that a human rights framework, by way of its legally binding nature and its globally accepted norms and values, provides a more universal foundation for discussions of the ethical, legal and social implications of emerging or disruptive technologies.