Impaired neural replay of inferred relationships in schizophrenia.

An ability to build structured mental maps of the world underpins our capacity to imagine relationships between objects that extend beyond experience. In rodents, such representations are supported by sequential place cell reactivations during rest, known as replay. Schizophrenia is proposed to reflect a compromise in structured mental representations, with animal models reporting abnormalities in hippocampal replay and associated ripple activity during rest. Here, utilizing magnetoencephalography (MEG), we tasked patients with schizophrenia and control participants to infer unobserved relationships between objects by reorganizing visual experiences containing these objects. During a post-task rest session, controls exhibited fast spontaneous neural reactivation of presented objects that replayed inferred relationships. Replay was coincident with increased ripple power in hippocampus. Patients showed both reduced replay and augmented ripple power relative to controls, convergent with findings in animal models. These abnormalities are linked to impairments in behavioral acquisition and subsequent neural representation of task structure.

Representing linguistic communicative functions in the premotor cortex.

Linguistic communication is often regarded as an action that serves a function to convey the speaker's goal to the addressee. Here, with an functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study and a lesion study, we demonstrated that communicative functions are represented in the human premotor cortex. Participants read scripts involving 2 interlocutors. Each script contained a critical sentence said by the speaker with a communicative function of either making a Promise, a Request, or a Reply to the addressee's query. With various preceding contexts, the critical sentences were supposed to induce neural activities associated with communicative functions rather than specific actions literally described by these sentences. The fMRI results showed that the premotor cortex contained more information, as revealed by multivariate analyses, on communicative functions and relevant interlocutors' attitudes than the perisylvian language regions. The lesion study results showed that, relative to healthy controls, the understanding of communicative functions was impaired in patients with lesions in the premotor cortex, whereas no reliable difference was observed between the healthy controls and patients with lesions in other brain regions. These findings convergently suggest the crucial role of the premotor cortex in representing the functions of linguistic communications, supporting that linguistic communication can be seen as an action.

The role of visual imagery in story reading: Evidence from aphantasia.

Aphantasia is a condition in which people are unable to experience visual imagery. Since visual imagery is thought to be key to language processing, we hypothesized the experience of a story would differ between individuals with aphantasia and controls. Forty-seven individuals with aphantasia were compared to fifty-one matched controls on their experience of reading a short story and their general reading habits. Aphantasics were less likely to be engaged with, interested in, and absorbed in the story, and experienced reduced emotional engagement with and sympathy for the story characters, compared to controls. Yet, aphantasics and controls did not differ in how much they liked or appreciated the story, and in general, the reading habits of the two groups also did not differ. Results have implications for embodied theories of language, suggesting visual imagery may influence how a story is experienced, but it is not the only route to story enjoyment.

Experiential traces first: Does holding a location in visuospatial working memory affect the processing of space-associated words?

This study aimed to systematically examine whether actively maintaining a visual location in working memory can influence the processing of spatially related words. In five experiments, we asked participants to maintain either the location or the shape of a visually presented stimulus in working memory so that it could later be compared with a test stimulus concerning the relevant target features. In between, we presented participants with words that refer to objects typically encountered in the upper or lower vertical space (roof vs. root, respectively). The task participants performed as a response to these words differed between experiments. In Experiments 1-3, participants performed a lexical decision task, in Experiment 4 they performed a semantic task (deciding whether the word refers to an occupation), and in Experiment 5 they performed a spatial task (deciding whether the word refers to something in the upper or lower visual field.) Only in Experiment 5 did we observe an interaction between the position of the visual stimulus held in working memory (up vs. down) and the meaning of the spatial words (associated with up vs. down). Our results therefore suggest that actively maintaining a stimulus location in working memory does not automatically affect the processing of spatially related words, but does so if the relevant spatial dimension is made highly salient by the task. The results are thus in line with studies showing a strong context-dependency of embodiment effects and thus allow the conclusion that language processing proper is not operating on a sensorimotor representational format.

The influence of sentence focus on mental simulation: A possible cause of ACE instability.

Recent studies have revealed the instability of the action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE). The current study was designed to demonstrate the hypothesis that the instability of the ACE may be attributed to the instability of focused information in a sentence. A pilot study indicated that the focused information of sentences was relatively stable in the sentence-picture verification task but exhibited significant interindividual variability in the action-sentence compatibility paradigm in previous studies. Experiments 1 and 2 examined the effect of sentence focus on the shape match effect and the ACE by manipulating the focused information of sentences using the focus marker word "" (is). Experiment 1 found that the shape match effect occurred in the original sentence, while it disappeared when the word "" (is) was used to make an object noun no longer the focus of a sentence. Experiment 2 failed to observe the ACE regardless of whether the sentence focus was on the action information. Experiment 3 modified the focus manipulation to observe its impact on the ACE using different fonts and underlines to highlight the focused information. The results indicated that the ACE only occurred when the action information was the sentence focus. These findings suggest that sentence focus influences mental simulation, and the instability of the ACE is likely to be associated with the instability of sentence focus in previous studies. This outcome highlights the crucial role of identifying specific information as the critical element expressed in the current linguistic context for successful simulation.

Automatic mental simulation in native and non-native speakers.

Pictures of objects are verified faster when they match the implied orientation, shape, and color in a sentence-picture verification task, suggesting that people mentally simulate these features during language comprehension. Previous studies had an unintended correlation between match status and the required response, which may have influenced participants' responses by eliciting strategic use of this correlation. We removed this correlation by including color-matching filler trials and investigated if the color-match effect was still obtained. In both a native sample (Experiment 1) and a non-native sample (Experiment 2), we found strong evidence for a color-match advantage on median reaction time and error rates. Our results are consistent with the view that color is automatically simulated during language comprehension as predicted by the grounded cognition framework.

Mental simulation of colour properties during language comprehension: influence of context and comprehension stages.

Many studies have shown that mental simulation may occur during language comprehension. Supporting evidence is derived from the matching effects in the sentence-picture verification (SPV) task often used to assess mental simulations of object properties, such as size, orientation, and shape. However, mixed results have been obtained regarding object colour, with researchers reporting matching or mismatching effects. This study investigated the impact of colour information clarity within sentences on the process of mental simulation during language comprehension. Employing the SPV task and using novel objects, we examined whether there is a mental simulation of colour after excluding typical/atypical colour bias and how varying levels of colour information clarity in sentences influence the emergence of matching effects at different stages of comprehension. To address these issues, we conducted two experiments. In Experiment 1, the participants read normal sentences and subsequently engaged in picture verification with a novel object after a 500 ms delay. In Experiment 2, the participants encountered sentences containing both clear and unclear colour information and, after either a 0 ms or 1500 ms interval, completed picture verification tasks with a novel object. Null effects were found in the 500 ms condition for normal sentences and the 0 ms condition for unclear colour information sentences. A mismatching effect appeared in the 0 ms condition after clear colour information sentences, and a matching effect appeared in the 1500 ms condition for all sentences. The results indicated that after excluding colour bias, the participants still formed mental simulations of colour during language comprehension. Our results also indicated that ongoing colour simulation with time pressure impacted the participant responses. The participants ignored unclear colour information under time pressure, but without time pressure, they constructed simulations that were as detailed as possible, regardless of whether the implicit colour information in the sentence was clear.

Mechanisms underlying superior memory of skilled climbers in indoor bouldering.

INTRODUCTION: Bouldering is an Olympic climbing discipline that encompasses short climbing sequences, referred to as boulders, set up on low-height bouldering walls. Memory plays a critical role in bouldering, as it allows climbers to develop climbing strategies, to mentally rehearse climbing movements, and to recall climbing holds of boulders. This study extends previous research on memory in climbing and bouldering with the purpose to elucidate potential mechanisms underlying superior memory abilities of skilled climbers. METHODS: Sixty climbers with intermediate (n = 20), advanced (n = 20), or elite (n = 20) skill levels were tasked to memorise the climbing holds and movements of a boulder, set up on a spray wall and demonstrated by a bouldering expert. RESULTS: Findings revealed a positive relation between the participants' bouldering skills and sport-specific movement knowledge and both, the number of climbing holds and movements they were able to memorise following a two-minute rehearsal period. CONCLUSION: Consistent with previous research, bouldering expertise is positively associated with the ability to memorise domain-specific information. Superior memory abilities among skilled climbers appear to be associated with climbing-specific movement knowledge, coupled with better mental visualisation and increased attentional focus towards functional aspects of boulders.

From tablet to table: How augmented reality influences food desirability.

Augmented reality (AR) technology has generated enormous industry investment and buzz, with the food and beverage sector quickly embracing this technology in an effort to enhance the customer experience. However, academic research has only just begun to empirically explore how and why this technology might influence consumer judgements and behaviors in such contexts. Across two field studies involving consequential behavior and two controlled laboratory studies, we find that AR's unique ability to visually superimpose objects onto a real-time environment increases consumers' ability to mentally simulate consuming a pictured food, which in turn increases their desire and purchase likelihood of the food item. Further, we find the increased mental simulation produced by AR is itself preceded and driven by an increased sense of personal relevance of the food items. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11747-022-00919-x.

Situating desire: Situational cues affect desire for food through eating simulations.

How do situations influence food desire? Although eating typically occurs in rich background situations, research on food desire often focuses on the properties of foods and consumers, rather than on the situations in which eating takes place. Here, we take a grounded cognition perspective and suggest that a situation that is congruent with consuming a food increases simulations of eating it, which, in turn, affect desire, and the expected and actual liking of the food. We tested this idea in four pre-registered experiments (N = 524). Participants processed an image of a food presented in a congruent situation, an incongruent situation, or no background situation. Compared to the incongruent situation, the congruent situation increased expected liking of the food and desire, and this was partially or fully mediated by eating simulations. The congruent situation also increased salivation, a physiological indicator of preparing to eat. However, there was only weak and indirect evidence for congruence effects on actual liking of the food when tasted. These findings show that situational cues can affect desire for food through eating simulations. Thus, background situations play an important but understudied role in human food desires. We address implications for research using food images, and for applications to promote healthy and sustainable eating behaviour.

Dutch sensory modality norms.

Many words are strongly connected to the senses, such as vision, taste, and touch. In order to facilitate research on language and the senses, large sets of linguistic stimuli and their corresponding measures of sensory associations should be available. To aid in such investigations, we present a new set of sensory modality norms for over 24,000 Dutch words. The sensory norms comprise perceptual strength ratings in six perceptual modalities: audition, gustation, haptics, olfaction, vision, and interoception. The new norms improve on existing Dutch sensory norms in three ways: 1) they significantly expand on the number of words rated; 2) they include multiple word classes; 3) they add a new perceptual modality: interoception. We show that the sensory norms are able to predict word processing behavior and outperform existing ratings of sensory experience: concreteness and imageability. The data are available via the Open Science Framework ( https://osf.io/ubvy2 ) and serve as a valuable resource for research into the relationship between language and perception.

Limits on simulation approaches in intuitive physics.

A popular explanation of the human ability for physical reasoning is that it depends on a sophisticated ability to perform mental simulations. According to this perspective, physical reasoning problems are approached by repeatedly simulating relevant aspects of a scenario, with noise, and making judgments based on aggregation over these simulations. In this paper, we describe three core tenets of simulation approaches, theoretical commitments that must be present in order for a simulation approach to be viable. The identification of these tenets threatens the plausibility of simulation as a theory of physical reasoning, because they appear to be incompatible with what we know about cognition more generally. To investigate this apparent contradiction, we describe three experiments involving simple physical judgments and predictions, and argue their results challenge these core predictions of theories of mental simulation.

Modulation of intracortical inhibition during physically performed and mentally simulated balance tasks.

PURPOSE: Action observation (AO) during motor imagery (MI), so-called AO + MI, has been proposed as a new form of non-physical training, but the neural mechanisms involved remains largely unknown. Therefore, this study aimed to explore whether there were similarities in the modulation of short-interval intracortical inhibition (SICI) during execution and mental simulation of postural tasks, and if there was a difference in modulation of SICI between AO + MI and AO alone. METHOD: 21 young adults (mean ± SD = 24 ± 6.3 years) were asked to either passively observe (AO) or imagine while observing (AO + MI) or physically perform a stable and an unstable standing task, while motor evoked potentials and SICI were assessed in the soleus muscle. RESULT: SICI results showed a modulation by condition (F2,40 = 6.42, p = 0.009) with less SICI in the execution condition compared to the AO + MI (p = 0.009) and AO (p = 0.002) condition. Moreover, switching from the stable to the unstable stance condition reduced significantly SICI (F1,20 = 8.34, p = 0.009) during both, physically performed (- 38.5%; p = 0.03) and mentally simulated balance (- 10%, p < 0.001, AO + MI and AO taken together). CONCLUSION: The data demonstrate that SICI is reduced when switching from a stable to a more unstable standing task during both real task execution and mental simulation. Therefore, our results strengthen and further support the existence of similarities between executed and mentally simulated actions by showing that not only corticospinal excitability is similarly modulated but also SICI. This proposes that the activity of the inhibitory cortical network during mental simulation of balance tasks resembles the one during physical postural task execution.

Is color continuously activated in mental simulations across a broader discourse context?

Previous studies have provided contradictory information regarding the activation of perceptual information in a changing discourse context. The current study examines the continued activation of color in mental simulations across one (Experiment 1), two (Experiment 2), and five sentences (Experiment 3), using a sentence-picture verification paradigm. In Experiment 1, the sentence either contained a reference to a color (e.g., a red bicycle) or no reference to a color (e.g., bicycle). In Experiments 2 and 3, either the first or the final sentence contained a reference to a color. Participants responded to pictures either matching the color mentioned in the sentence, or shown in grayscale. The results illustrated that color was activated in mental simulations when the final sentence contained a reference to color. When the target object (e.g., bicycle) was mentioned in all sentences (i.e., in Experiment 2), color remained activated in the mental simulation, even when only the first sentence made a reference to a color. When the focus of the story was shifted elsewhere and the target object was not present across all sentences (i.e., in Experiment 3), color was no longer activated in the mental simulation. These findings suggest that color remains active in mental simulations so long as the target object is present in every sentence. As soon as the focus of the story shifts to another event, this perceptual information is deactivated in the mental simulation. As such, there is no continued activation of color across a broader discourse context.

Getting lost in a story: how narrative engagement emerges from narrative perspective and individual differences in alexithymia.

The present research examines how narrative engagement, or the extent to which people immerse themselves into the world of a story, varies as a function of narrative perspective and individual differences in alexithymia. The authors hypothesised that narrative engagement would be higher when people assume a first-person (rather than third-person) perspective and for people lower (rather than higher) on alexithymia. In an online study (N = 541) and a lab study (N = 55), participants with varying levels of alexithymia read first- and/or third-person narrated texts and then rated their narrative engagement. As expected, first-person stories evoked more narrative engagement than third-person stories, and global alexithymia was negatively correlated with narrative engagement. Narrative perspective did not interact with cognitive facets of alexithymia (i.e. difficulties identifying, verbalising, and understanding feelings). However, narrative perspective did interact with affective facets of alexithymia (i.e. emotionalising and fantasising): First-person (rather than third-person) stories elicited more narrative engagement at lower levels of affective alexithymia, but not at higher levels of affective alexithymia. The interaction effect was significant in Study 1; the interaction was significant in Study 2 after controlling for trait absorption. Together, these findings suggest that alexithymia is linked to difficulties in mentally simulating narrative worlds.

The role of simulation in imagery rescripting for post-traumatic stress disorder: a single case series.

BACKGROUND: Imagery rescripting (ImRs) is an experiential therapy technique used to change the content and meaning of intrusive imagery in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by imagining alternative endings to traumatic events. There is growing evidence that ImRs is an effective treatment for PTSD; however, little is known about how it brings about change. AIMS: This study aimed to explore the role of mental simulation as a candidate mechanism of action in ImRs, and, specifically, whether well-simulated imagery rescripts are associated with greater change in symptom severity during ImRs. METHOD: Using a single-case experimental design, seven participants receiving cognitive therapy for PTSD were assessed before, during and after sessions of imagery rescripting for one intrusive image. Participants completed continuous symptom severity measures. Sessions were recorded, then coded for goodness of simulation (GOS) as well as additional factors (e.g. rescript believability, vividness). RESULTS: Participants were divided into high- and low-responders and coding was compared across groups. Correlational analyses were supported by descriptive analysis of individual sessions. High-responders' rescripts tended to be rated as well-simulated compared with those of low-responders. Specific factors (e.g. intensity of thoughts/emotions related to original and new imagery elements, level of cognitive and emotional shift and belief in the resultant rescript) were also associated with reductions in symptom severity. CONCLUSIONS: There was tentative evidence that well-simulated rescripted images tended to be associated with greater reductions in symptom severity of the target image. Clinical implications and avenues for further research are discussed.

Grounding language in the neglected senses of touch, taste, and smell.

Grounded theories hold sensorimotor activation is critical to language processing. Such theories have focused predominantly on the dominant senses of sight and hearing. Relatively fewer studies have assessed mental simulation within touch, taste, and smell, even though they are critically implicated in communication for important domains, such as health and wellbeing. We review work that sheds light on whether perceptual activation from lesser studied modalities contribute to meaning in language. We critically evaluate data from behavioural, imaging, and cross-cultural studies. We conclude that evidence for sensorimotor simulation in touch, taste, and smell is weak. Comprehending language related to these senses may instead rely on simulation of emotion, as well as crossmodal simulation of the "higher" senses of vision and audition. Overall, the data suggest the need for a refinement of embodiment theories, as not all sensory modalities provide equally strong evidence for mental simulation.

Screen-time influences children's mental imagery performance.

Mental imagery is a foundational human faculty that depends on active image construction and sensorimotor experiences. However, children now spend a significant proportion of their day engaged with screen-media, which (a) provide them with ready-made mental images, and (b) constitute a sensory narrowing whereby input is typically focused on the visual and auditory modalities. Accordingly, we test the idea that screen-time influences the development of children's mental imagery with a focus on mental image generation and inspection from the visual and haptic domains. In a longitudinal cross-lagged panel design, children (n = 266) aged between 3 and 9 years were tested at two points in time, 10 months apart. Measures of screen-time and mental imagery were employed, alongside a host of control variables including working memory, vocabulary, demographics, device ownership, and age of exposure to screen-media. Findings indicate a statistically significant path from screen-time at time 1 to mental imagery at time 2, above and beyond the influence of the control variables. These unique findings are discussed in terms of the influence of screen-time on mental imagery.

Fine motor skills and mental imagery: Is it all in the mind?

Previous work has indicated that children's fine motor skills (FMS) contribute to cognitive performance in a number of domains. A philosophically and scientifically central aspect of cognitive skill is the ability to mentally simulate external events; however, very little research has examined whether FMS relate to mental imagery. Children aged 35-129 months (N = 294) were administered measures of FMS and mental imagery. Control variables included working memory, vocabulary, visual closure, chronological age, and a vast array of stimulus lexical features. Multilevel linear models indicated that FMS uniquely predicted mental imagery abilities, as did visual closure, chronological age, and various lexical features, whereas working memory and vocabulary did not. Findings are taken to support the idea that both mental imagery and FMS share, in part, similar functional systems.

Spatial perspective taking: Effects of social, directional, and interactive cues.

Including an avatar in the array in a spatial perspective-taking test improves performance, but it is not clear why. Different aspects of an avatar, including its directional nature, its agency (perceived ability for action), and its interactivity, may all influence perspective-taking performance. Experiment 1 examined how performance was influenced by a social directional cue (an avatar) and an abstract directional cue (an arrow). Participants performed best in the avatar condition and no better in the arrow condition than in a control condition. These results suggest that directionality of the cue alone is not sufficient to facilitate performance on this task. Experiment 2 compared an avatar to a concrete directional cue that was grounded in everyday experience interacting with objects, but was non-agentive (a chair). There was no significant difference between the avatar and the chair conditions, which both outperformed the control condition. Participants in both experiments and all conditions primarily reported utilizing mental simulation strategies that involved imagining themselves in the array of objects. The results suggest that grounding the task in everyday interactions with people or objects facilitates this mental simulation process and more generally enhances performance on perspective-taking tasks.