Phantom perception as a Bayesian inference problem: a pilot study.

Tinnitus is the perception of a continuous sound in the absence of an external source. Although the role of the auditory system is well investigated, there is a gap in how multisensory signals are integrated to produce a single percept in tinnitus. Here, we train participants to learn a new sensory environment by associating a cue with a target signal that varies in perceptual threshold. In the test phase, we present only the cue to see whether the person perceives an illusion of the target signal. We perform two separate experiments to observe the behavioral and electrophysiological responses to the learning and test phases in 1) healthy young adults and 2) people with continuous subjective tinnitus and matched control subjects. We observed that in both parts of the study the percentage of false alarms was negatively correlated with the 75% detection threshold. Additionally, the perception of an illusion goes together with increased evoked response potential in frontal regions of the brain. Furthermore, in patients with tinnitus, we observe no significant difference in behavioral or evoked response in the auditory paradigm, whereas patients with tinnitus were more likely to report false alarms along with increased evoked activity during the learning and test phases in the visual paradigm. This emphasizes the importance of integrity of sensory pathways in multisensory integration and how this process may be disrupted in people with tinnitus. Furthermore, the present study also presents preliminary data supporting evidence that tinnitus patients may be building stronger perceptual models, which needs future studies with a larger population to provide concrete evidence on.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Tinnitus is the continuous phantom perception of a ringing in the ears. Recently, it has been suggested that tinnitus may be a maladaptive inference of the brain to auditory anomalies, whether they are detected or undetected by an audiogram. The present study presents empirical evidence for this hypothesis by inducing an illusion in a sensory domain that is damaged (auditory) and one that is intact (visual). It also presents novel information about how people with tinnitus process multisensory stimuli in the audio-visual domain.

Explanatory power by vagueness. Challenges to the strong prior hypothesis on hallucinations exemplified by the Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome.

Predictive processing models are often ascribed a certain generality in conceptually unifying the relationships between perception, action, and cognition or the potential to posit a 'grand unified theory' of the mind. The limitations of this unification can be seen when these models are applied to specific cognitive phenomena or phenomenal consciousness. Our article discusses these shortcomings for predictive processing models of hallucinations by the example of the Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. This case study shows that the current predictive processing account omits essential characteristics of stimulus-independent perception in general, which has critical phenomenological implications. We argue that the most popular predictive processing model of hallucinatory conditions - the strong prior hypothesis - fails to fully account for the characteristics of nonveridical perceptual experiences associated with Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. To fill this explanatory gap, we propose that the strong prior hypothesis needs to include reality monitoring to apply to more than just veridical percepts.

Associations of Cognitive Expectancies With Auditory Hallucinations and Hallucinatory-Like Experiences in Patients With Schizophrenia.

BACKGROUND: Various neurocognitive models explore perceptual distortions and hallucinations in schizophrenia and the general population. A variant of predictive coding account suggests that strong priors, like cognitive expectancy, may influence perception. This study examines if stronger cognitive expectancies result in more auditory false percepts in clinical and healthy control groups, investigates group differences, and explores the association between false percepts and hallucinations. STUDY DESIGN: Patients diagnosed with schizophrenia with current auditory hallucinations (n = 51) and without hallucinations (n = 66) and healthy controls (n = 51) underwent the False Perception Task under various expectancy conditions. All groups were examined for the presence and severity of hallucinations or hallucinatory-like experiences. STUDY RESULTS: We observed a main effect of condition across all groups, ie, the stronger the cognitive expectancy, the greater the ratio of auditory false percepts. However, there was no group effect for the ratio of auditory false percepts. Despite modest pairwise correlations in the hallucinating group, the ratio of auditory false percepts was not predicted by levels of hallucinations and hallucinatory-like experiences in a linear mixed model. CONCLUSIONS: The current study demonstrates that strong priors in the form of cognitive expectancies affect perception and play a role in perceptual disturbances. There is also a tentative possibility that overreliance on strong priors may be associated with hallucinations in currently hallucinating subjects. Possible, avoidable confounding factors are discussed in detail.