Belief traps: Tackling the inertia of harmful beliefs.

Beliefs can be highly resilient in the sense that they are not easily abandoned in the face of counterevidence. This has the advantage of guiding consistent behavior and judgments but may also have destructive consequences for individuals, nature, and society. For instance, pathological beliefs can sustain psychiatric disorders, the belief that rhinoceros horn is an aphrodisiac may drive a species extinct, beliefs about gender or race may fuel discrimination, and belief in conspiracy theories can undermine democracy. Here, we present a unifying framework of how self-amplifying feedbacks shape the inertia of beliefs on levels ranging from neuronal networks to social systems. Sustained exposure to counterevidence can destabilize rigid beliefs but requires organized rational override as in cognitive behavioral therapy for pathological beliefs or institutional control of discrimination to reduce racial biases. Black-and-white thinking is a major risk factor for the formation of resilient beliefs associated with psychiatric disorders as well as prejudices and conspiracy thinking. Such dichotomous thinking is characteristic of a lack of cognitive resources, which may be exacerbated by stress. This could help explain why conspiracy thinking and psychiatric disorders tend to peak during crises. A corollary is that addressing social factors such as poverty, social cleavage, and lack of education may be the most effective way to prevent the emergence of rigid beliefs, and thus of problems ranging from psychiatric disorders to prejudices, conspiracy theories, and posttruth politics.

How threat perceptions relate to learning and conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19: Evidence from a panel study.

According to appraisal theory, individuals cope with perceived threats in different ways. If engaging in problem-focused coping, for example, they may seek information useful for eliminating the root cause of the threat. However, during crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, people tend to navigate complex information environments marked by high levels of uncertainty. In such contexts, individuals may adopt maladaptive behaviours-for instance, avoiding information or switching to pseudo-epistemic coping-in which they engage with non-scientific explanations. As a consequence, they may learn less from their information environment and become susceptible to conspiracy theories. Against that background, we investigated how threat perceptions relate to learning, believing in conspiracy claims and conspiracy thinking in context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing from two-wave panel data, we found that threat perceptions were associated with a decrease in knowledge and an increase in believing conspiracy claims. Taken together, our findings indicate that high levels of threat perceptions in uncertain information environments may impede societal learning and encourage conspiracy beliefs. Thus, although provoking general anxiety may support short-term political goals, including adherence to policy during crises, accumulated threat perceptions may adversely affect citizens' motivation to cooperate in the long term.

Exploring Factors Influencing COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy and Refusal: A Study in Italy during the Vaccine Rollout.

The availability of an effective vaccine against COVID-19 virus marked a crucial moment in the fight against its pandemic spread. Although distribution of the vaccine began in December 2020, high acceptance rates and repeated administrations are needed to achieve widespread immunization, but hesitation toward the vaccine persists to this day. To identify psychological variables and other factors associated with vaccine hesitancy, we conducted a study from August 2021 to October 2022. An Internet-based survey gathered data from 137 Italian adults, exploring attitudes, sociodemographic characteristics, psychological variables, and immunization behavior. The results analysis showed that gender (69.2% of vaccine-adverse people were males), education (years of education was negatively correlated with vaccine hesitancy), and religion (not declaring oneself religious or atheist was more likely to be associated with hesitancy toward the vaccine) were the variables influencing attitudes toward the vaccine. Other psychological variables differentiated people with opposite attitudes toward the vaccine: high scores on the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ) and Core Belief Inventory (CBI) were positively correlated with vaccine hesitancy, indicating that individuals with more pronounced core belief violation, due to the pandemic, tend to express higher levels of vaccine hesitancy. Finally, a linear regression analysis confirmed the role of participants' conspiracy mentality as a valid predictor for vaccine hesitancy.

A vicious circle? Longitudinal relationships between different modes of in-group identity and COVID-19 conspiracy thinking.

Since March 2020, when the World Health Organization declared the spread of COVID-19 a global pandemic, conspiracy theories have continued to rise. This research examines the role of different forms of in-group identity in predicting conspiracy thinking in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. We hypothesized that conspiracy thinking would be predicted positively by national narcissism (i.e., a belief in in-group's greatness which is contingent on its external validation and makes in-group members sensitive to psychological threats) but negatively by secure national identification (i.e., a confidently held ingroup evaluation, which serves as a buffer against psychological threats). In a three-wave longitudinal study conducted on a representative sample of adult Poles (N = 650), conspiracy thinking was positively predicted by national narcissism, but negatively by national identification. Further, we found evidence that conspiracy thinking strengthened national narcissism (but not national identification) over time. Implications for intra- and intergroup processes are discussed.

Contemporary trends in psychological research on conspiracy beliefs. A systematic review.

Background: The number of psychological studies on conspiracy beliefs has been systematically growing for about a dozen years, but in recent years, the trend has intensified. We provided a review covering the psychological literature on conspiracy beliefs from 2018 to 2021. Halfway through this period, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, accompanied by an explosion of movements based on conspiracy theories, intensifying researchers' interest in this issue. Methods: Adhering to PRISMA guidelines, the review systematically searched for relevant journal articles published between 2018 and 2021. A search was done on Scopus and Web of Science (only peer-reviewed journals). A study was included if it contained primary empirical data, if specific or general conspiracy belief(s) were measured and if its correlation with at least one other psychological variable was reported. All the studies were grouped for the descriptive analysis according to the methodology used, the participants' characteristics, the continent of origin, the sample size, and the conspiracy beliefs measurement tools. Due to substantial methodological heterogeneity of the studies, narrative synthesis was performed. The five researchers were assigned specific roles at each stage of the analysis to ensure the highest quality of the research. Results: Following the proposed methodology, 308 full-text articles were assessed for eligibility and 274 articles (417 studies) meeting the inclusion criteria were identified and included in the review. Almost half of the studies (49.6%) were conducted in European countries. The vast majority of the studies (85.7%) were carried out on samples of adult respondents. The research presents antecedents as well as (potential) consequences of conspiracy beliefs. We grouped the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs into six categories: cognitive (e.g., thinking style) motivational (e.g., uncertainty avoidance), personality (e.g., collective narcissism), psychopathology (e.g., Dark Triad traits), political (e.g., ideological orientation), and sociocultural factors (e.g., collectivism). Conclusion and limitations: The research presents evidence on the links between conspiracy beliefs and a range of attitudes and behaviors considered unfavorable from the point of view of individuals and of the society at large. It turned out that different constructs of conspiracy thinking interact with each other. The limitations of the study are discussed in the last part of the article.

Conspiracy thinking and the long historical shadow of Romanticism on authoritarian politics.

Background: Similar effect sizes have been reported for the effects of conspiracy, pseudoscientific, and paranormal beliefs on authoritarian attitudes, which points to a conceptual problem at the heart of the conspiracy literature, namely lack of clarity as to what uniquely defines conspiracy beliefs and whether those unique elements contribute distinctly to authoritarian ideologies. To our knowledge, this is the first study to test empirically the predictive power of variance unique to each construct against covariance shared among these constructs when predicting authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. Methods: Online survey was administered to 314 participants in 2021 that included a battery of demographic and psychological measures. Hierarchical factor models were used to isolate unique variance from shared covariance among responses to items representing conspiracy, paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs. Structural equation models were used to test their unique and shared effects on authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. Results: We found that our combined measurement model of paranormal thinking, conspiracism, and pseudoscience exhibited exceptional model fit, and that each construct was strongly predictive of both SDO and RWA (r = 0.73-0.86). Once the shared covariance was partitioned into a higher order factor, the residual uniqueness in each first order factors was either negatively related or unrelated to authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. Moreover, the higher order factor explained the gross majority of variance in conspiracy (R2 = 0.81) paranormal (R2 = 0.81) and pseudoscientific (R2 = 0.95) beliefs and was a far stronger predictor (ß = 0.85, p < 0.01) of anti-democratic attitudes than political partisanship (ß = 0.17, p < 0.01). Strong partisan identifiers of both parties showed much higher romanticism scores than party moderates. Conclusion and limitations: When predicting authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes, we found no empirically unique contributions of conspiracy beliefs. Instead, we found that a shared factor, representing a 'romantic' mindset was the main predictor of authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. This finding potentially explains failures of interventions in stopping the spread of misinformation and conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theory researchers should refocus on the shared features that conspiracy thinking has with other unwarranted epistemic beliefs to better understand how to halt the spread of misinformation, conspiracy thinking, anti-science attitudes, and even global authoritarianism.

Trust in information sources as a moderator of the impact of COVID-19 anxiety and exposure to information on conspiracy thinking and misinformation beliefs: a multilevel study.

This study investigates the intricate relationship between exposure to information sources, trust in these sources, conspiracy and misinformation beliefs, and COVID-19 anxiety among 509 Omani citizens aged 11 to 50, representing 11 governorates. Employing structural equation modeling, we not only examine these associations but also explore how trust and COVID-19 anxiety act as moderating variables in this context. Additionally, we delve into demographic factors such as age group, educational level, gender, and place of residence (governorate) to discern potential variations.Our findings reveal that trust in health experts is inversely related to belief in conspiracy theories, while trust in health experts negatively correlates with exposure to conspiracy and misinformation. Intriguingly, trust in health experts exhibits divergent effects across governorates: it diminishes conspiracy and misinformation beliefs in some regions but not in others. Exposure to personal contacts and digital media, on the other hand, is associated with heightened beliefs in misinformation and conspiracy theories, respectively, in select governorates. These distinctions may be attributed to proximity to Muscat, the capital city of Oman, where various media outlets and policy-making institutions are situated. Furthermore, lower educational attainment is linked to greater belief in conspiracy and misinformation. Females reported higher levels of conspiracy theory beliefs and COVID-19 anxiety while no significant differences were detected in misinformation beliefs.This study sheds light on the intricate dynamics of misinformation and conspiracy theories in the context of COVID-19 in Oman, highlighting the pivotal roles of trust and COVID-19 anxiety as moderating factors. These findings offer valuable insights into understanding and addressing the spread of misinformation and conspiracy theories during a public health crisis.

Factors affecting conspiracy theory endorsement in paranoia.

Paranoia and conspiracy thinking are known to be distinct but correlated constructs, but it is unknown whether certain types of conspiracy thinking are more common in paranoia than others. In a large (n = 1000), pre-registered online study we tested if endorsement of items on a new Components of Conspiracy Ideation Questionnaire varied according to whether harm was described as being (a) intentional and (b) self-referential. Our predictions were supported: paranoia was positively associated with endorsement of items on this questionnaire overall and more paranoid individuals were more likely to endorse items describing intentional and self-referential harm. Belief in any item on the Components of Conspiracy Ideation Questionnaire was associated with belief in others and items describing incidental harm and harm to others were found to be more believable overall. Individuals who endorsed conspiracy theory items on the questionnaire were more likely to state that people similar to them would as well, although this effect was not reduced in paranoia, counter to our expectations.

Are Republicans and Conservatives More Likely to Believe Conspiracy Theories?

A sizable literature tracing back to Richard Hofstadter's The Paranoid Style (1964) argues that Republicans and conservatives are more likely to believe conspiracy theories than Democrats and liberals. However, the evidence for this proposition is mixed. Since conspiracy theory beliefs are associated with dangerous orientations and behaviors, it is imperative that social scientists better understand the connection between conspiracy theories and political orientations. Employing 20 surveys of Americans from 2012 to 2021 (total n = 37,776), as well as surveys of 20 additional countries spanning six continents (total n = 26,416), we undertake an expansive investigation of the asymmetry thesis. First, we examine the relationship between beliefs in 52 conspiracy theories and both partisanship and ideology in the U.S.; this analysis is buttressed by an examination of beliefs in 11 conspiracy theories across 20 more countries. In our second test, we hold constant the content of the conspiracy theories investigated-manipulating only the partisanship of the theorized villains-to decipher whether those on the left or right are more likely to accuse political out-groups of conspiring. Finally, we inspect correlations between political orientations and the general predisposition to believe in conspiracy theories over the span of a decade. In no instance do we observe systematic evidence of a political asymmetry. Instead, the strength and direction of the relationship between political orientations and conspiricism is dependent on the characteristics of the specific conspiracy beliefs employed by researchers and the socio-political context in which those ideas are considered. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-022-09812-3.

Conspiracy thinking as situation model construction.

Conspiracy thinking can be viewed as a form of narrative comprehension. We routinely infer actors' goals and plans when someone tells us a story. However, comprehenders extend this practice when considering real-world events, which are not orchestrated by a narrator. Comprehenders routinely favor information that is consistent with their perspective, but conspiracy thinkers likely do this to a greater extent, due to the low levels of cognitive reflection they exhibit. Comprehenders supplement incoming information with background knowledge. Conspiracy thinkers do this as well, but their knowledge base deviates from that of the mainstream, as a result of exposure to large amounts of misinformation.

Public Opinions and Conspiracy Thinking Toward the COVID-19 Outbreak in Iraqi Kurdistan.

OBJECTIVE: The public's perceptions toward the COVID-19 crisis and the government's attempts to handle the crisis are critically noteworthy. The public opinions toward the COVID-19 crisis were explored in this study. METHODS: In this report, 1102 participants were included from 2 popular social media platforms from the Duhok Governorate in Iraqi Kurdistan between June 2 and 22, 2020, through an online technique. RESULTS: The study revealed that 14.0% of the participants believed that there is no COVID-19 in this region, and 20.1% had no concerns about the disease spread. This study revealed that 27.4% had conspiracy thinking about the COVID-19 outbreak, including that the outbreak is a plot against/of the Kurdistan Region Government, 16.4% and 19.3%, respectively. The outbreak caused considerable changes in participants' lives (85.8%). The participants who had conspiracy thinking were younger (27.0 vs 30.0; P = 0.001) and had a higher level of education (37.50% high school and under, 26.0% college and above, 16.2% illiterate: P < 0.001). In addition, they had a private job (43.7%), and were unemployed (23.9%; P < 0.001), and had negative views on the TV information (38.9% vs 17.5%; P < 0.001). CONCLUSIONS: A considerable percentage of the public exhibits conspiracy thinking toward the COVID-19 crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Conspiratorial Beliefs About COVID-19 Pandemic - Can They Pose a Mental Health Risk? The Relationship Between Conspiracy Thinking and the Symptoms of Anxiety and Depression Among Adult Poles.

The aim of the study was to describe the relationship between the tendency to believe in false information about the COVID-19 pandemic, tendency to believe in conspiracy theories and the severity of anxiety and depression symptoms among the surveyed Poles. The study was conducted via the Internet in a group of 700 people aged 24.8 ± 6.3 years (mean ± SD). 585 females and 110 males were involved. Scales such as Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) and the original questionnaire COVID-19 Conspiratorial Beliefs Scale (COVID-19 CBS) designed to measure the tendency to believe in false information about COVID-19 pandemic were used. A positive correlation was observed between the tendency to believe in false information about the COVID-19 pandemic (COVID-19 CBS) and the tendency to believe in general conspiracy theories (GCBS) (r = 0.768; p < 0.001). Moreover, both COVID-19 CBS and GCBS positively correlated with the severity of anxiety and depression symptoms in the study group. For COVID-19 CBS, the correlation coefficients were 0.087 (p < 0.021) and.108 (p < 0.004) for depressive and anxiety symptoms, respectively, while for GCBS the coefficients were 0.132 (p < 0.001) and 0.147 (p < 0.001). Regression analysis showed that the increased tendency to believe in false beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic may be associated with an increase in the severity of anxiety (b = 0.04; p = 0.021) and depression (b = 0.06; p < 0.001) symptoms. It can be hypothesized that the tendency to believe in false information regarding the COVID-19 pandemic is positively associated with the tendency to general belief in conspiracy theories. False beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic may, at least to some extent, influence the development of anxiety and depression symptoms.