The Involvement of the Posterior Cerebellum in Reconstructing and Predicting Social Action Sequences.

Recent advances in social neuroscience have highlighted the critical role of the cerebellum and especially the posterior cerebellar Crus in social mentalizing (i.e., theory of mind). Research in the past 5 years has provided growing evidence supporting the view that the posterior cerebellum builds internal action models of our social interactions to predict how other people's actions will be executed, and what our most likely responses to these actions will be. This paper presents an overview of a series of fMRI experiments on novel tasks involving a combination of (a) the learning or generation of chronological sequences of social actions either in an explicit or implicit manner, which (b) require social mentalizing on another person's mental state such as goals, beliefs, and implied traits. Together, the results strongly confirm the central role of the posterior cerebellar Crus in identifying and automatizing action sequencing during social mentalizing, and in predicting future action sequences based on social mentalizing inferences about others. This research program has important implications: It provides for the first time (a) fruitful starting points for diagnosing and investigating social sequencing dysfunctions in a variety of mental disorders which have also been related to cerebellar dysfunctions, (b) provides the necessary tools for testing whether non-invasive neurostimulation targeting the posterior cerebellum has a causal effect on social functioning, and (c) whether these stimulation techniques and training programs guided by novel cerebellar social sequencing insights, can be exploited to increase posterior cerebellar plasticity in order to alleviate social impairments in mental disorders.

What do patients consulting in a free sexual health center know about HIV transmission and post-exposure prophylaxis?

BACKGROUND: Screening, condom use and post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) are among existing HIV prevention strategies. However, efficient use of these strategies requires that patients have an adequate knowledge of HIV transmission routes and awareness of risk behaviors. This study aimed to assess knowledge about HIV transmission among patients who attended a free HIV and sexually transmitted infection (STI) screening center in Paris, France, and to explore the patient profiles associated with HIV-related knowledge. METHODS: This observational cross-sectional study included 2002 patients who attended for STI testing from August 2017 through August 2018 and completed a self-administered electronic questionnaire. Based on incorrect answers regarding HIV transmission, two outcomes were assessed: lack of knowledge and false beliefs. Factors associated with these two outcomes were explored using univariate and multivariate logistic regressions. RESULTS: Only 3.6% of patients did not know about HIV transmission through unprotected sexual intercourse and/or by sharing needles. More than one third of patients (36.4%) had at least one false belief, believing that HIV could be transmitted by sharing a drink (9.7%), kissing (17.6%) or using public toilets (27.5%). A low educational level and no previous HIV testing were associated in multivariate analyses with both lack of knowledge and false beliefs. Age and sexual orientation were also associated with false beliefs. Furthermore, 55.6% of patients did not know that post-exposure prophylaxis consists of taking emergency treatment as soon as possible after risky intercourse. CONCLUSIONS: Although the main HIV transmission routes are well known, false beliefs persist and knowledge regarding PEP needs to be improved. Prevention campaigns must focus on these themes which appear as a complementary strategy to pre-exposure prophylaxis to reduce HIV infection.

Induction of false beliefs and false memories in laboratory studies-A systematic review.

Psychological interventions often use guided discovery and other techniques for diagnostic exploration and intervention planning. This way, memories may arise in the person, which may be true or false. False memories of earlier events can be harmful and result in real suffering, similar to actual traumatic memories. Based on cognitive psychological and psycho-traumatological findings, there is pronounced dissent in the academic disciplines regarding the conceptualization, relevance and research of false memories. This review contributes to the basic question of how often false beliefs and false memories may be induced within the frame of different interactional techniques. A systematic review has been conducted of 59 articles from (quasi-)experimental studies and two qualitative sources from 30 data bases. Three main methods of memory induction provide the basis for reporting: imagination inflation, false feedback, and memory implantation. Due to the conceptual and methodological diversity of the studies, the results appear to be heterogeneous. Free and guided imagery, as well as suggestive statements, could induce false beliefs or false memories in, on average, 20%-50% of the participants who underwent experimental manipulation concerning false past events. A false belief induction may occur after dream interpretation or hypnosis in more than 50% of participants. Personalized suggestion is more effective in inducing memory than the general plausibility of the suggested events. Further research questions are which therapeutic actions seem appropriate in cases of harmful false memories. This depends not only on whether there are veridical elements in the false memory but also on the quality and meaning of the memory for the person's life and ability to cope with burdens.

On the domain specificity of the mechanisms underpinning spontaneous anticipatory looks in false-belief tasks.

Many studies proposed that infants' and adults' looking behavior suggest a spontaneous and implicit ability to reason about others' beliefs. It has been argued, however, that these successes are false positives due to domain-general processes, such as retroactive interference. In this study, we investigated the domain specificity of mechanisms underpinning participants' looking behavior by manipulating the dynamic cues in the event stimuli. Infants aged 15 and 20 months and adults saw animation events in which either a self-moving triangle, or a hand holding an identical inert triangle, chased an animated disk. Most 20-month-olds and adults showed belief congruent anticipatory looks in the agent-triangle condition, whereas they showed no bias in the inert triangle control condition. These results are not consistent with submentalizing accounts based on domain-general low-level processes and provide further support for domain-specific explanations positing an early-emerging mentalistic reasoning.

Psychological Reasoning in Infancy.

Adults routinely make sense of others' actions by inferring the mental states that underlie these actions. Over the past two decades, developmental researchers have made significant advances in understanding the origins of this ability in infancy. This evidence indicates that when infants observe an agent act in a simple scene, they infer the agent's mental states and then use these mental states, together with a principle of rationality (and its corollaries of efficiency and consistency), to predict and interpret the agent's subsequent actions and to guide their own actions toward the agent. In this review, we first describe the initial demonstrations of infants' sensitivity to the efficiency and consistency principles. We then examine how infants identify novel entities as agents. Next, we summarize what is known about infants' ability to reason about agents' motivational, epistemic, and counterfactual states. Finally, we consider alternative interpretations of these findings and discuss the current controversy about the relation between implicit and explicit psychological reasoning.

Apes perform like infants in false-belief tasks.

Although the extent to which some nonhuman animals understand mental states is currently under debate, attributing false beliefs has been considered to be beyond their limits. A recent study by Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, and Tomasello (Science, 354, 110-114, 2016) shows that great apes pass a false-belief task when they are tested with an anticipatory-looking paradigm developed for nonverbal human infants.

I know you see it wrong! Children use others' false perceptions to predict their behaviors.

Research on children's ability to attribute false mental states to others has focused exclusively on false beliefs. We developed a novel paradigm that focuses instead on another type of false mental state: false perceptions. From approximately 4years of age, children begin to recognize that their perception of an illusory object can be at odds with its true properties. Our question was whether they also recognize that another individual viewing the object will similarly experience a false perception. We tested 33 preschool children with a task in which distorting lenses caused a small object to appear large and a large object to appear small. To succeed, children needed to recognize that a naive agent would falsely perceive the relative size of the objects and to correctly anticipate the agent's actions on that basis. Children performed significantly better than chance in our false perception test, and there was a developmental progression in performance from 4 to 5years of age similar to that seen in standard false belief tests. Our findings demonstrate that preschool children are capable of understanding that other individuals will be perceptually misled by illusory objects and that these false perceptions will influence their actions in predictable ways.

Processing of false belief passages during natural story comprehension: An fMRI study.

The neural correlates of theory of mind (ToM) are typically studied using paradigms which require participants to draw explicit, task-related inferences (e.g., in the false belief task). In a natural setup, such as listening to stories, false belief mentalizing occurs incidentally as part of narrative processing. In our experiment, participants listened to auditorily presented stories with false belief passages (implicit false belief processing) and immediately after each story answered comprehension questions (explicit false belief processing), while neural responses were measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). All stories included (among other situations) one false belief condition and one closely matched control condition. For the implicit ToM processing, we modeled the hemodynamic response during the false belief passages in the story and compared it to the hemodynamic response during the closely matched control passages. For implicit mentalizing, we found activation in typical ToM processing regions, that is the angular gyrus (AG), superior medial frontal gyrus (SmFG), precuneus (PCUN), middle temporal gyrus (MTG) as well as in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) billaterally. For explicit ToM, we only found AG activation. The conjunction analysis highlighted the left AG and MTG as well as the bilateral IFG as overlapping ToM processing regions for both implicit and explicit modes. Implicit ToM processing during listening to false belief passages, recruits the left SmFG and billateral PCUN in addition to the "mentalizing network" known form explicit processing tasks.

Intellectual humility as a tool to combat false beliefs: An individual-based approach to belief revision.

False beliefs pose significant societal threats, including health risks, political polarization and even violence. In two studies (N = 884) we explored the efficacy of an individual-based approach to correcting false beliefs. We examined whether the character virtue of intellectual humility (IH)-an appreciation of one's intellectual boundaries-encourages revising one's false beliefs in response to counter-information. Our research produced encouraging but also mixed findings. Among participants who held false beliefs about the risks of vaccines (Study 1) and the 2020 US Election being rigged (Study 2), those with higher IH explored more information opposing these false beliefs. This exploration of opposing information, in turn, predicted updating away from these inaccurate health and political beliefs. IH did not directly predict updating away from false beliefs, however, suggesting that this effect-if it exists-may not be particularly powerful. Taken together, these results provide moderate support for IH as a character trait that can foster belief revision but, simultaneously, suggest that alternate pathways to combat false beliefs and misinformation may be preferred.

False Beliefs about Mathematics in Spanish Pre-Service Teachers and Relations with Math Anxiety.

Teachers may hold beliefs about how students learn mathematics and about the subject itself. However, some of these beliefs, often referred to as "math myths", may be oversimplified ideas that appear valid but lack solid scientific evidence. This study was aimed to investigate the prevalence of math myths among Spanish pre-service teachers and compare it with the degree of support for these myths reported in previous studies; investigate the possible underlying structure of a set of false beliefs about math; and determine the relationships of certain math misconceptions with math anxiety. A total of 212 Spanish pre-service teachers were administered questionnaires about math myths and about general and math anxiety. The results showed prevalence patterns of each math misconception similar to those in previous studies. False beliefs about math showed weak or negligible correlations with each other and did not exhibit a discernible underlying structure. Furthermore, math anxiety was related to the belief that some individuals are perceived to possess a "math mind" while others do not. Our results suggest diverse origins for the development of different math myths, rather than the myths being the consequence of a single underlying factor. Finally, the endorsement of certain beliefs about who can do mathematics may contribute to negative emotions towards mathematics.

Verbal Perceptual Prompts Facilitate Children's Sensitivity to False Beliefs.

False belief understanding is always regarded as a milestone of Theory of Mind (ToM), which is an important aspect of social intelligence. Recently, some researchers have suggested the existence of two ToM systems in individuals: one that explicitly guides false belief understanding and another that implicitly directs sensitivity to false beliefs. However, studies on sensitivity to false beliefs have encountered challenges with replicability, and the factors influencing the manifestation of sensitivity to false beliefs remain to be explored. Based on the anticipatory looking task, we investigated whether verbal perceptual prompts could improve children's performance of sensitivity to false beliefs. Fifty-eight children aged 5 to 6 were randomly assigned tasks with or without verbal perceptual prompts, involving verbal descriptions and explanations of the protagonist's perceptual state. The findings showed that verbal perceptual prompts could slightly reduce children's propensity to look at the actual location of the object in false belief situations and increase the likelihood of exhibiting accurate anticipatory looking patterns across false belief and true belief situations. The results suggest that children's sensitivity to false beliefs may be situation-dependent, yet further investigation is needed to determine which situational factors can most effectively trigger robust sensitivity to false beliefs in children. The results enlighten educational practice, indicating that introducing cues in social environments that convey insights into others' mental states, akin to the use of learning scaffolding, is advantageous for the development of children's social cognitive abilities.

Combining refutations and social norms increases belief change.

Misinformed beliefs are difficult to change. Refutations that target false claims typically reduce false beliefs, but tend to be only partially effective. In this study, a social norming approach was explored to test whether provision of peer norms could provide an alternative or complementary approach to refutation. Three experiments investigated whether a descriptive norm-by itself or in combination with a refutation-could reduce the endorsement of worldview-congruent claims. Experiment 1 found that using a single-point estimate to communicate a norm affected belief but had less impact than a refutation. Experiment 2 used a verbally presented distribution of four values to communicate a norm, which was largely ineffective. Experiment 3 used a graphically presented social norm with 25 values, which was found to be as effective at reducing claim belief as a refutation, with the combination of both interventions being most impactful. These results provide a proof of concept that normative information can aid in the debunking of false or equivocal claims, and suggests that theories of misinformation processing should take social factors into account.

Organizational benefits of neurodiversity: Preliminary findings on autism and the bystander effect.

Although the bystander effect is one of the most important findings in the psychological literature, researchers have not explored whether autistic individuals are prone to the bystander effect. The present research examines whether autistic employees are more likely to report issues or concerns in an organization's systems and practices that are inefficient or dysfunctional. By bringing attention to these issues, autistic employees may foster opportunities to improve organizational performance, leading to the development of a more adaptive, high performing, and ethical culture. Thirty-three autistic employees and 34 nonautistic employees completed an online survey to determine whether employees on the autism spectrum (1) are more likely to report they would voice concerns about organizational dysfunctions, (2) are less likely to report they were influenced by the number of other witnesses to the dysfunction, (3) if they do not voice concerns, are more likely to acknowledge the influence of other people on the decision, (4) are less likely to formulate "elaborate rationales" for their decisions to intervene or not, and (5) whether any differences between autistic and nonautistic employees with regards to the first two hypotheses, intervention likelihood and degree of influence, are moderated by individual differences in camouflaging. Results indicate that autistic employees may be less susceptible to the bystander effect than nonautistic employees. As a result, autistic employees may contribute to improvements in organizational performance because they are more likely to identify and report inefficient processes and dysfunctional practices when they witness them. These preliminary findings suggesting potential benefits of neurodiversity in the workplace are promising. However, further research is required.

Updating false beliefs: The role of misplaced vs. well-placed certainty.

People can update their misconceptions or false beliefs by learning from corrective sources. However, research has shown that people vary drastically in the extent to which they learn from feedback and update their false beliefs accordingly. That past work drew attention to cognitive and motivational factors such as cognitive rigidity and closed-mindedness as inhibitors of belief updating. Here we examined a novel epistemic structure, misplaced certainty, a subjective sense of certainty while recognizing uncertainty in oneself or most people (e.g., I feel certain although I recognize X is technically uncertain or it is technically uncertain according to most people), as a unique predictor of lower belief updating. In a preregistered study, we hypothesized that those with high chronic misplaced certainty would be less likely to learn from feedback and revise their misconceptions in a feedback-learning task. In our analyses, we controlled for well-placed certainty-certainty while recognizing no doubt in oneself or most others. We also controlled for variables associated with closed-minded cognition. Consistent with our predictions, those with high misplaced certainty were less likely to revise their false beliefs in response to corrective feedback. In contrast, those with high well-placed certainty were more likely to learn from corrective feedback and revise their false beliefs. By shedding light on the nuances of different forms of subjective certainty, the present work aims to pave the way for further research on epistemic factors in the perseverance and correction of false beliefs.

Tenacious educational neuromyths: Prevalence among teachers and an intervention.

BACKGROUND: Several studies have revealed a common high prevalence of educational neuromyths among teachers from different countries. However, only one intervention aimed at reducing these beliefs among in-service teachers has been reported to date, and it was conducted in a non-naturalistic setting. PROCEDURE: In the present study, we administered a survey to measure the prevalence of common neuromyths in a large sample (n = 807) of primary and secondary teachers from 203 schools across Catalonia (Spain), and then we evaluated the impact that a 15-hour online course on neuroscience had on a sample of them as compared to a control group. MAIN FINDINGS: Results showed an initial distribution of neuromyth beliefs similar to those of previous studies and a large effect of the intervention on reducing their prevalence shortly after the training and in the long term. CONCLUSIONS: These findings provide evidence that an intervention addressed to in-service teachers that is low-cost and easy to implement can cast corrective effects that persist over time in neuromyth beliefs.

Levels and correlates of knowledge of teething among Saudi Arabian families.

Background: Parental knowledge of teething has been repeatedly investigated; however, little emphasis has been made on the associated sociodemographic factors with good knowledge of the parents and whether or not good knowledge is translated into adopting proper pain-relieving practices. The present study aims to firstly assess the knowledge level and practices of Saudi parents regarding teething and then explore associated sociodemographic variables with good knowledge of teething to determine the relation between parents' knowledge of teething and their adoption of pain-relieving practices. Methods: This cross-sectional study recruited parents from the social networking sites Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp, and they were asked to answer a pretested three-part internationally accepted questionnaire. Data were examined using descriptive statistics, chi-square analysis, multivariate logistic regression analysis, and Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient analysis. Results: One thousand four hundred ninety-nine parents responded and returned completed questionnaires. Of those, only 11.2% had good knowledge of teething. The majority of parents did not have basic knowledge of the teething period as well as believed that teething was associated with a runny nose (87.5%), diarrhea (77.9%), and sleep disturbance (72%). The results of multivariate logistic regression analysis indicated that parents with no primary school education (Odds Ratio: 0.29), or those who had an intermediate or secondary education level (OR: 0.55 and 0.78) were less likely to have good knowledge compared with parents who had a university degree. However, parents who earned intermediate monthly income (OR: 6.63) were more likely to have good knowledge of teething. With regards to practices used to relieve teething pain, inappropriate practices were observed regarding bottle feeding at night to soothe the child's pain (72%) and applying topical analgesics to rub the gum (72.4%). A significant positive correlation was found between the knowledge score and the practice score of both fathers and mothers (r = 0.22 and 0.13, p < 0.0001). Conclusion: A very low percentage of Saudi parents, mainly those with the highest education level and intermediate monthly income, had good knowledge of teething, which translated into appropriate practices to soothe the child's pain regardless of the parent's gender. Saudi parents should receive anticipatory guidance related to teething from all health professionals to ensure an uneventful teething period for their children.

Theory of Mind From Observation in Cognitive Models and Humans.

A major challenge for research in artificial intelligence is to develop systems that can infer the goals, beliefs, and intentions of others (i.e., systems that have theory of mind, ToM). In this research, we propose a cognitive ToM framework that uses a well-known theory of decisions from experience to construct a computational representation of ToM. Instance-based learning theory (IBLT) is used to construct a cognitive model that generates ToM from the observation of other agents' behavior. The IBL model of the observer distinguishes itself from previous models of ToM that make unreasonable assumptions about human cognition, are hand-crafted for particular settings, complex, or unable to explain a cognitive development of ToM compared to human's ToM. The IBL model learns from the observation of goal-directed agents' behavior in a gridworld navigation task, and it infers and predicts the behaviors of the agents in new gridworlds across different degrees of decision complexity in similar ways to the way human observers do. We provide evidence for the alignment of the IBL observer's predictions under various levels of decision complexity. We also advance the demonstration of the IBL predictions using a classic test of false beliefs (the Sally-Anne test), which is commonly used to test ToM in humans. We discuss our results and the potential of the IBL observer model to improve human-machine interactions.

Interventions to Dispel Neuromyths in Educational Settings-A Review.

Neuromyths are misconceptions about the brain and learning, for instance Tailoring instruction to students' preferred "learning styles" (e.g., visual, auditory, kinesthetic) promotes learning. Recent reviews indicate that the high prevalence of beliefs in neuromyths among educators did not decline over the past decade. Potential adverse effects of neuromyth beliefs on teaching practices prompted researchers to develop interventions to dispel these misconceptions in educational settings. This paper provides a critical review of current intervention approaches. The following questions are examined: Does neuroscience training protect against neuromyths? Are refutation-based interventions effective at dispelling neuromyths, and are corrective effects enduring in time? Why refutation-based interventions are not enough? Do reduced beliefs in neuromyths translate in the adoption of more evidence-based teaching practices? Are teacher professional development workshops and seminars on the neuroscience of learning effective at instilling neuroscience in the classroom? Challenges, issues, controversies, and research gaps in the field are highlighted, notably the so-called "backfire effect," the social desirability bias, and the powerful intuitive thinking mode. Future directions are outlined.

Can infants adopt underspecified contents into attributed beliefs? Representational prerequisites of theory of mind.

Recent evidence suggests that young infants, as well as nonhuman apes, can anticipate others' behavior based on their false beliefs. While such behaviors have been proposed to be accounted by simple associations between agents, objects, and locations, human adults are undoubtedly endowed with sophisticated theory of mind abilities. For example, they can attribute mental contents about abstract or non-existing entities, or beliefs whose content is poorly specified. While such endeavors may be human specific, it is unclear whether the representational apparatus that allows for encoding such beliefs is present early in development. In four experiments we asked whether 15-month-old infants are able to attribute beliefs with underspecified content, update their content later, and maintain attributed beliefs that are unknown to be true or false. In Experiment 1, infants observed as an agent hid an object to an unspecified location. This location was later revealed in the absence or presence of the agent, and the object was then hidden again to an unspecified location. Then the infants could search for the object while the agent was away. Their search was biased to the revealed location (that could be represented as the potential content of the agent's belief when she had not witnessed the re-hiding), suggesting that they (1) first attributed an underspecified belief to the agent, (2) later updated the content of this belief, and (3) were primed by this content in their own action even though its validity was unknown. This priming effect was absent when the agent witnessed the re-hiding of the object, and thus her belief about the earlier location of the object did not have to be sustained. The same effect was observed when infants searched for a different toy (Experiment 2) or when an additional spatial transformation was introduced (Experiment 4), but not when the spatial transformation disrupted belief updating (Experiment 3). These data suggest that infants' representational apparatus is prepared to efficiently track other agents' beliefs online, encode underspecified beliefs and define their content later, possibly reflecting a crucial characteristic of mature theory of mind: using a metarepresentational format for ascribed beliefs.

Understanding the dynamics emerging from infodemics: a call to action for interdisciplinary research.

Research on infodemics, i.e., the rapid spread of (mis)information related to a hazardous event, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, requires integrating a multiplicity of scientific disciplines. The dynamics emerging from infodemics have the potential to generate complex behavioral patterns. To react appropriately, it is of ultimate importance for the fields of Business and Economics to understand these dynamics. In the short run, they might lead to an adaptation in household spending or to a shift in buying behavior towards online providers. In the long run, changes in investments, consumer behavior, and markets are to be expected. We argue that the dynamics emerge from complex interactions among multiple factors, such as information and misinformation accessible to individuals and the formation and revision of beliefs. (Mis)information accessible to individuals is, amongst others, affected by algorithms specifically designed to provide personalized information, while automated fact-checking algorithms can help reduce the amount of circulating misinformation. The formation and revision of individual (and probably false) beliefs and individual fact-checking and interpretation of information are heavily affected by linguistic patterns inherent to information during pandemics and infodemics and further factors, such as affect, intuition, and motives. We argue that, to get a deep(er) understanding of the dynamics emerging from infodemics, the fields of Business and Economics should integrate the perspectives of Computer Science and Information Systems, (Computational) Linguistics, and Cognitive Science into the wider context of economic systems (e.g., organizations, markets or industries) and propose a way to do so. As research on infodemics is a strongly interdisciplinary field and the integration of the above-mentioned disciplines is a first step towards a holistic approach, we conclude with a call to action which should encourage researchers to collaborate across scientific disciplines and unfold collective creativity, which will substantially advance research on infodemics.