How to think about the social in psychiatric research? On language games and styles of social thought.

Over the last 20 years, the importance of 'the social' has again become a crucial theme within psychiatric research, as evidenced for example by the recent focus on the social determinants of mental health. However, what is less clear is what is meant, in this kind of research, by the very idea of the social-and what consequences those ideas have. The key purpose of the article is therefore to discuss what is often meant by the concept of 'the social'; what different ideas of the social do; and what can be at stake in the different, explicit and implicit, understandings of social life that proliferate in contemporary psychiatric research. We propose that there are, roughly, three widespread styles of social thought, wherein (a) the social is seen as structural, (b) the social is seen as individual, and (c) the social is seen as relational/processual. We exemplify these by discussing examples of 'social defeat' and 'therapeutic communities', focused on what might be at stake in different understandings of social life. Lastly, we draw on the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein to argue that a singular understanding of 'the social' is not achievable.

Good-Enough Production: Selecting Easier Words Instead of More Accurate Ones.

Dominant theories of language production suggest that word choice-lexical selection-is driven by alignment with the intended message: To talk about a young feline, we choose the most aligned word, kitten. Another factor that could shape lexical selection is word accessibility, or how easy it is to produce a given word (e.g., cat is more accessible than kitten). To test whether producers are also influenced by word accessibility, we designed an artificial lexicon containing high- and low-frequency words whose meanings correspond to compass directions. Participants in a communication game (total N = 181 adults) earned points by producing compass directions, which often required an implicit decision between a high- and low-frequency word. A trade-off was observed across four experiments; specifically, high-frequency words were produced even when less aligned with messages. These results suggest that implicit decisions between words are impacted by accessibility. Of all the times that people have produced cat, sometimes they likely meant kitten.

Pragmemes revisited. A theoretical framework.

In this paper, we take up an old issue that of pragmemes, broached by Mey and further explored by Capone. It is not easy to define pragmemes and distinguish them sufficiently from speech acts (units of language use broached by Austin and Searle) or from Wittgensteinian language games or from macro speech acts (see van Dijk on macrostructures) or from Goffman's scripts. The best idea we could develop about pragmemes is that they instantiate the triple articulation of language, proposed by Jock Wong; being essentially composed of phonological-syntactic units, that have a certain content relative to a social situation and to a certain culture, pragmemes express a certain function (or illocutionary force), like, e.g., modifying society or some aspect of it. They are part of a chapter that can be called either "societal pragmatics" or "emancipatory pragmatics," to use the words by Mey. In fact, knowledge of how language is used to diminish the rights of people and to propagate the "status quo" may be instrumental to give rights and power to ordinary human beings who are oppressed by political and economical structures.

Recursive Metropolis-Hastings naming game: symbol emergence in a multi-agent system based on probabilistic generative models.

In the studies on symbol emergence and emergent communication in a population of agents, a computational model was employed in which agents participate in various language games. Among these, the Metropolis-Hastings naming game (MHNG) possesses a notable mathematical property: symbol emergence through MHNG is proven to be a decentralized Bayesian inference of representations shared by the agents. However, the previously proposed MHNG is limited to a two-agent scenario. This paper extends MHNG to an N-agent scenario. The main contributions of this paper are twofold: (1) we propose the recursive Metropolis-Hastings naming game (RMHNG) as an N-agent version of MHNG and demonstrate that RMHNG is an approximate Bayesian inference method for the posterior distribution over a latent variable shared by agents, similar to MHNG; and (2) we empirically evaluate the performance of RMHNG on synthetic and real image data, i.e., YCB object dataset, enabling multiple agents to develop and share a symbol system. Furthermore, we introduce two types of approximations-one-sample and limited-length-to reduce computational complexity while maintaining the ability to explain communication in a population of agents. The experimental findings showcased the efficacy of RMHNG as a decentralized Bayesian inference for approximating the posterior distribution concerning latent variables, which are jointly shared among agents, akin to MHNG, although the improvement in ARI and κ coefficient is smaller in the real image dataset condition. Moreover, the utilization of RMHNG elucidated the agents' capacity to exchange symbols. Furthermore, the study discovered that even the computationally simplified version of RMHNG could enable symbols to emerge among the agents.

A Schutzian Analysis of Prayer with Perspectives from Linguistic Philosophy.

In this paper, we propose to analyze the phenomenon of Christian prayer by way of combining two different analytical frameworks. We start by applying Schutz's theories of "intersubjectivity," "inner time," "politheticality," and "multiple realities," and then proceed by drawing on the ideas and insights of linguistic philosophers, notably, Wittgenstein's "language-game," Austin's "speech act," and Evans's "logic of self-involvement". In conjoining these accounts, we wish to demonstrate how their combination sheds new light on understanding the phenomenon of prayer. Prayer is a complex phenomenon that involves two major dimensions: the private and the social, as Matthew (6: 6) and Acts (1: 14), respectively, demonstrate. Schutz's study of the phenomenon of "inner time" and the "polithetical" structure of consciousness, at both the subjective and intersubjective level, provides a useful lens to analyze these two dimensions. In addition, prayer, in following a specific set of rules, can also be considered as a specific, i.e., religious "language-game". In the last analysis, however, we propose to analyze prayer (and, finally, religion) within the Schutzian framework of "multiple realities," "enclaves," and "symbolic appresentation," which permits accessing the "religious finite province of meaning" in the very midst of the paramount reality of everyday life. In a nutshell, we claim that Christian prayer is a practice of constructing and living within a "religious province of meaning" in the everyday world; it is a practice that revolves around self-involving language-activities such as praising, confessing, thanksgiving, or requesting to God, which enable the praying subject to transfigure the language of everydayness and "see through" (Schutz) the world of everyday life in order to let it appear in a different light, e.g., the light of grace, gift, and salvation.

The Flexibility of Conceptual Pacts: Referring Expressions Dynamically Shift to Accommodate New Conceptualizations.

In a classic paper, Brennan and Clark argued that when interlocutors agree on a name for an object, they are forming a temporary agreement on how to conceptualize that object; that is, they are forming a conceptual pact. The literature on conceptual pacts has largely focused on the costs and benefits of breaking and maintaining lexical precedents, and the degree to which they might be partner-specific. The research presented here focuses on a question about conceptual pacts that has been largely neglected in the literature: To what extent are conceptual pacts specific to the local context of the interaction? If conceptual pacts are indeed temporary, then when the local context changes in ways that are accessible to participants, we would expect participants to seamlessly shift to referential expressions that reflect novel conceptualizations. Two experiments examined how referential forms change across context in collaborative, task-oriented dialog between naïve participants. In Experiment 1, names for parts of an unknown object were established in an "item" identification stage (e.g., a shape that looked like a wrench was called "the wrench"). In a second "build" stage, that name was often supplanted by an object-oriented name, e.g., the "leg." These changes happened abruptly and without negotiation. In Experiment 2, interlocutors manipulated clip art and more abstract tangram pictures in a "slider" puzzle to arrange the objects into a target configuration. On some trials moving an object revealed a picture that could be construed as a contrast competitor, e.g., a clip art picture of a camel after "the camel" had been negotiated as a name for a tangram shape, or vice versa. As would be expected, modification rates increased when a potential contrast was revealed. More strikingly, the degree to which a name had been negotiated or the frequency with which it had been used did not affect the likelihood that the revealed shape would be considered as a potential contrast. We find little evidence that names that are introduced as part of a conceptual pact persist when either the task goals or informational needs change. Rather, conceptual pacts are fluid temporary agreements.