Neurophysiology of Human Perceptual Decision-Making.

The discovery of neural signals that reflect the dynamics of perceptual decision formation has had a considerable impact. Not only do such signals enable detailed investigations of the neural implementation of the decision-making process but they also can expose key elements of the brain's decision algorithms. For a long time, such signals were only accessible through direct animal brain recordings, and progress in human neuroscience was hampered by the limitations of noninvasive recording techniques. However, recent methodological advances are increasingly enabling the study of human brain signals that finely trace the dynamics of the unfolding decision process. In this review, we highlight how human neurophysiological data are now being leveraged to furnish new insights into the multiple processing levels involved in forming decisions, to inform the construction and evaluation of mathematical models that can explain intra- and interindividual differences, and to examine how key ancillary processes interact with core decision circuits.

Predictions and rewards affect decision-making but not subjective experience.

To survive, organisms constantly make decisions to avoid danger and maximize rewards in information-rich environments. As a result, decisions about sensory input are not only driven by sensory information but also by other factors, such as the expected rewards of a decision (known as the payoff matrix) or by information about temporal regularities in the environment (known as cognitive priors or predictions). However, it is unknown to what extent these different types of information affect subjective experience or whether they merely result in nonperceptual response criterion shifts. To investigate this question, we used three carefully matched manipulations that typically result in behavioral shifts in decision criteria: a visual illusion (Müller-Lyer condition), a punishment scheme (payoff condition), and a change in the ratio of relevant stimuli (base rate condition). To gauge shifts in subjective experience, we introduce a task in which participants not only make decisions about what they have just seen but are also asked to reproduce their experience of a target stimulus. Using Bayesian ordinal modeling, we show that each of these three manipulations affects the decision criterion as intended but that the visual illusion uniquely affects sensory experience as measured by reproduction. In a series of follow-up experiments, we use computational modeling to show that although the visual illusion results in a distinct drift-diffusion (DDM) parameter profile relative to nonsensory manipulations, reliance on DDM parameter estimates alone is not sufficient to ascertain whether a given manipulation is perceptual or nonperceptual.

Neural Representations of Post-Decision Accuracy and Reward Expectation in the Caudate Nucleus and Frontal Eye Field.

Performance monitoring that supports ongoing behavioral adjustments is often examined in the context of either choice confidence for perceptual decisions (i.e., "did I get it right?") or reward expectation for reward-based decisions (i.e., "what reward will I receive?"). However, our understanding of how the brain encodes these distinct evaluative signals remains limited because they are easily conflated, particularly in commonly used two-alternative tasks with symmetric rewards for correct choices. Previously we used a motion-discrimination task with asymmetric rewards to identify neural substrates of forming reward-biased perceptual decisions in the caudate nucleus (part of the striatum in the basal ganglia) and the frontal eye field (FEF, in prefrontal cortex). Here we leveraged this task design to partially decouple estimates of accuracy and reward expectation and examine their impacts on subsequent decisions and their representations in those two brain areas. We identified distinguishable representations of these two evaluative signals in individual caudate and FEF neurons, with regional differences in their distribution patterns and time courses. We observed that well-trained monkeys (both sexes) used both evaluative signals, infrequently but consistently, to adjust their subsequent decisions. We found further that these behavioral adjustments had reliable relationships with the neural representations of both evaluative signals in caudate, but not FEF. These results suggest that the cortico-striatal decision network may use diverse evaluative signals to monitor and adjust decision-making behaviors, adding to our understanding of the different roles that the FEF and caudate nucleus play in a diversity of decision-related computations.

Threat Expectation Does Not Improve Perceptual Discrimination despite Causing Heightened Priority Processing in the Frontoparietal Network.

Threat cues have been widely shown to elicit increased sensory and attentional neural processing. However, whether this enhanced recruitment leads to measurable behavioral improvements in perception is still in question. Here, we adjudicate between two opposing theories: that threat cues do or do not enhance perceptual sensitivity. We created threat stimuli by pairing one direction of motion in a random dot kinematogram with an aversive sound. While in the MRI scanner, 46 subjects (both men and women) completed a cued (threat/safe/neutral) perceptual decision-making task where they indicated the perceived motion direction of each moving dot stimulus. We found strong evidence that threat cues did not increase perceptual sensitivity compared with safe and neutral cues. This lack of improvement in perceptual decision-making ability occurred despite the threat cue resulting in widespread increases in frontoparietal BOLD activity, as well as increased connectivity between the right insula and the frontoparietal network. These results call into question the intuitive claim that expectation automatically enhances our perception of threat and highlight the role of the frontoparietal network in prioritizing the processing of threat-related environmental cues.

Flexible integration of continuous sensory evidence in perceptual estimation tasks.

Temporal accumulation of evidence is crucial for making accurate judgments based on noisy or ambiguous sensory input. The integration process leading to categorical decisions is thought to rely on competition between neural populations, each encoding a discrete categorical choice. How recurrent neural circuits integrate evidence for continuous perceptual judgments is unknown. Here, we show that a continuous bump attractor network can integrate a circular feature, such as stimulus direction, nearly optimally. As required by optimal integration, the population activity of the network unfolds on a two-dimensional manifold, in which the position of the network's activity bump tracks the stimulus average, and, simultaneously, the bump amplitude tracks stimulus uncertainty. Moreover, the temporal weighting of sensory evidence by the network depends on the relative strength of the stimulus compared to the internally generated bump dynamics, yielding either early (primacy), uniform, or late (recency) weighting. The model can flexibly switch between these regimes by changing a single control parameter, the global excitatory drive. We show that this mechanism can quantitatively explain individual temporal weighting profiles of human observers, and we validate the model prediction that temporal weighting impacts reaction times. Our findings point to continuous attractor dynamics as a plausible neural mechanism underlying stimulus integration in perceptual estimation tasks.

Neural Signatures of Evidence Accumulation Encode Subjective Perceptual Confidence Independent of Performance.

Confidence is an adaptive computation when environmental feedback is absent, yet there is little consensus regarding how perceptual confidence is computed in the brain. Difficulty arises because confidence correlates with other factors, such as accuracy, response time (RT), or evidence quality. We investigated whether neural signatures of evidence accumulation during a perceptual choice predict subjective confidence independently of these factors. Using motion stimuli, a central-parietal positive-going electroencephalogram component (CPP) behaves as an accumulating decision variable that predicts evidence quality, RT, accuracy, and confidence (Experiment 1, N = 25 adults). When we psychophysically varied confidence while holding accuracy constant (Experiment 2, N = 25 adults), the CPP still predicted confidence. Statistically controlling for RT, accuracy, and evidence quality (Experiment 3, N = 24 adults), the CPP still explained unique variance in confidence. The results indicate that a predecision neural signature of evidence accumulation, the CPP, encodes subjective perceptual confidence in decision-making independent of task performance.

Quantifying the contribution of subject and group factors in brain activation.

Research in neuroscience often assumes universal neural mechanisms, but increasing evidence points toward sizeable individual differences in brain activations. What remains unclear is the extent of the idiosyncrasy and whether different types of analyses are associated with different levels of idiosyncrasy. Here we develop a new method for addressing these questions. The method consists of computing the within-subject reliability and subject-to-group similarity of brain activations and submitting these values to a computational model that quantifies the relative strength of group- and subject-level factors. We apply this method to a perceptual decision-making task (n = 50) and find that activations related to task, reaction time, and confidence are influenced equally strongly by group- and subject-level factors. Both group- and subject-level factors are dwarfed by a noise factor, though higher levels of smoothing increases their contributions relative to noise. Overall, our method allows for the quantification of group- and subject-level factors of brain activations and thus provides a more detailed understanding of the idiosyncrasy levels in brain activations.

Trial-by-trial fluctuations in amygdala activity track motivational enhancement of desirable sensory evidence during perceptual decision-making.

People are biased toward seeing outcomes that they are motivated to see. For example, wanting their favored team to prevail biases sports fans to perceive an ambiguous foul in a manner that is favorable to the team they support. Here, we test the hypothesis that such motivational biases in perceptual decision-making are associated with amygdala activity. We used monetary incentives to experimentally manipulate participants to want to see one percept over another while they performed a categorization task involving ambiguous images. Participants were more likely to categorize an image as the category we motivated them to see, suggesting that wanting to see a particular percept biased their perceptual decisions. Heightened amygdala activity was associated with motivation consistent categorizations and tracked trial-by-trial enhancement of neural activity in sensory cortices encoding the desirable category. Analyses using a drift diffusion model further suggest that trial-by-trial amygdala activity was specifically associated with biases in the accumulation of sensory evidence. In contrast, frontoparietal regions commonly associated with biases in perceptual decision-making were not associated with motivational bias. Altogether, our results suggest that wanting to see an outcome biases perceptual decisions via distinct mechanisms and may depend on dynamic fluctuations in amygdala activity.

Similar functional networks predict performance in both perceptual and value-based decision tasks.

There are numerous commonalities between perceptual and preferential decision processes. For instance, previous studies have shown that both of these decision types are influenced by context. Also, the same computational models can explain both. However, the neural processes and functional connections that underlie these similarities between perceptual and value-based decisions are still unclear. Hence, in the current study, we examine whether perceptual and preferential processes can be explained by similar functional networks utilizing data from the Human Connectome Project. We used resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging data to predict performance of 2 different decision-making tasks: a value-related task (the delay discounting task) and a perceptual task (the flanker task). We then examined the existence of shared predictive-network features across these 2 decision tasks. Interestingly, we found a significant positive correlation between the functional networks, which predicted the value-based and perceptual tasks. In addition, a larger functional connectivity between visual and frontal decision brain areas was a critical feature in the prediction of both tasks. These results demonstrate that functional connections between perceptual and value-related areas in the brain are inherently related to decision-making processes across domains.

Temporal stability of Bayesian belief updating in perceptual decision-making.

Bayesian inference suggests that perception is inferred from a weighted integration of prior contextual beliefs with current sensory evidence (likelihood) about the world around us. The perceived precision or uncertainty associated with prior and likelihood information is used to guide perceptual decision-making, such that more weight is placed on the source of information with greater precision. This provides a framework for understanding a spectrum of clinical transdiagnostic symptoms associated with aberrant perception, as well as individual differences in the general population. While behavioral paradigms are commonly used to characterize individual differences in perception as a stable characteristic, measurement reliability in these behavioral tasks is rarely assessed. To remedy this gap, we empirically evaluate the reliability of a perceptual decision-making task that quantifies individual differences in Bayesian belief updating in terms of the relative precision weighting afforded to prior and likelihood information (i.e., sensory weight). We analyzed data from participants (n = 37) who performed this task twice. We found that the precision afforded to prior and likelihood information showed high internal consistency and good test-retest reliability (ICC = 0.73, 95% CI [0.53, 0.85]) when averaged across participants, as well as at the individual level using hierarchical modeling. Our results provide support for the assumption that Bayesian belief updating operates as a stable characteristic in perceptual decision-making. We discuss the utility and applicability of reliable perceptual decision-making paradigms as a measure of individual differences in the general population, as well as a diagnostic tool in psychiatric research.

Using mixture modeling to examine differences in perceptual decision-making as a function of the time and method of participant recruitment.

We examine whether perceptual decision-making differs as a function of the time in the academic term and whether the participant is an undergraduate participating for course credit, a paid in-person participant, or a paid online participant recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. We use a mixture modeling approach within an evidence accumulation framework that separates stimulus-driven responses from contaminant responses, allowing us to distinguish between performance when a participant is engaged in the task and the consistency in this task focus. We first report a survey showing cognitive psychologists expect performance and response caution to be lower among undergraduate participants recruited at the end of the academic term compared to those recruited near the start, and highest among paid in-person participants. The findings from two experiments using common paradigms revealed very little evidence of time-of-semester effects among course credit participants on accuracy, response time, efficiency of information processing (when engaged in the task), caution, and non-decision time, or consistency in task focus. However, paid in-person participants did tend to be more accurate than the other two groups. Groups showed similar effects of speed/accuracy emphasis on response caution and of discrimination difficulty on information processing efficiency, but the effect of speed/accuracy emphasis on information processing efficiency was less consistent among groups. We conclude that online crowdsourcing platforms can provide quality perceptual decision-making data, but recommend that mixture modeling be used to adequately account for data generated by processes other than the psychological phenomena under investigation.

Support for the Time-Varying Drift Rate Model of Perceptual Discrimination in Dynamic and Static Noise Using Bayesian Model-Fitting Methodology.

The drift-diffusion model (DDM) is a common approach to understanding human decision making. It considers decision making as accumulation of evidence about visual stimuli until sufficient evidence is reached to make a decision (decision boundary). Recently, Smith and colleagues proposed an extension of DDM, the time-varying DDM (TV-DDM). Here, the standard simplification that evidence accumulation operates on a fully formed representation of perceptual information is replaced with a perceptual integration stage modulating evidence accumulation. They suggested that this model particularly captures decision making regarding stimuli with dynamic noise. We tested this new model in two studies by using Bayesian parameter estimation and model comparison with marginal likelihoods. The first study replicated Smith and colleagues' findings by utilizing the classical random-dot kinomatogram (RDK) task, which requires judging the motion direction of randomly moving dots (motion discrimination task). In the second study, we used a novel type of stimulus designed to be like RDKs but with randomized hue of stationary dots (color discrimination task). This study also found TV-DDM to be superior, suggesting that perceptual integration is also relevant for static noise possibly where integration over space is required. We also found support for within-trial changes in decision boundaries ("collapsing boundaries"). Interestingly, and in contrast to most studies, the boundaries increased with increasing task difficulty (amount of noise). Future studies will need to test this finding in a formal model.

Neural Encoding of Active Multi-Sensing Enhances Perceptual Decision-Making via a Synergistic Cross-Modal Interaction.

Most perceptual decisions rely on the active acquisition of evidence from the environment involving stimulation from multiple senses. However, our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying this process is limited. Crucially, it remains elusive how different sensory representations interact in the formation of perceptual decisions. To answer these questions, we used an active sensing paradigm coupled with neuroimaging, multivariate analysis, and computational modeling to probe how the human brain processes multisensory information to make perceptual judgments. Participants of both sexes actively sensed to discriminate two texture stimuli using visual (V) or haptic (H) information or the two sensory cues together (VH). Crucially, information acquisition was under the participants' control, who could choose where to sample information from and for how long on each trial. To understand the neural underpinnings of this process, we first characterized where and when active sensory experience (movement patterns) is encoded in human brain activity (EEG) in the three sensory conditions. Then, to offer a neurocomputational account of active multisensory decision formation, we used these neural representations of active sensing to inform a drift diffusion model of decision-making behavior. This revealed a multisensory enhancement of the neural representation of active sensing, which led to faster and more accurate multisensory decisions. We then dissected the interactions between the V, H, and VH representations using a novel information-theoretic methodology. Ultimately, we identified a synergistic neural interaction between the two unisensory (V, H) representations over contralateral somatosensory and motor locations that predicted multisensory (VH) decision-making performance.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT In real-world settings, perceptual decisions are made during active behaviors, such as crossing the road on a rainy night, and include information from different senses (e.g., car lights, slippery ground). Critically, it remains largely unknown how sensory evidence is combined and translated into perceptual decisions in such active scenarios. Here we address this knowledge gap. First, we show that the simultaneous exploration of information across senses (multi-sensing) enhances the neural encoding of active sensing movements. Second, the neural representation of active sensing modulates the evidence available for decision; and importantly, multi-sensing yields faster evidence accumulation. Finally, we identify a cross-modal interaction in the human brain that correlates with multisensory performance, constituting a putative neural mechanism for forging active multisensory perception.

Interoceptive and metacognitive facets of fatigue in multiple sclerosis.

Numerous disorders are characterised by fatigue as a highly disabling symptom. Fatigue plays a particularly important clinical role in multiple sclerosis (MS) where it exerts a profound impact on quality of life. Recent concepts of fatigue grounded in computational theories of brain-body interactions emphasise the role of interoception and metacognition in the pathogenesis of fatigue. So far, however, for MS, empirical data on interoception and metacognition are scarce. This study examined interoception and (exteroceptive) metacognition in a sample of 71 persons with a diagnosis of MS. Interoception was assessed by prespecified subscales of a standard questionnaire (Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness [MAIA]), while metacognition was investigated with computational models of choice and confidence data from a visual discrimination paradigm. Additionally, autonomic function was examined by several physiological measurements. Several hypotheses were tested based on a preregistered analysis plan. In brief, we found the predicted association of interoceptive awareness with fatigue (but not with exteroceptive metacognition) and an association of autonomic function with exteroceptive metacognition (but not with fatigue). Furthermore, machine learning (elastic net regression) showed that individual fatigue scores could be predicted out-of-sample from our measurements, with questionnaire-based measures of interoceptive awareness and sleep quality as key predictors. Our results support theoretical concepts of interoception as an important factor for fatigue and demonstrate the general feasibility of predicting individual levels of fatigue from simple questionnaire-based measures of interoception and sleep.

Explicit effort may not influence perceptuomotor decision-making.

Many decisions that humans make are enacted by the action system. For example, humans use reach-to-grasp movements when making perceptuomotor decisions between and obtaining fruits of varying quality from a pile. Recent work suggests that the characteristics of each action alternative may influence the decision itself-there may be a bias away from making perceptuomotor alternatives associated with high effort when participants are unaware of the effort differences between responses. The present study examined if perceptuomotor decisions were influenced by explicit reaching effort differences. Neurotypical human participants were presented with random dot motion stimuli in which most dots moved in random directions and varying percentages of remaining dots moved coherently left- or rightward. Participants reported leftward motion judgements by performing leftward (or left hand) reaching movements and rightward motion judgements by performing rightward (or right hand) reaching movements. A resistance band was affixed to participants' wrists and to the table in different configurations. The configurations allowed for one movement/motion direction judgement to always require stretching of the band and, therefore, require relatively more effort. Across a set of experiments, the response context (i.e. selecting directions within a limb or selecting between limbs) and the effort difference between responses were manipulated. Overall, no experiment revealed a bias away from the perceptuomotor decision associated with high effort. Based on these results, it is concluded that, in this biomechanical context, explicit effort may not influence perceptuomotor decision-making and may point to a contextual influence of action effort on perceptuomotor decision-making.

The impact of feedback on metacognition: Enhancing in easy tasks, impeding in difficult ones.

Metacognition refers to the ability to monitor and introspect upon cognitive performance. Abundant research suggests that individual metacognition is easily affected by feedback in daily life, but how feedback affects metacognition in perceptual decision-making remains unclear. Here we investigated how trial-by-trial feedback shapes perceptual metacognition in two experiments with either high (n = 82) or low difficulty (n = 90). Participants were randomly divided into a feedback group in which participants received trial-by-trial performance feedback or a no-feedback group. Results showed that, in the high-difficulty task, participants in the feedback group revealed inferior metacognitive performance than the no-feedback group, manifested as decreased metacognitive efficiency while controlling for performance sensitivity. In the low-difficulty task, however, participants in the feedback group had higher metacognitive efficiency than the no-feedback group. The distinct patterns of findings in the two experiments indicate that whether feedback promotes or impedes metacognition is adjusted by task difficulty.

Supervised Multisensory Calibration Signals Are Evident in VIP But Not MSTd.

Multisensory plasticity enables our senses to dynamically adapt to each other and the external environment, a fundamental operation that our brain performs continuously. We searched for neural correlates of adult multisensory plasticity in the dorsal medial superior temporal area (MSTd) and the ventral intraparietal area (VIP) in 2 male rhesus macaques using a paradigm of supervised calibration. We report little plasticity in neural responses in the relatively low-level multisensory cortical area MSTd. In contrast, neural correlates of plasticity are found in higher-level multisensory VIP, an area with strong decision-related activity. Accordingly, we observed systematic shifts of VIP tuning curves, which were reflected in the choice-related component of the population response. This is the first demonstration of neuronal calibration, together with behavioral calibration, in single sessions. These results lay the foundation for understanding multisensory neural plasticity, applicable broadly to maintaining accuracy for sensorimotor tasks.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Multisensory plasticity is a fundamental and continual function of the brain that enables our senses to adapt dynamically to each other and to the external environment. Yet, very little is known about the neuronal mechanisms of multisensory plasticity. In this study, we searched for neural correlates of adult multisensory plasticity in the dorsal medial superior temporal area (MSTd) and the ventral intraparietal area (VIP) using a paradigm of supervised calibration. We found little plasticity in neural responses in the relatively low-level multisensory cortical area MSTd. By contrast, neural correlates of plasticity were found in VIP, a higher-level multisensory area with strong decision-related activity. This is the first demonstration of neuronal calibration, together with behavioral calibration, in single sessions.

Cross-Hemispheric Complementary Prefrontal Mechanisms during Task Switching under Perceptual Uncertainty.

Flexible adaptation to changing environments is a representative executive control function implicated in the frontoparietal network that requires appropriate extraction of goal-relevant information through perception of the external environment. It remains unclear, however, how the flexibility is achieved under situations where goal-relevant information is uncertain. To address this issue, the current study examined neural mechanisms for task switching in which task-relevant information involved perceptual uncertainty. Twenty-eight human participants of both sexes alternated behavioral tasks in which they judged motion direction or color of visually presented colored dot stimuli that moved randomly. Task switching was associated with frontoparietal regions in the left hemisphere, and perception of ambiguous stimuli involved contralateral homologous frontoparietal regions. On the other hand, in stimulus-modality-dependent occipitotemporal regions, task coding information was increased during task switching. Effective connectivity analysis revealed that the frontal regions signaled toward the modality-dependent occipitotemporal regions when a relevant stimulus was more ambiguous, whereas the occipitotemporal regions signaled toward the frontal regions when the stimulus was more distinctive. These results suggest that complementary prefrontal mechanisms in the left and right hemispheres help to achieve a behavioral goal when the external environment involves perceptual uncertainty.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT In our daily life, environmental information to achieve a goal is not always certain, but we make judgments in such situations, and change our behavior accordingly. This study examined how the flexibility of behavior is achieved in a situation where goal-relevant information involves perceptual uncertainty. fMRI revealed that the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) in the left hemisphere is associated with behavioral flexibility, and the perception of ambiguous stimuli involves the PFC in the right hemisphere. These bilateral PFC signaled to stimulus-modality-dependent occipitotemporal regions, depending on perceptual uncertainty and the task to be performed. These top-down signals supplement task coding in the occipitotemporal regions, and highlight interhemispheric prefrontal mechanisms involved in executive control and perceptual decision-making.

Evidence for cortical adjustments to perceptual decision criteria during word recognition in noise.

Extensive increases in cingulo-opercular frontal activity are typically observed during speech recognition in noise tasks. This elevated activity has been linked to a word recognition benefit on the next trial, termed "adaptive control," but how this effect might be implemented has been unclear. The established link between perceptual decision making and cingulo-opercular function may provide an explanation for how those regions benefit subsequent word recognition. In this case, processes that support recognition such as raising or lowering the decision criteria for more accurate or faster recognition may be adjusted to optimize performance on the next trial. The current neuroimaging study tested the hypothesis that pre-stimulus cingulo-opercular activity reflects criterion adjustments that determine how much information to collect for word recognition on subsequent trials. Participants included middle-age and older adults (N = 30; age = 58.3 ± 8.8 years; m ± sd) with normal hearing or mild sensorineural hearing loss. During a sparse fMRI experiment, words were presented in multitalker babble at +3 dB or +10 dB signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), which participants were instructed to repeat aloud. Word recognition was significantly poorer with increasing participant age and lower SNR compared to higher SNR conditions. A perceptual decision-making model was used to characterize processing differences based on task response latency distributions. The model showed that significantly less sensory evidence was collected (i.e., lower criteria) for lower compared to higher SNR trials. Replicating earlier observations, pre-stimulus cingulo-opercular activity was significantly predictive of correct recognition on a subsequent trial. Individual differences showed that participants with higher criteria also benefitted the most from pre-stimulus activity. Moreover, trial-level criteria changes were significantly linked to higher versus lower pre-stimulus activity. These results suggest cingulo-opercular cortex contributes to criteria adjustments to optimize speech recognition task performance.

Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying cross-modal associations and their influence on perceptual decisions.

When exposed to complementary features of information across sensory modalities, our brains formulate cross-modal associations between features of stimuli presented separately to multiple modalities. For example, auditory pitch-visual size associations map high-pitch tones with small-size visual objects, and low-pitch tones with large-size visual objects. Preferential, or congruent, cross-modal associations have been shown to affect behavioural performance, i.e. choice accuracy and reaction time (RT) across multisensory decision-making paradigms. However, the neural mechanisms underpinning such influences in perceptual decision formation remain unclear. Here, we sought to identify when perceptual improvements from associative congruency emerge in the brain during decision formation. In particular, we asked whether such improvements represent 'early' sensory processing benefits, or 'late' post-sensory changes in decision dynamics. Using a modified version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), coupled with electroencephalography (EEG), we measured the neural activity underlying the effect of auditory stimulus-driven pitch-size associations on perceptual decision formation. Behavioural results showed that participants responded significantly faster during trials when auditory pitch was congruent, rather than incongruent, with its associative visual size counterpart. We used multivariate Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) to characterise the spatiotemporal dynamics of EEG activity underpinning IAT performance. We found an 'Early' component (∼100-110 ms post-stimulus onset) coinciding with the time of maximal discrimination of the auditory stimuli), and a 'Late' component (∼330-340 ms post-stimulus onset) underlying IAT performance. To characterise the functional role of these components in decision formation, we incorporated a neurally-informed Hierarchical Drift Diffusion Model (HDDM), revealing that the Late component decreases response caution, requiring less sensory evidence to be accumulated, whereas the Early component increased the duration of sensory-encoding processes for incongruent trials. Overall, our results provide a mechanistic insight into the contribution of 'early' sensory processing, as well as 'late' post-sensory neural representations of associative congruency to perceptual decision formation.