Social feedback biases emerge during recall but not prediction and shift across the development of social anxiety.

Memory is a reconstructive process that can result in events being recalled as more positive or negative than they actually were. While positive recall biases may contribute to well-being, negative recall biases may promote internalizing symptoms, such as social anxiety. Adolescence is characterized by increased salience of peers and peak incidence of social anxiety. Symptoms often wax and wane before becoming more intractable during adulthood. Open questions remain regarding how and when biases for social feedback are expressed and how individual differences in biases may contribute to social anxiety across development. Two studies used a social feedback and cued response task to assess biases about being liked or disliked when retrieving memories vs. making predictions. Findings revealed a robust positivity bias about memories for social feedback, regardless of whether memories were true or false. Moreover, memory bias was associated with social anxiety in a developmentally sensitive way. Among adults (study 1), more severe symptoms of social anxiety were associated with a negativity bias. During the transition from adolescence to adulthood (study 2), age strengthened the positivity bias in those with less severe symptoms and strengthened the negativity bias in those with more severe symptoms. These patterns of bias were isolated to perceived memory retrieval and did not generalize to predictions about social feedback. These results provide initial support for a model by which schemas may infiltrate perceptions of memory for past, but not predictions of future, social events, shaping susceptibility for social anxiety, particularly during the transition into adulthood.

Separable amygdala activation patterns in the evaluations of robots.

Given the increasing presence of robots in everyday environments and the significant challenge posed by social interactions with robots, it is crucial to gain a deeper understanding into the social evaluations of robots. One potentially effective approach to comprehend the fundamental processes underlying controlled and automatic evaluations of robots is to probe brain response to different perception levels of robot-related stimuli. Here, we investigate controlled and automatic evaluations of robots based on brain responses during viewing of suprathreshold (duration: 200 ms) and subthreshold (duration: 17 ms) humanoid robot stimuli. Our behavioral analysis revealed that despite participants' self-reported positive attitudes, they held negative implicit attitudes toward humanoid robots. Neuroimaging analysis indicated that subthreshold presentation of humanoid robot stimuli elicited significant activation in the left amygdala, which was associated with negative implicit attitudes. Conversely, no significant left amygdala activation was observed during suprathreshold presentation. Following successful attenuation of negative attitudes, the left amygdala response to subthreshold presentation of humanoid robot stimuli decreased, and this decrease correlated positively with the reduction in negative attitudes. These findings provide evidence for separable patterns of amygdala activation between controlled and automatic processing of robots, suggesting that controlled evaluations may influence automatic evaluations of robots.

The impact of social distance on the processing of social evaluation: evidence from brain potentials and neural oscillations.

Previous research indicates that social distance can influence people's social evaluations of others. Individuals tend to evaluate intimate others more positively than distant others. The present study investigates the modulating effect of social distance on the time course underlying individuals' evaluation processes of others using adequate electroencephalography methods. The results reveal that in the initial processing stage, the P2 component is larger when friends are negatively evaluated, whereas this pattern is the opposite for strangers. In the second stage, medial frontal negativity and early mid-frontal theta band activity is enhanced for negative evaluations of friends, whereas this effect is absent in social evaluations of strangers. At the late stage, the P3 is larger for positive evaluations of friends but insensitive to social evaluations of strangers, and the late mid-frontal theta is also modulated by social distance. These findings provide direct and powerful evidence that social distance modulates individuals' evaluations of others with different levels of intimacy throughout all processing stages.

Fear of negative evaluation modulates the processing of social evaluative feedback with different valence and contexts.

Fear of negative evaluation (FNE) is a susceptible and maintaining factor of social anxiety disorders. However, the question, how people process negative evaluation is influenced by individual differences in FNE, is poorly understood. To clarify the habitual processing characteristics of individuals with different levels of FNE, electroencephalography was recorded when two groups of participants with high FNE (hFNE) and low FNE (lFNE) performed a social evaluation perception task in which the feedback context/source (human vs. a computer) and valence (thumb-up/like vs. thumb-down/dislike) were manipulated. We found effects of feedback source and valence on N1, P2, and P3, which reflect early attention, integrated perception, and elaborative processing, respectively, as well as general reward effects on reward positivity (RewP) across contexts. Importantly, compared to the lFNE group, the hFNE group showed larger midfrontal N1 and theta oscillation in response to negative feedback indicating dislike (vs. like), and also showed larger P3. These findings suggest that individuals with hFNE are more attentional vigilance to negative (vs. positive) social feedback, implying that individuals with different levels of FNE assign different implicit threat values to social-evaluation threat stimuli.

Toddlers' affective responses to sociomoral scenes: Insights from physiological measures.

A growing literature suggests that preverbal infants are sensitive to sociomoral scenes and prefer prosocial agents over antisocial agents. It remains unclear, however, whether and how emotional processes are implicated in infants' responses to prosocial/antisocial actions. Although a recent study found that infants and toddlers showed more positive facial expressions after viewing helping (vs. hindering) events, these findings were based on naïve coder ratings of facial activity; furthermore, effect sizes were small. The current studies examined 18- and 24-month-old toddlers' real-time reactivity to helping and hindering interactions using three physiological measures of emotion-related processes. At 18 months, activity in facial musculature involved in smiling/frowning was explored via facial electromyography (EMG). At 24 months, stress (sweat) was explored via electrodermal activity (EDA). At both ages, arousal was explored via pupillometry. Behaviorally, infants showed no preferences for the helper over the hinderer across age groups. EMG analyses revealed that 18-month-olds showed higher corrugator activity (more frowning) during hindering (vs. helping) actions, followed by lower corrugator activity (less frowning) after hindering (vs. helping) actions finished. These findings suggest that antisocial actions elicited negativity, perhaps followed by brief disengagement. EDA analyses revealed no significant event-related differences. Pupillometry analyses revealed that both 18- and 24-month-olds' pupils were smaller after viewing hindering (vs. helping), replicating recent evidence with 5-month-olds and suggesting that toddlers also show less arousal following hindering than following helping. Together, these results provide new evidence with respect to whether and how arousal/affective processes are involved when infants process sociomoral scenarios.

Children's consideration of motivation in evaluations of socially (un)mindful actions.

Previous research shows that both adults and children by 5 or 6 years of age appreciate socially mindful actions where one leaves a choice for others. However, less is known as to whether children consider motivations in their evaluations of socially (un)mindful actions. Here we investigated whether children and adults can spontaneously evaluate socially (un)mindful behaviors depending on contextual cues, specifically whether the actions happen in public or in private. We also investigated how children evaluate these actions when provided with explicit information on motivations. We presented 99 children (aged 6-11 years) and 99 adults in China with two characters performing the same socially mindful or unmindful behaviors. One character acted publicly, whereas the other acted privately. Participants were asked to compare the two characters first spontaneously and then again after explicit information on the characters' motivations was provided. We found that whereas adults spontaneously favor private socially mindful acts, children favor public socially mindful acts. Only after motivations were provided did children favor private socially mindful acts like adults. In addition, we found asymmetry in that motivation seems to matter more in evaluations of socially mindful actions than in evaluations of socially unmindful ones. These findings are the first to reveal children's consideration of motivations in their evaluations of socially mindful behaviors.

Neural Sensitivity to Peer Feedback and Depressive Symptoms: Moderation by Executive Function.

Theories of adolescent development suggest that elevated neural sensitivity to social evaluation confers tradeoffs for adolescents' wellbeing, promoting adaptation to changing social contexts but increasing risk for emotional distress and depression. This study investigated whether the association between neural processing of peer feedback and depressive symptoms depends on teacher-reported executive function (EF) ability in adolescent girls. Girls showed activation to negative and positive peer feedback in regions implicated in social-emotional processing that interacted with EF to predict depressive symptoms. Specifically, activation predicted more depression in youth with poorer EF but less depression in youth with better EF, suggesting that the impact of increased social sensitivity may depend on youths' ability to regulate this sensitivity in adaptive ways.

Computational modeling of social evaluative decision-making elucidates individual differences in adolescent anxiety.

Adolescents experience significant developmental changes during a time of heightened sensitivity to social cues, particularly rejection by peers, which can be especially overwhelming for those with elevated levels of social anxiety. Social evaluative decision-making tasks have been useful in uncovering the neural correlates of information processing biases; however, linking youths' task-based performance to individual differences in psychopathology (e.g., anxiety symptoms) has proven more elusive. Here, we address this weakness with drift diffusion modeling to decompose youths' performance on the social judgment paradigm (SJP) to determine if this approach is useful in discovering individual differences in anxiety symptoms, as well as puberty, age, and sex. A sample of 103 adolescents (55 males, Mage = 14.49, SD = 1.69) completed the SJP and self-report measures of anxiety, as well as self- and parent-reported measures of puberty. The decision threshold parameter, reflecting the amount of evidence needed to make a social evaluative decision, predicted youth self-reported anxiety, above and beyond typical metrics of SJP performance. Our results highlight the potential advantage of parsing task performance according to the underlying cognitive processes. Future research would likely benefit from applying computational modeling approaches to social judgment tasks when attempting to uncover performance-based individual differences in psychopathology.

Two social minds in one brain? error-related negativity provides evidence for parallel processing pathways during social evaluation.

Several authors assume that evaluative conditioning (EC) relies on high-level propositional thinking. In contrast, the dual-process perspective proposes two processing pathways, one associative and the other propositional, contributing to EC. Dual-process theorists argue that attitudinal ambiguity resulting from these two pathways' conflicting evaluations demonstrate the involvement of both automatic and controlled processes in EC. Previously, we suggested that amplitude variations of error-related negativity and error-positivity, two well-researched event-related potentials of performance monitoring, allow for the detection of attitudinal ambiguity at the neural level. The present study utilises self-reported evaluation, categorisation performance, and neural correlates of performance monitoring to explore associative-propositional ambiguity during social attitude formation. Our results show that compared to associative-propositional harmony, attitudinal ambiguity correlates with more neutral subjective evaluations, longer response times, increased error commission, and diminished error-related negativity amplitudes. While our findings align with dual-process models, we aim to offer a propositional interpretation. We discuss dual-process theories in the context of evolutionary psychology, suggesting that associative processes may only represent a small piece of the EC puzzle.

Social Evaluation in Emerging Adults: Associations with Interpretation Bias and Perceived Social Support.

Social anxiety symptoms are one of the most common mental health concerns across the lifespan (Bandelow and Michaelis in Dialogues Clin Neurosci 17(3):327-335, 2015. https://doi.org/10.31887/DCNS.2015.17.3/bbandelow ) and are especially relevant during emerging adulthood, when social feedback occurs daily (Auxier and Anderson in Social media use in 2021, 2021. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/social-media-use-in-2021/ ) as emerging adults navigate new social environments. Two cognitive processes have been identified as relevant to social anxiety: high threat interpretation bias (i.e., the tendency to appraise threat from ambiguity; Rozenman et al. in Behav Ther 45(5):594-605, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2014.03.009 ; J Anxiety Disord 45:34-42, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2016.11.004 ) is associated with high social anxiety, whereas high perceived social support is associated with low social anxiety. In this study, emerging adults (N = 303) completed an online adaptation of the Chatroom task (Guyer et al. in Arch Gener Psychiatry 65(11):1303-1312, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.65.11.1303 ), an experimental paradigm designed to simulate social acceptance and rejection, as well as a performance-based measure of interpretation bias (Word Sentence Association Paradigm; Beard and Amir in Behav Res Ther 46(10):1135-1141, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2008.05.012 ), and a self-report measure of perceived social support (Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support; Zimet et al. in J Pers Assess 52(1), 30-41, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa5201_2 ). Social anxiety symptoms did not increase as a function of acceptance or rejection during the Chatroom task. However, there were significant interactions between each cognitive predictor and social anxiety change: emerging adults with low interpretation bias towards threat and emerging adults with high perceived social support both experienced decreases in social anxiety from pre- to post-Chatroom task, regardless of whether they were accepted or rejected during the Chatroom task. If replicated, low interpretation bias and high perceived social support may serve as promotive factors in social interactions for emerging adults.

Toddlers' social evaluations of agents who act on false beliefs.

Mature social evaluations privilege agents' intentions over the outcomes of their actions, but young children often privilege outcomes over intentions in verbal tasks probing their social evaluations. In three experiments (N = 118), we probed the development of intention-based social evaluation and mental state reasoning using nonverbal methods with 15-month-old toddlers. Toddlers viewed scenarios depicting a protagonist who sought to obtain one of two toys, each inside a different box, as two other agents observed. Then, the boxes' contents were switched in the absence of the protagonist and either in the presence or the absence of the other agents. When the protagonist returned, one agent opened the box containing the protagonist's desired toy (a positive outcome), and the other opened the other box (a neutral outcome). When both agents had observed the toys move to their current locations, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box containing the desired toy. In contrast, when the agents had not seen the toys move and therefore should have expected the desired toy's location to be unchanged, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box that no longer contained the desired toy. Thus, the toddlers preferred the agent who intended to make the protagonist's desired toy accessible, even when its action, guided by a false belief concerning that toy's location, did not produce a positive outcome. Well before children connect beliefs to social behavior in verbal tasks, toddlers engage in intention-based evaluations of social agents with false beliefs.

Do preschoolers track and evaluate social includers and excluders?

Social exclusion is harmful and leads to negative consequences across the lifespan. Based on studies primarily with adults, psychologists have characterized a highly sensitive "ostracism detection system" that acts quickly and automatically to detect exclusion and mitigate its effects. However, research with children has not fully explored whether a system with similar characteristics is operational in early childhood, and prior work probing children's responses to exclusion has produced mixed findings. We investigated 4- to 6-year-old children's abilities to negatively evaluate those who have excluded them as well as to use these experiences for prosocial gossip. Children engaged one pair of play partners in an inclusive game and engaged another pair in an exclusive game. Nearly one third (n = 28 of 96) did not accurately recall who had excluded them. Yet those who did recall their game experiences evaluated excluders more negatively than includers, and they were less likely to recommend excluders as play partners to others. These findings indicate that not all children sensitively track their excluders' identities-but those who do so will evaluate excluders negatively. More work is needed to understand developments in how and when children recognize their own exclusion and whether the underlying processes should be viewed as homologous to adults' ostracism detection system.

Preference matters: Knowledge of beneficiary's preference influences children's evaluations of the act of leaving a choice for others.

People value indirect prosocial actions that benefit others as byproducts of self-oriented actions. One example of such an action is the act of leaving a choice for others when selecting an item for oneself. In this study, we investigated how knowledge of the beneficiary's preference may influence children's evaluations of such actions. Children (n = 91, 4- to 10-year-olds) and adults (n = 43) were asked to evaluate characters taking a snack for themselves from a set of three items-two identical items and one unique item-in a way that either leaves a choice (two different items) or leaves no choice (two identical items) for the next person (the beneficiary). The beneficiary's preference was systematically manipulated as unknown, preferring the unique item, or preferring the item of which there are two. We found notable developmental changes: Children as young as 4 years of age understand that it is nicer not to take away the only thing others prefer; with age, children increasingly appreciate the value of leaving a diverse choice when the beneficiary's preference is unknown; however, when the beneficiary clearly prefers the item of which there are two, children increasingly think that it is nicer to leave two identical but preferred items than to leave a diverse choice. These findings reveal increasing flexibility and subtlety in children's social evaluation of indirect prosocial actions; their evaluation develops from a mere understanding of the value of preference to a flexible appreciation of both preference and choice.

Longitudinal changes in DLPFC activation during childhood are related to decreased aggression following social rejection.

Regulating aggression after social feedback is an important prerequisite for developing and maintaining social relations, especially in the current times with larger emphasis on online social evaluation. Studies in adults highlighted the role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in regulating aggression. Little is known about the development of aggression regulation following social feedback during childhood, while this is an important period for both brain maturation and social relations. The current study used a longitudinal design, with 456 twins undergoing two functional MRI sessions across the transition from middle (7 to 9 y) to late (9 to 11 y) childhood. Aggression regulation was studied using the Social Network Aggression Task. Behavioral aggression after social evaluation decreased over time, whereas activation in the insula, dorsomedial PFC and DLPFC increased over time. Brain-behavior analyses showed that increased DLPFC activation after negative feedback was associated with decreased aggression. Change analyses further revealed that children with larger increases in DLPFC activity from middle to late childhood showed stronger decreases in aggression over time. These findings provide insights into the development of social evaluation sensitivity and aggression control in childhood.

Chimpanzees consider freedom of choice in their evaluation of social action.

Judgements of wrongdoing in humans often hinge upon an assessment of whether a perpetrator acted out of free choice: whether they had more than one option. The classic inhibitors of free choice are constraint (e.g. having your hands tied together) and ignorance (e.g. being unaware that an alternative exists). Here, across two studies, we investigate whether chimpanzees consider these factors in their evaluation of social action. Chimpanzees interacted with a human experimenter who handed them a non-preferred item of food, either because they were physically constrained from accessing the preferred item (Experiment 1) or because they were ignorant of the availability of the preferred item (Experiment 2). We found that chimpanzees were more likely to accept the non-preferred food and showed fewer negative emotional responses when the experimenter was physically constrained compared with when they had free choice. We did not, however, find an effect of ignorance on chimpanzee's evaluation. Freedom of choice factors into chimpanzees' evaluation of how they are treated, but it is unclear whether mental state reasoning is involved in this assessment.

Infants' preferences for approachers over repulsers shift between 4 and 8 months of age.

Despite its adaptive value for social life, the emergence and the development of the ability to detect agents that cause aversive interactions and distinguish them from potentially affiliative agents (approachers) has not been investigated. We presented infants with a simple interaction involving two agents: one of them (the "repulser") moved toward and pushed the other (the "approacher") which reacted by simply moving toward the repulser without contacting it. We found that 8-month-olds (N = 28) looked longer at the approacher than at the repulser (Experiment 1), whereas 4-month-olds (N = 30) exhibited no preference (Experiment 2). To control for low-level cues (such as the preference for the agent that moved after the contact), two new groups of 4- and 8-month-old infants were presented with a series of interactions in which the agents inverted their social roles. Older infants (N = 30) manifested no preference for either agent (Experiment 3), while younger infants (N = 30) looked longer at the first agent to move (Experiment 4). Our results indicated that 8-month-olds' preferences for the approacher over the repulser depended on social information and were finely tuned to agents that display prosocial rather than antisocial behavior. We discuss these findings in light of the development and adaptive value of the ability to negatively evaluate repulsers, to avoid choosing them as partners.

Let's Talk About Each Other: Neural Responses to Dissenting Personality Evaluations Based on Real Dyadic Interactions.

Dyadic interactions are associated with the exchange of personality-related messages, which can be congruent or incongruent with one's self-view. In the current preregistered study (N = 52), we investigated event-related potentials (ERPs) toward real social evaluations in order to uncover the neural mechanisms underlying the processing of congruent and incongruent evaluative feedback. Participants interacted first, and then during an electroencephalogram (EEG) session, they received evaluations from their interaction partner that were either congruent or incongruent with their own ratings. Findings show potentiated processing of self-related incongruent negative evaluations at early time points (N1) followed by increased processing of both incongruent negative and positive evaluations at midlatency time windows (early posterior negativity) and a prioritized processing of self-related incongruent positive evaluations at late time points (feedback-related P3, late positive potential). These findings reveal that, after real social interactions, evaluative feedback about oneself that violates one's self-view modulates all processing stages with an early negativity and a late positivity bias.

Training differences predict dogs' (Canis lupus familiaris) preferences for prosocial others.

Humans evaluate other agents' behavior on a variety of different dimensions, including morally, from a very early age. For example, human infants as young as 6-months old prefer prosocial over antisocial others and demonstrate negative evaluations of antisocial others in a variety of paradigms (Hamlin et al. in Nature 450(7169):557, 2007; Dev Sci 13(6):923-929, 2010; Proc Natl Acad Sci 108(50):19931-19936, 2011). While these tendencies are well documented in the human species, less is known about whether similar preference emerge in non-human animals. Here, we explore this question by testing prosocial preferences in one non-human species: the domestic dog (Canis lupus familiaris). Given the ubiquity of dog-human social interactions, it is possible that dogs display human-like social evaluation tendencies. Unfortunately, prior research examining social evaluation in dogs has produced mixed results. To assess whether differences in methodology or training differences account for these contrasting results, we tested two samples of dogs with different training histories on an identical social evaluation task. Trained agility dogs approached a prosocial actor significantly more often than an antisocial actor, while untrained pet dogs showed no preference for either actor. These differences across dogs with different training histories suggest that while dogs may demonstrate preferences for prosocial others in some contexts, their social evaluation abilities are less flexible and less robust compared to those of humans.

Young children and adults associate social power with indifference to others' needs.

In hierarchical societies, what do we expect from people at the top? Early in life, children use horizontal relationships (e.g., affiliation) to predict selectivity in others' prosocial behavior. But it is unknown whether children also view asymmetries in prosocial behavior as characteristic of vertical relationships (e.g., differences in social power). In two experiments, we investigated 4- to 7-year-old children's and adults' (N = 192) intuitions about links among relative authority status, helpful action, and unhelpful inaction. In Experiment 1, participants at all ages viewed a character who chose not to help another person as holding a position of authority over them; participants also viewed this unhelpful character as being less nice than the person in need. However, no age group made consistent inferences about the relative authority of a helper and a helpee. In Experiment 2, children had mixed intuitions when separately predicting whether high- and low-authority characters would be helpful in the future. However, older children and adults consistently indicated that a subordinate would be more likely than an authority to help a third party. These findings establish that children's social theories include expectations for links between power and prosociality by at least the preschool years. Whereas some judgments in this domain are stable from 4 years of age onward, others emerge gradually. Whether consistent responses occurred early or only later in development, however, all measures converged on a single intuition: People more easily associate authority with indifference to others' needs.

Watching a video together creates social closeness between children and adults.

Human social relationships are often formed through shared social activities in which individuals share mental states about external stimuli. Previous work on joint attention has shown that even minimal shared experiences such as watching something together facilitates social closeness between individuals. Here, we examined whether young children already connect with others through joint attention. In the current studies, children sat next to a novel adult who either watched a film with them or was not able to see the film and read a book instead. After the video, we measured children's willingness (i.e., latency) to approach the experimenter holding out a toy. In both studies, the 2.5-year-olds who watched the film together approached more quickly than the other children. These results show that both minimally interactive shared experiences and noninteractive shared experiences lead children to feel more comfortable with a novel adult. This suggests that joint attention interactions, and shared experiences in general, play an important role not only in children's cognitive development but also in their social development and the formation of their social relationships.