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The biosecurity benefits of genetic engineering attribution.
Lewis, Gregory; Jordan, Jacob L; Relman, David A; Koblentz, Gregory D; Leung, Jade; Dafoe, Allan; Nelson, Cassidy; Epstein, Gerald L; Katz, Rebecca; Montague, Michael; Alley, Ethan C; Filone, Claire Marie; Luby, Stephen; Church, George M; Millett, Piers; Esvelt, Kevin M; Cameron, Elizabeth E; Inglesby, Thomas V.
Afiliação
  • Lewis G; Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK. gregory.lewis@zoo.ox.ac.uk.
  • Jordan JL; Alt. Technology Labs, Inc., Berkeley, CA, USA. gregory.lewis@zoo.ox.ac.uk.
  • Relman DA; Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC, USA.
  • Koblentz GD; Department of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA, USA.
  • Leung J; Department of Microbiology & Immunology, Stanford University School of Medicine; and Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA.
  • Dafoe A; Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Washington, DC, USA.
  • Nelson C; Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.
  • Epstein GL; Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.
  • Katz R; Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.
  • Montague M; Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA.
  • Alley EC; Center for Global Health Science and Security, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA.
  • Filone CM; Center for Health Security, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA.
  • Luby S; Alt. Technology Labs, Inc., Berkeley, CA, USA.
  • Church GM; Media Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA.
  • Millett P; Department of Genetics, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA.
  • Esvelt KM; The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MA, USA.
  • Cameron EE; Department of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA, USA.
  • Inglesby TV; Alt. Technology Labs, Inc., Berkeley, CA, USA.
Nat Commun ; 11(1): 6294, 2020 12 08.
Article em En | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33293537
ABSTRACT
Biology can be misused, and the risk of this causing widespread harm increases in step with the rapid march of technological progress. A key security challenge involves attribution determining, in the wake of a human-caused biological event, who was responsible. Recent scientific developments have demonstrated a capability for detecting whether an organism involved in such an event has been genetically modified and, if modified, to infer from its genetic sequence its likely lab of origin. We believe this technique could be developed into powerful forensic tools to aid the attribution of outbreaks caused by genetically engineered pathogens, and thus protect against the potential misuse of synthetic biology.
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Texto completo: 1 Coleções: 01-internacional Base de dados: MEDLINE Assunto principal: Medidas de Segurança / DNA / Organismos Geneticamente Modificados / Bioterrorismo / Genética Forense Limite: Animals / Humans Idioma: En Ano de publicação: 2020 Tipo de documento: Article
Texto completo
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XML
PubMed Links
Buscar no Google

Texto completo: 1 Coleções: 01-internacional Base de dados: MEDLINE Assunto principal: Medidas de Segurança / DNA / Organismos Geneticamente Modificados / Bioterrorismo / Genética Forense Limite: Animals / Humans Idioma: En Ano de publicação: 2020 Tipo de documento: Article