Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: coordination and equilibrium selection.

ABSTRACT

We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We investigate three possible update rules the replicator dynamics (RD), the best response (BR), and the unconditional imitation (UI). Players interact on a two-layer random regular network. The population on each layer plays a different game, with layer I preferring the opposite strategy to layer II. We measure the difference between the two games played on the layers by a difference in payoffs, and the inter-connectedness by a node overlap parameter. We discover a critical value of the overlap below which layers do not synchronise, i.e. they display different levels of coordination. Above this threshold both layers typically coordinate on the same strategy. Surprisingly, there is a symmetry breaking in the selection of equilibrium-for RD and UI there is a phase where only the payoff-dominant equilibrium is selected. It is not observed, however, for BR update rule. Our work is an example of previously observed differences between the update rules. Nonetheless, we took a novel approach with the game being played on two inter-connected layers. As we show, the multilayer structure enhances the abundance of the Pareto-optimal equilibrium in coordination games with imitative update rules.