Managing Risk When Working with Orbiviruses with a Special Emphasis on Epizootic Hemorrhagic Disease Virus.

Risk assessment is the cornerstone of working safely with biological agents. The World Health Organization (WHO) Laboratory Biosafety Manual Fourth Edition Monograph on Risk Assessment provides stepwise guidance for completing a risk assessment, from information gathering and identifying hazards to evaluating the risks, developing, and implementing controls and review.To support the development of a mature safety culture within laboratories, it is important that all staff who handle biological agents understand the fundamentals of risk assessment and receive training in identifying hazards created by their work activities (or tasks) and understand how to mitigate the risks arising from carrying out that work. Any "competent" person may be involved in assessing the risks posed by carrying out an activity. Those closest to the work, who understand the details of the task being undertaken, should be involved in creating the risk assessment. The guidance in this chapter is not just applicable to biosafety professionals, laboratory scientists, or facility managers but can be used by any competent worker familiar with the activity being assessed.This chapter uses the guidance from the WHO to apply the principles of risk assessment to working with Epizootic hemorrhagic disease virus (EHDV), using an example activity-virus isolation from EHDV test samples in cell culture.

Implementation of a High-Level Isolation Unit Readiness Checklist in the Irish Setting.

A high-level isolation unit (HLIU) is a specially designed biocontainment unit for suspected or confirmed high-consequence infectious diseases. For most HLIUs, maintaining readiness during times of inactivity is a challenge. In this case study, we describe a checklist approach to assess HLIU readiness to rapidly operate upon activation. This checklist includes readiness criteria in several domains, such as infrastructure, human resources, and material supplies, that are required to safely activate the unit at any time. The checklist audit tool was derived from a novel activation readiness checklist published by the biocontainment unit at The Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland. It was then adapted for the Irish healthcare setting and implemented at the Mater Misericordiae University Hospital, Ireland's current isolation facility. Results from the audit were also used to inform recommendations for the construction of a new HLIU to open in 2025. The audit tool is user friendly, practical, and focuses on the essential elements of readiness to ensure a successful rapid operation.

Using Video-Reflexive Methods to Develop a Provider Down Protocol for the New South Wales Biocontainment Center.

The New South Wales Biocontainment Centre is a statewide referral facility for patients with high-consequence infectious disease (HCID). The facility collaborates with researchers to adapt existing HCID procedures such as donning and doffing of personal protective equipment (PPE). However, information on how to respond safely to collapse of a healthcare provider in full PPE within a contaminated zone is scarce. To address this gap, we adapted Nebraska Medicine's "provider down" protocol on paper and then simulated and video recorded the process, iteratively, in the facility. Clinicians analyzed the recordings collaboratively in researcher-facilitated reflexive discussions. Our primary aim was to ascertain how to maintain optimal infection prevention and control while providing urgent care for the healthcare provider. We tested participants' suggested modifications, in repeated video recorded simulations, until consensus on optimal practice was achieved. Our secondary aim was to assess the utility of video-reflexive methods to enhance clinicians' awareness and understanding of infection prevention and control in a rare and complex scenario. Six adaptations and simulations were discussed in video-reflexive sessions before consensus was reached; the final version of the protocol differed considerably from the first. Viewing footage of simulations in situ enabled participants to (1) identify infection and occupational risks not identified on paper or during verbal postsimulation debriefs and (2) test alternative perspectives on safe procedure. Video-reflexivity enables context-sensitive and consensus-building codesign of policies and procedures, critical to protocol development in a new unit. It contributes to a culture of teamwork, preparedness, and confidence before, rather than in the heat of, a crisis.

The state of biosafety across China's CDC microbiology laboratories: insights from a nationwide survey (2021-2023).

Background: The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the critical importance of biosafety in microbiology laboratories worldwide. In response, China has ramped up its efforts to enhance biosafety measures within its Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) laboratories. This study provides the first comprehensive assessment of biosafety practices across provincial, city, and county levels of CDC microbiology laboratories in China. Methods: We conducted a nationwide cross-sectional survey from 2021 to 2023, targeting staff from microbiology laboratories within CDCs at all administrative levels in China. Stratified sampling was employed to select respondents, ensuring a representative mix across different CDC hierarchies, job titles, and academic qualifications. The survey encompassed questions on biosafety training, the presence of BSL-2 and BSL-3 laboratories, adherence to general biosafety guidelines, and management practices regarding specimens, reagents, and consumables. Statistical analysis was performed to identify significant differences in biosafety practices among different CDC levels. Results: A total of 990 valid responses were received, highlighting a nearly universal presence (98.69%) of BSL-2 laboratories and a significant yet varied presence of BSL-3 laboratories across the CDC network. The survey revealed high levels of biosafety training (98.69%) and adherence to biosafety protocols. However, challenges remain in the consistent application of certain safety practices, especially at lower administrative levels. Notable differences in the management of specimens, reagents, and consumables point to areas for improvement in ensuring biosecurity. Conclusion: Our findings indicate a robust foundation of biosafety practices within CDC microbiology laboratories in China, reflecting significant advancements in the wake of the Biosecurity Law's implementation. Nevertheless, the variability in adherence to specific protocols underscores the need for ongoing training, resources allocation, and policy refinement to enhance biosafety standards uniformly across all levels. This study's insights are crucial for guiding future improvements in laboratory biosafety, not just in China but potentially in other countries enhancing their public health infrastructures.

Biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of biosafety in the biomedical sciences. While it is often assumed that biosafety is a purely technical matter that has little to do with philosophy or the humanities, biosafety raises important ethical issues that have not been adequately examined in the scientific or bioethics literature. This article reviews some pivotal events in the history of biosafety and biosecurity and explores three different biosafety topics that generate significant ethical concerns, i.e., risk assessment, risk management, and risk distribution. The article also discusses the role of democratic governance in the oversight of biosafety and offers some suggestions for incorporating bioethics into biosafety practice, education, and policy.

The Importance of Networks and Relationships: Leveraging the Biocontainment Unit Leadership Workgroup for Special Pathogen Outbreak Response.

Developing and sustaining relationships and networks before an emergency occurs is crucial. The Biocontainment Unit Leadership Workgroup is a consortium of the 13 Regional Emerging Special Pathogen Treatment Centers in the United States. Established in 2017, the volunteer-based workgroup is composed of operational leaders dedicated to maintaining readiness for special pathogen care. Monthly meetings focus on addressing operational challenges, sharing best practices, and brainstorming solutions to common problems. Task forces are leveraged to tackle more complex issues that are identified as priorities. In 2022, members of the workgroup were harnessed for response efforts related to mpox, Sudan ebolavirus, and Marburg virus disease. The weekly Outbreak Readiness call is a shared effort between the Biocontainment Unit Leadership Workgroup and the Special Pathogens Research Network of the National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center. Call participants included leaders of the Regional Emerging Special Pathogen Treatment Centers and federal partners who shared weekly updates on operational readiness of units, case counts, laboratory capacity, available medical countermeasures, and other pertinent information. The routine exchange of real-time information enabled learning and collegial sharing of experiences, highlighted the experience of the network to federal partners, and provided situational awareness of special pathogen outbreaks across the country. The consortium enabled this rapid convening of partners to meet an urgent need for special pathogen response. The weekly Outbreak Readiness call is a communication model and scalable framework that serves both domestic preparedness efforts and international efforts should the need for a collaborative global response arise. In this case study, we describe the framework and experience of this partnership, along with the structure of rapid deployment for group convening.

Quantifying Viable M. tuberculosis Safely Obviating the Need for High Containment Facilities.

Mycobacterium tuberculosis is an infectious pathogen that requires biosafety level-3 laboratory for handling. The risk of transmission is high to laboratory staff, and to manage the organism safely, it is necessary to construct high containment laboratory facilities at great expense. This limits the application of tuberculosis diagnostics to areas where there is insufficient capital to invest in laboratory infrastructure. In this method, we describe a process of inactivating sputum samples by either heat or guanidine thiocyanate (GTC) that renders them safe without affecting the quantification of viable bacteria. This method eliminates the need for level 3 containment laboratory for the tuberculosis molecular bacterial load assay (TB-MBLA) and is applicable in low- and middle-income countries.

Validated Methods for Effective Decontamination and Inactivation of Rift Valley Fever Virus.

The Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) is an arthropod-borne, zoonotic, hemorrhagic fever virus that can cause severe diseases both in livestock and humans. The spread of RVFV in areas previously considered as non-endemic together with the absence of licensed vaccines for use in humans and animals poses a major health and economic threat worldwide. It is therefore crucial to make major progresses in our understanding and management of this virus and its zoonosis. RVFV is considered a bioterrorism pathogen, and, thus, only a few institutes, facilities, and personnel are legally authorized to detain it and handle it. Moreover, this virus must be manipulated in a biosafety level 3 (BSL3) laboratory following strict biosafety protocols to ensure that biosecurity's highest standards are met. Only certain attenuated strains such as the MP12 strain can be handled in BSL2 laboratories, depending on the country considered. To assist researchers in working with RVFV in the safest possible conditions, this chapter presents validated methods for effective RVFV decontamination and inactivation.

Spatial distribution of bioaerosols and evaluation of four ventilation method on controlling their diffusion in a typical enhanced biosafety level 2 laboratory.

Biosafety laboratories are critical in many fields. However, experimenters associated the infection risk from biological aerosols. In this study, by conducting experiments on the release and collection of bioaerosols within a typical BSL-2 + laboratory, the spatial distribution of bioaerosols was tracked. Numerical calculations were employed to obtain and visualize the airflow patterns and aerosol dispersion paths of four ventilation methods. The results indicated that equipment and tables led to uneven airflow distribution within the laboratory. The comparison results of the four evaluation indicators showed that the air age distribution of UU (Upward supply and upward return) mode and CD (Cross-supply and downward return) mode was superior, with air change efficiency values of 0.595 and 0.603, respectively. Additionally, the contaminant removal index of CD mode was 1.48, significantly higher than the other ventilation methods. The statistical results of the contaminant dispersion index also indicated that CD mode was most conducive to diluting aerosols in the spatial environment. The LD (lateral supply and downward return) mode may lead to airflow short-circuiting. The UD (upward supply and downward return) mode can provide balanced protection for laboratory. Overall, CD mode performed the best among the four ventilation methods, followed by UU mode.

A BSL-2 compliant mouse model of SARS-CoV-2 infection for efficient and convenient antiviral evaluation.

Animal models of authentic severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection require operation in biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) containment. In the present study, we established a mouse model employing a single-cycle infectious virus replicon particle (VRP) system of SARS-CoV-2 that can be safely handled in BSL-2 laboratories. The VRP [ΔS-VRP(G)-Luc] contains a SARS-CoV-2 genome in which the spike gene was replaced by a firefly luciferase (Fluc) reporter gene (Rep-Luci), and incorporates the vesicular stomatitis virus glycoprotein on the surface. Intranasal inoculation of ΔS-VRP(G)-Luc can successfully transduce the Rep-Luci genome into mouse lungs, initiating self-replication of Rep-Luci and, accordingly, inducing acute lung injury mimicking the authentic SARS-CoV-2 pathology. In addition, the reporter Fluc expression can be monitored using a bioluminescence imaging approach, allowing a rapid and convenient determination of viral replication in ΔS-VRP(G)-Luc-infected mouse lungs. Upon treatment with an approved anti-SARS-CoV-2 drug, VV116, the viral replication in infected mouse lungs was significantly reduced, suggesting that the animal model is feasible for antiviral evaluation. In summary, we have developed a BSL-2-compliant mouse model of SARS-CoV-2 infection, providing an advanced approach to study aspects of the viral pathogenesis, viral-host interactions, as well as the efficacy of antiviral therapeutics in the future.IMPORTANCESevere acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is highly contagious and pathogenic in humans; thus, research on authentic SARS-CoV-2 has been restricted to biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories. However, due to the scarcity of BSL-3 facilities and trained personnel, the participation of a broad scientific community in SARS-CoV-2 research had been greatly limited, hindering the advancement of our understanding on the basic virology as well as the urgently necessitated drug development. Previously, our colleagues Jin et al. had generated a SARS-CoV-2 replicon by replacing the essential spike gene in the viral genome with a Fluc reporter (Rep-Luci), which can be safely operated under BSL-2 conditions. By incorporating the Rep-Luci into viral replicon particles carrying vesicular stomatitis virus glycoprotein on their surface, and via intranasal inoculation, we successfully transduced the Rep-Luci into mouse lungs, developing a mouse model mimicking SARS-CoV-2 infection. Our model can serve as a useful platform for SARS-CoV-2 pathological studies and antiviral evaluation under BSL2 containment.

Implementing an Organizational Culture of Biosafety and Biosecurity in the SAP Institute.

An organizational culture of biosafety and biosecurity is critical for effective management of transboundary animal diseases. One essential aspect of this work is keeping important pathogens studied in veterinary laboratories under control. Türkiye is among the countries that are both endemic and disease-free for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus, and it has a unique institute dedicated to FMD diagnosis, control, and vaccine production. To build an organizational safety culture within this institute and strengthen awareness of the importance of safe and secure handling of FMD, 4 staff members previously trained in biorisk management developed and provided trainings to all institute staff. The institute's 173 personnel were divided into 3 groups by job description based on direct or indirect work with FMD virus. All 3 groups received training that addressed biosecurity, biosafety, biorisk awareness, and insider threat; the trainings varied in length by group. Three-quarters (n=130, 75%) of all institute staff completed their training and were asked to complete knowledge surveys using a Likert scale survey before and after their training. A majority (n=104, 80%) of those participants completed both the pretraining and posttraining surveys. All 3 training groups' posttraining surveys showed improved awareness above baseline scores, and all 3 groups scores reached the targeted threshold goal. Group 2 demonstrated a realization that some of the knowledge and habits they had acquired through experience were incorrect. Scores for several individual questions decreased at posttraining, and these results will need further evaluation. The overall training results prompted the institute to provide periodic updates to employees to sustain the organizational safety culture. With this study, the institute now has a dedicated group of biorisk management representatives. This work serves as a wake-up call for established institutions that rely on staff experience to foster an organizational culture of biosafety and biosecurity.

Design and Application of Biosafe Coronavirus Engineering Systems without Virulence.

In the last twenty years, three deadly zoonotic coronaviruses (CoVs)-namely, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and SARS-CoV-2-have emerged. They are considered highly pathogenic for humans, particularly SARS-CoV-2, which caused the 2019 CoV disease pandemic (COVID-19), endangering the lives and health of people globally and causing unpredictable economic losses. Experiments on wild-type viruses require biosafety level 3 or 4 laboratories (BSL-3 or BSL-4), which significantly hinders basic virological research. Therefore, the development of various biosafe CoV systems without virulence is urgently needed to meet the requirements of different research fields, such as antiviral and vaccine evaluation. This review aimed to comprehensively summarize the biosafety of CoV engineering systems. These systems combine virological foundations with synthetic genomics techniques, enabling the development of efficient tools for attenuated or non-virulent vaccines, the screening of antiviral drugs, and the investigation of the pathogenic mechanisms of novel microorganisms.

Collection and transportation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza A virus diagnostic samples: Optimizing the usage of guanidine-based chaotropic salts for enhanced biosafety and viral genome preservation.

Many virus lysis/transport buffers used in molecular diagnostics, including the detection of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) RNA, contain guanidine-based chaotropic salts, primarily guanidine hydrochloride (GuHCl) or guanidine isothiocyanate (GITC). Although the virucidal effects of GuHCl and GITC alone against some enveloped viruses have been established, standardized data on their optimum virucidal concentrations against SARS-CoV-2 and effects on viral RNA stability are scarce. Thus, we aimed to determine the optimum virucidal concentrations of GuHCl and GITC against SARS-CoV-2 compared to influenza A virus (IAV), another enveloped respiratory virus. We also evaluated the effectiveness of viral RNA stabilization at the determined optimum virucidal concentrations under high-temperature conditions (35°C) using virus-specific real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction. Both viruses were potently inactivated by 1.0 M GITC and 2.5 M GuHCl, but the GuHCl concentration for efficient SARS-CoV-2 inactivation was slightly higher than that for IAV inactivation. GITC showed better viral RNA stability than GuHCl at the optimum virucidal concentrations. An increased concentration of GuHCl or GITC increased viral RNA degradation at 35°C. Our findings highlight the need to standardize GuHCl and GITC concentrations in virus lysis/transport buffers and the potential application of these guanidine-based salts alone as virus inactivation solutions in SARS-CoV-2 and IAV molecular diagnostics.

To probe outbreak, BSL-3 labs plan to infect cows with flu virus.

Novel effort comes as study finds key receptor for avian flu virus in udders, where the virus flourishes.

A novel BSL-2 Lassa virus reverse genetics system modelling the complete viral life cycle.

Lassa virus (LASV), a risk-group 4 pathogen, must be handled in biosafety level-4 (BSL-4) conditions, thereby limiting its research and antiviral development. Here, we developed a novel LASV reverse genetics system which, to our knowledge, is the first to study the complete LASV life cycle under BSL-2 conditions. Viral particles can be produced efficiently when LASV minigenomic RNA harbouring minimal viral cis-elements and reporter genes is transfected into a helper cell line stably expressing viral NP, GP, Z and L proteins. The resulting defective virions, named LASVmg, can propagate only in the helper cell line, providing a BSL-2 model to study the complete LASV life cycle. Using this model, we found that a previously reported cellular receptor α-dystroglycan is dispensable for LASVmg infection. Furthermore, we showed that ribavirin can inhibit LASVmg infection by inducing viral mutations. This new BSL-2 system should facilitate studying the LASV life cycle and screening antivirals.