Assessing dimensions of thought disorder with large language models: The tradeoff of accuracy and consistency.

Natural Language Processing (NLP) methods have shown promise for the assessment of formal thought disorder, a hallmark feature of schizophrenia in which disturbances to the structure, organization, or coherence of thought can manifest as disordered or incoherent speech. We investigated the suitability of modern Large Language Models (LLMs - e.g., GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Llama 3) to predict expert-generated ratings for three dimensions of thought disorder (coherence, content, and tangentiality) assigned to speech samples collected from both patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (n = 26) and healthy control participants (n = 25). In addition to (1) evaluating the accuracy of LLM-generated ratings relative to human experts, we also (2) investigated the degree to which the LLMs produced consistent ratings across multiple trials, and we (3) sought to understand the factors that impacted the consistency of LLM-generated output. We found that machine-generated ratings of the level of thought disorder in speech matched favorably those of expert humans, and we identified a tradeoff between accuracy and consistency in LLM ratings. Unlike traditional NLP methods, LLMs were not always consistent in their predictions, but these inconsistencies could be mitigated with careful parameter selection and ensemble methods. We discuss implications for NLP-based assessment of thought disorder and provide recommendations of best practices for integrating these methods in the field of psychiatry.

Harnessing technology to measure individual differences in spatial thinking in early childhood from a relational developmental systems perspective.

According to the Relational Developmental Systems perspective, the development of individual differences in spatial thinking (e.g., mental rotation, spatial reorientation, and spatial language) are attributed to various psychological (e.g., children's cognitive strategies), biological (e.g., structure and function of hippocampus), and cultural systems (e.g., caregiver spatial language input). Yet, measuring the development of individual differences in spatial thinking in young children, as well as the psychological, biological, and cultural systems that influence the development of these abilities, presents unique challenges. The current paper outlines ways to harness available technology including eye-tracking, eye-blink conditioning, MRI, Zoom, and LENA technology, to study the development of individual differences in young children's spatial thinking. The technologies discussed offer ways to examine children's spatial thinking development from different levels of analyses (i.e., psychological, biological, cultural), thereby allowing us to advance the study of developmental theory. We conclude with a discussion of the use of artificial intelligence.

The recursive grammar of mental time travel.

One apparent feature of mental time travel is the ability to recursively embed temporal perspectives across different times: humans can remember how we anticipated the future and anticipate how we will remember the past. This recursive structure of mental time travel might be formalized in terms of a 'grammar' that is reflective of but more general than linguistic notions of absolute and relative tense. Here, I provide a foundation for this grammatical framework, emphasizing a bounded (rather than unbounded) recursive function that supports mental time travel to a limited temporal depth and to actual and possible scenarios. Anticipated counterfactual thinking, for instance, entails three levels of mental time travel to a possible scenario ('in the future, I will reflect on how my past self could have taken a different future action') and is centrally implicated in complex human decision-making. This perspective calls for further research into the mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny of recursive mental time travel, and revives the question of links with other recursive forms of thinking such as theory of mind. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Children's mental time travel into the future: a functional perspective.

Children's episodic future-thinking is typically assessed using experimental tasks that measure whether children select an item with future utility. Although these tasks-inspired by Tulving's seminal 'spoon test' (Tulving E. 2005 Episodic memory and autonoesis: uniquely human? In The missing link in cognition: origins of self-reflective consciousness [eds HS Terrace, J Metcalfe], pp. 3-56. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. [doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161564.001.0001])-are passed around age 4, they tell us little about the functional significance of children's episodic future-thinking in their day-to-day lives. We highlight how a naturalistic approach can shed light on this issue, and present a small study where we recruited mothers to report on their children's (N = 12, 3- and 4-year-olds and 6- and 7-year-olds) future-thinking over a 7-day period. We used a thematic analysis to understand why children express future thoughts and derived the following themes: (1) expressing future desires and/or intentions, (2) future-oriented information-seeking, (3) connecting present actions with future outcomes, and (4) predicting future mental/physiological states. We compare these themes with recent accounts of the functional significance of future-thinking in adults and conclude that children largely express their future-thinking verbally to request information or support from their parent-likely because they do not yet possess enough control/autonomy to independently act for their own future. Our findings both complement and extend an experimental approach and further elucidate the functional significance of mental time travel in children. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Beyond the episodic-semantic continuum: the multidimensional model of mental representations.

Tulving's concept of mental time travel (MTT), and the related distinction of episodic and semantic memory, have been highly influential contributions to memory research, resulting in a wealth of findings and a deeper understanding of the neurocognitive correlates of memory and future thinking. Many models have conceptualized episodic and semantic representations as existing on a continuum that can help to account for various hybrid forms. Nevertheless, in most theories, MTT remains distinctly associated with episodic representations. In this article, we review existing models of memory and future thinking, and critically evaluate whether episodic representations are distinct from other types of explicit representations, including whether MTT as a neurocognitive capacity is uniquely episodic. We conclude by proposing a new framework, the Multidimensional Model of Mental Representations (MMMR), which can parsimoniously account for the range of past, present and future representations the human mind is capable of creating. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Measuring episodic memory and mental time travel: crossing the species gap.

Mental time travel is the projection of the mind into the past or future, and relates to experiential aspects of episodic memory, and episodic future thinking. Framing episodic memory and future thinking in this way causes a challenge when studying memory in animals, where demonstration of this mental projection is prevented by the absence of language. However, there is good evidence that non-human animals pass tests of episodic memory that are based on behavioural criteria, meaning a better understanding needs to be had of the relationship between episodic memory and mental time travel. We argue that mental time travel and episodic memory are not synonymous, and that mental time travel is neither a requirement of, nor an irrelevance to, episodic memory. Mental time travel can allow improved behavioural choices based on episodic memory, and work in all species (including humans) should include careful consideration of the behavioural outputs being measured. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Life-Threatening Clinical Simulations for Nursing Students: Promoting Critical Thinking and Satisfaction.

BACKGROUND: Integrating life-threatening clinical simulations improves learning outcomes. This study assessed nursing students' critical thinking factors before and after simulation, evaluated nursing clinical reasoning ability and learning satisfaction at two time points, and explored relationships and predictions among critical thinking, clinical reasoning, and satisfaction before and after simulation. METHOD: Surveys and focus groups were used for this mixed-methods study. RESULTS: Quantitative findings revealed increased critical thinking scores for curiosity, skepticism, and systematicity; clinical reasoning; and satisfaction after simulation. Qualitative results supported these improvements and indicated enhanced curiosity for clinical knowledge and iterative phases of clinical reasoning. Students expressed satisfaction with the simulations. Objectivity significantly influenced clinical reasoning and satisfaction in nursing students following life-threatening simulations. CONCLUSION: Fostering a culture of critical thinking in life-threatening simulations is crucial. Educators must teach the importance of objectivity in clinical practice, encourage critical evaluation, and foster self-reflection in simulations. [J Nurs Educ. 2024;63(9):595-603.].

The Inventory of Personality Organization-Reality Testing Subscale and Belief in Science Scale: Confirmatory factor and Rasch analysis of thinking style measures.

The Inventory of Personality Organization-Reality Testing Subscale (IPO-RT) and Belief in Science Scale (BIS) represent indirect, proxy measures of intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking. However, a limited appraisal of factorial structure exists, and assessment of person-item functioning has not occurred. This study assessed the IPO-RT and BIS using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and Rasch analysis with a sample of 1030 participants (465 males, 565 females). Correlation analysis revealed a negative, moderate relationship between the measures. CFA supported a bifactorial model of the IPO-RT with four bifactors (Auditory and Visual Hallucinations, Delusional Thinking, Social Deficits, and Confusion). A one-factor model best fitted the BIS. Satisfactory item/person reliability and unidimensionality was observed for both measures using Rasch analysis, and items generally exhibited gender invariance. However, IPO-RT items were challenging, whereas BIS items were relatively easy to endorse. Overall, results indicated that the IPO-RT and BIS are conceptually sound, indirect indices of intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking. Acknowledging the breadth of these thinking styles, a useful future research focus includes evaluating the performance of IPO-RT and BIS alongside objective tests.

The Emergence of Edgar Morin's Complex Thinking.

Edgar Morin is more than 100 years old and has produced numerous original ideas. Complex Thinking is his approach to complexity and took almost thirty years to be written. He developed it based on many other thinkers but chiefly, we argue, on Wiener's Cybernetics, von Bertalanffy's General System Theory and Shannon's Information Theory. This article describes and discusses how those latter theories have been incorporated into Morin's thought, especially in La Méthode, his magnum opus, and presents, in a comparative fashion, his pros and contras on each of them. In our conclusion, we discuss how some of Morin's criticisms of the founding theories might be unjust and also present a summary of some judgmental appraisals of Complex Thinking.

The role of action concepts in physical reasoning: insights from late childhood.

A fundamental component of human cognition is the ability to intuitively reason about behaviours of objects and systems in the physical world without resorting to explicit scientific knowledge. This skill was traditionally considered a symbolic process. However, in the last decades, there has been a shift towards ideas of embodiment, suggesting that accessing physical knowledge and predicting physical outcomes is grounded in bodily interactions with the environment. Infants and children, who learn mainly through their embodied experiences, serve as a model to probe the link between reasoning and physical concepts. Here, we tested school-aged children (5- to 15-year-olds) in online reasoning games that involve different physical action concepts such as supporting, launching and clearing. We assessed changes in children's performance and strategies over development and their relationships with the different action concepts. Children reasoned more accurately in problems that involved supporting actions compared to launching or clearing actions. Moreover, when children failed, they were more strategic in subsequent attempts when problems involved support rather than launching or clearing. Children improved with age, but improvements differed across action concepts. Our findings suggest that accessing physical knowledge and predicting physical events are affected by action concepts, and those effects change over development. This article is part of the theme issue 'Minds in movement: embodied cognition in the age of artificial intelligence'.

Mind-wandering in daily life in depressed individuals: An experience sampling study.

BACKGROUND: A diagnostic criterion for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is difficulty concentrating and increased distractibility. One form of distraction that occurs in everyday life is mind-wandering. The current study aims to test how individuals with MDD and healthy controls differ in their mind-wandering in everyday life. METHODS: Adults diagnosed with MDD (n = 53) and healthy controls (n = 53) completed a week of experience sampling, with prompts administered up to eight times per day. At each prompt, participants reported the occurrence and characteristics of their mind-wandering. They also reported levels of momentary negative affect (NA), positive affect (PA), and rumination. RESULTS: MDD participants reported mind-wandering almost twice as often as healthy control participants. Compared to healthy participants, MDD participants rated their mind-wandering as more negative, but did not differ in terms of temporal orientation. Higher NA and lower PA predicted mind-wandering in the MDD group but not healthy controls, even after controlling for rumination. Time-lagged analyses revealed that current mind-wandering predicted future levels of PA in MDD participants but not in healthy controls; in contrast, current NA and PA did not predict future mind-wandering. LIMITATIONS: Limitations include our examination of specific forms of mind-wandering (i.e., we did not sample the full spectrum of this construct). CONCLUSIONS: Individuals with MDD frequently report engaging in mind-wandering in everyday life, and this appears to be coupled with affect. Mind-wandering may have maladaptive effects in MDD and could serve as a target for intervention.

Evidence-based scientific thinking and decision-making in everyday life.

In today's knowledge economy, it is critical to make decisions based on high-quality evidence. Science-related decision-making is thought to rely on a complex interplay of reasoning skills, cognitive styles, attitudes, and motivations toward information. By investigating the relationship between individual differences and behaviors related to evidence-based decision-making, our aim was to better understand how adults engage with scientific information in everyday life. First, we used a data-driven exploratory approach to identify four latent factors in a large set of measures related to cognitive skills and epistemic attitudes. The resulting structure suggests that key factors include curiosity and positive attitudes toward science, prosociality, cognitive skills, and openmindedness to new information. Second, we investigated whether these factors predicted behavior in a naturalistic decision-making task. In the task, participants were introduced to a real science-related petition and were asked to read six online articles related to the petition, which varied in scientific quality, while deciding how to vote. We demonstrate that curiosity and positive science attitudes, cognitive flexibility, prosociality and emotional states, were related to engaging with information and discernment of evidence reliability. We further found that that social authority is a powerful cue for source credibility, even above the actual quality and relevance of the sources. Our results highlight that individual motivating factors toward information engagement, like curiosity, and social factors such as social authority are important drivers of how adults judge the credibility of everyday sources of scientific information.

Reasoning From Quantified Modal Premises.

Quantified modal inferences interest logicians, linguists, and computer scientists, but no previous psychological study of them appears to be in the literature. Here is an example of one: All those artists are businessmen. Paulo is possibly one of the artists. What follows? People tend to conclude: Paulo is possibly a businessman (Experiment 1). It seems plausible, and it follows from an intuitive mental model in which Paulo is one of a set of artists who are businessmen. Further deliberation can yield a model of an alternative possibility in which Paulo is not one of the artists, which confirms that the conclusion is only a possibility. The snag is that standard modal logics, which deal with possibilities, cannot yield a particular conclusion to any premises: Infinitely many follow validly (from any premises) but they do not include the present conclusion. Yet, further experiments corroborated a new mental model theory's predictions for various inferences (Experiment 2), for the occurrence of factual conclusions drawn from premises about possibilities (Experiment 3) and for inferences from premises of modal syllogisms (Experiment 4). The theory is therefore plausible, but we explore the feasibility of a cognitive theory based on modifications to modal logic.

Decomposing modal thought.

Cognitive scientists have become increasingly interested in understanding how natural minds represent and reason about possible ways the world could be. However, there is currently little agreement on how to understand this remarkable capacity for modal thought. We argue that the capacity for modal thought is built from a set of relatively simple component parts, centrally involving an ability to consider possible extensions of a part of the actual world. Natural minds can productively combine this ability with a range of other capacities, eventually allowing for the observed suite of increasingly more sophisticated ways of modal reasoning. We demonstrate how our (de)compositional account is supported by both the trajectory of children's developing capacity for reasoning about possible ways the world could be and by what we know about how such modal thought is expressed within and across natural languages. Our approach makes new predictions about which kinds of capacities are required by which kinds of experimental tasks and, as a result, contributes to settling currently open theoretical questions about the development of modal thought and the acquisition of modal vocabulary in children. Our work also provides a more systematic way of understanding possible variation in modal thought and talk, and, more generally, paves the way toward a unified theory that will ultimately allow researchers across disciplines to relate their findings to each other within a framework of shared assumptions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Prevalence and Course of Unwanted, Intrusive Thoughts of Infant-Related Harm.

Objective: Unwanted, intrusive thoughts (UITs) of infant-related harm are a common postpartum phenomenon and can be classified into thoughts of accidental harm (TAHs) and thoughts of intentional harm (TIHs). Our study's objective was to complete a comprehensive, comparative analysis of TAHs and TIHs by commenting on their prevalence, course, characteristics (time, distress, and impairment) and most intense period.Methods: A total of 763 English-speaking pregnant women across British Columbia were recruited to participate in a prospective cohort study. Study data were collected between February 2014 and February 2017. UITs were assessed by semistructured interviews twice during the postpartum period.Results: The prevalence of TAHs and TIHs in the postpartum period was 95.8% and 53.9%, respectively. The most common TAHs included thoughts of the baby suffocating or dying from sudden infant death syndrome; the most common TIHs included thoughts of neglect. On average, TAHs are more prevalent, time-consuming, and result in greater interference compared to TIHs. The most intense period for TAHs (5.74 weeks postpartum) and TIHs (within first 8 weeks postpartum) was identified. During this period, over 40% of participants reported moderate or extreme distress related to UITs. For most, UITs decreased in frequency or completely resolved by 6 months postpartum, and most participants did not report clinically significant symptoms.Conclusion: UITs are a normative and typically self-resolving occurrence in the postpartum period. UITs' most intense period signifies a time of heightened vulnerability. Increased education is necessary to normalize and reduce distress associated with UITs.J Clin Psychiatry 2024;85(3):23m15145. Author affiliations are listed at the end of this article.