Greater learning transfer effect for avoidance of loss than for achievement of gain in Finnish and Russian schoolchildren.

Classification of behavior into principal categories of approach and avoidance is grounded in evolutionary considerations and multiple results of behavioral, self-report, and brain-activity analyses. Contrasted via measures of cognitive processes, avoidance is accompanied by greater cognitive engagement than approach. Considering outcome as a key constituent of behavioral underpinnings, we interpret approach/avoidance distinction in terms of structure of experience: avoidance domain provides more detailed interaction with the environment, than approach domain. Learning outwardly similar behaviors aimed at gain or loss outcomes manifests formation of different structures that underlie further learning. Therefore, we predicted difference of learning transfer between gain and loss contexts that was revealed here by introducing two tasks for different groups of schoolchildren in Finland and Russia. The cultural specificity of gain/loss differences was also evident with employed measures, including error rate and post-error slowing. The results support that avoidance-motivated behavior is organized as a more complex organism-environment interaction, than the approach-motivated behavior.

The structure of experience, the nature of the visual, and type 2 blindsight.

Unlike those with type 1 blindsight, people who have type 2 blindsight have some sort of consciousness of the stimuli in their blind field. What is the nature of that consciousness? Is it visual experience? I address these questions by considering whether we can establish the existence of any structural-necessary-features of visual experience. I argue that it is very difficult to establish the existence of any such features. In particular, I investigate whether it is possible to visually, or more generally perceptually, experience form or movement at a distance from our body, without experiencing colour. The traditional answer, advocated by Aristotle, and some other philosophers, up to and including the present day, is that it is not and hence colour is a structural feature of visual experience. I argue that there is no good reason to think that this is impossible, and provide evidence from four cases-sensory substitution, achomatopsia, phantom contours and amodal completion-in favour of the idea that it is possible. If it is possible then one important reason for rejecting the idea that people with type 2 blindsight do not have visual experiences is undermined. I suggest further experiments that could be done to help settle the matter.