14-month-old infants detect a semantic mismatch when occluded objects are mislabeled.

When infants start mastering their first language, they may start to notice when words are used incorrectly. Around 14-months of age, infants detect incorrect labeling when they are presented with an object which is labeled while still visible. However, things that are referred to are often out of sight when we communicate about them. The present study examined infants' detection of semantic mismatch when the object was occluded at the time of labeling. Specifically, we investigated whether mislabeling that referred to an occluded object could elicit a semantic mismatch. We showed 14-month-old Danish-speaking infants events where an onscreen agent showed an object and then hid it in a box. This was followed by another agent's hand pointing at the box, and a concurrent auditory category label played, which either matched or did not match the hidden object. Our results indicate that there is an effect of semantic mismatch with a larger negativity in incongruent trials. Thus, infants detected a mismatch, as indicated by a larger n400, when occluded objects were mislabeled. This finding suggests that infants can sustain an object representation in memory and compare it to a semantic representation of an auditory category label.

Differential trajectory of cognitive functions in neurocognitive subgroups of newly diagnosed patients with bipolar disorder and their unaffected first-degree relatives - A longitudinal study.

BACKGROUND: Cognitive impairments exist in a large proportion of remitted patients with bipolar disorder (BD). However, no study has investigated the cognitive trajectories across neurocognitive subgroups of patients or their unaffected first-degree relatives (UR). METHODS: Newly diagnosed BD patients, UR and healthy controls (HC) underwent comprehensive cognitive testing at baseline and at 16-months follow-up. Hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted to identify homogeneous subgroups of patients based on their neurocognitive profile at baseline. Cognitive change across subgroups of patients and UR was assessed with linear mixed-model analyses. RESULTS: Data from baseline and follow-up were collected from 152 patients, 53 UR and 135 HC. Patients were clustered into three discrete neurocognitive subgroups: 'cognitively normal' (43%), 'mild-moderately impaired' (33%) and 'globally impaired' (24%). While 'mild-moderately impaired' patients and HC showed normative cognitive improvement over time in global cognition (p < .001), 'globally impaired' patients showed greater improvement than all groups (p < .001), whereas 'cognitively normal' patients showed a lack of normative improvement (p = .17). UR of impaired patients showed a lack of normative improvement in executive functions (p = .01). 'Globally impaired' patients also presented with stable impairments in facial expression recognition and emotion regulation. LIMITATIONS: Follow-up data was available for 62% of participants, possibly reflecting a selection bias. CONCLUSIONS: The greater cognitive improvement in 'globally impaired' patients partly speaks against neuroprogression. However, the lack of normative improvement in 'cognitively normal' patients could indicate negative effects of illness. Further follow-up assessments are warranted to clarify whether lack of normative improvement in executive function in UR represents an illness risk-marker.

Cognitive dissonance from 2 years of age: Toddlers', but not infants', blind choices induce preferences.

As adults, not only do we choose what we prefer, we also tend to adapt our preferences according to our previous choices. We do this even when choosing blindly and we could not have had any previous preference for the option we chose. These blind choice-induced preferences are thought to result from cognitive dissonance as an effort to reconcile our choices and values. In the present preregistered study, we asked when this phenomenon develops. We reasoned that cognitive dissonance may emerge around 2 years of age in connection with the development of children's self-concept. We presented N = 200 children aged 16 to 36 months with a blind choice between two toys, and then tested whether their choice had induced a preference for the chosen, and a devaluation of the discarded, toy. Indeed, children's choice-induced preferences substantially increased with age. 26- to 36-months-old children preferred a neutral over the previously blindly discarded toy, but the previously chosen over the neutral toy, in line with cognitive dissonance predictions. Younger infants showed evidence against such blind choice-induced preferences, indicating its emergence around 2 years of age. Contrary to our hypotheses, the emergence of blind choice-induced preferences was not related to measures of self-concept development in the second year of life. Our results suggest that cognitive dissonance develops around 2 years. We speculate about cognitive mechanisms that underlie this development, including later-developing aspects of the self-concept and increasingly abstract representational abilities.

Emotional cognition subgroups in mood disorders: Associations with familial risk.

Patients with mood disorders show heterogeneity in non-emotional cognition. However, it is unclear whether emotional cognition (EC) is characterised by similar heterogeneity. We aimed to investigate the heterogeneity in EC among remitted patients with mood disorders and explore its association with familial risk. Data from 269 partially or fully remitted patients with mood disorders, 87 of their unaffected relatives (UR) and 203 healthy controls (HC) were pooled from two cohort studies. Hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted using the EC data from patients. UR were categorised into groups consistent with their affected relatives' cluster assignment. Clusters were compared to HC on EC, non-emotional cognition, clinical characteristics and functioning.  We identified three clusters: an 'emotionally preserved' (57%), an 'emotionally blunted' (26%) and an 'emotionally volatile' cluster (17%). 'Emotionally blunted' and 'emotionally volatile' patients also presented more deficits in non-emotional cognition (global cognition read z=-0.3 and -0.5 respectively). Relatives of 'emotionally preserved' patients were more successful at dampening negative emotions (p=.01, d=0.39, 95% CI [-0.76,-0.09]), whereas UR of 'emotionally impaired' patients underperformed in verbal fluency (p=.03, d=0.46, 95% CI [.03, 0.68]) compared to HC. The existence of impaired EC groups in remitted mood disorder highlights a need to screen for and treat EC in mood disorders. Improved ability to dampen emotions in UR of 'emotionally preserved' patients may reflect a resilience marker while impaired verbal fluency in UR of 'emotionally impaired' patients may reflect distinct genetic risk profiles in these EC subgroups.