A 17-month longitudinal surface sampling study carried out on public transport vehicles operating in England during the COVID-19 pandemic identified low levels of SARS-CoV-2 RNA contamination.

AIMS: To monitor severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) RNA contamination in vehicles operating in England during the pandemic, to better understand transmission risk of SARS-CoV-2 on public transport. METHODS AND RESULTS: We collected 1314 surface samples between December 2020 and April 2022 on trains and buses managed by five different transport operators. The presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA was investigated through reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). SARS-CoV-2 RNA was found on 197 (15%) of the 1314 surfaces sampled, including seat head rests, handholds, and air extract grilles, but the levels of RNA recovered on those samples (median value of 23.4, interquartile range: 14.3-35.4, N gene copies per extraction) made the presence of infectious virus at the time of sampling extremely unlikely. However, detection rates varied over time with peaks broadly coinciding with times of high community transmission, when it was more likely that people infected with SARS-CoV-2 were travelling on public transport. CONCLUSION: During the pandemic, and as in other public spaces, low levels of SARS-CoV-2 RNA were found on surfaces associated with public transport.

Laboratory Evaluation of a Quaternary Ammonium Compound-Based Antimicrobial Coating Used in Public Transport during the COVID-19 Pandemic.

The virucidal activity of the Zoono Z71 Microbe Shield surface sanitizer and protectant, a quaternary ammonium compound (QAC)-based antimicrobial coating that was used by the United Kingdom rail industry during the COVID-19 pandemic, was evaluated, using the bacteriophage ɸ6 as a surrogate for SARS-CoV-2. Immediately after application and in the absence of interfering substances, the product effectively reduced (>3 log10) the viability of ɸ6 on some materials that are typically used in rail carriages (stainless steel, high-pressure laminate, plastic). If, after the application of the product, these surfaces remained undisturbed, the antimicrobial coating retained its efficacy for at least 28 days. However, efficacy depended on the material being coated. The product provided inconsistent results when applied to glass surfaces and was ineffective (i.e., achieved <3 log10 reduction) when applied to a train arm rest that was made of Terluran 22. Regardless of the material that was coated or the time since application, the presence of organic debris (fetal bovine serum) significantly reduced the viricidal activity of the coating. Wiping the surface with a wetted cloth after the deposition of organic debris was not sufficient to restore efficacy. We conclude that the product is likely to be of limited effectiveness in a busy, multiuser environment, such as public transport. IMPORTANCE This study evaluated the performance of a commercially available antimicrobial coating that was used by the transport industry in the United Kingdom during the COVID-19 pandemic. While the product was effective against ɸ6, the efficacy of the coating depended upon the material to which it was applied. Similarly, and regardless of the surface material, the presence of organic debris severely impaired viricidal activity, and efficacy could not be recovered through wiping (cleaning) the surface. This highlights the importance of including relevant materials and conditions when evaluating antimicrobial coatings in the laboratory. Further efforts are required to identify suitable infection prevention and control practices for the transport industry.

Surface sampling for SARS-CoV-2 RNA in workplace outbreak settings in the UK, 2021-22.

AIMS: To utilize environmental surface sampling to evaluate areas of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) contamination within workplaces to identify trends and improve local coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) control measures. METHODS AND RESULTS: Surface sampling was undertaken at 12 workplaces that experienced a cluster of COVID-19 cases in the workforce between March 2021 and March 2022. A total of 7.4% (61/829) samples collected were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA by the quantitative PCR (qPCR) with only 1.8% (15/829) of samples identified with crossing threshold (Ct) values <35.0. No sample returned whole-genome sequence inferring RNA detected was degraded. CONCLUSIONS: Few workplace surface samples were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA and positive samples typically contained low levels of nucleic acid. Although these data may infer a low probability of fomite transmission within the workplace, Ct values may have been lower at the time of contamination. Workplace environmental sampling identified lapses in COVID-19 control measures within individual sites and showed trends throughout the pandemic.

A SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in a plastics manufacturing plant.

BACKGROUND: A SARS-CoV-2 outbreak with an attack rate of 14.3% was reported at a plastics manufacturing plant in England. METHODS: Between 23rd March and 13th May 2021, the COVID-OUT team undertook a comprehensive outbreak investigation, including environmental assessment, surface sampling, molecular and serological testing, and detailed questionnaires, to identify potential SARS-CoV-2 transmission routes, and workplace- and worker-related risk factors. RESULTS: While ventilation, indicated using real-time CO2 proxy measures, was generally adequate on-site, the technical office with the highest localized attack rate (21.4%) frequently reached peaks in CO2 of 2100ppm. SARS-CoV-2 RNA was found in low levels (Ct ≥35) in surface samples collected across the site. High noise levels (79dB) were recorded in the main production area, and study participants reported having close work contacts (73.1%) and sharing tools (75.5%). Only 20.0% of participants reported using a surgical mask and/or FFP2/FFP3 respirator at least half the time and 71.0% expressed concerns regarding potential pay decreases and/or unemployment due to self-isolation or workplace closure. CONCLUSIONS: The findings reinforce the importance of enhanced infection control measures in manufacturing sectors, including improved ventilation with possible consideration of CO2 monitoring, utilising air cleaning interventions in enclosed environments, and provision of good-quality face masks (i.e., surgical masks or FFP2/FFP3 respirators) especially when social distancing cannot be maintained. Further research on the impacts of job security-related concerns is warranted.

Infection-competent monkeypox virus contamination identified in domestic settings following an imported case of monkeypox into the UK.

An imported case of monkeypox was diagnosed in December 2019 in a traveller returning from Nigeria to the UK. Subsequently, environmental sampling was performed at two adjoining single-room residences occupied by the patient and their sibling. Monkeypox virus DNA was identified in multiple locations throughout both properties, and monkeypox virus was isolated from several samples 3 days after the patient was last in these locations. Positive samples were identified following the use of both vacuum and surface sampling techniques; these methodologies allowed for environmental analysis of potentially contaminated porous and non-porous surfaces via real-time quantitative reverse transcriptase PCR analysis in addition to viral isolation to confirm the presence of infection-competent virus. This report confirms the potential for infection-competent monkeypox virus to be recovered in environmental settings associated with known positive cases and the necessity for rapid environmental assessment to reduce potential exposure to close contacts and the general public. The methods adopted in this investigation may be used for future confirmed cases of monkeypox in order to establish levels of contamination, confirm the presence of infection-competent material and to identify locations requiring additional cleaning.

Comparison of Surface Persistence of SARS-CoV-2 Alpha and Delta Variants on Stainless Steel at 4°C and 24°C.

Most studies on surface persistence of SARS-CoV-2 have been conducted at temperatures between 20°C and 30°C. There is limited data on the survival of SARS-CoV-2 at low temperatures. In this study, the stability of SARS-CoV-2 Alpha and Delta variants on stainless steel was investigated at two temperatures (4°C and 24°C). The results show that both variants decayed more rapidly at 24°C compared with 4°C. At 24°C, Alpha and Delta variants showed reductions of 0.33 log10 and 1.02 log10, respectively, within the first 2.5 h. However, at 4°C, Alpha variant showed a reduction of 0.16 log10 within the first 2.5 h while no reduction was observed with Delta variant. After remaining in situ for 24 h at 24°C, log10 reductions of 2.66 (Alpha) and 3.11 (Delta) were observed. No viable Alpha and Delta variant was recovered after 48 h and 72 h, respectively. After 24 h in a refrigerated environment (4°C) log10 reductions of 1.16 (Alpha) and 0.95 (Delta) were observed. Under these experimental conditions, both viruses survived on stainless steel for at least 1 week. No viable Alpha and Delta variant was recovered after 10 days. These findings support the potential for increased fomite transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during winter months in colder regions worldwide and in some industrial sectors. IMPORTANCE Human transmission is believed to occur primarily through direct transfer of infectious droplets or aerosols. However, fomite transmission through contact with contaminated surfaces may also play an important role. This study provides novel evidence comparing the stability of Alpha and Delta variants on stainless steel surfaces at 4°C and 24°C. At 4°C both variants were found to be still detectable for up to 7 days. At 24°C Delta variant could be recovered over 2 days compared with Alpha variant which could not be recovered after 2 days. This has implications for fomite transmission interventions for people living and working in cold environments.

Modeling and experimental study of dispersion and deposition of respiratory emissions with implications for disease transmission.

The ability to model the dispersion of pathogens in exhaled breath is important for characterizing transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and other respiratory pathogens. A Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) model of droplet and aerosol emission during exhalations has been developed and for the first time compared directly with experimental data for the dispersion of respiratory and oral bacteria from ten subjects coughing, speaking, and singing in a small unventilated room. The modeled exhalations consist of a warm, humid, gaseous carrier flow and droplets represented by a discrete Lagrangian particle phase which incorporates saliva composition. The simulations and experiments both showed greater deposition of bacteria within 1 m of the subject, and the potential for a substantial number of bacteria to remain airborne, with no clear difference in airborne concentration of small bioaerosols (<10 µm diameter) between 1 and 2 m. The agreement between the model and the experimental data for bacterial deposition directly in front of the subjects was encouraging given the uncertainties in model input parameters and the inherent variability within and between subjects. The ability to predict airborne microbial dispersion and deposition gives confidence in the ability to model the consequences of an exhalation and hence the airborne transmission of respiratory pathogens such as SARS-CoV-2.

Persistence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Virus and Viral RNA in Relation to Surface Type and Contamination Concentration.

The transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is likely to occur through a number of routes, including contact with contaminated surfaces. Many studies have used reverse transcription-PCR (RT-PCR) analysis to detect SARS-CoV-2 RNA on surfaces, but seldom has viable virus been detected. This paper investigates the viability over time of SARS-CoV-2 dried onto a range of materials and compares viability of the virus to RNA copies recovered and whether virus viability is concentration dependent. Viable virus persisted for the longest time on surgical mask material and stainless steel, with a 99.9% reduction in viability by 122 and 114 h, respectively. Viability of SARS-CoV-2 reduced the fastest on a polyester shirt, with a 99.9% reduction within 2.5 h. Viability on the bank note was reduced second fastest, with 99.9% reduction in 75 h. RNA on all surfaces exhibited a 1-log reduction in genome copy number recovery over 21 days. The findings show that SARS-CoV-2 is most stable on nonporous hydrophobic surfaces. RNA is highly stable when dried on surfaces, with only 1-log reduction in recovery over 3 weeks. In comparison, SARS-CoV-2 viability reduced more rapidly, but this loss in viability was found to be independent of starting concentration. Expected levels of SARS-CoV-2 viable environmental surface contamination would lead to undetectable levels within 2 days. Therefore, when RNA is detected on surfaces, it does not directly indicate the presence of viable virus, even at low cycle threshold values. IMPORTANCE This study shows the impact of material type on the viability of SARS-CoV-2 on surfaces. It demonstrates that the decay rate of viable SARS-CoV-2 is independent of starting concentration. However, RNA shows high stability on surfaces over extended periods. This has implications for interpretation of surface sampling results using RT-PCR to determine the possibility of viable virus from a surface, where RT-PCR is not an appropriate technique to determine viable virus. Unless sampled immediately after contamination, it is difficult to align RNA copy numbers to quantity of viable virus on a surface.

Biosafety and biosecurity requirements for Orientia spp. diagnosis and research: recommendations for risk-based biocontainment, work practices and the case for reclassification to risk group 2.

Scrub typhus is an important arthropod-borne disease causing significant acute febrile illness by infection with Orientia spp.Using a risk-based approach, this review examines current practice, the evidence base and regulatory requirements regarding matters of biosafety and biosecurity, and presents the case for reclassification from Risk Group 3 to Risk Group 2 along with recommendations for safe working practices of risk-based activities during the manipulation of Orientia spp. in the laboratory.We recommend to reclassify Orientia spp. to Risk Group 2 based on the classification for RG2 pathogens as being moderate individual risk, low community risk. We recommend that low risk activities, can be performed within a biological safety cabinet located in a Biosafety Level (BSL) 2 core laboratory using standard personal protective equipment. But when the risk assessment indicates, such as high concentration and volume, or aerosol generation, then a higher biocontainment level is warranted. For, the majority of animal activities involving Orientia spp., Animal BSL 2 (ABSL2) is recommended however where high risk activities are performed including necropsies, Animal BSL (ABSL3) is recommended.

Insidious Risk of Severe Mycobacterium chimaera Infection in Cardiac Surgery Patients.

BACKGROUND: An urgent UK investigation was launched to assess risk of invasive Mycobacterium chimaera infection in cardiothoracic surgery and a possible association with cardiopulmonary bypass heater-cooler units following alerts in Switzerland and The Netherlands. METHODS: Parallel investigations were pursued: (1) identification of cardiopulmonary bypass-associated M. chimaera infection through national laboratory and hospital admissions data linkage; (2) cohort study to assess patient risk; (3) microbiological and aerobiological investigations of heater-coolers in situ and under controlled laboratory conditions; and (4) whole-genome sequencing of clinical and environmental isolates. RESULTS: Eighteen probable cases of cardiopulmonary bypass-associated M. chimaera infection were identified; all except one occurred in adults. Patients had undergone valve replacement in 11 hospitals between 2007 and 2015, a median of 19 months prior to onset (range, 3 months to 5 years). Risk to patients increased after 2010 from <0.2 to 1.65 per 10000 person-years in 2013, a 9-fold rise for infections within 2 years of surgery (rate ratio, 9.08 [95% CI, 1.81-87.76]). Endocarditis was the most common presentation (n = 11). To date, 9 patients have died. Investigations identified aerosol release through breaches in heater-cooler tanks. Mycobacterium chimaera and other pathogens were recovered from water and air samples. Phylogenetic analysis found close clustering of strains from probable cases. CONCLUSIONS: We identified low but escalating risk of severe M. chimaera infection associated with heater-coolers with cases in a quarter of cardiothoracic centers. Our investigations strengthen etiological evidence for the role of heater-coolers in transmission and raise the possibility of an ongoing, international point-source outbreak. Active management of heater-coolers and heightened clinical awareness are imperative given the consequences of infection.

Aerosolization of respirable droplets from a domestic spa pool and the use of MS-2 coliphage and Pseudomonas aeruginosa as markers for Legionella pneumophila.

Legionnaires' disease can result when droplets or aerosols containing legionella bacteria are inhaled and deposited in the lungs. A number of outbreaks have been associated with the use of a spa pool where aeration, a high water temperature, and a large and variable organic load make disinfectant levels difficult to maintain. Spa pool ownership is increasing, and the aim of this study, using two surrogate organisms (MS-2 coliphage and Pseudomonas aeruginosa [a natural contaminant]), was to assess the potential risk to domestic users when disinfection fails. A representative "entry level" domestic spa pool was installed in an outdoor courtyard. The manufacturer's instructions for spa pool maintenance were not followed. A cyclone sampler was used to sample the aerosols released from the spa pool with and without activation of the air injection system. Samples were taken at increasing heights and distances from the pool. An aerodynamic particle sizer was used to measure the water droplet size distribution at each sample point. When the air injection system was inactivated, neither surrogate organism was recovered from the air. On activation of the air injection system, the mean mass of droplets within the respirable range (10 cm above the water line) was 36.8 µg cm(-3). This corresponded to a mean air concentration of P. aeruginosa of 350 CFU m(-3). From extrapolation from animal data, the estimated risk of infection from aerosols contaminated with similar concentrations of Legionella pneumophila was 0.76 (males) and 0.65 (females). At 1 m above and/or beyond the pool, the mean aerosol mass decreased to 0.04 µg cm(-3) and corresponded to a 100-fold reduction in mean microbial air concentration. The estimated risk of infection at this distance was negligible.

Reaerosolization of Spores from Flooring Surfaces To Assess the Risk of Dissemination and Transmission of Infections.

The aim of this study was to quantify reaerosolization of microorganisms caused by walking on contaminated flooring to assess the risk to individuals accessing areas contaminated with pathogenic organisms, for example, spores of Bacillus anthracis. Industrial carpet and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) floor coverings were contaminated with aerosolized spores of Bacillus atrophaeus by using an artist airbrush to produce deposition of ∼10(3) to 10(4) CFU · cm(-2). Microbiological air samplers were used to quantify the particle size distribution of the aerosol generated when a person walked over the floorings in an environmental chamber. Results were expressed as reaerosolization factors (percent per square centimeter per liter), to represent the ratio of air concentration to surface concentration generated. Walking on carpet generated a statistically significantly higher reaerosolization factor value than did walking on PVC (t = 20.42; P < 0.001). Heavier walking produced a statistically significantly higher reaerosolization factor value than did lighter walking (t = 12.421; P < 0.001). Height also had a statistically significant effect on the reaerosolization factor, with higher rates of recovery of B. atrophaeus at lower levels, demonstrating a height-dependent gradient of particle reaerosolization. Particles in the respirable size range were recovered in all sampling scenarios (mass mean diameters ranged from 2.6 to 4.1 µm). The results of this study can be used to produce a risk assessment of the potential aerosol exposure of a person accessing areas with contaminated flooring in order to inform the choice of appropriate respiratory protective equipment and may aid in the selection of the most suitable flooring types for use in health care environments, to reduce aerosol transmission in the event of contamination.

Biofilm formation in an experimental water distribution system: the contamination of non-touch sensor taps and the implication for healthcare.

Hospital tap water is a recognised source of Pseudomonas aeruginosa. U.K. guidance documents recommend measures to control/minimise the risk of P. aeruginosa in augmented care units but these are based on limited scientific evidence. An experimental water distribution system was designed to investigate colonisation of hospital tap components. P. aeruginosa was injected into 27 individual tap 'assemblies'. Taps were subsequently flushed twice daily and contamination levels monitored over two years. Tap assemblies were systematically dismantled and assessed microbiologically and the effect of removing potentially contaminated components was determined. P. aeruginosa was repeatedly recovered from the tap water at levels above the augmented care alert level. The organism was recovered from all dismantled solenoid valves with colonisation of the ethylene propylene diene monomer (EPDM) diaphragm confirmed by microscopy. Removing the solenoid valves reduced P. aeruginosa counts in the water to below detectable levels. This effect was immediate and sustained, implicating the solenoid diaphragm as the primary contamination source.

A SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in a public order and safety training facility in England, June 2021.

BACKGROUND: The public order and safety (POS) sector remains susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) outbreaks, as workplace attendance is typically compulsory and close physical contact is often needed. Here, we report on a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak with an attack rate of 39% (9/23), which occurred between 19 and 29 June 2021 among a cohort of new POS recruits participating in a mandatory 18-week training programme in England. METHODS: The COVID-OUT (COVID-19 Outbreak investigation to Understand Transmission) study team undertook a multidisciplinary outbreak investigation, including viral surface sampling, workplace environmental assessment, participant viral and antibody testing, and questionnaires, at the two associated training facilities between 5 July and 24 August 2021. RESULTS: Environmental factors, such as ventilation, were deemed inadequate in some areas of the workplace, with carbon dioxide (CO2) levels exceeding 1,500 ppm on multiple occasions within naturally ventilated classrooms. Activities during safety training required close contact, with some necessitating physical contact, physical exertion, and shouting. Furthermore, most participants reported having physical contact with colleagues (67%) and more than one close work contact daily (97%). CONCLUSIONS: Our investigation suggests that site- and activity-specific factors likely contributed to the transmission risks within the POS trainee cohort. Potential interventions for mitigating SARS-CoV-2 transmission in this POS training context could include implementing regular rapid lateral flow testing, optimizing natural ventilation, using portable air cleaning devices in classrooms, and expanding use of well-fitted FFP2/FFP3 respirators during activities where prolonged close physical contact is required.

Laboratory-acquired infections and pathogen escapes worldwide between 2000 and 2021: a scoping review.

Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) and accidental pathogen escape from laboratory settings (APELS) are major concerns for the community. A risk-based approach for pathogen research management within a standard biosafety management framework is recommended but is challenging due to reasons such as inconsistency in risk tolerance and perception. Here, we performed a scoping review using publicly available, peer-reviewed journal and media reports of LAIs and instances of APELS between 2000 and 2021. We identified LAIs in 309 individuals in 94 reports for 51 pathogens. Eight fatalities (2·6% of all LAIs) were caused by infection with Neisseria meningitidis (n=3, 37·5%), Yersinia pestis (n=2, 25%), Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium (S Typhimurium; n=1, 12·5%), or Ebola virus (n=1, 12·5%) or were due to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (n=1, 12·5%). The top five LAI pathogens were S Typhimurium (n=154, 49·8%), Salmonella enteritidis (n=21, 6·8%), vaccinia virus (n=13, 4·2%), Brucella spp (n=12, 3·9%), and Brucella melitensis (n=11, 3·6%). 16 APELS were reported, including those for Bacillus anthracis, SARS-CoV, and poliovirus (n=3 each, 18·8%); Brucella spp and foot and mouth disease virus (n=2 each, 12·5%); and variola virus, Burkholderia pseudomallei, and influenza virus H5N1 (n=1 each, 6·3%). Continual improvement in LAI and APELS management via their root cause analysis and thorough investigation of such incidents is essential to prevent future occurrences. The results are biased due to the reliance on publicly available information, which emphasises the need for formalised global LAIs and APELS reporting to better understand the frequency of and circumstances surrounding these incidents.

Stability of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern (Delta and Omicron) on surfaces at room temperature.

Surfaces contaminated with infectious SARS-CoV-2 particles have the potential to cause human infection and any increase in surface survivability of a SARS-CoV-2 variant may increase its prevalence over other variants. This study investigated whether there were differences in surface persistence between Delta and Omicron variants leading to Omicron's dominance globally. Stainless steel coupons were inoculated with suspensions of either Delta or Omicron variant and exposed to typical environmental conditions within a containment level 3 laboratory. Coupons were recovered at different timepoints and enumerated using plaque assay. Both variants were recoverable for >48 h on the coupons. Omicron showed a greater reduction of viability after 48 h compared to Delta with a 20-fold decrease versus 15-fold respectively, but this difference was not statistically significant (p = 0.424). These results indicate that Omicron's surface persistence is unlikely to contribute to it becoming the dominant variant over Delta.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in Human and Veterinary Laboratories.

Introduction: Lack of evidence-based information regarding potential biological risks can result in inappropriate or excessive biosafety and biosecurity risk-reduction strategies. This can cause unnecessary damage and loss to the physical facilities, physical and psychological well-being of laboratory staff, and community trust. A technical working group from the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), World Health Organization (WHO), and Chatham House collaborated on the Biosafety Research Roadmap (BRM) project. The goal of the BRM is the sustainable implementation of evidence-based biorisk management of laboratory activities, particularly in low-resource settings, and the identification of gaps in the current biosafety and biosecurity knowledge base. Methods: A literature search was conducted for the basis of laboratory design and practices for four selected high-priority subgroups of pathogenic agents. Potential gaps in biosafety were focused on five main sections, including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Categories representing miscellaneous, respiratory, bioterrorism/zoonotic, and viral hemorrhagic fever pathogens were created within each group were selected for review. Results: Information sheets on the pathogens were developed. Critical gaps in the evidence base for safe sustainable biorisk management were identified. Conclusion: The gap analysis identified areas of applied biosafety research required to support the safety, and the sustainability, of global research programs. Improving the data available for biorisk management decisions for research with high-priority pathogens will contribute significantly to the improvement and development of appropriate and necessary biosafety, biocontainment and biosecurity strategies for each agent.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-Bacillus anthracis and Brucella melitensis.

Introduction: Brucella melitensis and Bacillus anthracis are zoonoses transmitted from animals and animal products. Scientific information is provided in this article to support biosafety precautions necessary to protect laboratory workers and individuals who are potentially exposed to these pathogens in the workplace or other settings, and gaps in information are also reported. There is a lack of information on the appropriate effective concentration for many chemical disinfectants for this agent. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling of contaminated materials. B. melitensis is reported to have the highest number of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) to date in laboratory workers. Methods: A literature search was conducted to identify potential gaps in biosafety and focused on five main sections including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, LAIs, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Results: Scientific literature currently lacks information on the effective concentration of many chemical disinfectants for this agent and in the variety of matrices where it may be found. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of PPE during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling contaminated materials. Discussion: Clarified vulnerabilities based on specific scientific evidence will contribute to the prevention of unwanted and unpredictable infections, improving the biosafety processes and procedures for laboratory staff and other professionals such as veterinarians, individuals associated with the agricultural industry, and those working with susceptible wildlife species.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-Shigella spp.

Introduction: Shigella bacteria cause shigellosis, a gastrointestinal infection most often acquired from contaminated food or water. Methods: In this review, the general characteristics of Shigella bacteria are described, cases of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) are discussed, and evidence gaps in current biosafety practices are identified. Results: LAIs are undoubtedly under-reported. Owing to the low infectious dose, rigorous biosafety level 2 practices are required to prevent LAIs resulting from sample manipulation or contact with infected surfaces. Conclusions: It is recommended that, before laboratory work with Shigella, an evidence-based risk assessment be conducted. Particular emphasis should be placed on personal protective equipment, handwashing, and containment practices for procedures that generate aerosols or droplets.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-Foot and Mouth Disease Virus.

Introduction: Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious infection of cloven-hoofed animals. The Biosafety Research Road Map reviewed scientific literature regarding the foot and mouth disease virus (FMDV). This project aims to identify gaps in the data required to conduct evidence-based biorisk assessments, as described by Blacksell et al., and strengthen control measures appropriate for local and national laboratories. Methods: A literature search was conducted to identify potential gaps in biosafety and focused on five main sections: the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Results: The available data regarding biosafety knowledge gaps and existing evidence have been collated. Some gaps include the need for more scientific data that identify the specific safety contribution of engineering controls, support requirements for showering out after in vitro laboratory work, and whether a 3- to 5-day quarantine period should be applied to individuals conducting in vitro versus in vivo work. Addressing these gaps will contribute to the remediation and improvement of biosafety and biosecurity systems when working with FMDV.