Screening Out Controversy: Human Genetics, Emerging Techniques of Diagnosis, and the Origins of the Social Issues Committee of the American Society of Human Genetics, 1964-1973.

In the years following World War II, and increasingly during the 1960s and 1970s, professional scientific societies developed internal sub-committees to address the social implications of their scientific expertise (Moore, Disrupting Science: Social Movements, American Scientists, and the Politics of the Military, 1945-1975. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). This article explores the early years of one such committee, the American Society of Human Genetics' "Social Issues Committee," founded in 1967. Although the committee's name might suggest it was founded to increase the ASHG's public and policy engagement, exploration of the committee's early years reveals a more complicated reality. Affronted by legislators' recent unwillingness to seek the expert advice of human geneticists before adopting widespread neonatal screening programs for phenylketonuria (PKU), and feeling pressed to establish their relevance in an increasingly resource-scarce funding environment, committee members sought to increase the discipline's expert authority. Painfully aware of controversy over abortion rights and haunted by the taint of the discipline's eugenic past, however, the committee proceeded with great caution. Seeking to harness interest in and assert professional control over emerging techniques of genetic diagnosis, the committee strove to protect the society's image by relegating ethical and policy questions about their use to the individual consciences of member scientists. It was not until 1973, after the committee's modest success in organizing support for a retrospective public health study of PKU screening and following the legalization of abortion on demand, that the committee decided to take a more publicly engaged stance.

Psychoactive Substances Bill and Act of New Zealand: A Chance to Engage Undergraduate Scientists with Society using a Transfer Learning Paradigm.

Our aim was to develop a teaching paradigm that connected undergraduate's neuropharmacological/toxicological knowledge to that of government policy. One goal of undergraduate education should be to help develop scientists that can use their scientific knowledge to critique government policy. There is little research, however, on whether democratization of science occurs: nor how to achieve this. Our work focused on a semi-structured workshop designed around the Psychoactive Substances Bill (PSB). Third year science students were given a questionnaire that was designed to address whether participating in the workshop enhanced their understanding of the PSB and its relationship to their established knowledge (i.e., transfer learning). Furthermore, whether they felt that they had enough expertise to consider making a submission (i.e., societal engagement). Results showed that the students appreciated the opportunity to explore potential application of their knowledge and delve into a socio-scientific issue. However, our findings suggested they felt uncomfortable discussing their ideas outside the classroom: nor, did they identify themselves as having sufficient knowledge to contribute to a submission. In conclusion, this study highlights two points. First, that discussion based transfer learning can be used in the tertiary sector and students value the opportunity to apply their knowledge to socio-scientific issue. Second, if social participation and democratization of science is a goal, then more emphasis should be placed on how students can realistically and confidently apply their learning to change social policy. In order to achieve this, education programs need to focus on legitimate real-life processes such as the PSB for engagement.

Virtual diversity: Resolving the tension between the wider culture and the institution of science.

There are widespread calls for increased demographic diversity in science, often linked to the epistemic claim that including more perspectives will improve the quality of the knowledge produced. By distinguishing between demographic and epistemic diversity, we show that this is only true some of the time. There are cases where increasing demographic diversity will not bring about the necessary epistemic diversity and cases where failing to exclude some voices reduces the quality of the scientific debate. We seek to resolve these tensions with an analysis that turns on the way the experience-based expertise of non-scientists can be absorbed into mainstream science. Mostly it has to be done via what we call 'virtual diversity', in which scientists take responsibility for acquiring interactional expertise in the non-scientific expertise-based domains which they consider provide knowledge valuable to the science. We argue that virtual diversity represents the only feasible option in most scenarios, with cases where demographic diversity or full cultural mergers provide the solution being the exception rather than the rule. This analysis is an exercise in the sociology of knowledge, which is considered as being continuous with philosophy. The paper is prescriptive as well as descriptive, and the moral, cultural, political, and educational implications of the argument are drawn out. A main conclusion is that the acquisition of virtual diversity should be a new norm for science, allowing the voices of experienced non-scientist citizens to be heard but without eroding the institution of science, which continues to be a vital foundation of truth in democracy.

An infrastructural account of scientific objectivity for legal contexts and bloodstain pattern analysis.

In the United States, scientific knowledge is brought before the courts by way of testimony - the testimony of scientific experts. We argue that this expertise is best understood first as related to the quality of the underlying science and then in terms of who delivers it. Bloodstain pattern analysis (BPA), a contemporary forensic science, serves as the vaulting point for our exploration of objectivity as a metric for the quality of a science in judicial contexts. We argue that BPA fails to meet the minimal standard set by Helen Longino's social-procedural account of objectivity (1990, 2002). In light of some pressing issues for social-procedural accounts, we offer an infrastructural account of objectivity. This account offers what amounts to a friendly amendment to Longino's account and adds to the ways in which we might analyze social-procedural objectivity. Finally, we address an issue that is pressing in the legal context: given that scientific knowledge is delivered by individuals, not communities, at least in U.S. courts, we (may) need a way to evaluate individual scientific and epistemic agents. We suggest a means for making this evaluation that is derived from our infrastructural account of objectivity.

Open Science for private Interests? How the Logic of Open Science Contributes to the Commercialization of Research.

Financial conflicts of interest, several cases of scientific fraud, and research limitations from strong intellectual property laws have all led to questioning the epistemic and social justice appropriateness of industry-funded research. At first sight, the ideal of Open Science, which promotes transparency, sharing, collaboration, and accountability, seems to target precisely the type of limitations uncovered in commercially-driven research. The Open Science movement, however, has primarily focused on publicly funded research, has actively encouraged liaisons with the private sector, and has also created new strategies for commercializing science. As a consequence, I argue that Open Science ends up contributing to the commercialization of science, instead of overcoming its limitations. I use the examples of research publications and citizen science to illustrate this point. Accordingly, the asymmetry between private and public science, present in the current plea to open science, ends up compromising the values of transparency, democracy, and accountability.