Model of strategy control for delayed panic spread in emergencies.

In emergencies similar to virus spreading in an epidemic model, panic can spread in groups, which brings serious bad effects to society. To explore the transmission mechanism and decision-making behavior of panic, a government strategy was proposed in this paper to control the spread of panic. First, based on the SEIR epidemiological model, considering the delay effect between susceptible and exposed individuals and taking the infection rate of panic as a time-varying variable, a SEIR delayed panic spread model was established and the basic regeneration number of the proposed model was calculated. Second, the control strategy was expressed as a state delayed feedback and solved using the exact linearization method of nonlinear control system; the control law for the system was determined, and its stability was proven. The aim was to eradicate panic from the group so that the recovered group tracks the whole group asymptotically. Finally, we simulated the proposed strategy of controlling the spread of panic to illustrate our theoretical results.

Research on panic spread and decision behaviour in a delayed SEIR evolutionary game model under an emergency.

Taking major emergencies as the research background, the transmission mechanism for panic spread and the decision behaviour of the opinion field are explored in this paper. By using evolutionary game theory to explore the game relationship between the official opinion field and the public opinion field and by considering the existence of strategy dependency in the same game group, the dependence coefficient is introduced to improve replicator dynamics. The dynamic delayed SEIR evolutionary game model is built by combining the epidemic model with the delay effect within the group, and the stability of the proposed model is analysed. The research results show that the strategy dependency among the same game group has positive and negative effects on the evolution process. The evolution of the dynamic delayed panic SEIR evolutionary game spread model under the effect of a positive effect is simulated. The results suggest that the official opinion field and the public opinion field should actively deal with emergencies, formulate effective control strategies to make the panic within the group disappear, and provide theoretical guidance for the relevant government to formulate plans.

Research on false information clarification mechanism among government, opinion leaders, and Internet users - Based on differential game theory.

This article considers the government, opinion leaders, and Internet users to be a system for correcting false information, and it considers the problem of correcting false information that arises in the aftermath of major emergencies. We use optimal control theory and differential game theory to construct differential game models of decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, and subsidized decision-making. The solutions to these models and their numerical simulations show that the government, opinion leaders, and Internet users exercise cost-subsidized decision-making instead of decentralized decision-making. The equilibrium strategies, local optimal benefits, and overall optimal benefits of the system achieve Pareto improvement. Given the goal of maximizing the benefits to the system under centralized decision-making, the equilibrium results are Pareto-optimal. The research here provides a theoretical basis for dealing with the mechanism of correcting false information arising from major emergencies, and our conclusions provide methodological support for the government to effectively deal with such scenarios.

Optimal Control of False Information Clarification System under Major Emergencies Based on Differential Game Theory.

To further study the issue of false information classification on social platforms after major emergencies, this study regards opinion leaders and Internet users as a false-information classification system and constructs three differential game models of decentralized, centralized, and subsidized decision-making based on optimal control and differential game theory. Comparison analyses and numerical simulations of optimal equilibrium strategies and the optimal benefit between opinion leaders and Internet users, the optimal trajectory and the steady-state value of the total volume of real information, and the optimal benefit of the false information clarification system are carried out. It is found that under centralized decision-making, equilibrium strategy and total benefit of opinion leaders and Internet users, system total benefit, and total volume of real information can achieve Pareto optimality. Although subsidized decision-making fails to achieve Pareto optimality, with opinion leaders providing cost subsidies for Internet users, it is possible to reach relative Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision-making.