Cultural relativity in perceiving emotion from vocalizations.

A central question in the study of human behavior is whether certain emotions, such as anger, fear, and sadness, are recognized in nonverbal cues across cultures. We predicted and found that in a concept-free experimental task, participants from an isolated cultural context (the Himba ethnic group from northwestern Namibia) did not freely label Western vocalizations with expected emotion terms. Responses indicate that Himba participants perceived more basic affective properties of valence (positivity or negativity) and to some extent arousal (high or low activation). In a second, concept-embedded task, we manipulated whether the target and foil on a given trial matched in both valence and arousal, neither valence nor arousal, valence only, or arousal only. Himba participants achieved above-chance accuracy only when foils differed from targets in valence only. Our results indicate that the voice can reliably convey affective meaning across cultures, but that perceptions of emotion from the voice are culturally variable.

Face and context integration in emotion inference is limited and variable across categories and individuals.

The ability to make nuanced inferences about other people's emotional states is central to social functioning. While emotion inferences can be sensitive to both facial movements and the situational context that they occur in, relatively little is understood about when these two sources of information are integrated across emotion categories and individuals. In a series of studies, we use one archival and five empirical datasets to demonstrate that people could be integrating, but that emotion inferences are just as well (and sometimes better) captured by knowledge of the situation alone, while isolated facial cues are insufficient. Further, people integrate facial cues more for categories for which they most frequently encounter facial expressions in everyday life (e.g., happiness). People are also moderately stable over time in their reliance on situational cues and integration of cues and those who reliably utilize situation cues more also have better situated emotion knowledge. These findings underscore the importance of studying variability in reliance on and integration of cues.

What We Can Learn About Emotion by Talking With the Hadza.

Emotions are often thought of as internal mental states centering on individuals' subjective feelings and evaluations. This understanding is consistent with studies of emotion narratives, or the descriptions people give for experienced events that they regard as emotions. Yet these studies, and contemporary psychology more generally, often rely on observations of educated Europeans and European Americans, constraining psychological theory and methods. In this article, we present observations from an inductive, qualitative analysis of interviews conducted with the Hadza, a community of small-scale hunter-gatherers in Tanzania, and juxtapose them with a set of interviews conducted with Americans from North Carolina. Although North Carolina event descriptions largely conformed to the assumptions of eurocentric psychological theory, Hadza descriptions foregrounded action and bodily sensations, the physical environment, immediate needs, and the experiences of social others. These observations suggest that subjective feelings and internal mental states may not be the organizing principle of emotion the world around. Qualitative analysis of emotion narratives from outside of a U.S. (and western) cultural context has the potential to uncover additional diversity in meaning-making, offering a descriptive foundation on which to build a more robust and inclusive science of emotion.

Emotional Granularity is Associated with Daily Experiential Diversity.

Emotional granularity is the ability to create differentiated and nuanced emotional experiences and is associated with positive health outcomes. Individual differences in granularity are hypothesized to reflect differences in emotion concepts, which are informed by prior experience and impact current and future experience. Greater variation in experience, then, should be related to the rich and diverse emotion concepts that support higher granularity. Using natural language processing methods, we analyzed descriptions of everyday events to estimate the diversity of contexts and activities encountered by participants. Across three studies varying in language (English, Dutch) and modality (written, spoken), we found that participants who referred to a more varied and balanced set of contexts and activities reported more differentiated and nuanced negative emotions. Experiential diversity was not consistently associated with granularity for positive emotions. We discuss the contents of daily life as a potential source and outcome of individual differences in emotion. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42761-023-00185-2.

Overperception of moral outrage in online social networks inflates beliefs about intergroup hostility.

As individuals and political leaders increasingly interact in online social networks, it is important to understand the dynamics of emotion perception online. Here, we propose that social media users overperceive levels of moral outrage felt by individuals and groups, inflating beliefs about intergroup hostility. Using a Twitter field survey, we measured authors' moral outrage in real time and compared authors' reports to observers' judgements of the authors' moral outrage. We find that observers systematically overperceive moral outrage in authors, inferring more intense moral outrage experiences from messages than the authors of those messages actually reported. This effect was stronger in participants who spent more time on social media to learn about politics. Preregistered confirmatory behavioural experiments found that overperception of individuals' moral outrage causes overperception of collective moral outrage and inflates beliefs about hostile communication norms, group affective polarization and ideological extremity. Together, these results highlight how individual-level overperceptions of online moral outrage produce collective overperceptions that have the potential to warp our social knowledge of moral and political attitudes.

Erratum: Publisher Correction: Assessing the Power of Words to Facilitate Emotion Category Learning.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1007/s42761-021-00084-4.].

Assessing the Power of Words to Facilitate Emotion Category Learning.

Previous research suggests that labels shape the categorization of emotional stimuli such as facial configurations, yet the strongest evidence of labels' influence on category learning comes from work on object categories. In particular, Lupyan et al. (Psychol Sci 18(12):1077-1083, 2007) found that novel categories of aliens were learned faster by participants provided with nonsense labels during feedback. We summarize a series of five studies in which we examined whether this word-enhancement effect on learning would extend to novel categories of emotion. These studies were conceptual replications of the paradigm used by Lupyan et al. (Psychol Sci 18(12):1077-1083, 2007) designed so that participants would associate novel expressive behaviors with situated experiences. We hypothesized that participants would learn to categorize exemplars of novel emotion categories over the duration of the task, and that categorization would be facilitated for participants who were presented with category labels during learning. We simultaneously analyzed data from all five studies in an integrative data analysis, allowing us to test the effects of learning over time and label condition with increased statistical power. Across all five studies, we found that, while participant performance did improve over time, in no case was it facilitated by including emotion labels at feedback. These results join others in suggesting that the effect of labels on emotion categorization may be more context-dependent than previously supposed-varying by the type of category learning task as well as the specific categories being learned and their relationship to previously acquired knowledge-such that there may be multiple pathways for emotion category learning. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42761-021-00084-4.

Language Is a Unique Context for Emotion Perception.

Access to words used to label emotion concepts (e.g., "disgust") facilitates perceptions of facial muscle movements as instances of specific emotions (see Lindquist & Gendron, 2013). However, it remains unclear whether the effect of language on emotion perception is unique or whether it is driven by language's tendency to evoke situational context. In two studies, we used a priming and perceptual matching task to test the hypothesis that the effect of language on emotion perception is unique to that of situational context. We found that participants were more accurate to perceptually match facial portrayals of emotion after being primed with emotion labels as compared to situational context or control stimuli. These findings add to growing evidence that language serves as context for emotion perception and demonstrates for the first time that the effect of language on emotion perception is not merely a consequence of evoked situational context.

Introducing a Face Sort Paradigm to Evaluate Age Differences in Emotion Perception.

OBJECTIVES: Previous research has uncovered age-related differences in emotion perception. To date, studies have relied heavily on forced-choice methods that stipulate possible responses. These constrained methods limit discovery of variation in emotion perception, which may be due to subtle differences in underlying concepts for emotion. METHOD: We employed a face sort paradigm in which young (N = 42) and older adult (N = 43) participants were given 120 photographs portraying six target emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and neutral) and were instructed to create and label piles, such that individuals in each pile were feeling the same way. RESULTS: There were no age differences in number of piles created, nor in how well labels mapped onto the target emotion categories. However, older adults demonstrated lower consistency in sorting, such that fewer photographs in a given pile belonged to the same target emotion category. At the same time, older adults labeled piles using emotion words that were acquired later in development, and thus are considered more semantically complex. DISCUSSION: These findings partially support the hypothesis that older adults' concepts for emotions and emotional expressions are more complex than those of young adults, demonstrate the utility of incorporating less constrained experimental methods into the investigation of age-related differences in emotion perception, and are consistent with existing evidence of increased cognitive and emotional complexity in adulthood.

Professional actors demonstrate variability, not stereotypical expressions, when portraying emotional states in photographs.

It is long hypothesized that there is a reliable, specific mapping between certain emotional states and the facial movements that express those states. This hypothesis is often tested by asking untrained participants to pose the facial movements they believe they use to express emotions during generic scenarios. Here, we test this hypothesis using, as stimuli, photographs of facial configurations posed by professional actors in response to contextually-rich scenarios. The scenarios portrayed in the photographs were rated by a convenience sample of participants for the extent to which they evoked an instance of 13 emotion categories, and actors' facial poses were coded for their specific movements. Both unsupervised and supervised machine learning find that in these photographs, the actors portrayed emotional states with variable facial configurations; instances of only three emotion categories (fear, happiness, and surprise) were portrayed with moderate reliability and specificity. The photographs were separately rated by another sample of participants for the extent to which they portrayed an instance of the 13 emotion categories; they were rated when presented alone and when presented with their associated scenarios, revealing that emotion inferences by participants also vary in a context-sensitive manner. Together, these findings suggest that facial movements and perceptions of emotion vary by situation and transcend stereotypes of emotional expressions. Future research may build on these findings by incorporating dynamic stimuli rather than photographs and studying a broader range of cultural contexts.

Emotion Perception in Hadza Hunter-Gatherers.

It has long been claimed that certain configurations of facial movements are universally recognized as emotional expressions because they evolved to signal emotional information in situations that posed fitness challenges for our hunting and gathering hominin ancestors. Experiments from the last decade have called this particular evolutionary hypothesis into doubt by studying emotion perception in a wider sample of small-scale societies with discovery-based research methods. We replicate these newer findings in the Hadza of Northern Tanzania; the Hadza are semi-nomadic hunters and gatherers who live in tight-knit social units and collect wild foods for a large portion of their diet, making them a particularly relevant population for testing evolutionary hypotheses about emotion. Across two studies, we found little evidence of universal emotion perception. Rather, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that people infer emotional meaning in facial movements using emotion knowledge embrained by cultural learning.

Context facilitates performance on a classic cross-cultural emotion perception task.

The majority of studies designed to assess cross-cultural emotion perception use a choice-from-array task in which participants are presented with brief emotion stories and asked to choose between target and foil cues. This task has been widely criticized, evoking a lively and prolonged debate about whether it inadvertently helps participants to perform better than they otherwise would, resulting in the appearance of universality. In 3 studies, we provide a strong test of the hypothesis that the classic choice-from-array task constitutes a potent source of context that shapes performance. Participants from a remote small-scale (the Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania) and 2 urban industrialized (China and the United States) cultural samples selected target vocalizations that were contrived for 6 non-English, nonuniversal emotion categories at levels significantly above chance. In studies of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise, above chance performance is interpreted as evidence of universality. These studies support the hypothesis that choice-from-array tasks encourage evidence for cross-cultural emotion perception. We discuss these findings with reference to the history of cross-cultural emotion perception studies, and suggest several processes that may, together, give rise to the appearance of universal emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Language as context for the perception of emotion.

In the blink of an eye, people can easily see emotion in another person's face. This fact leads many to assume that emotion perception is given and proceeds independently of conceptual processes such as language. In this paper we suggest otherwise and offer the hypothesis that language functions as a context in emotion perception. We review a variety of evidence consistent with the language-as-context view and then discuss how a linguistically relative approach to emotion perception allows for intriguing and generative questions about the extent to which language shapes the sensory processing involved in seeing emotion in another person's face.

Universality Reconsidered: Diversity in Making Meaning of Facial Expressions.

It has long been claimed that certain facial movements are universally perceived as emotional expressions. The critical tests of this universality thesis were conducted between 1969 and 1975 in small-scale societies in the Pacific using confirmation-based research methods. New studies conducted since 2008 have examined a wider sample of small-scale societies, including on the African and South American continents. They used more discovery-based research methods, providing an important opportunity for reevaluating the universality thesis. These new studies reveal diversity, rather than uniformity, in how perceivers make sense of facial movements, calling the universality thesis into doubt. Instead, they support a perceiver-constructed account of emotion perception that is consistent with the broader literature on perception.

Emotion words: Adding face value.

Despite a growing number of studies suggesting that emotion words affect perceptual judgments of emotional stimuli, little is known about how emotion words affect perceptual memory for emotional faces. In Experiments 1 and 2 we tested how emotion words (compared with control words) affected participants' abilities to select a target emotional face from among distractor faces. Participants were generally more likely to false alarm to distractor emotional faces when primed with an emotion word congruent with the face (compared with a control word). Moreover, participants showed both decreased sensitivity (d') to discriminate between target and distractor faces, as well as altered response biases (c; more likely to answer "yes") when primed with an emotion word (compared with a control word). In Experiment 3 we showed that emotion words had more of an effect on perceptual memory judgments when the structural information in the target face was limited, as well as when participants were only able to categorize the face with a partially congruent emotion word. The overall results are consistent with the idea that emotion words affect the encoding of emotional faces in perceptual memory. (PsycINFO Database Record

Revisiting diversity: cultural variation reveals the constructed nature of emotion perception.

The extent of cultural variation in emotion perception has long been assumed to be bounded by underlying universality. A growing body of research reveals, however, that evidence of universality in emotion perception is method-bound. Without the assumption of underlying universality, new lines of inquiry become relevant. Accumulating evidence suggests that cultures vary in what cues are relevant to perceptions of emotion. Further, cultural groups vary in their spontaneous inferences; mental state inference does not appear to be the only, or even most routine, mode of perception across cultures. Finally, setting universality assumptions aside requires innovation in the theory and measurement of culture. Recent studies reveal the promise of refinements in psychological approaches to culture. Together, the available evidence is consistent with a view of emotion perceptions as actively constructed by perceivers to fit the social and physical constraints of their cultural worlds.

Bio-behavioral synchrony promotes the development of conceptualized emotions.

As adults, we have structured conceptual representations of our emotions that help us to make sense of and regulate our ongoing affective experience. The ability to use emotion concepts is critical to make predictions about the world and choose appropriate action, such as 'I am afraid, and going to run away' or 'I am hungry and going to eat'. Thus, emotion concepts have an important role in helping us maintain our ongoing physiological balance, or allostasis. We will suggest here that infants can learn emotion concepts for the purpose of allostasis regulation, and that conceptualization is key component in emotional development. Moreover, we will suggest that social dyads facilitate concept learning because of a robust evolutionary feature seen in newborns of social species: they cannot survive alone and depend on conspecifics for allostasis regulation. Such social dependency creates a robust driving force for social learning of emotion concepts, and makes the social dyad, which is designed to regulate the infant's allostasis, an optimal medium for concept learning. In line with that, we will review evidence showing that the neural reference space for emotion overlaps with neural circuits that support allostasis (striatum, amygdala, and hypothalamus) and conceptualization (medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex), and that their developmental trajectories are interrelated, and depend on synchronous social care.

Mixed emotions in the predictive brain.

Understanding complex or mixed emotions first requires an exploration of the human nervous system underlying emotions, and indeed all experience. We review current research in neuroscience, which describes the brain as a predictive, internal model of the world that flexibly combines features from past experience to construct emotions. We argue that "mixed emotions" result when these features of past experience correspond to multiple emotion categories. Integrating event perception and cognitive linguistic theories, we propose that "mixed emotions" are perceived as an episode of distinct, linked emotional events due to attentional shifts which update the predicted model of experience. These proposed mechanisms have profound implications for the study of emotion; we conclude by suggesting methodological improvements for future research.