Airport exit and entry screening for Ebola--August-November 10, 2014.

In response to the largest recognized Ebola virus disease epidemic now occurring in West Africa, the governments of affected countries, CDC, the World Health Organization (WHO), and other international organizations have collaborated to implement strategies to control spread of the virus. One strategy recommended by WHO calls for countries with Ebola transmission to screen all persons exiting the country for "unexplained febrile illness consistent with potential Ebola infection." Exit screening at points of departure is intended to reduce the likelihood of international spread of the virus. To initiate this strategy, CDC, WHO, and other global partners were invited by the ministries of health of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to assist them in developing and implementing exit screening procedures. Since the program began in August 2014, an estimated 80,000 travelers, of whom approximately 12,000 were en route to the United States, have departed by air from the three countries with Ebola transmission. Procedures were implemented to deny boarding to ill travelers and persons who reported a high risk for exposure to Ebola; no international air traveler from these countries has been reported as symptomatic with Ebola during travel since these procedures were implemented.

An overview of adverse events reported by participants in CDC's anthrax vaccine and antimicrobial availability program.

PURPOSE: The CDC's Anthrax Vaccine and Antibiotic Availability Program was implemented under an Investigational New Drug (IND) application to provide additional post-exposure prophylaxis for individuals potentially exposed to Bacillus anthracis in the fall of 2001. Participants were provided with two options: (1) 40 additional days of antimicrobial prophylaxis (i.e., ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, or amoxicillin); or (2) 40 additional days of antimicrobial prophylaxis plus three doses of anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA). METHODS: Participants were monitored for adverse events (AEs). Participants were asked to complete 2-week AE diaries for 6 weeks post-enrollment, and approximately 2 months after enrollment, active surveillance was conducted through telephone interviews with 1113 (64%) participants. RESULTS: A total of 1727 of approximately 10 000 previously prophylaxed persons enrolled to receive 40 additional days of antibiotics. Of these, 199 opted at enrollment to receive three doses of AVA in addition to the additional 40 days of antibiotic. Overall, 28% of participants reported at least one AE on their diaries. Results varied by surveillance mechanism, the diary data indicated differences in the proportion reporting AEs between participants receiving antibiotic only and participants receiving antibiotic and AVA. However, during the active 2-month telephone follow-up, the rates of AEs reported for both the antibiotic only and antibiotic plus AVA treatment regimens were similar. Additionally, ciprofloxacin and doxycycline had similar AE profiles, with only rigors reported significantly more often among ciprofloxacin recipients. CONCLUSIONS: Overall, the rates of AEs experienced by all participants were acceptable given the seriousness of potential B. anthracis exposure.