ABSTRACT
Objective To explore the tripartite dynamic game strategy involving the interest relationship between government,hospital and patients in the tiered diagnosis and treatment system,which is conducive to improving the theoretical paradigm and policy logic of tiered diagnosis and treatment system.Methods It built a tripartite evolu-tionary game model to analyse their strategy choices and evolutionary paths,and to solve for stable strategies in the three-way evolutionary game.MATLAB R2018b was used to simulate the model,and the evolution paths and the in-fluence of different strategy choices on the promotion of the tiered diagnosis and treatment system were further ana-lyzed.Results Government,hospitals,and patients will influence each other and eventually evolve to the ideal stable state(1,1,1).Increasing government subsidies will accelerate the convergence of the initial participation probability of hospitals and patients to 1,while excessive subsidies will gradually cause the government to deviate from the strategy of encouraging.Conclusions The government should restrict subsidies for high-quality medical resources to a reasonable range,attract hospital experts,and strengthen regulations.It is important for large hospitals and basic medical institutions to realize the free flow and rational distribution of the resources available to doctors.Patients need to change their inherent concept of medical treatment to achieve orderly medical treatment.
ABSTRACT
Objective:To explore the driving mechanisms of doctors′ collaborative willingness and behavior in the tiered diagnosis and treatment system, in order to provide reference for promoting the construction of the tiered diagnosis and treatment system.Methods:Based on the harmonious management theory, a theoretical framework for the driving mechanisms of doctors′ collaborative behavior in the tiered diagnosis and treatment system was developed. Through random sampling, a questionnaire survey was conducted among doctors from 40 medical institutions in five prefecture-level cities in Zhejiang province between April and May 2022. The t-test, variance analysis, and non-parametric tests were employed to analyze the differences in collaborative willingness and behavior among doctors based on various demographic characteristics. The structural equation model and stratified linear regression were used to assess the impact of collaborative factors (professional environment and work expectations) and harmonious factors (perception of policy support and perception of management mechanism) on doctors′ collaboration willingness and behavior. Results:A total of 1 959 doctors participated in the survey. Doctors′ collaborative behavior scored 2.13±1.12, indicating a slightly below-average level, whereas their willingness to collaborate scored 3.88±0.79, falling between neutral and somewhat willing. Significant differences in collaborative behavior scores were observed based on the medical institution′s ranking, age, years of experience, monthly average income, and professional titles ( P<0.05). Both collaborative and harmonious factors directly influenced the doctors′ willingness to collaborate, with standardized path coefficients of 0.428 and 0.139, respectively. Similarly, these factors directly impacted their collaborative behavior, with standardized path coefficients of 0.104 and 0.366. The perceptions of policy support and management mechanisms demonstrated a significant positive moderating effect on the relationship between doctors′ collaborative willingness and behavior, with effect values of 0.047 and 0.043 respectively ( P<0.05). Conclusions:The collaborative and harmonious elements serve as positive drivers for collaboration among doctors in the tiered diagnosis and treatment system at both the cognitive and behavioral levels. Enhancing and optimizing policy support and management mechanisms can facilitate the transition from intention to actual collaborative actions among doctors from different levels of medical institutions.