Coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine use: Options and potential consequences.

Due to the very low, but nonzero, paralysis risks associated with the use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), eradicating poliomyelitis requires ending all OPV use globally. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated cessation of Sabin type 2 OPV (OPV2 cessation) in 2016, except for emergency outbreak response. However, as of early 2023, plans for cessation of bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 OPV) remain undefined, and OPV2 use for outbreak response continues due to ongoing transmission of type 2 polioviruses and reported type 2 cases. Recent development and use of a genetically stabilized novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) leads to additional potential vaccine options and increasing complexity in strategies for the polio endgame. Prior applications of integrated global risk, economic, and poliovirus transmission modeling consistent with GPEI strategic plans that preceded OPV2 cessation explored OPV cessation dynamics and the evaluation of options to support globally coordinated risk management efforts. The 2022-2026 GPEI strategic plan highlighted the need for early bOPV cessation planning. We review the published modeling and explore bOPV cessation immunization options as of 2022, assuming that the GPEI partners will not support restart of the use of any OPV type in routine immunization after a globally coordinated cessation of such use. We model the potential consequences of globally coordinating bOPV cessation in 2027, as anticipated in the 2022-2026 GPEI strategic plan. We do not find any options for bOPV cessation likely to succeed without a strategy of bOPV intensification to increase population immunity prior to cessation.

Worst-case scenarios: Modeling uncontrolled type 2 polio transmission.

In May 2016, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated the cessation of all use of type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2), except for emergency outbreak response. Since then, paralytic polio cases caused by type 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses now exceed 3,000 cases reported by 39 countries. In 2022 (as of April 25, 2023), 20 countries reported detection of cases and nine other countries reported environmental surveillance detection, but no reported cases. Recent development of a genetically modified novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) may help curb the generation of neurovirulent vaccine-derived strains; its use since 2021 under Emergency Use Listing is limited to outbreak response activities. Prior modeling studies showed that the expected trajectory for global type 2 viruses does not appear headed toward eradication, even with the best possible properties of nOPV2 assuming current outbreak response performance. Continued persistence of type 2 poliovirus transmission exposes the world to the risks of potentially high-consequence events such as the importation of virus into high-transmission areas of India or Bangladesh. Building on prior polio endgame modeling and assuming current national and GPEI outbreak response performance, we show no probability of successfully eradicating type 2 polioviruses in the near term regardless of vaccine choice. We also demonstrate the possible worst-case scenarios could result in rapid expansion of paralytic cases and preclude the goal of permanently ending all cases of poliomyelitis in the foreseeable future. Avoiding such catastrophic scenarios will depend on the development of strategies that raise population immunity to type 2 polioviruses.

First Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus in the United States.

An outbreak of novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) that began in Wuhan, China, has spread rapidly, with cases now confirmed in multiple countries. We report the first case of 2019-nCoV infection confirmed in the United States and describe the identification, diagnosis, clinical course, and management of the case, including the patient's initial mild symptoms at presentation with progression to pneumonia on day 9 of illness. This case highlights the importance of close coordination between clinicians and public health authorities at the local, state, and federal levels, as well as the need for rapid dissemination of clinical information related to the care of patients with this emerging infection.

Updated Characterization of Poliovirus Transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the Impacts of Different Outbreak Response Vaccine Options.

BACKGROUND: Pakistan and Afghanistan remain the only reservoirs of wild poliovirus transmission. Prior modeling suggested that before the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, plans to stop the transmission of serotype 1 wild poliovirus (WPV1) and persistent serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) did not appear on track to succeed. METHODS: We updated an existing poliovirus transmission and Sabin-strain oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) evolution model for Pakistan and Afghanistan to characterize the impacts of immunization disruptions and restrictions on human interactions (ie, population mixing) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. We also consider different options for responding to outbreaks and for preventive supplementary immunization activities (SIAs). RESULTS: The modeling suggests that with some resumption of activities in the fall of 2020 to respond to cVDPV2 outbreaks and full resumption on 1 January 2021 of all polio immunization activities to pre-COVID-19 levels, Pakistan and Afghanistan would remain off-track for stopping all transmission through 2023 without improvements in quality. CONCLUSIONS: Using trivalent OPV (tOPV) for SIAs instead of serotype 2 monovalent OPV offers substantial benefits for ending the transmission of both WPV1 and cVDPV2, because tOPV increases population immunity for both serotypes 1 and 2 while requiring fewer SIA rounds, when effectively delivered in transmission areas.

The seasonality of nonpolio enteroviruses in the United States: Patterns and drivers.

Nonpolio enteroviruses are diverse and common viruses that can circulate year-round but tend to peak in summer. Although most infections are asymptomatic, they can result in a wide range of neurological and other diseases. Many serotypes circulate every year, and different serotypes predominate in different years, but the drivers of their geographical and temporal dynamics are not understood. We use national enterovirus surveillance data collected by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention during 1983-2013, as well as demographic and climatic data for the same period, to study the patterns and drivers of the seasonality of these infections. We find that the seasonal pattern of enterovirus cases is spatially structured in the United States and similar to that observed for historical prevaccination poliomyelitis (1931-1954). We identify latitudinal gradients for the amplitude and the timing of the peak of cases, meaning that those are more regularly distributed all year-round in the south and have a more pronounced peak that arrives later toward the north. The peak is estimated to occur between July and September across the United States, and 1 month earlier than that for historical poliomyelitis. Using mixed-effects models, we find that climate, but not demography, is likely to drive the seasonal pattern of enterovirus cases and that the dew point temperature alone explains ∼30% of the variation in the intensity of transmission. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the epidemiology of enteroviruses, demonstrates important similarities in their circulation dynamics with polioviruses, and identifies potential drivers of their seasonality.

Global Transmission of Live Polioviruses: Updated Dynamic Modeling of the Polio Endgame.

Nearly 20 years after the year 2000 target for global wild poliovirus (WPV) eradication, live polioviruses continue to circulate with all three serotypes posing challenges for the polio endgame. We updated a global differential equation-based poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to include programmatic and epidemiological experience through January 2020. We used the model to explore the likely dynamics of poliovirus transmission for 2019-2023, which coincides with a new Global Polio Eradication Initiative Strategic Plan. The model stratifies the global population into 72 blocks, each containing 10 subpopulations of approximately 10.7 million people. Exported viruses go into subpopulations within the same block and within groups of blocks that represent large preferentially mixing geographical areas (e.g., continents). We assign representative World Bank income levels to the blocks along with polio immunization and transmission assumptions, which capture some of the heterogeneity across countries while still focusing on global poliovirus transmission dynamics. We also updated estimates of reintroduction risks using available evidence. The updated model characterizes transmission dynamics and resulting polio cases consistent with the evidence through 2019. Based on recent epidemiological experience and prospective immunization assumptions for the 2019-2023 Strategic Plan, the updated model does not show successful eradication of serotype 1 WPV by 2023 or successful cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine serotype 2-related viruses.

Updated Characterization of Post-OPV Cessation Risks: Lessons from 2019 Serotype 2 Outbreaks and Implications for the Probability of OPV Restart.

After the globally coordinated cessation of any serotype of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), some risks remain from undetected, existing homotypic OPV-related transmission and/or restarting transmission due to several possible reintroduction risks. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of serotype 2-containing OPV (OPV2) in 2016. Following OPV2 cessation, the GPEI and countries implemented activities to withdraw all the remaining trivalent OPV, which contains all three poliovirus serotypes (i.e., 1, 2, and 3), from the supply chain and replace it with bivalent OPV (containing only serotypes 1 and 3). However, as of early 2020, monovalent OPV2 use for outbreak response continues in many countries. In addition, outbreaks observed in 2019 demonstrated evidence of different types of risks than previously modeled. We briefly review the 2019 epidemiological experience with serotype 2 live poliovirus outbreaks and propose a new risk for unexpected OPV introduction for inclusion in global modeling of OPV cessation. Using an updated model of global poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution with and without consideration of this new risk, we explore the implications of the current global situation with respect to the likely need to restart preventive use of OPV2 in OPV-using countries. Simulation results without this new risk suggest OPV2 restart will likely need to occur (81% of 100 iterations) to manage the polio endgame based on the GPEI performance to date with existing vaccine tools, and with the new risk of unexpected OPV introduction the expected OPV2 restart probability increases to 89%. Contingency planning requires new OPV2 bulk production, including genetically stabilized OPV2 strains.

Modeling Poliovirus Transmission in Borno and Yobe, Northeast Nigeria.

Beginning in 2013, multiple local government areas (LGAs) in Borno and Yobe in northeast Nigeria and other parts of the Lake Chad basin experienced a violent insurgency that resulted in substantial numbers of isolated and displaced people. Northeast Nigeria represents the last known reservoir country of wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission in Africa, with detection of paralytic cases caused by serotype 1 WPV in 2016 in Borno and serotype 3 WPV in late 2012. Parts of Borno and Yobe are also problematic areas for transmission of serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses, and they continue to face challenges associated with conflict and inadequate health services in security-compromised areas that limit both immunization and surveillance activities. We model poliovirus transmission of all three serotypes for Borno and Yobe using a deterministic differential equation-based model that includes four subpopulations to account for limitations in access to immunization services and dynamic restrictions in population mixing. We find that accessibility issues and insufficient immunization allow for prolonged poliovirus transmission and potential undetected paralytic cases, although as of the end of 2019, including responsive program activities in the modeling suggest die out of indigenous serotypes 1 and 3 WPVs prior to 2020. Specifically, recent and current efforts to access isolated populations and provide oral poliovirus vaccine continue to reduce the risks of sustained and undetected transmission, although some uncertainty remains. Continued improvement in immunization and surveillance in the isolated subpopulations should minimize these risks. Stochastic modeling can build on this analysis to characterize the implications for undetected transmission and confidence about no circulation.

Updated Characterization of Outbreak Response Strategies for 2019-2029: Impacts of Using a Novel Type 2 Oral Poliovirus Vaccine Strain.

Delays in achieving the global eradication of wild poliovirus transmission continue to postpone subsequent cessation of all oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use. Countries must stop OPV use to end all cases of poliomyelitis, including vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) and cases caused by vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of all type 2 OPV (OPV2) use in routine immunization in 2016 but did not successfully end the transmission of type 2 VDPVs (VDPV2s), and consequently continues to use type 2 OPV (OPV2) for outbreak response activities. Using an updated global poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model, we characterize outbreak response options for 2019-2029 related to responding to VDPV2 outbreaks with a genetically stabilized novel OPV (nOPV2) strain or with the currently licensed monovalent OPV2 (mOPV2). Given uncertainties about the properties of nOPV2, we model different assumptions that appear consistent with the evidence on nOPV2 to date. Using nOPV2 to respond to detected cases may reduce the expected VDPV and VAPP cases and the risk of needing to restart OPV2 use in routine immunization compared to mOPV2 use for outbreak response. The actual properties, availability, and use of nOPV2 will determine its effects on type 2 poliovirus transmission in populations. Even with optimal nOPV2 performance, countries and the GPEI would still likely need to restart OPV2 use in routine immunization in OPV-using countries if operational improvements in outbreak response to stop the transmission of cVDPV2s are not implemented effectively.

Immunogenicity of full and fractional dose of inactivated poliovirus vaccine for use in routine immunisation and outbreak response: an open-label, randomised controlled trial.

BACKGROUND: Intradermal administration of fractional inactivated poliovirus vaccine (fIPV) is a dose-sparing alternative to the intramuscular full dose. We aimed to compare the immunogenicity of two fIPV doses versus one IPV dose for routine immunisation, and also assessed the immunogenicity of an fIPV booster dose for an outbreak response. METHODS: We did an open-label, randomised, controlled, inequality, non-inferiority trial in two clinics in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Healthy infants were randomly assigned at 6 weeks to one of four groups: group A received IPV at age 14 weeks and IPV booster at age 22 weeks; group B received IPV at age 14 weeks and fIPV booster at age 22 weeks; group C received IPV at age 6 weeks and fIPV booster at age 22 weeks; and group D received fIPV at 6 weeks and 14 weeks and fIPV booster at age 22 weeks. IPV was administered by needle-syringe as an intramuscular full dose (0·5 mL), and fIPV was administered intradermally (0·1 mL of the IPV formulation was administered using the 0·1 mL HelmJect auto-disable syringe with a Helms intradermal adapter). Both IPV and fIPV were administered on the outer, upper right thigh of infants. The primary outcome was vaccine response to poliovirus types 1, 2, and 3 at age 22 weeks (routine immunisation) and age 26 weeks (outbreak response). Vaccine response was defined as seroconversion from seronegative (<1:8) at baseline to seropositive (≥1:8) or four-fold increase in reciprocal antibody titres adjusted for maternal antibody decay and was assessed in the modified intention-to-treat population (infants who received polio vaccines per group assignment and polio antibody titre results to serotypes 1, 2, and 3 at 6, 22, 23, and 26 weeks of age). The non-inferiority margin was 12·5%. This trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT02847026. FINDINGS: Between Sept 1, 2016 and May 2, 2017, 1076 participants were randomly assigned and included in the modified intention-to-treat analysis: 271 in Group A, 267 in group B, 268 in group C, and 270 in group D. Vaccine response at 22 weeks to two doses of fIPV (group D) was significantly higher (p<0·0001) than to one dose of IPV (groups A and B) for all three poliovirus serotypes: the type 1 response comprised 212 (79% [95% CI 73-83]) versus 305 (57% [53-61]) participants, the type 2 response comprised 173 (64% [58-70]) versus 249 (46% [42-51]) participants, and the type 3 response comprised 196 (73% [67-78]) versus 196 (36% [33-41]) participants. At 26 weeks, the fIPV booster was non-inferior to IPV (group B vs group A) for serotype 1 (-1·12% [90% CI -2·18 to -0·06]), serotype 2 (0·40%, [-2·22 to 1·42]), and serotype 3 (1·51% [-3·23 to -0·21]). Of 129 adverse events, 21 were classified as serious including one death; none were attributed to IPV or fIPV. INTERPRETATION: fIPV appears to be an effective dose-sparing strategy for routine immunisation and outbreak responses. FUNDING: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Progress Toward Poliovirus Containment Implementation - Worldwide, 2019-2020.

Since 1988, when World Health Organization (WHO) Member States and partners launched the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, the number of wild poliovirus (WPV) cases has declined from 350,000 in 125 countries to 176 in only two countries in 2019 (1). The Global Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication (GCC) declared two of the three WPV types, type 2 (WPV2) and type 3 (WPV3), eradicated globally in 2015 and 2019, respectively (1). Wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) remains endemic in Afghanistan and Pakistan (1). Containment under strict biorisk management measures is vital to prevent reintroduction of eradicated polioviruses into communities from poliovirus facilities. In 2015, Member States committed to contain type 2 polioviruses (PV2) in poliovirus-essential facilities (PEFs) certified in accordance with a global standard (2). Member states agreed to report national PV2 inventories annually, destroy unneeded PV2 materials, and, if retaining PV2 materials, establish national authorities for containment (NACs) and a PEF auditing process. Since declaration of WPV3 eradication in October 2019, these activities are also required with WPV3 materials. Despite challenges faced during 2019-2020, including the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the global poliovirus containment program continues to work toward important milestones. To maintain progress, all WHO Member States are urged to adhere to the agreed containment resolutions, including officially establishing legally empowered NACs and submission of PEF Certificates of Participation.

Update on Vaccine-Derived Poliovirus Outbreaks - Worldwide, January 2018-June 2019.

Certification of global eradication of indigenous wild poliovirus type 2 occurred in 2015 and of type 3 in 2019. Since the launch of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 1988 and broad use of live, attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), the number of wild poliovirus cases has declined >99.99% (1). Genetically divergent vaccine-derived poliovirus* (VDPV) strains can emerge during vaccine use and spread in underimmunized populations, becoming circulating VDPV (cVDPV) strains, and resulting in outbreaks of paralytic poliomyelitis.† In April 2016, all oral polio vaccination switched from trivalent OPV (tOPV; containing vaccine virus types 1, 2, and 3) to bivalent OPV (bOPV; containing types 1 and 3) (2). Monovalent type 2 OPV (mOPV2) is used in response campaigns to control type 2 cVDPV (cVDPV2) outbreaks. This report presents data on cVDPV outbreaks detected during January 2018-June 2019 (as of September 30, 2019). Compared with January 2017-June 2018 (3), the number of reported cVDPV outbreaks more than tripled, from nine to 29; 25 (86%) of the outbreaks were caused by cVDPV2. The increase in the number of outbreaks in 2019 resulted from VDPV2 both inside and outside of mOPV2 response areas. GPEI is planning future use of a novel type 2 OPV, stabilized to decrease the likelihood of reversion to neurovirulence. However, all countries must maintain high population immunity to decrease the risk for cVDPV emergence. Cessation of all OPV use after certification of polio eradication will eliminate the risk for VDPV emergence.

Modeling Undetected Live Poliovirus Circulation After Apparent Interruption of Transmission: Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Since most poliovirus infections occur with no paralytic symptoms, the possibility of silent circulation complicates the confirmation of the end of poliovirus transmission. Based on empirical field experience and theoretical modeling results, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative identified three years without observing paralytic cases from wild polioviruses with good acute flaccid paralysis surveillance as an indication of sufficient confidence that poliovirus circulation stopped. The complexities of real populations and the imperfect nature of real surveillance systems subsequently demonstrated the importance of specific modeling for areas at high risk of undetected circulation, resulting in varying periods of time required to obtain the same level of confidence about no undetected circulation. Using a poliovirus transmission model that accounts for variability in transmissibility and neurovirulence for different poliovirus serotypes and characterizes country-specific factors (e.g., vaccination and surveillance activities, demographics) related to wild and vaccine-derived poliovirus transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan, we consider the probability of undetected poliovirus circulation for those countries once apparent die-out occurs (i.e., in the absence of any epidemiological signals). We find that gaps in poliovirus surveillance or reaching elimination with borderline sufficient population immunity could significantly increase the time to reach high confidence about interruption of live poliovirus transmission, such that the path taken to achieve and maintain poliovirus elimination matters. Pakistan and Afghanistan will need to sustain high-quality surveillance for polioviruses after apparent interruption of transmission and recognize that as efforts to identify cases or circulating live polioviruses decrease, the risks of undetected circulation increase and significantly delay the global polio endgame.

Immune Priming and Long-term Persistence of Memory B Cells After Inactivated Poliovirus Vaccine in Macaque Models: Support for at least 2 Doses.

Background: As a risk-mitigation strategy to minimize paralytic polio following withdrawal of Sabin type 2 from the oral poliovirus vaccine in April 2016, a single full dose or 2 fractional doses of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) are recommended. However, limited knowledge exists on long-term persistence of immune memory following 1- or 2-dose IPV schedules. Methods: We examined induction and maintenance of immune memory following single- vs 2-dose IPV schedules, either full-dose intramuscular or fractional-dose intradermal, in rhesus macaques. Humoral responses, bone marrow-homing antibody-secreting plasma cells, and blood-circulating/lymph node-homing memory B cells were examined longitudinally. Results: A single dose of IPV, either full or fractional, induced binding antibodies and memory B cells in all vaccinated macaques, despite failing to induce neutralizing antibodies (NT Abs) in many of them. However, these memory B cells declined rapidly, reaching below detection in the systemic circulation by 5 months; although a low frequency of memory B cells was detectable in draining lymph nodes of some, but not all, animals. By contrast, a 2-dose vaccination schedule, either full or fractional, efficiently induced NT Abs in all animals along with bone marrow-homing plasma cells and memory B cells. These memory B cells persisted in the systemic circulation for up to 16 months, the maximum duration tested after the second dose of vaccination. Conclusions: Two doses of IPV, regardless of whether fractional or full, are more effective than a single dose for inducing long-lasting memory B cells.

Progress in Vaccine-Preventable and Respiratory Infectious Diseases-First 10 Years of the CDC National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, 2006-2015.

The need for closer linkages between scientific and programmatic areas focused on addressing vaccine-preventable and acute respiratory infections led to establishment of the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. During its first 10 years (2006-2015), NCIRD worked with partners to improve preparedness and response to pandemic influenza and other emergent respiratory infections, provide an evidence base for addition of 7 newly recommended vaccines, and modernize vaccine distribution. Clinical tools were developed for improved conversations with parents, which helped sustain childhood immunization as a social norm. Coverage increased for vaccines to protect adolescents against pertussis, meningococcal meningitis, and human papillomavirus-associated cancers. NCIRD programs supported outbreak response for new respiratory pathogens and oversaw response of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. Other national public health institutes might also find closer linkages between epidemiology, laboratory, and immunization programs useful.

Increase in Acute Flaccid Myelitis - United States, 2018.

In August 2018, CDC noted an increased number of reports of patients having symptoms clinically compatible with acute flaccid myelitis (AFM), a rare condition characterized by rapid onset of flaccid weakness in one or more limbs and spinal cord gray matter lesions, compared with August 2017. Since 2014, CDC has conducted surveillance for AFM using a standardized case definition (1,2). An Epi-X* notice was issued on August 23, 2018, to increase clinician awareness and provide guidance for case reporting.

Modeling Poliovirus Transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan to Inform Vaccination Strategies in Undervaccinated Subpopulations.

Due to security, access, and programmatic challenges in areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, both countries continue to sustain indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission and threaten the success of global polio eradication and oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation. We fitted an existing differential-equation-based poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to Pakistan and Afghanistan using four subpopulations to characterize the well-vaccinated and undervaccinated subpopulations in each country. We explored retrospective and prospective scenarios for using inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in routine immunization or supplemental immunization activities (SIAs). The undervaccinated subpopulations sustain the circulation of serotype 1 WPV and serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus. We find a moderate impact of past IPV use on polio incidence and population immunity to transmission mainly due to (1) the boosting effect of IPV for individuals with preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection and (2) the effect of IPV-only on oropharyngeal transmission for individuals without preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection. Future IPV use may similarly yield moderate benefits, particularly if access to undervaccinated subpopulations dramatically improves. However, OPV provides a much greater impact on transmission and the incremental benefit of IPV in addition to OPV remains limited. This study suggests that despite the moderate effect of using IPV in SIAs, using OPV in SIAs remains the most effective means to stop transmission, while limited IPV resources should prioritize IPV use in routine immunization.

The Global Polio Laboratory Network as a Platform for the Viral Vaccine-Preventable and Emerging Diseases Laboratory Networks.

The Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) began building in the late 1980s on a 3-tiered structure of 146 laboratories with different and complementary technical and support capacities (poliovirus isolation, molecular strain characterization including sequencing, quality assurance, and research). The purpose of this network is to provide timely and accurate laboratory results to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. Deeply integrated with field case-based surveillance, it ultimately provides molecular epidemiological data from polioviruses used to inform programmatic and immunization activities. This network of global coverage requires substantial investments in laboratory infrastructure, equipment, supplies, reagents, quality assurance, staffing and training, often in resource-limited settings. The GPLN has not only developed country capacities, but it also serves as a model to other global laboratory networks for vaccine-preventable diseases that will endure after the polio eradication goal is achieved. Leveraging lessons learned during past 27 years, the authors discuss options for transitioning GPLN assets to support control of other viral vaccine-preventable, emerging, and reemerging diseases.

Guidance for Assessment of Poliovirus Vaccination Status and Vaccination of Children Who Have Received Poliovirus Vaccine Outside the United States.

In 1988, the World Health Assembly resolved to eradicate poliomyelitis (polio). Since then, wild poliovirus (WPV) cases have declined by >99.9%, from an estimated 350,000 cases of polio each year to 74 cases in two countries in 2015 (1). This decrease was achieved primarily through the use of trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV), which contains types 1, 2, and 3 live, attenuated polioviruses. Since 2000, the United States has exclusively used inactivated polio vaccine (IPV), which contains all three poliovirus types (2,3). In 2013, the World Health Organization (WHO) set a target of a polio-free world by 2018 (4). Of the three WPV types, type 2 was declared eradicated in September 2015. To remove the risk for infection with circulating type 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV), which can lead to paralysis similar to that caused by WPV, all OPV-using countries simultaneously switched in April 2016 from tOPV to bivalent OPV (bOPV), which contains only types 1 and 3 polioviruses (5). This report summarizes current Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommendations for poliovirus vaccination and provides CDC guidance, in the context of the switch from tOPV to bOPV, regarding assessment of vaccination status and vaccination of children who might have received poliovirus vaccine outside the United States, to ensure that children living in the United States (including immigrants and refugees) are protected against all three poliovirus types. This guidance is not new policy and does not change the recommendations of ACIP for poliovirus vaccination in the United States. Children living in the United States who might have received poliovirus vaccination outside the United States should meet ACIP recommendations for poliovirus vaccination, which require protection against all three poliovirus types by age-appropriate vaccination with IPV or tOPV. In the absence of vaccination records indicating receipt of these vaccines, only vaccination or revaccination in accordance with the age-appropriate U.S. IPV schedule is recommended. Serology to assess immunity for children with no or questionable documentation of poliovirus vaccination will no longer be an available option and therefore is no longer recommended, because of increasingly limited availability of antibody testing against type 2 poliovirus.