Early Fractional Ablative Laser for Skin Cancer Excision Scars: A Randomized Split-Scar Study.

BACKGROUND: Fractional ablative laser resurfacing has been shown to improve the final cosmetic appearance of surgical scars, but optimal timing is unknown. OBJECTIVE: To compare surgical scars treated with fractional carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) laser performed on Day 0 and Day 14. METHODS: Prospective, randomized, split-scar, physician-blinded study of 30 surgical scars on the limbs. Scars halves received fractional CO 2 laser on either Day 0 or Day 14. Scar assessment at 6 months evaluated patient preference, physician modified Manchester Scar Scale (MMSS) score, and quantitative scar analysis on histology (fractal dimension [F D ] and lacunarity [L] analysis). RESULTS: There was no significant difference in patient assessment (54% preferred Day 0 side, 46% preferred Day 14 side, p = .58) or physician assessment (mean MMSS 8.4 for Day 0 vs 8.7 for Day 14, p = .28). Fractal dimensions were similar for both interventions (mean 1.778 for Day 0 vs 1.781 for Day 14, p = .80). Lacunarity was similar for both interventions (mean 0.368 for Day 0 vs 0.345 for Day 14, p = .44). LIMITATIONS: Single-center study with wounds limited to limbs of skin Phototype I-II subjects; 4 of whom were lost to follow-up. CONCLUSION: Intraoperative CO 2 laser is noninferior to Day 14 laser resurfacing for surgical scar treatment.

Repetition effects in memory and truth assessments through the lens of transfer-appropriate processing.

The Transfer-appropriate Processing (TAP) framework has demonstrated enhanced recognition memory when processing operations engaged at encoding and at test match. Our research applied TAP to study the illusory truth effect (ITE). We investigated whether the match/mismatch of evaluative goals at encoding and at test affects the ITE. At encoding, participants saw target words (Experiments 1-3; or full trivia claims Experiments 4-5) and completed an evaluative goal: imagery task or vowel-counting. At test, participants saw target words embedded in trivia claims that were old or new and completed the same (matching) or different (mismatching) evaluative goal that they completed at encoding, before making truth or memory ratings. We found a typical TAP effect for memory judgements when people saw words at encoding, but no TAP effect when people saw claims at encoding. We also found an ITE when people saw claims at encoding, but no ITE when people saw words at encoding (no evidence of TAP moderating truth judgments). Together these results extend both the TAP and ITE literatures, suggesting boundary conditions for TAP and the conditions under which the ITE emerges.

Cross-examination may be more detrimental to repeated-event children than single-event children.

Cross-examination is detrimental to the consistency and accuracy of children's reports and a re-direct interview may rehabilitate accuracy. We compared the effects of cross-examination on reports provided by single-event and repeated-event children. Children participated in one or five magic shows. One week later they were interviewed in a supportive manner (Interview 1). Next, a different interviewer cross-examined half the children or asked the other children all questions again (Interview 2). Finally, the initial interviewer re-directed the children by re-asking questions in a supportive manner (Interview 3). When defined narrowly (the instance children were asked to describe), cross-examination was more detrimental to single-event children and the re-direct interview rehabilitated correct responses for all children. When defined broadly (experienced details), cross-examination was more detrimental to repeated-event children and the re-direct did not rehabilitate correct responses for repeated-event children. Therefore when performance was off the floor, cross-examination was more detrimental to repeated-event children. The changes that repeated-event children make under cross-examination are explained by cognitive factors and social influences Ost et al., [2016]. Recall, verbatim memory and remembered narratives. In G. Oxburgh (Ed.), Communication in investigative and legal contexts: Integrated approaches from forensic psychology, linguistics and law enforcement (pp. 39-54). Wiley Blackwell).

Harm to others reduces the sunk-cost effect.

The sunk-cost effect (SCE) is the tendency to continue investing in something that is not working out because of previous investments that cannot be recovered. In three experiments, we examine the SCE when continued investment violates the ethic of care by harming others. In Experiment 1, the SCE was smaller if the sunk-cost decision resulted in harmful consequences towards others (an interaction between sunk cost and the ethic of care). In Experiment 2, participants considered vignettes from their own or another person's perspective. We observed an interpersonal SCE - people showed the SCE when taking the perspective of others. We did not replicate the interaction found in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, we used statistically more powerful analyses - Bayesian sequential hypothesis testing - to examine the interaction between sunk cost and the ethic of care. We found evidence in favor of the interaction; the SCE was smaller if the sunk-cost decision harmed others. We suggest that violating one's ethic of care de-biases decision-making by overshadowing sunk costs. These findings may help explain decision-making in real-world situations involving large investments.

Metacognitive hindsight bias.

Hindsight bias (HB) is the tendency to see known information as obvious. We studied metacognitive hindsight bias (MC-HB)-a shift away from one's original confidence regarding answers provided before learning the actual facts. In two experiments, participants answered general-knowledge questions in social scenarios and provided their confidence in each answer. Subsequently, they learned answers to half the questions and then recalled their initial answers and confidence. Finally, they reanswered, as a learning check. We measured confidence accuracy by calibration (over/underconfidence) and resolution (discrimination between incorrect and correct answers), expecting them to improve in hindsight. In both experiments, participants displayed robust HB and MC-HB for resolution despite attempts to recall the initial confidence in one's answer. In Experiment 2, promising anonymity to participants eliminated MC-HB, while social scenarios produced MC-HB for both resolution and calibration-indicative of overconfidence. Overall, our findings highlight that in social contexts, recall of confidence in hindsight is more consistent with answers' accuracy than confidence initially was. Social scenarios differently affect HB and MC-HB, thus dissociating these two biases.

The integrative memory model is detailed, but skimps on false memories and development.

The integrative memory model combines five core memory systems with an attributional system. We agree with Bastin et al. that this melding is the most novel aspect of the model. But we await further evidence that the model's substantial complexity informs our understanding of false memories or of the development of recollection and familiarity.

Fluency misattribution and auditory hindsight bias.

We conducted three experiments to test the fluency-misattribution account of auditory hindsight bias. According to this account, prior exposure to a clearly presented auditory stimulus produces fluent (improved) processing of a distorted version of that stimulus, which results in participants mistakenly rating that item as easy to identify. In all experiments, participants in an exposure phase heard clearly spoken words zero, one, three, or six times. In the test phase, we examined auditory hindsight bias by manipulating whether participants heard a clear version of a target word just prior to hearing the distorted version of that word. Participants then estimated the ability of naïve peers to identify the distorted word. Auditory hindsight bias and the number of priming presentations during the exposure phase interacted underadditively in their prediction of participants' estimates: When no clear version of the target word appeared prior to the distorted version of that word in the test phase, participants identified target words more often the more frequently they heard the clear word in the exposure phase. Conversely, hearing a clear version of the target word at test produced similar estimates, regardless of the number of times participants heard clear versions of those words during the exposure phase. As per Roberts and Sternberg's (Attention and Performance XIV, pp. 611-653, 1993) additive factors logic, this finding suggests that both auditory hindsight bias and repetition priming contribute to a common process, which we propose involves a misattribution of processing fluency. We conclude that misattribution of fluency accounts for auditory hindsight bias.

Testing the validity of a continuous false belief task in 3- to 7-year-old children.

In two studies, we examined young children's performance on the paper-and-pencil version of the Sandbox task, a continuous measure of false belief, and its relations with other false belief and inhibition tasks. In Study 1, 96 children aged 3 to 7years completed three false belief tasks (Sandbox, Unexpected Contents, and Appearance/Reality) and two inhibition tasks (Head-Shoulders-Knees-Toes and Grass/Snow). Results revealed that false belief bias-a measure of egocentrism-on the Sandbox task correlated with age but not with the Unexpected Contents or Appearance/Reality task or with measures of inhibition after controlling for age. In Study 2, 90 3- to 7-year-olds completed five false belief tasks (Sandbox, Unexpected Contents, Appearance/Reality, Change of Location, and a second-order false belief task), two inhibition tasks (Simon Says and Grass/Snow), and a receptive vocabulary task (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test). Results showed that false belief bias on the Sandbox task correlated negatively with age and with the Change of Location task but not with the other false belief or inhibition tasks after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. The Sandbox task shows promise as an age-sensitive measure of false belief performance during early childhood and shows convergent and discriminant validity.

Task difficulty moderates the revelation effect.

Tasks that precede a recognition probe induce a more liberal response criterion than do probes without tasks-the "revelation effect." For example, participants are more likely to claim that a stimulus is familiar directly after solving an anagram, relative to a condition without an anagram. Revelation effect hypotheses disagree whether hard preceding tasks should produce a larger revelation effect than easy preceding tasks. Although some studies have shown that hard tasks increase the revelation effect as compared to easy tasks, these studies suffered from a confound of task difficulty and task presence. Conversely, other studies have shown that the revelation effect is independent of task difficulty. In the present study, we used new task difficulty manipulations to test whether hard tasks produce larger revelation effects than easy tasks. Participants (N = 464) completed hard or easy preceding tasks, including anagrams (Exps. 1 and 2) and the typing of specific arrow key sequences (Exps. 3-6). With sample sizes typical of revelation effect experiments, the effect sizes of task difficulty on the revelation effect varied considerably across experiments. Despite this variability, a consistent data pattern emerged: Hard tasks produced larger revelation effects than easy tasks. Although the present study falsifies certain revelation effect hypotheses, the general vagueness of revelation effect hypotheses remains.

Reprint of: Equal egocentric bias in school-aged children with and without autism spectrum disorders.

Egocentric bias is a core feature of autism. This phenomenon has been studied using the false belief task. However, typically developing children who pass categorical (pass or fail) false belief tasks may still show subtle egocentric bias. We examined 7- to 13-year-old children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; n=76) or typical development (n=113) using tasks with a continuous response scale: a modified false belief task and a visual hindsight bias task. All children showed robust egocentric bias on both tasks, but no group effects were found. Our large sample size, coupled with our sensitive tasks and resoundingly null group effects, indicate that children with and without ASD possess more similar egocentric tendencies than previously reported.

Equal egocentric bias in school-aged children with and without autism spectrum disorders.

Egocentric bias is a core feature of autism. This phenomenon has been studied using the false belief task. However, typically developing children who pass categorical (pass or fail) false belief tasks may still show subtle egocentric bias. We examined 7- to 13-year-old children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; n=76) or typical development (n=113) using tasks with a continuous response scale: a modified false belief task and a visual hindsight bias task. All children showed robust egocentric bias on both tasks, but no group effects were found. Our large sample size, coupled with our sensitive tasks and resoundingly null group effects, indicate that children with and without ASD possess more similar egocentric tendencies than previously reported.

A new paper and pencil task reveals adult false belief reasoning bias.

Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to take other people's perspective by inferring their mental state. Most 6-year olds pass the change-of-location false belief task that is commonly used to assess ToM. However, the change-of-location task is not suitable for individuals over 5 years of age, due to its discrete response options. In two experiments, we used a paper and pencil version of a modified change-of-location task (the Real Object Sandbox task) to assess false belief reasoning continuously rather than discretely in adults. Participants heard nine change-of-location scenarios and answered a critical question after each. The memory control questions only required the participant to remember the object's original location, whereas the false belief questions required participants to take the perspective of the protagonist. Participants were more accurate on memory trials than trials requiring perspective taking, and performance on paper and pencil trials correlated with corresponding trials on the Real Object Sandbox task. The Paper and Pencil Sandbox task is a convenient continuous measure of ToM that could be administered to a wide range of age groups.

Age differences in hindsight bias: the role of episodic memory and inhibition.

UNLABELLED: BACKGROUND/STUDY CONTEXT: After learning an event's outcome, people's recollection of their former prediction of that event shifts towards the actual outcome. This hindsight bias (HB) phenomenon tends to be stronger in older compared with younger adults; however, it is unclear whether age-related changes in other cognitive abilities mediate this relationship. METHODS: Sixty-four younger adults (Mage = 20.1; range = 18-25) and 60 community-dwelling older adults (Mage = 72.5; range = 65-87) completed a memory design HB task. Two aspects of HB, its occurrence and magnitude, were examined. Multiple regression and mediation analyses were conducted to determine whether episodic memory and inhibition mediate age differences in the occurrence and magnitude of HB. RESULTS: Older adults exhibited a greater occurrence and magnitude of HB as compared with younger adults. The present findings revealed that episodic memory and inhibition mediated age-related increases in HB occurrence. Conversely, neither cognitive ability mediated age-related increases in HB magnitude. CONCLUSION: Older adults' susceptibility to the occurrence of HB is partly due to age-related declines in episodic memory and inhibition. Conversely, age differences in the magnitude of HB appear to be independent of episodic memory and inhibition. These findings have important implications for understanding the mechanisms by which susceptibility to HB changes across the adult life span.

Measuring beliefs in centimeters: private knowledge biases preschoolers' and adults' representation of others' beliefs.

A novel task, using a continuous spatial layout, was created to investigate the degree to which (in centimeters) 3-year-old children's (N = 63), 5-year-old children's (N = 60), and adults' (N = 60) own privileged knowledge of the location of an object biased their representation of a protagonist's false belief about the object's location. At all ages, participants' knowledge of the object's actual location biased their search estimates, independent of the attentional or memory demands of the task. Children's degree of bias correlated with their performance on a classic change-of-location false belief task, controlling for age. This task is a novel tool for providing a quantitative measurement of the degree to which self-knowledge can bias estimates of others' beliefs.

An ongoing secondary task can reduce the illusory truth effect.

Introduction: People are more likely to believe repeated information-this is known as the Illusory Truth Effect (ITE). Recent research on the ITE has shown that semantic processing of statements plays a key role. In our day to day experience, we are often multi-tasking which can impact our ongoing processing of information around us. In three experiments, we investigate how asking participants to engage in an ongoing secondary task in the ITE paradigm influences the magnitude of the effect of repetition on belief. Methods: Using an adapted ITE paradigm, we embedded a secondary task into each trial of the encoding and/or test phase (e.g., having participants count the number of vowels in a target word of each trivia claim) and calculated the overall accuracy on the task. Results: We found that the overall ITE was larger when participants had no ongoing secondary task during the experiment. Further, we predicted and found that higher accuracy on the secondary task was associated with a larger ITE. Discussion: These findings provide initial evidence that engaging in an ongoing secondary task may reduce the impact of repetition. Our findings suggest that exploring the impact of secondary tasks on the ITE is a fruitful area for further research.

Hindsight bias for emotional faces.

People who learn the outcome to a situation or problem tend to overestimate what was known in the past-this is hindsight bias. Whereas previous research has revealed robust hindsight bias in the visual domain, little is known about how outcome information affects our memory of others' emotional expressions. The goal of the current work was to test whether participants exhibited hindsight bias for emotional faces and whether this varied as a function of emotion. Across five experiments, participants saw images of faces displaying different emotions. In the foresight phase, participants watched several emotional faces gradually clarify from blurry to clear. Once participants believed they knew what emotion the face was exhibiting, they identified the emotion from several options (e.g., angry, disgusted, happy, scared, surprised). In the hindsight phase, participants saw clear versions of each face before stopping the clarification at the point at which they previously identified the emotional expression. On average, participants exhibited hindsight bias for all emotions except happy faces (i.e., they indicated that they identified the emotional expressions at a blurrier point in hindsight than they had in foresight). A multinomial processing tree model of our data revealed that this was not due to participants' better recollection of foresight judgments for happy faces compared to the other emotions. Additionally, participants showed a smaller reconstruction bias for happy faces than the other emotions. We discuss the social implications of these findings as well as the potential for this paradigm to be used across cultures and ages. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Stable truthiness effect across the lifespan.

When semantically-related photos appear with true-or-false trivia claims, people more often rate the claims as true compared to when photos are absent-truthiness. This occurs even when the photos lack information useful for assessing veracity. We tested whether truthiness changed in magnitude as a function of participants' age in a diverse sample using materials appropriate for all ages. We tested participants (N = 414; Age range = 3-87 years) in two culturally diverse environments: a community science center (First language: English (61.4%); Mandarin/Cantonese (11.6%); Spanish (6%), other (21%); ethnicity: unreported) and a psychology lab (First language: English (64.4%); Punjabi (9.8%); Mandarin/Cantonese (7.4%); other (18.4%); ethnicity: Caucasian (38%); South Asian (30.7%); Asian (22.7%); other/unreported (8.6%). Participants rated trivia claims as true or false. Half the claims appeared with a semantically related photo, and half appeared without a photo. Results showed that participants of all ages more often rated claims as true when claims appeared with a photo; however, this truthiness effect was stable across the lifespan. If truthiness age differences exist, they are likely negligible in the general population. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Theory of mind through the ages: older and middle-aged adults exhibit more errors than do younger adults on a continuous false belief task.

Theory of mind (ToM), or the ability to understand mental states, is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. Previous research has documented marked advances in ToM in preschoolers, and declines in ToM in older-aged adults. In the present study, younger (n=37), middle-aged (n=20), and older (n=37) adults completed a continuous false belief task measuring ToM. Middle-aged and older adults exhibited more false belief bias than did younger adults, irrespective of language ability, executive function, processing speed, and memory. The authors conclude that ToM declines from younger to older adulthood, independent of age-related changes to domain-general cognitive functioning.

Hindsight bias and false-belief reasoning from preschool to old age.

Participants ranging in age from 3 to 98 years (N = 708; approximately 60% female; 49% Caucasian, 38% Asian; 12% Other ethnicities, 1% Indigenous; modal household income > $80,000) completed a battery of tasks involving verbal ability, executive function, and perspective-taking. Wherever possible, all participants completed the same version of a task. The current study tested hindsight bias and false-belief reasoning to determine how these constructs relate to each other across the child-to-adult life span. Participants of all ages showed robust hindsight bias and false-belief reasoning errors. Hindsight bias followed a U-shaped function, wherein preschoolers and older adults showed more hindsight bias than older children and younger adults. False-belief reasoning, conversely, was relatively constant from preschool to older adulthood. Hindsight bias did not correlate with false-belief reasoning. We conclude that hindsight bias and false-belief reasoning errors are robust but unrelated cognitive biases across the life span. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).