The ethics of non-partner requests for posthumous assisted reproduction.

After the death of a loved one, family will occasionally request posthumous assisted reproduction (PAR). Professional medical societies in the US and Europe oppose such requests without written consent except from the surviving partner with whom the deceased presumably shared a joint reproductive project. Here, however, we argue that joint reproductive projects are not limited to two-person romantic partners and therefore ethical policies should not be either. In other words, we argue the criterion of being in a romantic partnership with the decedent is biased and unjustly excludes certain family formations. We begin by describing the professional society guidelines to highlight how they presume a two-person romantic couple is the ideal basis for reproductive projects and families. Then, we discuss examples of alternative parental projects, noting that they are usually grounded in feminist and queer values. Finally, we respond to potential objections about violating the autonomy of the deceased and conflating reproductive and parental projects. In sum, as long as medical societies continue to uphold a policy whereby romantic partners may seek PAR in the absence of written consent, we believe that these societies must also allow for the potential of family formations that do not fit into the dominant paradigm.

No clitting! We need to talk about clitoris transplantation.

In the last two decades, genital transplants have emerged as another type of quality-of-life transplants. Successful allogenic transplantations of the uterus, ovary, testicle, and penis have all been reported. Yet, there is no discussion of clitoris transplantation in the medical literature, mass media, and everywhere else I searched. This surgery could be used for cisgender women who have a clitoral injury or disease or who have undergone female genital cutting. I examine the gender norms regarding sexuality and reproduction to show how they shape surgical advancements. My point in this paper is not to take a normative position on status of current genital transplantations. Rather, I highlight that their existence is due, at least in part, because they align with dominant gender norms: penis and testicle transplantations reinforce the importance of men's virility and the existence of "normal" male genitalia, whereas uterus and ovary transplantations uphold the conflation of women and reproduction and the strong valuing of women's fertility. That medical advances reflect cultural values is not a new claim. What is new in this paper is the discussion of how sexism norms-regarding the invisibility of the clitoris and the devaluing of women's sexual pleasure- has engendered various types of genital transplants, but not clitoris transplantation.

Should patients pay for sperm given for free? Results from a pilot study on fertility clinics' views on the charging for altruistically donated sperm.

PURPOSE: Many countries prohibit payment for gamete donation, which means fertility clinics do not have to compensate donors. However, acquiring and utilizing donor sperm can still be expensive for fertility clinics. This study evaluates international fertility workers' views on charging patients for altruistically donated sperm. METHODS: Using social media and email, we disseminated a SurveyMonkey survey with a question that was specifically focused on opinions about charging patients for altruistically donated sperm. Clinicians were able to select multiple pre-populated answer choices as well as write answers that reflected their views as an open-ended response. Snowball sampling was utilized to reach international fertility clinicians. RESULTS: Of 112 respondents from 14 countries, 88% believe it is acceptable to charge for altruistically donated sperm based on one or more of four different assenting categories: so patients appreciate that sperm is valuable, because it generates funds for the running of the clinic, to cover specific costs associated with sperm, and to make a profit for the clinic. CONCLUSIONS: The consensus that charging for altruistically donated sperm is acceptable was not surprising since recruiting and processing donor sperm can be expensive for clinics. However, there were geographical differences for specific assenting answer choices which may be based on countries' income, and healthcare system, as well as religious and cultural beliefs.

Clinicians' criteria for fetal moral status: viability and relationality, not sentience.

The antiabortion movement is increasingly using ostensibly scientific measurements such as 'fetal heartbeat' and 'fetal pain' to provide 'objective' evidence of the moral status of fetuses. However, there is little knowledge on how clinicians conceptualise and operationalise the moral status of fetuses. We interviewed obstetrician/gynaecologists and neonatologists on this topic since their practice regularly includes clinical management of entities of the same gestational age. Contrary to our expectations, there was consensus among clinicians about conceptions of moral status regardless of specialty. First, clinicians tended to take a gradualist approach to moral status during pregnancy as they developed and viewed viability, the ability to live outside of the uterus, as morally significant. Second, in contrast to 'fetal pain' laws and philosophical discussions about the ethical salience of sentience, the clinicians in our study did not consider the ability to feel pain as a morally relevant factor in moral status determinations. Third, during previability and perviability, clinicians viewed moral status as a personal value decision, which should be made by pregnant people and parents of neonates.

Assisted reproductive technology, justice and autonomy in an era of COVID-19.

Fertility services were significantly curtailed or suspended as an initial response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic earlier this year, following guidance from European Society for Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) as well as a General Direction (GD0014) issued by the Human Fertilisation and Embryo Authority (HFEA). It is difficult to argue with triage of medical care and resources in the face of anticipated overwhelming demand, but this situation resulted in considerable distress, as shown by a change.org petition opposing ASRM recommendations, which has gathered over 21,000 signatures to date. Although halting assisted reproductive technology (ART) as the pandemic unfolded was ethical because public health goals superseded individual patient autonomy, the fertility sector now faces a greater challenge balancing ethical considerations in an era characterized by the ongoing threat of COVID-19. This article discusses justice and autonomy in the context of ART, potential conflicts and resolutions.

A View from the past into our collective future: the oncofertility consortium vision statement.

PURPOSE: Today, male and female adult and pediatric cancer patients, individuals transitioning between gender identities, and other individuals facing health extending but fertility limiting treatments can look forward to a fertile future. This is, in part, due to the work of members associated with the Oncofertility Consortium. METHODS: The Oncofertility Consortium is an international, interdisciplinary initiative originally designed to explore the urgent unmet need associated with the reproductive future of cancer survivors. As the strategies for fertility management were invented, developed or applied, the individuals for who the program offered hope, similarly expanded. As a community of practice, Consortium participants share information in an open and rapid manner to addresses the complex health care and quality-of-life issues of cancer, transgender and other patients. To ensure that the organization remains contemporary to the needs of the community, the field designed a fully inclusive mechanism for strategic planning and here present the findings of this process. RESULTS: This interprofessional network of medical specialists, scientists, and scholars in the law, medical ethics, religious studies and other disciplines associated with human interventions, explore the relationships between health, disease, survivorship, treatment, gender and reproductive longevity. CONCLUSION: The goals are to continually integrate the best science in the service of the needs of patients and build a community of care that is ready for the challenges of the field in the future.

Reproductive technologies are not the cure for social problems.

Giulia Cavaliere disagrees with claims that ectogenesis will increase equality and freedom for women, arguing that they often ignore social context and consequently fail to recognise that ectogenesis may not benefit women or it may only benefit a small subset of already privileged women. In this commentary, I will contextualise her argument within the broader cultural milieu to highlight the pattern of reproductive advancements and technologies, such as egg freezing and birth control, being presented as the panacea for women's inequality. While these advancements and technologies can benefit women, I argue medicine is not the best tool to 'cure' social problems and should not be co-opted as an agent of social change. Systemic social changes, not just technomedical approaches, are needed to address the root of gender inequality, which is social in nature, not medical.

Fertility Preservation for a Teenager with Differences (Disorders) of Sex Development: An Ethics Case Study.

Fertility preservation has become more common for various populations, including oncology patients, transgender individuals, and women who are concerned about age-related infertility. Little attention has been paid to fertility preservation for patients with differences/disorders of sex development (DSD). Our goal in this article is to address specific ethical considerations that are unique to this patient population. To this end, we present a hypothetical DSD case. We then explore ethical considerations related to patient's age, risk of cancer, concern about genetic transmission of a DSD condition to children, co-occurring gender dysphoria, and access to experimental fertility preservation procedures. Given the limitations of current technologies, we recommend offering fertility preservation to individuals living with DSD using an informed decision-making approach that instills realistic expectations and minimizes the potential for false hope. Finally, we conclude with practical recommendations for this case based on the ethical considerations.

Should Health Care Providers Uphold the DNR of a Terminally Ill Patient Who Attempts Suicide?

An individual's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is a fundamental expression of patient autonomy; however, supporting this right poses ethical dilemmas for healthcare providers when the patient has attempted suicide. Emergency physicians encounter patients who have attempted suicide and are likely among the first medical providers to face the dilemma of honoring the patient's DNR or intervening to reverse the effects of potentially fatal actions. We illustrate this issue by introducing a case example in which the DNR of a terminally ill woman was not honored because the cause of her cardiac arrest was suicide. We argue that although a terminal diagnosis should change the way health care providers respond to a suicide attempt, many of the theoretical underpinnings for how one should treat suicide attempts-especially the criterion of external reasonability, that is the action to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures is reasonable independent of the precipitating event-are common to all situations (Brown et al. in Am J Bioeth 13(3):3-12, 2013). The presumption that patients who attempt suicide lack capacity due to acute mental illness is flawed because it fails to account for a competent individual's reasonable preference to not be forced to live in an unbearable, terminal condition. In states without legislation allowing physician aid in dying, patients and providers must grapple with these limitations on a case-by-case basis. In cases where the patient has a limited life expectancy and there is not concern for psychiatric illness as the primary cause of the suicidal action, we argue that the negative right to refuse life-sustaining treatment should prevail.

Scheduling the Stork: Media Portrayals of Women's and Physicians' Reasons for Elective Cesarean Delivery.

BACKGROUND: Media interest in cesarean delivery has grown in recent years driven both by rising cesarean delivery rates and the decision by the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) to permit elective cesarean (EC) delivery. METHODS: A content analysis of United States newspaper and magazine articles from 2000 to 2013 (n = 131 articles) was completed to understand how the news media portrays ECs. RESULTS: The majority of articles (71.8%) emphasized reasons to support women having an EC, while 38.2 percent of the articles exhibited themes of physician support for ECs. Relatively few articles mentioned reasons against ECs either from the women's perspective (11.5%) or the practitioners' (3.8%). The most common themes given for women choosing ECs were convenience/scheduling (48.9%), avoidance of pain or fear of labor (29.8%), and physical harm to women from vaginal birth (17.6%). Doctors' perspectives were less prevalent in the media than women's perspectives, but when mentioned they were almost exclusively in support of ECs for reasons including avoiding malpractice (28.2%), avoiding physical harm to the woman or baby (16.8%), and timing/scheduling (14.5%). DISCUSSION: Media coverage suggests ECs are widely accepted by both women and doctors, with women choosing an EC mainly for convenience/scheduling and fear. However, 43 percent of doctors surveyed by ACOG said they were not willing to perform the procedure, and surveys report that mothers rarely request an EC.

Breaking Binaries: The Critical Need for Feminist Bioethics in Pediatric Gender-Affirming Care.

This commentary responds to Moti Gorin's article "What Is the Aim of Pediatric 'Gender-Affirming' Care?" We argue that Gorin's case against pediatric gender-affirming care rests upon numerous false conceptual binaries: female/male, public/private, objective/subjective, and medically necessary/elective. Drawing on feminist bioethics, we show how such dichotomous thinking is both inaccurate and marginalizing of gender minorities.