Institutional trust is a distinct construct related to vaccine hesitancy and refusal.

BACKGROUND: Vaccine hesitancy is driven by a heterogeneous and changing set of psychological, social and historical phenomena, requiring multidisciplinary approaches to its study and intervention. Past research has brought to light instances of both interpersonal and institutional trust playing an important role in vaccine uptake. However, no comprehensive study to date has specifically assessed the relative importance of these two categories of trust as they relate to vaccine behaviors and attitudes. METHODS: In this paper, we examine the relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust and four measures related to COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy and one measure related to general vaccine hesitancy. We hypothesize that, across measures, individuals with vaccine hesitant attitudes and behaviors have lower trust-especially in institutions-than those who are not hesitant. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 1541 Canadians. RESULTS: A deficit in both interpersonal and institutional trust was associated with higher levels of vaccine hesitant attitudes and behaviors. However, institutional trust was significantly lower than interpersonal trust in those with high hesitancy scores, suggesting that the two types of trust can be thought of as distinct constructs in the context of vaccine hesitancy. CONCLUSIONS: Based on our findings, we suggest that diminished institutional trust plays a crucial role in vaccine hesitancy. We propose that this may contribute to a tendency to instead place trust in interpersonally propagated belief systems, which may be more strongly misaligned with mainstream evidence and thus support vaccine hesitancy attitudes. We offer strategies rooted in these observations for creating public health messages designed to enhance vaccine uptake.

Countering medical nihilism by reconnecting facts and values.

A pessimistic strain of thought is fomenting in the health studies literature regarding the status of medicine. Ioannidis's (2005) now famous finding that "most published research findings are false" and Stegenga's (2018) book-length argument for medical nihilism are examples of this. In this paper, we argue that these positions are incorrect insofar as they rest on an untenable account of the nature of facts. Proper attention to fallibilism and the social organization of knowledge, as well as Bayesian probabilities in medical reasoning, prompt us to ask why the cynics expect the results of quantitative studies to be incontrovertibly true in the first place. While we agree with Ioannidis and others' identified flaws in the medical research enterprise, and encourage rectification, we conclude that medical nihilism is not the natural outcome of the current state of research.

Crowdfunding narratives and the valuation of vaccines for COVID-19.

Social media spreads information about vaccines and can be used to better understand public attitudes about them. Using American crowdfunding campaigns that mentioned COVID-19 vaccines from January 2020 to March 2021, this paper investigates public attitudes towards vaccines, specifically the perceived role vaccines could (or couldn't) play in ending the pandemic. We identified 776 crowdfunding campaigns and coded each for their aims and whether they valued vaccines as returning their community to a pre-pandemic state (utopian), helping some but not all people (cautious), and doubtful about the likely positive impacts of vaccines (skeptical). Cautious and skeptical valuations increased over time whereas utopian views declined. This paper uniquely situates attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccines in the context of financial need (as characterized by the campaigners). It offers insight into the "vaccine class gap" in America and demonstrates the usefulness of crowdfunding campaigns for assessing public views on vaccines.

Can Peer Review Be Kinder? Supportive Peer Review: A Re-Commitment to Kindness and a Call to Action.

Peer review aims to select articles for publication and to improve articles before publication. We believe that this process can be infused by kindness without losing rigor. In 2014, the founding editorial team of the Canadian Journal of Kidney Health and Disease (CJKHD) made an explicit commitment to treat authors as we would wish to be treated ourselves. This broader group of authors reaffirms this principle, for which we suggest the terminology "supportive review."

L'évaluation par les pairs vise à sélectionner les articles à publier et à en améliorer le contenu avant publication. Nous sommes d'avis que ce processus peut être fait avec bienveillance sans perdre en rigueur. En 2014, l'équipe de rédaction fondatrice du Canadian Journal of Kidney Health and Disease (CJKHD) a pris l'engagement ferme de traiter les auteurs comme ses membres souhaiteraient eux-mêmes être traités. Aujourd'hui, notre groupe élargi d'auteur(e)s réaffirme ce principe pour lequel nous proposons la terminologie « évaluation constructive ¼.

Deliberation on Childhood Vaccination in Canada: Public Input on Ethical Trade-Offs in Vaccination Policy.

BACKGROUND: Policy decisions about childhood vaccination require consideration of multiple, sometimes conflicting, public health and ethical imperatives. Examples of these decisions are whether vaccination should be mandatory and, if so, whether to allow for non-medical exemptions. In this article we argue that these policy decisions go beyond typical public health mandates and therefore require democratic input. METHODS: We report on the design, implementation, and results of a deliberative public forum convened over four days in Ontario, Canada, on the topic of childhood vaccination. RESULTS: 25 participants completed all four days of deliberation and collectively developed 20 policy recommendations on issues relating to mandatory vaccinations and exemptions, communication about vaccines and vaccination, and AEFI (adverse events following immunization) compensation and reporting. Notable recommendations include unanimous support for mandatory childhood vaccination in Ontario, the need for broad educational communication about vaccination, and the development of a no-fault compensation scheme for AEFIs. There was persistent disagreement among deliberants about the form of exemptions from vaccination (conscience, religious beliefs) that should be permissible, as well as appropriate consequences if parents do not vaccinate their children. CONCLUSIONS: We conclude that conducting deliberative democratic processes on topics that are polarizing and controversial is viable and should be further developed and implemented to support democratically legitimate and trustworthy policy about childhood vaccination.

On evidence and evidence-based medicine: lessons from the philosophy of science.

The evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement is touted as a new paradigm in medical education and practice, a description that carries with it an enthusiasm for science that has not been seen since logical positivism flourished (circa 1920-1950). At the same time, the term "evidence-based medicine" has a ring of obviousness to it, as few physicians, one suspects, would claim that they do not attempt to base their clinical decision-making on available evidence. However, the apparent obviousness of EBM can and should be challenged on the grounds of how 'evidence' has been problematised in the philosophy of science. EBM enthusiasm, it follows, ought to be tempered. The post-positivist, feminist, and phenomenological philosophies of science that are examined in this paper contest the seemingly unproblematic nature of evidence that underlies EBM by emphasizing different features of the social nature of science. The appeal to the authority of evidence that characterizes evidence-based practices does not increase objectivity but rather obscures the subjective elements that inescapably enter all forms of human inquiry. The seeming common sense of EBM only occurs because of its assumed removal from the social context of medical practice. In the current age where the institutional power of medicine is suspect, a model that represents biomedicine as politically disinterested or merely scientific should give pause.

Just regionalisation: rehabilitating care for people with disabilities and chronic illnesses.

BACKGROUND: Regionalised models of health care delivery have important implications for people with disabilities and chronic illnesses yet the ethical issues surrounding disability and regionalisation have not yet been explored. Although there is ethics-related research into disability and chronic illness, studies of regionalisation experiences, and research directed at improving health systems for these patient populations, to our knowledge these streams of research have not been brought together. Using the Canadian province of Ontario as a case study, we address this gap by examining the ethics of regionalisation and the implications for people with disabilities and chronic illnesses. The critical success factors we provide have broad applicability for guiding and/or evaluating new and existing regionalised health care strategies. DISCUSSION: Ontario is in the process of implementing fourteen Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs). The implementation of the LHINs provides a rare opportunity to address systematically the unmet diverse care needs of people with disabilities and chronic illnesses. The core of this paper provides a series of composite case vignettes illustrating integration opportunities relevant to these populations, namely: (i) rehabilitation and services for people with disabilities; (ii) chronic illness and cancer care; (iii) senior's health; (iv) community support services; (v) children's health; (vi) health promotion; and (vii) mental health and addiction services. For each vignette, we interpret the governing principles developed by the LHINs - equitable access based on patient need, preserving patient choice, responsiveness to local population health needs, shared accountability and patient-centred care - and describe how they apply. We then offer critical success factors to guide the LHINs in upholding these principles in response to the needs of people with disabilities and chronic illnesses. SUMMARY: This paper aims to bridge an important gap in the literature by examining the ethics of a new regionalisation strategy with a focus on the implications for people with disabilities and chronic illnesses across multiple sites of care. While Ontario is used as a case study to contextualize our discussion, the issues we identify, the ethical principles we apply, and the critical success factors we provide have broader applicability for guiding and evaluating the development of - or revisions to - a regionalised health care strategy.

Evidence-based ethics? On evidence-based practice and the "empirical turn" from normative bioethics.

BACKGROUND: The increase in empirical methods of research in bioethics over the last two decades is typically perceived as a welcomed broadening of the discipline, with increased integration of social and life scientists into the field and ethics consultants into the clinical setting, however it also represents a loss of confidence in the typical normative and analytic methods of bioethics. DISCUSSION: The recent incipiency of "Evidence-Based Ethics" attests to this phenomenon and should be rejected as a solution to the current ambivalence toward the normative resolution of moral problems in a pluralistic society. While "evidence-based" is typically read in medicine and other life and social sciences as the empirically-adequate standard of reasonable practice and a means for increasing certainty, I propose that the evidence-based movement in fact gains consensus by displacing normative discourse with aggregate or statistically-derived empirical evidence as the "bottom line". Therefore, along with wavering on the fact/value distinction, evidence-based ethics threatens bioethics' normative mandate. The appeal of the evidence-based approach is that it offers a means of negotiating the demands of moral pluralism. Rather than appealing to explicit values that are likely not shared by all, "the evidence" is proposed to adjudicate between competing claims. Quantified measures are notably more "neutral" and democratic than liberal markers like "species normal functioning". Yet the positivist notion that claims stand or fall in light of the evidence is untenable; furthermore, the legacy of positivism entails the quieting of empirically non-verifiable (or at least non-falsifiable) considerations like moral claims and judgments. As a result, evidence-based ethics proposes to operate with the implicit normativity that accompanies the production and presentation of all biomedical and scientific facts unchecked. SUMMARY: The "empirical turn" in bioethics signals a need for reconsideration of the methods used for moral evaluation and resolution, however the options should not include obscuring normative content by seemingly neutral technical measure.

Placebo orthodoxy and the double standard of care in multinational clinical research.

It has been almost 20 years since the field of bioethics was galvanized by a controversial series of multinational AZT trials employing placebo controls on pregnant HIV-positive women in the developing world even though a standard of care existed in the sponsor countries. The trove of ethical investigations that followed was thoughtful and challenging, yet an important and problematic methodological assumption was left unexplored. In this article, I revisit the famous "double standard of care" case study in order to offer novel consideration of the placebo orthodoxy that underlies much of the ethical debate. This majority view found in medical research is that placebo-controlled trials are methodologically superior to comparative trials that use active controls. I challenge this orthodoxy and argue that lives were unnecessarily lost in these trials as a result. Furthermore, current HIV research on vaccines and microbicides is now poised to repeat the error of subscribing to the placebo orthodoxy.

Defining "quality of care" persuasively.

As the quality movement in health care now enters its fourth decade, the language of quality is ubiquitous. Practitioners, organizations, and government agencies alike vociferously testify their commitments to quality and accept numerous forms of governance aimed at improving quality of care. Remarkably, the powerful phrase "quality of care" is rarely defined in the health care literature. Instead it operates as an accepted and assumed goal worth pursuing. The status of evidence-based medicine, for instance, hinges on its ability to improve quality of care, and efforts are made by both proponents and detractors to unpack the contents and outcomes of evidence-based practice while the contents of "quality of care" are presumed to be understood. Because the goals of medicine are far from obvious, this paper investigates the neglected term, "quality of care," in an effort to understand what it is that health care practices are so uncritically assumed to be striving for. Finding lack of consensus on the terminology in the quality literature, I propose that the term operates rhetorically by way of persuasive appeal (and lack of descriptive meaning). Unsatisfied that "quality of care" operates as a mere buzzword in morally contentious debates over resource allocation and duties of care, I implore health care communities to go beyond mere commitments to quality and, instead, to focus attention on the difficult task of specifying what counts as quality care within an economically constrained health care system.

Iconoclast or creed? Objectivism, pragmatism, and the hierarchy of evidence.

Because "evidence" is at issue in evidence-based medicine (EBM), the critical responses to the movement have taken up themes from post-positivist philosophy of science to demonstrate the untenability of the objectivist account of evidence. While these post-positivist critiques seem largely correct, I propose that when they focus their analyses on what counts as evidence, the critics miss important and desirable pragmatic features of the evidence-based approach. This article redirects critical attention toward EBM's rigid hierarchy of evidence as the culprit of its objectionable epistemic practices. It reframes the EBM discourse in light of a distinction between objectivist and pragmatic epistemology, which allows for a more nuanced analysis of EBM than previously offered: one that is not either/or in its evaluation of the decision-making technology as either iconoclastic or creedal.