Who Has Done It? Exploring Gaze Agency in Obsessive-Compulsive Checkers.

The sense of agency (SoA) is a multifaceted construct, which can be defined as the ability to understand the causal relationships between our actions and sensory events. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) patients with checking compulsions often report a "lack of action completion" sensations, which has been conceptualized in the so-called "Not Just Right Experiences" construct. An intriguing explanation of this phenomenon comes from Belayachi and Van der Linden (2009, 2010), who suggest that OCD-checking patients are more prone to specify their action in a relatively molecular and inflexible way. Currently, there are no studies in literature which address this issue in OCD patients, except for the one of Gentsch et al. (2012), who suggested an altered SoA in these patients. Here we exploited a novel construct, gaze agency, to evaluate causal attribution capabilities in a group of 21 OCD patients (checkers) and matched healthy controls (HCs). Basically, two tasks targeted observers' capability to identify their own eye movements as the cause of concurrently presented beeps, which allowed us to measure agency sensitivity as well as subtle agency alterations in an ecological setting. We found a poorer performance in OCD patients as compared to HCs in many parameters of our tasks, suggesting a difficulty with causal attribution possibly due to both a reduced cognitive flexibility and a less functional gaze agency in OCD patients.

Covert enaction at work: Recording the continuous movements of visuospatial attention to visible or imagined targets by means of Steady-State Visual Evoked Potentials (SSVEPs).

Whereas overt visuospatial attention is customarily measured with eye tracking, covert attention is assessed by various methods. Here we exploited Steady-State Visual Evoked Potentials (SSVEPs) - the oscillatory responses of the visual cortex to incoming flickering stimuli - to record the movements of covert visuospatial attention in a way operatively similar to eye tracking (attention tracking), which allowed us to compare motion observation and motion extrapolation with and without eye movements. Observers fixated a central dot and covertly tracked a target oscillating horizontally and sinusoidally. In the background, the left and the right halves of the screen flickered at two different frequencies, generating two SSVEPs in occipital regions whose size varied reciprocally as observers attended to the moving target. The two signals were combined into a single quantity that was modulated at the target frequency in a quasi-sinusoidal way, often clearly visible in single trials. The modulation continued almost unchanged when the target was switched off and observers mentally extrapolated its motion in imagery, and also when observers pointed their finger at the moving target during covert tracking, or imagined doing so. The amplitude of modulation during covert tracking was ∼25-30% of that measured when observers followed the target with their eyes. We used 4 electrodes in parieto-occipital areas, but similar results were achieved with a single electrode in Oz. In a second experiment we tested ramp and step motion. During overt tracking, SSVEPs were remarkably accurate, showing both saccadic-like and smooth pursuit-like modulations of cortical responsiveness, although during covert tracking the modulation deteriorated. Covert tracking was better with sinusoidal motion than ramp motion, and better with moving targets than stationary ones. The clear modulation of cortical responsiveness recorded during both overt and covert tracking, identical for motion observation and motion extrapolation, suggests to include covert attention movements in enactive theories of mental imagery.

Assessing Self-Awareness through Gaze Agency.

We define gaze agency as the awareness of the causal effect of one's own eye movements in gaze-contingent environments, which might soon become a widespread reality with the diffusion of gaze-operated devices. Here we propose a method for measuring gaze agency based on self-monitoring propensity and sensitivity. In one task, naïf observers watched bouncing balls on a computer monitor with the goal of discovering the cause of concurrently presented beeps, which were generated in real-time by their saccades or by other events (Discovery Task). We manipulated observers' self-awareness by pre-exposing them to a condition in which beeps depended on gaze direction or by focusing their attention to their own eyes. These manipulations increased propensity to agency discovery. In a second task, which served to monitor agency sensitivity at the sensori-motor level, observers were explicitly asked to detect gaze agency (Detection Task). Both tasks turned out to be well suited to measure both increases and decreases of gaze agency. We did not find evident oculomotor correlates of agency discovery or detection. A strength of our approach is that it probes self-monitoring propensity-difficult to evaluate with traditional tasks based on bodily agency. In addition to putting a lens on this novel cognitive function, measuring gaze agency could reveal subtle self-awareness deficits in pathological conditions and during development.

Delayed perceptual awareness in rapid perceptual decisions.

The flourishing of studies on the neural correlates of decision-making calls for an appraisal of the relation between perceptual decisions and conscious perception. By exploiting the long integration time of noisy motion stimuli, and by forcing human observers to make difficult speeded decisions--sometimes a blind guess--about stimulus direction, we traced the temporal buildup of motion discrimination capability and perceptual awareness, as assessed trial by trial through direct rating. We found that both increased gradually with motion coherence and viewing time, but discrimination was systematically leading awareness, reaching a plateau much earlier. Sensitivity and criterion changes contributed jointly to the slow buildup of perceptual awareness. It made no difference whether motion discrimination was accomplished by saccades or verbal responses. These findings suggest that perceptual awareness emerges on the top of a developing or even mature perceptual decision. We argue that the middle temporal (MT) cortical region does not confer us the full phenomenic depth of motion perception, although it may represent a precursor stage in building our subjective sense of visual motion.