Resolving content moderation dilemmas between free speech and harmful misinformation.

In online content moderation, two key values may come into conflict: protecting freedom of expression and preventing harm. Robust rules based in part on how citizens think about these moral dilemmas are necessary to deal with this conflict in a principled way, yet little is known about people's judgments and preferences around content moderation. We examined such moral dilemmas in a conjoint survey experiment where US respondents (N = 2, 564) indicated whether they would remove problematic social media posts on election denial, antivaccination, Holocaust denial, and climate change denial and whether they would take punitive action against the accounts. Respondents were shown key information about the user and their post as well as the consequences of the misinformation. The majority preferred quashing harmful misinformation over protecting free speech. Respondents were more reluctant to suspend accounts than to remove posts and more likely to do either if the harmful consequences of the misinformation were severe or if sharing it was a repeated offense. Features related to the account itself (the person behind the account, their partisanship, and number of followers) had little to no effect on respondents' decisions. Content moderation of harmful misinformation was a partisan issue: Across all four scenarios, Republicans were consistently less willing than Democrats or independents to remove posts or penalize the accounts that posted them. Our results can inform the design of transparent rules for content moderation of harmful misinformation.

Automating hybrid collective intelligence in open-ended medical diagnostics.

Collective intelligence has emerged as a powerful mechanism to boost decision accuracy across many domains, such as geopolitical forecasting, investment, and medical diagnostics. However, collective intelligence has been mostly applied to relatively simple decision tasks (e.g., binary classifications). Applications in more open-ended tasks with a much larger problem space, such as emergency management or general medical diagnostics, are largely lacking, due to the challenge of integrating unstandardized inputs from different crowd members. Here, we present a fully automated approach for harnessing collective intelligence in the domain of general medical diagnostics. Our approach leverages semantic knowledge graphs, natural language processing, and the SNOMED CT medical ontology to overcome a major hurdle to collective intelligence in open-ended medical diagnostics, namely to identify the intended diagnosis from unstructured text. We tested our method on 1,333 medical cases diagnosed on a medical crowdsourcing platform: The Human Diagnosis Project. Each case was independently rated by ten diagnosticians. Comparing the diagnostic accuracy of single diagnosticians with the collective diagnosis of differently sized groups, we find that our method substantially increases diagnostic accuracy: While single diagnosticians achieved 46% accuracy, pooling the decisions of ten diagnosticians increased this to 76%. Improvements occurred across medical specialties, chief complaints, and diagnosticians' tenure levels. Our results show the life-saving potential of tapping into the collective intelligence of the global medical community to reduce diagnostic errors and increase patient safety.

Science Communication as a Collective Intelligence Endeavor: A Manifesto and Examples for Implementation.

Effective science communication is challenging when scientific messages are informed by a continually updating evidence base and must often compete against misinformation. We argue that we need a new program of science communication as collective intelligence-a collaborative approach, supported by technology. This would have four key advantages over the typical model where scientists communicate as individuals: scientific messages would be informed by (a) a wider base of aggregated knowledge, (b) contributions from a diverse scientific community, (c) participatory input from stakeholders, and (d) better responsiveness to ongoing changes in the state of knowledge.

Reach and speed of judgment propagation in the laboratory.

In recent years, a large body of research has demonstrated that judgments and behaviors can propagate from person to person. Phenomena as diverse as political mobilization, health practices, altruism, and emotional states exhibit similar dynamics of social contagion. The precise mechanisms of judgment propagation are not well understood, however, because it is difficult to control for confounding factors such as homophily or dynamic network structures. We introduce an experimental design that renders possible the stringent study of judgment propagation. In this design, experimental chains of individuals can revise their initial judgment in a visual perception task after observing a predecessor's judgment. The positioning of a very good performer at the top of a chain created a performance gap, which triggered waves of judgment propagation down the chain. We evaluated the dynamics of judgment propagation experimentally. Despite strong social influence within pairs of individuals, the reach of judgment propagation across a chain rarely exceeded a social distance of three to four degrees of separation. Furthermore, computer simulations showed that the speed of judgment propagation decayed exponentially with the social distance from the source. We show that information distortion and the overweighting of other people's errors are two individual-level mechanisms hindering judgment propagation at the scale of the chain. Our results contribute to the understanding of social-contagion processes, and our experimental method offers numerous new opportunities to study judgment propagation in the laboratory.

Boosting medical diagnostics by pooling independent judgments.

Collective intelligence refers to the ability of groups to outperform individual decision makers when solving complex cognitive problems. Despite its potential to revolutionize decision making in a wide range of domains, including medical, economic, and political decision making, at present, little is known about the conditions underlying collective intelligence in real-world contexts. We here focus on two key areas of medical diagnostics, breast and skin cancer detection. Using a simulation study that draws on large real-world datasets, involving more than 140 doctors making more than 20,000 diagnoses, we investigate when combining the independent judgments of multiple doctors outperforms the best doctor in a group. We find that similarity in diagnostic accuracy is a key condition for collective intelligence: Aggregating the independent judgments of doctors outperforms the best doctor in a group whenever the diagnostic accuracy of doctors is relatively similar, but not when doctors' diagnostic accuracy differs too much. This intriguingly simple result is highly robust and holds across different group sizes, performance levels of the best doctor, and collective intelligence rules. The enabling role of similarity, in turn, is explained by its systematic effects on the number of correct and incorrect decisions of the best doctor that are overruled by the collective. By identifying a key factor underlying collective intelligence in two important real-world contexts, our findings pave the way for innovative and more effective approaches to complex real-world decision making, and to the scientific analyses of those approaches.

The Online Misinformation Engagement Framework.

Research on online misinformation has evolved rapidly, but organizing its results and identifying open research questions is difficult without a systematic approach. We present the Online Misinformation Engagement Framework, which classifies people's engagement with online misinformation into four stages: selecting information sources, choosing what information to consume or ignore, evaluating the accuracy of the information and/or the credibility of the source, and judging whether and how to react to the information (e.g., liking or sharing). We outline entry points for interventions at each stage and pinpoint the two early stages-source and information selection-as relatively neglected processes that should be addressed to further improve people's ability to contend with misinformation.

Collective Intelligence Increases Diagnostic Accuracy in a General Practice Setting.

BACKGROUND: General practitioners (GPs) work in an ill-defined environment where diagnostic errors are prevalent. Previous research indicates that aggregating independent diagnoses can improve diagnostic accuracy in a range of settings. We examined whether aggregating independent diagnoses can also improve diagnostic accuracy for GP decision making. In addition, we investigated the potential benefit of such an approach in combination with a decision support system (DSS). METHODS: We simulated virtual groups using data sets from 2 previously published studies. In study 1, 260 GPs independently diagnosed 9 patient cases in a vignette-based study. In study 2, 30 GPs independently diagnosed 12 patient actors in a patient-facing study. In both data sets, GPs provided diagnoses in a control condition and/or DSS condition(s). Each GP's diagnosis, confidence rating, and years of experience were entered into a computer simulation. Virtual groups of varying sizes (range: 3-9) were created, and different collective intelligence rules (plurality, confidence, and seniority) were applied to determine each group's final diagnosis. Diagnostic accuracy was used as the performance measure. RESULTS: Aggregating independent diagnoses by weighing them equally (i.e., the plurality rule) substantially outperformed average individual accuracy, and this effect increased with increasing group size. Selecting diagnoses based on confidence only led to marginal improvements, while selecting based on seniority reduced accuracy. Combining the plurality rule with a DSS further boosted performance. DISCUSSION: Combining independent diagnoses may substantially improve a GP's diagnostic accuracy and subsequent patient outcomes. This approach did, however, not improve accuracy in all patient cases. Therefore, future work should focus on uncovering the conditions under which collective intelligence is most beneficial in general practice. HIGHLIGHTS: We examined whether aggregating independent diagnoses of GPs can improve diagnostic accuracy.Using data sets of 2 previously published studies, we composed virtual groups of GPs and combined their independent diagnoses using 3 collective intelligence rules (plurality, confidence, and seniority).Aggregating independent diagnoses by weighing them equally substantially outperformed average individual GP accuracy, and this effect increased with increasing group size.Combining independent diagnoses may substantially improve GP's diagnostic accuracy and subsequent patient outcomes.

Toolbox of individual-level interventions against online misinformation.

The spread of misinformation through media and social networks threatens many aspects of society, including public health and the state of democracies. One approach to mitigating the effect of misinformation focuses on individual-level interventions, equipping policymakers and the public with essential tools to curb the spread and influence of falsehoods. Here we introduce a toolbox of individual-level interventions for reducing harm from online misinformation. Comprising an up-to-date account of interventions featured in 81 scientific papers from across the globe, the toolbox provides both a conceptual overview of nine main types of interventions, including their target, scope and examples, and a summary of the empirical evidence supporting the interventions, including the methods and experimental paradigms used to test them. The nine types of interventions covered are accuracy prompts, debunking and rebuttals, friction, inoculation, lateral reading and verification strategies, media-literacy tips, social norms, source-credibility labels, and warning and fact-checking labels.

Blinding to Circumvent Human Biases: Deliberate Ignorance in Humans, Institutions, and Machines.

Inequalities and injustices are thorny issues in liberal societies, manifesting in forms such as the gender-pay gap; sentencing discrepancies among Black, Hispanic, and White defendants; and unequal medical-resource distribution across ethnicities. One cause of these inequalities is implicit social bias-unconsciously formed associations between social groups and attributions such as "nurturing," "lazy," or "uneducated." One strategy to counteract implicit and explicit human biases is delegating crucial decisions, such as how to allocate benefits, resources, or opportunities, to algorithms. Algorithms, however, are not necessarily impartial and objective. Although they can detect and mitigate human biases, they can also perpetuate and even amplify existing inequalities and injustices. We explore how a philosophical thought experiment, Rawls's "veil of ignorance," and a psychological phenomenon, deliberate ignorance, can help shield individuals, institutions, and algorithms from biases. We discuss the benefits and drawbacks of methods for shielding human and artificial decision makers from potentially biasing information. We then broaden our discussion beyond the issues of bias and fairness and turn to a research agenda aimed at improving human judgment accuracy with the assistance of algorithms that conceal information that has the potential to undermine performance. Finally, we propose interdisciplinary research questions.

How experts' own inconsistency relates to their confidence and between-expert disagreement.

People routinely rely on experts' advice to guide their decisions. However, experts are known to make inconsistent judgments when judging the same case twice. Previous research on expert inconsistency has largely focused on individual or situational factors; here we focus directly on the cases themselves. First, using a theoretical model, we study how within-expert inconsistency and confidence are related to how strongly experts agree on a case. Second, we empirically test the model's predictions in two real-world datasets with a diagnostic ground truth from follow-up research: diagnosticians rating the same mammograms or images of the lower spine twice. Our modeling and empirical analyses converge on the same novel results: The more experts disagree in their initial decisions about a case (i.e., as consensus decreases), the less confident individual experts are in their initial decision-despite not knowing the level of consensus-and the more likely they are to judge that same case differently when facing it again months later, regardless of whether the expert consensus is correct. Our results suggest the following advice when faced with two conflicting decisions from a single expert: In the absence of more predictive cues, choose the more confident decision.

Time pressure reduces misinformation discrimination ability but does not alter response bias.

Many parts of our social lives are speeding up, a process known as social acceleration. How social acceleration impacts people's ability to judge the veracity of online news, and ultimately the spread of misinformation, is largely unknown. We examined the effects of accelerated online dynamics, operationalised as time pressure, on online misinformation evaluation. Participants judged the veracity of true and false news headlines with or without time pressure. We used signal detection theory to disentangle the effects of time pressure on discrimination ability and response bias, as well as on four key determinants of misinformation susceptibility: analytical thinking, ideological congruency, motivated reflection, and familiarity. Time pressure reduced participants' ability to accurately distinguish true from false news (discrimination ability) but did not alter their tendency to classify an item as true or false (response bias). Key drivers of misinformation susceptibility, such as ideological congruency and familiarity, remained influential under time pressure. Our results highlight the dangers of social acceleration online: People are less able to accurately judge the veracity of news online, while prominent drivers of misinformation susceptibility remain present. Interventions aimed at increasing deliberation may thus be fruitful avenues to combat online misinformation.

Boosting people's ability to detect microtargeted advertising.

Online platforms' data give advertisers the ability to "microtarget" recipients' personal vulnerabilities by tailoring different messages for the same thing, such as a product or political candidate. One possible response is to raise awareness for and resilience against such manipulative strategies through psychological inoculation. Two online experiments (total [Formula: see text]) demonstrated that a short, simple intervention prompting participants to reflect on an attribute of their own personality-by completing a short personality questionnaire-boosted their ability to accurately identify ads that were targeted at them by up to 26 percentage points. Accuracy increased even without personalized feedback, but merely providing a description of the targeted personality dimension did not improve accuracy. We argue that such a "boosting approach," which here aims to improve people's competence to detect manipulative strategies themselves, should be part of a policy mix aiming to increase platforms' transparency and user autonomy.

Pooling decisions decreases variation in response bias and accuracy.

Decision makers in contexts as diverse as medical, judicial, and political decision making are known to differ substantially in response bias and accuracy, and these differences are a major factor undermining the reliability and fairness of the respective decision systems. Using theoretical modeling and empirical testing across five domains, we show that collective systems based on pooling decisions robustly overcome this important but as of now unresolved problem of experts' heterogeneity. In breast and skin cancer diagnostics and fingerprint analysis, we find that pooling the decisions of five experts reduces the variation in sensitivity among decision makers by 52%, 54%, and 41%, respectively. Similar reductions are achieved for specificity and response bias, and in other domains. Thus, although outcomes in individual decision systems are highly variable and at the mercy of individual decision makers, collective systems based on pooling decrease this variation, thereby promoting reliability, fairness, and possibly even trust.

Psychological factors shaping public responses to COVID-19 digital contact tracing technologies in Germany.

The COVID-19 pandemic has seen one of the first large-scale uses of digital contact tracing to track a chain of infection and contain the spread of a virus. The new technology has posed challenges both for governments aiming at high and effective uptake and for citizens weighing its benefits (e.g., protecting others' health) against the potential risks (e.g., loss of data privacy). Our cross-sectional survey with repeated measures across four samples in Germany ([Formula: see text]) focused on psychological factors contributing to the public adoption of digital contact tracing. We found that public acceptance of privacy-encroaching measures (e.g., granting the government emergency access to people's medical records or location tracking data) decreased over the course of the pandemic. Intentions to use contact tracing apps-hypothetical ones or the Corona-Warn-App launched in Germany in June 2020-were high. Users and non-users of the Corona-Warn-App differed in their assessment of its risks and benefits, in their knowledge of the underlying technology, and in their reasons to download or not to download the app. Trust in the app's perceived security and belief in its effectiveness emerged as psychological factors playing a key role in its adoption. We incorporate our findings into a behavioral framework for digital contact tracing and provide policy recommendations.

Emergency department patients with weakness or fatigue: Can physicians predict their outcomes at the front door? A prospective observational study.

BACKGROUND: Generalized weakness and fatigue are underexplored symptoms in emergency medicine. Triage tools often underestimate patients presenting to the emergency department (ED) with these nonspecific symptoms (Nemec et al., 2010). At the same time, physicians' disease severity rating (DSR) on a scale from 0 (not sick at all) to 10 (extremely sick) predicts key outcomes in ED patients (Beglinger et al., 2015; Rohacek et al., 2015). Our goals were (1) to characterize ED patients with weakness and/or fatigue (W|F); to explore (2) to what extent physicians' DSR at triage can predict five key outcomes in ED patients with W|F; (3) how well DSR performs relative to two commonly used benchmark methods, the Emergency Severity Index (ESI) and the Charlson Comorbidity Index (CCI); (4) to what extent DSR provides predictive information beyond ESI, CCI, or their linear combination, i.e., whether ESI and CCI should be used alone or in combination with DSR; and (5) to what extent ESI, CCI, or their linear combination provide predictive information beyond DSR alone, i.e., whether DSR should be used alone or in combination with ESI and / or CCI. METHODS: Prospective observational study between 2013-2015 (analysis in 2018-2020, study team blinded to hypothesis) conducted at a single center. We study an all-comer cohort of 3,960 patients (48% female patients, median age = 51 years, 94% completed 1-year follow-up). We looked at two primary outcomes (acute morbidity (Bingisser et al., 2017; Weigel et al., 2017) and all-cause 1- year mortality) and three secondary outcomes (in-hospital mortality, hospitalization and transfer to ICU). We assessed the predictive power (i.e., resolution, measured as the Area under the ROC Curve, AUC) of the scores and, using logistic regression, their linear combinations. FINDINGS: Compared to patients without W|F (n = 3,227), patients with W|F (n = 733) showed higher prevalences for all five outcomes, reported more symptoms across both genders, and received higher DSRs (median = 4; interquartile range (IQR) = 3-6 vs. median = 3; IQR = 2-5). DSR predicted all five outcomes well above chance (i.e., AUCs > ~0.70), similarly well for both patients with and without W|F, and as good as or better than ESI and CCI in patients with and without W|F (except for 1-year mortality where CCI performs better). For acute morbidity, hospitalization, and transfer to ICU there is clear evidence that adding DSR to ESI and/or CCI improves predictions for both patient groups; for 1-year mortality and in-hospital mortality this holds for most, but not all comparisons. Adding ESI and/or CCI to DSR generally did not improve performance or even decreased it. CONCLUSIONS: The use of physicians' disease severity rating has never been investigated in patients with generalized weakness and fatigue. We show that physicians' prediction of acute morbidity, mortality, hospitalization, and transfer to ICU through their DSR is also accurate in these patients. Across all patients, DSR is less predictive of acute morbidity for female than male patients, however. Future research should investigate how emergency physicians judge their patients' clinical state at triage and how this can be improved and used in simple decision aids.

The wisdom of many in one mind: improving individual judgments with dialectical bootstrapping.

The "wisdom of crowds" in making judgments about the future or other unknown events is well established. The average quantitative estimate of a group of individuals is consistently more accurate than the typical estimate, and is sometimes even the best estimate. Although individuals' estimates may be riddled with errors, averaging them boosts accuracy because both systematic and random errors tend to cancel out across individuals. We propose exploiting the power of averaging to improve estimates generated by a single person by using an approach we call dialectical bootstrapping. Specifically, it should be possible to reduce a person's error by averaging his or her first estimate with a second one that harks back to somewhat different knowledge. We derive conditions under which dialectical bootstrapping fosters accuracy and provide an empirical demonstration that its benefits go beyond reliability gains. A single mind can thus simulate the wisdom of many.

Fluency heuristic: a model of how the mind exploits a by-product of information retrieval.

Boundedly rational heuristics for inference can be surprisingly accurate and frugal for several reasons. They can exploit environmental structures, co-opt complex capacities, and elude effortful search by exploiting information that automatically arrives on the mental stage. The fluency heuristic is a prime example of a heuristic that makes the most of an automatic by-product of retrieval from memory, namely, retrieval fluency. In 4 experiments, the authors show that retrieval fluency can be a proxy for real-world quantities, that people can discriminate between two objects' retrieval fluencies, and that people's inferences are in line with the fluency heuristic (in particular fast inferences) and with experimentally manipulated fluency. The authors conclude that the fluency heuristic may be one tool in the mind's repertoire of strategies that artfully probes memory for encapsulated frequency information that can veridically reflect statistical regularities in the world.

Deciding on behalf of others: a population survey on procedural preferences for surrogate decision-making.

OBJECTIVES: To assess people's procedural preferences for making medical surrogate decisions, from the perspectives of both a potential surrogate and an incapacitated patient. DESIGN: Computer-assisted telephone interviews. Respondents were randomly assigned either the role of an incapacitated patient or that of a potential surrogate for an incapacitated family member. They were asked to rate six approaches to making a surrogate decision: patient-designated surrogate, discussion among family members, majority vote of family members' individual judgements, legally assigned surrogate, population-based treatment indicator and delegating the decision to a physician. SETTING: Germany and German-speaking and French-speaking parts of Switzerland. PARTICIPANTS: 2010 respondents were quota sampled from a panel (representative for the German and German-speaking and French-speaking Swiss populations, respectively, in terms of age, sex and regions). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Endorsement of each approach (rated on a scale from 1 to 10). Degree to which preferences overlap between the perspective of potential surrogates and potential patients. RESULTS: Respondents' endorsement of the six different approaches varied markedly (from Mdn=9.3 to Mdn=2.6). Yet the preferences of respondents taking the perspective of incapacitated patients corresponded closely with those of respondents taking the perspective of a potential surrogate (absolute differences ranging from 0.1 to 1.3). The preferred approaches were a patient-designated surrogate (Mdn=9.3) and all family members making a collective decision by means of group discussion (Mdn=9.3). The two least-preferred approaches were relying on a statistical prediction rule (Mdn=3.0) and delegating the decision to a physician (Mdn=2.6). CONCLUSIONS: Although respondents taking the perspective of an incapacitated patient preferred a patient-designated surrogate, few people have designated such a surrogate in practice. Policy-makers may thus consider implementing active choice, that is, identifying institutional settings in which many people can be reached (eg, when obtaining a driver's licence) and requesting them to complete advance directives and to designate a specific surrogate. Moreover, potential patients and surrogates alike highly valued shared surrogate decisions among family members. Policy-makers may consider acknowledging this possibility explicitly in future legislation, and caregivers and physicians may consider promoting shared surrogate decisions in practice.

Publisher Correction: Social learning strategies for matters of taste.

The version of the Supplementary Information file that was originally published with this Article was not the latest version provided by the authors. In the captions of Supplementary Figs. 2 and 8, the median standard error values were reported to be 0.0028 in both cases; instead, in both instances, the values should have been 0.0015. These have now been updated and the Supplementary Information file replaced.